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# REGENERATING URBAN NEIGHBOURHOODS IN EUROPE

Eight case Studies in six European Countries



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# Introduction: Urban Neighbourhood Regeneration in Europe

*Céline Widmer and Daniel Kübler*

National policy programmes aimed at neighbourhood regeneration and renewal have been high on the agenda in many European countries since the early 1990s, most prominently in France (Politique de la ville), Britain (New deal for communities), and Germany (Programm Soziale Stadt), but also in smaller countries such as the Netherlands (Grotestedenbeleid). They all draw on an area based and cross-sectoral approach to urban problems, seeking to combine physical, economic and community interventions in order to tackle decay, deprivation and social exclusion in a comprehensive and encompassing way.

As such an approach had been undertaken in various countries, neighbourhood regeneration strategies also drew increasing scholarly interest. However, the overwhelming majority of the existing studies on neighbourhood regeneration is limited to single cities or provides comparisons between cities within a single national context. Systematic cross-national comparison is rare - a notable exception is van Gent et al.'s (2009) study of neighbourhood regeneration in four different national contexts (Britain, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden). The project "Regenerating urban neighbourhoods" (RUN), initiated by Prof. Clarence Stone (University of Maryland) in 2006, seeks to explore and understand cross-national variation in place-based policy response to neighbourhood distress in Europe and North America. The project brought together European and American scholars in a networked effort to investigate differences and similarities in patterns of policy intervention in distressed urban neighbourhoods across a broad range of countries. The aim of the project is a better understanding of policy intervention that involves sub-city residential areas experiencing distress. It is not concerned with explaining the underlying causes of distressed neighbourhoods or with evaluating the impact of policy initiatives, but with answering the questions of how and why policy choices were made and acted upon. In line with historical institutionalism (Steinmo et al., 1992), it is assumed that urban policy has institutional aspects, both intergovernmental and spatial, that are distinct (Brenner, 2004).

The present working paper brings together eight case study reports on neighbourhood regeneration strategies in 17 deprived urban neighbourhoods, located in eight cities within six European countries (see Table 1 below).

Table 1: Case studies of neighbourhood regeneration strategies

Country	City	Neighbourhoods
Britain	Manchester	Beswick, Hulme
	Leicester	Braunstone, St. Matthews and St. Marks
Czech Republic	Prague	South City, Zizkov
France	Lille	Lille sud, Bois Blancs
	Paris	Porte de Clignancourt-Porte Montmartre, Portes du sud
Germany	Berlin	Kotbusser Tor, Marzahn-Nord
Netherlands	Rotterdam	Pendrecht, Tarwewijk, Afrikaanderwijk
Switzerland	Zurich	Schwamendingen, Langstrasse
<i>Total: 6 Countries</i>	<i>Total: 8 Cities</i>	<i>Total: 17 Neighbourhoods</i>

The case studies explore neighbourhood regeneration strategies in eight large European cities: Berlin, Lille, Leicester, Manchester, Paris, Prague, Rotterdam, and Zurich. The case studies were conducted between 2006 and 2010 by national research teams on the basis of a common research protocol elaborated in the framework of the broader RUN research project in 2006 and further developed during the research process (see the model in the appendix). The common goal is to understand the politics of neighbourhood-based initiatives for the regeneration of urban areas. All eight case studies focus on how and why certain policy choices were made, why a particular neighbourhood approach has been selected over other possible interventions, how neighbourhood working does fit with other aspects of city politics and governance, what mechanisms have been put in place, and how neighbourhood interventions can be explained and interpreted. While all the city-teams collected original empirical data - mainly via documentary analysis and indepth interviews - to respond to these questions, the project guidelines were formulated open enough to allow case-oriented research strategies. Therefore, the structure of the case study presentations may differ quite substantially. But although the eight case studies did not follow exactly the same structure, they basically discuss the following common topics:

- Neighbourhood distress as a topic of concern
- Legacies of earlier neighbourhood policy
- The citywide dimensions of socio-spatial inequality
- Portrait of neighbourhoods selected for detailed study
- Policy interventions in neighbourhoods chosen: Agenda standing, strategy, tools, and content
- The local structure of politics and government
- Resource availability
- Institutional structure of intergovernmental supports
- Mapping of potential major players
- Understanding of the problem
- Explaining and interpreting neighbourhood intervention

In 2010, the authors of the eight European case studies and the project convenor, Prof. Clarence Stone, met in Zurich to discuss insights from the empirical work and to identify and discuss differences and similarities across the single cases, as well as emerging overarching themes. More precisely, the following overarching themes have been identified as Examples of such themes that emerged and could be investigated further in a cross-national perspective:

1. *The convergence towards area-based policies in neighbourhood regeneration.* The European case studies show a noticeable coincidence in the evolution of area-based regeneration policies. In several countries and cities, at the end of the 1990s, governments introduced, or set a strong focus on, neighbourhood regeneration policies (either at the national or at the local level): E.g. in German, English, Swiss, and Dutch cities, so-called integral policies had then a clearly territory-based focus, and were supposed to overcome merely physical interventions and sectorisation. In French cities, area-based regeneration policies have been introduced thirty years ago but neighbourhood interventions changed their focus with the neoliberal turn in European countries. In Prague, there are virtually no neighbourhood regeneration policies that would be territorially targeted and cross-sectoral as opposed to all other cities under scrutiny. Whereas in France an ongoing discussion and critique of place-oriented (in contrast to people-oriented) policies takes place, such policies in the German speaking countries hardly seem to be critically analysed.
2. *From physical to more comprehensive neighbourhood regeneration strategies: variations in policy interventions.* The case studies conducted in eight large European cities reveal a broad range of different interventions related to distressed neighbourhoods. However, it seems that in almost every city, neighbourhood regeneration policy developed from physical interventions to more comprehensive policies. In this new view, intervention strategies to counteract problems in distressed neighbourhoods intend to cover more than one policy at the same time and seek to go beyond merely physical interventions. Other variations however can be observed: E.g. image improvement strategies emerged as a new instrument for distressed neighbourhoods. And by the end of the 1990s and later on, some cities called for repressive and crime prevention policies instead of inequality and poverty reduction strategies, i.e., there was a shift towards safety policies. A more specific issue concerning variation in neighbourhood regeneration strategies is the role of ‘social-mixing’ policies. The social mixing approach can be found in almost all case studies, but with different implementations.
3. *Evolution and role of community engagement.* All the case studies presented in this working paper mention the evolution of community based approaches or at least a strong discourse of citizens’ participation. From ‘round table’ discussions to the involvement of inhabitants in the development of a community hammam or the support of grassroots movements, different forms of community engagement are taken into account in regeneration strategies. Therefore, participation can be considered as a major tool in neighbourhood regeneration policy since the end of the 1990s. The case studies interpret these tools differently. E.g. citizens’ participation is described as a crucial precondition for the emergence of stable community life (Berlin). Others see community engagement – among other things – as a strategic focus on efficiency improvement in service delivery (Manchester).
4. *Multi-level governance: role of the central government and the local government.* Although neighbourhood regeneration in European cities is primarily conducted by the public sector, different actors on different scales are involved as major players. In most of the countries covered by the case studies at hand, neighbourhood regeneration was initiated at the national scale. National programmes such as the ‘New Deal for Communities’ in England, the ‘Socially Integrative City Programme’ in Germany or ‘politique de la ville’ in France, are main promoters and also funding sources for area-based policy interventions in distressed neighbourhoods. In contrast, neighbourhood

regeneration has only very recently become a topic in Switzerland for the national government. The case studies show interactions, conflicts and cooperation between different levels of government (state/local/community/district) when it comes to neighbourhood regeneration strategies. Therefore, they reveal interesting multi-level aspects of neighbourhood governance.

These preliminary thoughts show that the insights brought together in these eight case studies uncovers a variety of interesting insights for a more general, cross-national perspective on issues related to neighbourhood regeneration strategies.

This working paper presents updated versions of all eight case study reports discussed in the Zurich meeting in 2010. The aim of this working paper is to make the comprehensive, in-depth research work on neighbourhood regeneration in eight European cities available to a wider audience, so to enable further analyses. The structure of the working paper arranges the case studies of the eight cities Berlin, Lille, Leicester, Manchester, Paris, Prague, Rotterdam, and Zurich in an alphabetical order.

The editors would like to thank the authors of the case studies to enable the publication of this working paper and for their willingness to support the publication process. Last but not least, a very special thank you goes to Su Yun Woo for editing all the case studies.



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# Berlin Progress Report

*Melanie Walter-Rogg*

## 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Fundamental socioeconomic change has aggravated a new type of social and (urban) spatial inequality in German cities in the last decades. One of the symptoms is the emergence of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Districts with particular development needs are usually beset by a combination of problems. Given the complex interaction between these problems they no longer seem amenable to the traditional sectorial political and administrative solutions.

The idea of social sustainability has fundamentally redefined city planning since the mid-1990s. In 1996, the ARGEBAU Construction Ministers' Conference (a consortium of the Construction Ministries of the 16 German states) launched the nationwide "Socially Integrative City" initiative. This initiative also generated the federal/state programme "**Districts with Special Development Needs – the Socially Integrative City**" in 1999 which took a new approach in developing and promoting integrated problem-solving strategies in German cities. It was based on the coalition pact between Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Alliance 90/The Greens.

Not only "classical" investment project funding is envisaged but also self-help, private initiative, and collaboration by the people concerned, thus stimulating and supporting essential local development resources. Neighbourhood management is a crucial tool in implementing this new programme.

North Rhine-Westphalia was the first state in Germany to open an agency for Neighbourhood Management (**Quartiersmanagement**) as part of this initiative, followed by similar projects in Hamburg, Hessen, Bremen, and Berlin. The federal/state "**Socially Integrative City**" programme started in 1999 with 161 neighbourhoods in 124 German cities and municipalities. By 2009, the programme had provided financial support to 571 neighbourhoods in around 355 cities and municipalities.

The "Socially Integrative City programme" of Berlin is coordinated by the Department of Urban Development of the Senate of Berlin. Working together with the affected boroughs of Berlin, the Senate supports 34 socially unstable areas of Berlin by providing neighbourhood management, intervention and prevention programmes.

The "Socially Integrative City programme" is funded by state, federal and European (European Funds for **RE**gional Development) resources.

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<sup>1</sup> This case study report includes information as per September 2010.

The programme fosters participation and cooperation and represents a new integrative political approach to urban district development. All the disadvantaged districts require special development and have indicated different scopes/forms of intervention. Nevertheless, the recommended selection procedure was useful to select two of them as highlighted below:

- 1) Helping people to help themselves
- 2) Creating self-reliant civic organisations and stable neighbourhood social networks to enable the neighbourhoods to function as independent communities again (Argebau 2000: 4ff).

The city of Berlin is a good example of different strategies of neighbourhood management in the frame of the Socially Integrative City.

The programme provides four categories of support depending on local needs:

- Strong intervention
- Middle intervention
- Prevention
- Long-term sustainability

These four categories of support are translated into the following programmes and initiatives to implement strategies of neighbourhood management.

Category 1: Neighbourhood Management (15 neighbourhoods)

Category 2: Locality Management (5 neighbourhoods)

Category 3: Locality Management (10 neighbourhoods)

Category 4: From Neighbourhood Management to local resident responsibility (3 neighbourhoods)

**Intervention** (both strong and middle forms) includes methods previously tested in the Neighbourhood Management programme (category 1) as well as new district management methods (category 2). Programmes in these categories are carried out mainly in areas of the city with high percentages of unemployed people and social aid recipients as well as highly mobile and declining populations using the instruments employed up to now within the Neighbourhood Management programme.

The district management programme for **prevention** and networking (category 3) is designed to create measures that put a stop to further negative developments. It includes areas with a large percentage of unemployed persons, usually combined with severely declining populations in specific social strata (above-average selective mobility).

**Achieving long-term sustainability** means moving the structures created through neighbourhood management to the local level and anchoring them in resident-run processes and structures (category 4) following successful intervention through the Neighbourhood Management programme. The practical work of neighbourhood management should, in a transitional period, be handed over to local residents.

The following intervention tools have been utilised:

- Guidance services
- Outreach
- Streetwork
- Networking and mediation between individual players
- Public and private organisations
- Organisation of meetings, festivals, events and campaigns
- Site and facility inspection tours
- Publications and briefings
- Neighbourhood public relations through multilingual newspapers, posters, flyers, brochures, websites
- Use of logos and slogans

We decided to choose the neighbourhood **Kottbusser Tor** in the town-centre district of Kreuzberg and **Marzahn-NordWest** in the district of Marzahn on the outskirts.

Both are members of the Socially Integrative City programme since the beginning in 1999 and both are in category of strong intervention strategies.

Whereas in the **Kottbusser Tor** project the main focus is on **ethnic integration** and **public order issues** like drug policy or prostitution, the **Marzahn-NordWest** neighbourhood deals above all with issues of **housing** and **physical renewal**.

#### **Funds provided for the Berlin Neighbourhood Management programme**

	<b>1999–2005</b>	<b>2007-2013</b>
City of Berlin	53 million €	68 million €
Federal Government	21 million €	29 million €
European Union (EFRE)	49 million €	54 million €
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>123 million €</b>	<b>151 million €</b>

For Berlin's Neighbourhood Management areas, funding is provided not only through the Socially Integrative City programme but also through "Local Capital for Social Purposes" (LOS).

This nationwide programme allocates funds to so-called "microprojects" active at the local level in fostering the participation of all social groups in the development of their neighbourhoods and especially in promoting these groups' integration into the local labour market.

## 2 Policy Intervention as the Dependent Variable

### 2.1 Clarification – public policy intervention

The aim of the **Socially Integrative City** programme was to counteract the widening socio-spatial rifts in the cities. The programme seeks to foster participation and cooperation and represents a new integrative political approach to urban district development. Neighbourhood Management with respect to public policy intervention is devised by the German *Länder*. The integrative approach of the **Socially Integrative City** is reflected in the fact that measures and projects are realised in all policy areas and often cover more than one policy area at the same time. Realisation of measures and projects in substantive activity areas requires the establishment of effective coordination and efficient management of multilateral participation in instrumental strategic fields of activity. Neighbourhood or district management is one important tool of the **Socially Integrative City** which differs very much from previous handling of problems caused by poverty and their spatial concentration in certain neighbourhoods (Alisch 1998: 12ff). This new form of management is based on cooperation and consensus between legislative and executive branches, the market, the third sector and the society. The following key actors of neighbourhood management and their interests have been defined in the report of the German Institute of Urban Affairs (2003):

#### 2.1.1 Supra-local politics and administration

Implementation of the complex and ambitious **Socially Integrative City** programme required a great deal of experience sharing, knowledge transfer, cooperation and PR work. That is why the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs (BMVBS), represented by the Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (BBR), commissioned the German Institute of Urban Affairs (Difu) to support the programme for the initial implementation phase (autumn 1999 to autumn 2003). Central elements included setting up a nationwide network, providing onsite programme support in the 16 **Socially Integrative City** pilot districts and designing a programme evaluation system.

#### 2.1.2 Local politics

The implementation of **Socially Integrative City** involved confronting municipal politicians with new decision-making structures alongside the traditional control functions mandated to elected officials. Local civil servants and the population in general interpret this trend as an increase in power. Legislators, however, see it as a loss of influence. Other reasons exist for this loss of power. It could be the restricted scope for action due to the massive municipal funding problems, reduced influence through outsourcing and privatisation, local government modernisation and simultaneous stricter budgeting. The division of tasks and responsibilities between government (formulating goals and monitoring their realisation) and administration (operationalisation of goals and implementation) as expressed in the **New Public Management** seems to underscore the imbalance which politicians fear. Moreover, a widening gulf is appearing between administrative professionalisation and the comparatively inadequate qualifications of many unpaid politicians.

### 2.1.3 Local administration

Municipal authorities play two key roles in the **Socially Integrative City** implementation. They have the "traditional" task of meeting formal requirements and establishing the necessary conditions for programme participation (e.g. district selection, coordination of integrated action plan formulation, resource management and budgeting, cost auditing). However, a new form of management, based on cooperation and consensus between various governmental, business or non-profit actors as well as neighbourhood residents is also called for. This dual role, with which many authorities have to juggle, generates pressure to act. They are torn between having to oversee formal programme implementation in their function as "traditional" government authorities, and at the same time wanting to test the experimental and progressive district-based cooperation approaches with other non-governmental players as required by the **Socially Integrative City** programme. Despite being discouraged by rigidity and departmental self-centredness in some areas, administrators themselves call for a "shift in mentality" from scepticism to curiosity and commitment.

### 2.1.4 Neighbourhood residents

In the **Socially Integrative City** programme, the continuous integration of residents into the process of improving and developing their own neighbourhoods is seen as a crucial precondition for the emergence of stable community life. This allows them to take on responsibility and provides them with the ability to shape and define their immediate environment. Existing networks, organisations, and initiatives constitute the basis for the Neighbourhood Management programme. Together with the residents, a district commissioner works to develop strategies for counteracting the dangers of increasing anonymity in the area, establishing modes of social control, and shaping dynamic neighbourhoods. The central goal of residents' activation and participation programme is to identify population groups which had previously taken a back seat in social development processes and hence in public perception. Challenging these groups to express their views and to get involved now gives them the opportunity to channel their expertise into improving their neighbourhood. Fulfilling this role presupposes that the people are recognised in the street and taken seriously when granted the freedom to act independently and spontaneously as well as to be given a say in decision-making, e.g. in the distribution of contingency funds and district budgets.

### 2.1.5 Non-governmental organisations

Social work in Germany has long been based on the dual system of public and private providers, whose interrelationship is primarily determined by the subsidiarity principle (Enquiry Commission 2002: 192). The rich and influential traditional welfare organisations, which include the *Arbeiterwohlfahrt*, *Deutscher Caritasverband*, *Diakonisches Werk*, *Deutscher Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband*, the German Red Cross and the *Zentrale Wohlfahrtsstelle der Juden*, are loosely combined in the *Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Freien Wohlfahrtspflege*. Some other groups do not belong to the welfare associations. Welfare associations are "fixtures of the public welfare establishment" (Enquiry Commission 2002: 241).

Private organisations focus on particular groups (e.g. children, young people, senior citizens). They perform services in society and for families, sponsor projects and encourage volunteers to assume social responsibilities. They broaden the range of social services in the districts, often cooperating with the municipality in education, family welfare, addiction counselling, emergency services and youth aid centres. Private welfare organisations are important

partners of **Socially Integrative City**, as the objectives and requirements coincide with those of the programme. "Together with citizens (voluntary workers from churches, self-help groups and associations, etc.), they form a major lobby for these districts and lend a voice to disadvantaged population segments" (Thies 2002: 99). However, Thies claims that the "social workers" have "not maintained a high enough profile" in implementing integrated urban district development, and that this is reflected in the "insufficient involvement of private social and youth welfare sponsors". Currently the social players' "greatest deficit" is apparently their unsatisfactory involvement in self-help and citizens' activities, "which could give them identity and local relevance" (Klug 1999). As such, clearer private sponsor adherence to non-government principles and closer consideration of individual surroundings and community life would be necessary. This involves expanding the personal emphasis to embrace spatial concerns and hence a shift "from case to field".

### **Housing industry**

Big estates comprise around half of the **Socially Integrative City** areas. This indicates that (generally) the larger housing companies – associations and cooperatives – are key players in programme implementation. Housing companies also loom large in pre-war neighbourhoods and areas with buildings from various eras, but individual owners are more strongly represented here. Like *Zwischenerwerber* (interim owners who purchase to rent or resell) on large estates, they are reluctant to become involved in the programme implementation and therefore rarely feature in this context.

However, housing company participation in programme implementation processes still leaves much to be desired. Many enterprises have been pioneers in improving large estates for some time. They have committed themselves to implementing innovative projects such as service intensification, new forms of sheltered accommodation, neighbourhood support organisation, bolstering of tenant involvement and establishment of management offices. These efforts enabled them to realise that socially oriented efforts are compatible with their own business objectives of rentability. Others, however, have reservations about the programme. They are hidebound by intrasectoral competition, despite the fact that in the large new residential neighbourhoods particularly, the goal is to work together to develop and implement mutual marketing, modernisation and stabilisation strategies.

### **Traders**

Tradespeople in disadvantaged urban areas have the difficult task of securing their livelihood in the face of falling purchasing power and demand, as well as a dubious local image so that they can help supply the neighbourhood and offer jobs. The number of vacant shops and other premises resulting from population depletion, reduced purchasing power, and narrower business opportunities further curbs the attractiveness of the neighbourhoods. Traders in the **Socially Integrative City** programme areas are chiefly very small retailers, repairers and manufacturers, and predominantly home service providers (areas with a high migrant population have many non-native businesses) – generally a group "which chambers, banks and municipal politicians hold in low esteem – which therefore have no lobby" (Becker 2002).



## Schools

Schools are increasingly proving to be key institutions in the **Socially Integrative City** areas. They are called upon to assume a wide range of additional responsibilities. They must compensate for the failure of many parents to do the job of educating their children due to the hardships they face. Schools are also centres for integrating German and foreign children. Besides imparting knowledge, today's schools must also teach and train social, communication and everyday practical skills. As many **Socially Integrative City** districts have above-average numbers of foreign pupils, intercultural education is particularly important.

## Associations

As legally recognised purpose-oriented social groups, associations remain the "classic" and "dominant form of civic involvement". In the new *Länder* the degree of organisation is slightly less. In the former GDR, associations with autonomous interests were not tolerated. The foundation of clubs therefore started booming in 1990 (Enquiry Commission 2002: 69). Neighbourhoods have a wide range of associations enhancing social and cultural life. They provide leisure, recreation, culture, education and include civic and neighbourhood groups. Ethnic associations are "key ports of call" for migrant households. They serve as places of orientation for sharing practical knowledge about the host society and help to foster communication and provide support as well. Sports clubs in particular are often a place where German and foreign children and young people can mingle without the barrier of linguistic skills since other (athletic) skills are required and valued.

In recent years, the potential of the association as a legal body for organising networks and self-help groups has been (re)discovered, especially in the context of **Socially Integrative City**. Associations are founded specifically to assume key functions during programme implementation. The association serves as a pillar for **Socially Integrative City** projects and measures, whether as a legal framework and organiser of local neighbourhood management and district forums, as an umbrella organisation, as a district budget administrator in consultation with local government, as a sponsor of neighbourhood circles and exchanges, or as an "association of associations" which sponsors local district management.


The new Neighbourhood Management programme uses the resources and abilities of its "strong partners" in the area. These include first and foremost housing companies, neighbourhood centres, schools and local businesses, and tradespeople. Working together promotes the emergence of important synergies that in turn improve overall life opportunities in the districts. Integration, education, and work are the most important focal points of the new programme. Supporting measures will include construction work, which can significantly improve disadvantaged areas.

## 2.2 Clarification – neighbourhood selection

Contrary to the matrix on our project webpage where the analysis supposedly pertains to one neighbourhood in Berlin and one in Munich, the focus in this paper is now with respect to the RUN protocol on two neighbourhoods in Berlin, the capital of Germany. Nowadays, 33 neighbourhoods in Berlin participate in the **Socially Integrative City** project. The programme is coordinated by the Department of Urban Development of the Senate of Berlin. Working together with the affected boroughs, the Senate supports these socially unstable areas of Berlin by providing neighbourhood management, intervention and prevention programmes. The **Socially Integrative City** programme is funded by state, federal and European resources (EFRE: European Funds for Regional Development).

All the disadvantaged districts require special development and have indicated different scopes of intervention. Nevertheless, the recommended selection procedure was useful to select two of them. Therefore, we decided to choose the neighbourhood Kottbusser Tor in the town-centre district of Kreuzberg and Marzahn-Nord in the district of Marzahn on the outskirts. Both are member of the **Socially Integrative City** programme since the beginning in 1999. Whereas in the Kottbusser Tor project the main focus is on ethnic integration and public order issues like drug policy or prostitution the Marzahn-Nord neighbourhood needs above all housing and physical renewal.

Figure 1: Areas of Neighbourhood Management (NM) in Berlin, 2007



Source: [www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/wohnen/quartiersmanagement/download/qm\\_gebiete\\_karte01\\_07.pdf](http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/wohnen/quartiersmanagement/download/qm_gebiete_karte01_07.pdf)

Table 1: Structural data of Berlin, the districts of Kreuzberg and Marzahn and the neighbourhoods Kottbusser Tor and Marzahn Nord, 2000

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Berlin</b>	<b>Kreuzberg</b>	<b>Kottbusser Tor</b>	<b>Marzahn</b>	<b>Marzahn Nord</b>
Size in ha	89,169	1,038	approx. 15	850	250,4
Population (2000)	3,382,169	145,645	4,354	142,314	25,700
Population decline (1995–2000)	-2.6 %	-5.1 %	no decline	-20.3 %	-23.0 %
Average household size (2000)	1.9 pers.	1.9 pers.	2.8 pers.	2.2 pers.	2.1 pers.
Number of dwellings (2000)	1,862,766	75,334	1,576	70,000	4,265
Vacant dwelling units (2000)	approx. 8 %	13.7 %	3.2 %	11.0 %	21.0 %
Housing benefit recipients (2000)	10.6 %	19.3 %	-	12.4 %	-
Level of poverty (share of population in private households)	12.8 %	26.4 %	-	10.2 %	-
Unemployment rate (2000)	18.4 %	26.2 %	23.1 %	19.5 %	16.6 %
Social assistance recipients (2000)	7.9 %	17.8 %	42.2 %	6.2 %	11.2 %
Foreign population (2000)	13.1 %	33.0 %	55.2 %	3.7 %	3.9 %
Population under 18 (2000)	17.0 %	19.8 %	33.2 %	-	25.8 %
Population under 45 (2000)	-	-	-	-	74.2 %
Population 65 and older (2000)	14.2 %	8.1 %	6.8 %	6.0 %	6.3 %

Notes: Since January 2001 the city of Berlin has a new district arrangement. The former 23 districts were reduced to 12, mostly by amalgamation of two neighbouring districts. The two districts of the new one Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg were part of East and West Berlin before the German unification.

Sources: [www.sozialestadt.de/en/veroeffentlichungen/zwischenbilanz/2-berlin-english.shtm](http://www.sozialestadt.de/en/veroeffentlichungen/zwischenbilanz/2-berlin-english.shtm); [www.quartiersmanagement.de](http://www.quartiersmanagement.de); [www.quartiersagentur.de/gebiet/if-gebiet.html](http://www.quartiersagentur.de/gebiet/if-gebiet.html); [www.statistik-berlin.de](http://www.statistik-berlin.de); [www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/wohnen/wohnungsmarktbericht/pdf/womarktbericht.pdf](http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/wohnen/wohnungsmarktbericht/pdf/womarktbericht.pdf); [www.quartiersmanagement-berlin.de/dokumentation/evaluation/](http://www.quartiersmanagement-berlin.de/dokumentation/evaluation/); [www.stadtumbau-berlin.de/Marzahn-Hellersdorf.254.0.html](http://www.stadtumbau-berlin.de/Marzahn-Hellersdorf.254.0.html)

### 2.3 Steps taken so far

At this stage, we have done a literature and document review. The federal-*Land* programme, **Socially Integrative City**, has produced a lot of documents and evaluations of the new neighbourhood management processes since 1999. Scholars have also accompanied this programme at length (see Schader-Stiftung 2001; Greiffenhagen/Neller 2005).

The German Institute of Urban Affairs (Difu) has conducted a national level evaluation of the Neighbourhood Management work carried out hitherto within the “**Socially Integrative City**” programme. In December 2004, after the first four years of the “**Socially Integrative City**” programme, a nationwide interim evaluation conducted on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Transport, Building and Housing was published as well. The main programme documents are the *Guideline for Implementation of the Joint Socially Integrative City Initiative*, devised by the German *Länder*, the annual administrative agreements between the Federal and *Land* governments, and many other publications and regulations of the *Länder*.

On behalf of the Senate Department for Urban Development in Berlin, the "empirica economic and social science consultancy" evaluated the pilot phase of the Berlin Neighbourhood Management programme from 1999 to 2002. Its report covers the basic aspects and implementation of Neighbourhood Management, assessing the overall process and its outcomes in the individual areas. One of the findings of this evaluation was that Neighbourhood Management is fundamentally very well suited to systematically improve disadvantaged areas, particularly given its focus on local residents and urban development policy. The Neighbourhood Fund and the resident juries were found to be hugely successful in activating local residents. On the basis of these recommendations, the Berlin Senate decided to extend the duration of Neighbourhood Management and further optimise the programme up to the end of 2006.

The city of Berlin is a good example of different strategies of neighbourhood management in the frame of the **Socially Integrative City**. The programme provides four categories of support depending on local needs:

A. Intervention: includes methods previously tested in the Neighbourhood Management program (category 1) as well as new district management methods (category 2). Programmes in these categories are carried out mainly in areas of the city with high percentages of unemployed people and social aid recipients as well as highly mobile and declining populations using the instruments employed up to now within the Neighbourhood Management programme.

Category 1 Neighbourhood Management (15 neighbourhoods)

Category 2 Locality Management (5 neighbourhoods)

B. Prevention: The district management programme for prevention and networking (category 3) is designed to create measures that put a stop to further negative developments. It includes areas with a large percentage of unemployed persons, usually combined with severely declining populations in specific social strata (above-average selective mobility).

Category 3 Locality Management (10 neighbourhoods)

C. Long-term sustainability: Achieving long-term sustainability means moving the structures created through Neighbourhood Management to the local level and anchoring them in resident-run processes and structures (category 4) following successful intervention through the Neighbourhood Management programme. The practical work of Neighbourhood Management should, in a transitional period, be handed over to local residents.

Category 4: From Neighbourhood Management to local resident responsibility  
(3 neighbourhoods)

The two neighbourhoods Kottbusser Tor and Marzahn Nord are both in category 1. In intervention and prevention areas, instruments of the neighbourhood management programme are used in cooperation with “strong partners” to help strengthen and stabilise at-risk districts. Efforts to achieve long-term sustainability of neighbourhood management are undertaken in those areas that have already shown strong evidence of recovery through previous participation in the Neighbourhood Management programme. In such areas, local residents and public initiatives are encouraged to work with the borough administration to establish “resident-run” programmes in which they take responsibility for their neighbourhoods.

### 3 State of research following the guidelines of the RUN protocol

#### 3.1 Dependent Variable 1: Agenda Standing

Since the end of the 1990s, neighbourhood issues have been of very high importance in Germany. The federal government has assigned high policy priority to the **Socially Integrative City** programme. In order to break down traditional administrative processes and find new modes of action, this kind of support has been indispensable. Currently 300 urban districts with special development needs in 214 cities and towns are participating in the **Socially Integrative City** programme. In Berlin, funding for all Neighbourhood Management programmes (33 in 2007) and the projects that are developed within them has been made available since 1999 through the federal-state programme. Up to 2005, the federal government’s contribution amounted to a total of 21 million Euros. Furthermore, between 2000 and 2006, 50 million Euros were provided from the Funds for Regional Development of the European Union (support measures for urban and local infrastructures) to Berlin’s Neighbourhood Management areas. 1,500 projects were approved with support from EFRE in the years 2000 to 2005. Within the framework of the Neighbourhood Management programme, the city of Berlin provides the necessary co-financing for the aforementioned programmes of the federal government and the EU. From 1999 to 2005, the Berlin share amounted to 53 million Euros.

Despite the tight fiscal situation in Berlin, support from the European Union and the federal government in 2005 made additional project funds amounting to 15 million Euros available to the Neighbourhood Management programme. The money went mainly to projects aimed at long-term improvement of the urban space and the residential living environment, at social and ethnic integration, and at fostering neighbourhood cooperation and connections. It was furthermore used to help children and young people without access to the regular educational system and labour market find training programmes and career perspectives.

### **Funds provided for the Neighbourhood Management programme in Berlin, 1999–2005:**

Berlin	53 million €
Federal government	21 million €
European Union (EFRE)	49 million €
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>123 million €</b>

For Berlin's Neighbourhood Management areas, funding is provided not only through the **Socially Integrative City** programme but also through "Local Capital for Social Purposes" (LOS). This nationwide programme allocates funds to so-called "micro projects" active at the local level aiming at fostering the participation of all social groups in the development of their neighbourhoods and especially in promoting these groups' integration into the local labour market.

Interview data are not planned due to the lack of financial resources. If these funding arguments are not sufficient, it would be possible to compare the budgets of Berlin for different local issues in 1995 and 2005.

### 3.2 Dependent Variable 2: Conceptualisation and measurement of Policy Strategy, Content, and Tools

#### 3.2.1 A. Strategies

Numerous changes have been initiated, both in internal Senate and borough planning processes in the direction of more integrated and integrative organisational forms, and also in the relationship between public administration and civil society – including the economic sphere. In order to successfully promote district development, cooperation transcending the different administrative departments is required. Building an efficient management system of coordination, cooperation, and participation is indispensable. The administration of each borough is responsible for the local steering and implementation of the programme. This includes both the steering work carried out by district commissioners in their areas, networking among all the local players involved such as the businesspeople, housing owners, clubs, and social organisations. The borough administration still holds the responsibility for developing overarching concepts for action and projects.

Tasks for the city as a whole – in other words, ministerial tasks – remain in the hands of the Senate Department for Urban Development. Decentralised tasks related to the implementation of Neighbourhood Management are the responsibility of the boroughs. The Senate Department for Urban Development continues to direct the Neighbourhood Management programme, which includes the further development of the programme strategy, coordination of the programme and promotional funds at the state level, and development of borough-wide projects such as initiatives for the integration of immigrants. Budget responsibilities also remain with the Senate Department for Urban Development since this programme also includes federal funds. The Senate Department must account to the federal government on the use of these funds, and for this reason, the funds do not go directly into the borough budgets. The same procedure applies to the management of European Structural Funds (EFRE).

With regards to the broad strategies at the city level, Berlin is mainly concentrating on the most deprived areas and people. One important tool used in territorial targeting is the monitoring process in Berlin to identify Neighbourhood Management areas. Since 1998, the

monitoring process of the **Socially Integrative City** programme has organised the continuous observation of socio-spatial developments at the local level. It has served as an instrument for examining developments up to the present and simultaneously as an early warning system for identifying specific areas requiring urgent action. The duration of the monitoring programme is extended by the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development at two-year intervals. The monitoring uses quantitative methods of data analysis, in particular cluster analysis, to identify “areas with similar development tendencies.” The results can then be used to derive concrete recommendations for using the urban development policy instruments of prevention and intervention to meet specific local needs.

The second mentioned strategy was to emphasise physical conditions or focusing on people. The **Socially Integrative City** programme includes both of these goals. Investments in the urban architectural environment should ultimately be linked with support to other areas so that districts can develop and flourish – not only architecturally, but also socially, ecologically, and economically. From the beginning of the Neighbourhood Management programme it was clear, that fundamental changes would hardly be achieved, so the focus was more on limited ameliorations in the context of the available resources. The **Socially Integrative City** programme is a comprehensive approach to improve the living conditions of the neighbourhoods, whereas the operators use tight-knit strategies with benchmarks.

### 3.2.2 B. Content: goals and substantive focus

The integrative approach of **Socially Integrative City** is reflected in the fact that measures and projects are realised in all policy areas and often cover more than one policy area at the same time. In “districts with special development needs,” social issues coincide with architectural issues, and integration problems coincide with educational problems. Realisation of measures and projects in substantive activity areas of **Socially Integrative City** demands the establishment of effective coordination and efficient management of multilateral participation in instrumental strategic fields of activity. Substantive activity areas are:

- Employment
- Qualifications and training
- Accumulation of neighbourhood assets
- Social activities and social infrastructure
- Schools and education
- Health promotion
- Transport and the environment
- Urban district culture
- Sports and recreation
- Integration of diverse social and ethnic groups
- Housing market and housing industry
- Living environment and public space
- Image improvement and public relations
- Community Living in the Districts

To expand the opportunities of people in disadvantaged areas, future measures and projects within the Neighbourhood Management programme will focus even more on integration, education, and promoting employment. As supporting measures, investments in construction can make important contributions to neighbourhood improvement in these areas. Integration and equality of opportunity are two major themes of the Neighbourhood Management programme. Different approaches and funding opportunities are designed to encourage people

from other countries to become active in working for their neighbourhoods, and to help both younger and older residents to obtain qualifications that translate into jobs on the labour market.

In the field of education, major deficits sometimes exist – especially among people with an immigration background. Those without a secondary school diploma or good German skills have significantly lower chances of finding regular employment. Promoting adult education and language learning is therefore top priority in districts with a high percentage of immigrants.

Along with the focus on education, emphasis is also placed on improving the local economy. The employment situation can be promoted, for example, by helping area businesses develop concerted advertising strategies. In December 2004, representatives of the Berlin Neighbourhood Management areas met with economic experts to develop common strategies. Cooperation with the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development and the Chamber of Industry and Commerce has been organised to promote the integration of local residents into the labour market.

Maybe additional information can help in the selection of important policies. The final evaluation report of the German Institute of Urban Affairs was accompanied by a survey of the persons in charge of the **Socially Integrative City** programme in each local neighbourhood (199 of 210 persons answered the survey in 2000/2001 and 222 in 2002). The following step will determine to what extent goals are pursued and programmes established in the sectors of the RUN protocol.

#### *Clarification—the gentrification issue*

In the view of experts, gentrification is an important tool to increase the purchasing power of disadvantaged neighbourhoods such as Berlin Kreuzberg. They state that these districts need more higher-income residents and the settlement of high-order trade if they do not want to live only from housing benefits and social assistance (Dangschat 1997: 625). The next step is a detailed description of gentrification projects in the two neighbourhoods of Berlin.

### 3.2.3 C. Tools

With the help of Neighbourhood Management in Berlin, links are created and networks built among different groups that usually have very little contact with one another: government administrations, private businesses, clubs and associations, and individual residents who are otherwise not involved in local organisations. In each of the neighbourhoods, teams were created to put the district development programme into practice. The boroughs treat these selected districts as targeted development areas, and assign to each team a district coordinator within the borough administration, as does the Senate Department for Urban Development as well. This guarantees coordinated action among the different authorities and administrative bodies involved.



In building the teams, priority was placed on involving participants with extensive knowledge and skills in the following areas:

- Management, mediation, and networking
- Education, qualification, and labour market policy programmes
- Fundraising, new financing programmes, grant applications
- Social competencies, particularly in relation to young people, people with an immigration background, and specific initiatives and projects
- Experience in small business and financial consulting


Each Neighbourhood Management team has an “onsite office”. Often borough offices or housing companies make their own infrastructural contribution by providing the office space at no cost or by covering the costs of maintenance, equipment, and materials. The onsite offices are also made available to residents for their own activities and initiatives. There are contact persons responsible for the individual activity areas of the programme in the onsite offices, in the borough offices, and in the Senate Department. At the local, borough, and state levels, steering meetings are set up to allow all the different parties to participate in regular processes of coordination and decision-making. Although a considerable investment of time and labour is involved, this is essential for the success of the undertaking. On a regular monthly basis, the Senate Department for Urban Development holds a meeting of all the neighbourhood managers, borough office coordinators, and cooperation partners from the city administration. These regular steering meetings are a forum for exchanging experiences and discussing strategies.

#### ***Clarification—engagement as a tool***

A further objective of the Neighbourhood Management programme is to encourage the residents of the districts to become involved and active participants in their communities. This is alternative 3 of the RUN protocol: neighbourhood residents do not press for an official role in the decision process (independent variable) but are awarded one (dependent variable). By holding regular citizens’ forums, supporting ideas from within the neighbourhood, and providing financial support for projects, residents are encouraged to take on increased responsibility and a more active role.

The Neighbourhood Management teams hold public forums at regular intervals between once monthly and four times per year, inviting all programme participants, concerned and interested parties, institutions and experts, and political parties represented in the local Borough Assembly. In addition, they organise a multitude of public events on different topics and projects, ranging from small working groups, workshops, mediation meetings and planning sessions to exhibitions and media initiatives. Each annual programme is decided on at a steering meeting (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Committees in Neighbourhood Management Procedures of Berlin



Source: [www.quartiersmanagement.de](http://www.quartiersmanagement.de)

In the view of the programme, district improvement can be achieved best from within, by allowing districts to focus on how to meet their own needs. This activates residents and integrates them into processes of change. Helping residents to help themselves thus becomes a process of self-empowerment with the long-term goal that residents will take responsibility for their own neighbourhoods, and that external organisational structures will be replaced by the self-organised structures of local residents. For the realisation of smaller projects such as organising a street fair or courtyard party, doing publicity work for individual projects, publishing a neighbourhood newspaper, buying new playground equipment, and planting public spaces, money can be applied for through the Action Fund or the Contingency Fund. By making decisions on the allocation of funds and seeing the activities that become possible through them, local residents are inspired to play a more active role and take on greater responsibility for their own neighbourhoods (cf. [www.quartiersmanagement-berlin.de](http://www.quartiersmanagement-berlin.de)).

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# Leicester City Report

*Tomila Lankina*

## 1 Introduction: Neighbourhood Distress as a Topic of Concern<sup>1</sup>

### 1.1 Context of the Emergence of Neighbourhood as a Site for Policy Action

The UK is considered one of the pioneers in neighbourhood interventions in Europe (Smith et al 2007). One important reason for a policy shift towards more local, neighbourhood approaches to governance is the declining faith and interest in traditional local government (Stoker 2004). The size of UK's local government administrative units, which is among the largest in Europe, has been one of the factors hampering citizen's identifications with, and interest in, local government. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, voter turnout in local elections has been steadily declining. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted neighbourhood based approaches to 'modernising' local government, aiming to stimulate citizen engagement, empower local councillors, and 'join-up' local service delivery (Lowndes and Sullivan 2008). Neighbourhood approaches have gone hand in hand with a shift to more dispersed forms of governance involving a plethora of actors, both public and private (Sullivan and Skelcher 2001). In the UK, the growth of neighbourhood approaches is associated as much with centralisation as decentralisation, forming part of a process in which functions and authority have been progressively shifted *away* from elected city councils, with the central government (and even the EU) establishing direct relationships with non-elected sub-local bodies and partnerships (see Lowndes and Sullivan 2008 for a comparison with trends elsewhere in Europe and in the US.)

### 1.2 Neighbourhood Conditions in Case Study City

The city of Leicester provides an excellent laboratory for the analysis of UK neighbourhood interventions. Leicester is typical of UK's many "northern" cities which have experienced industrial decline and related socio-economic problems in the second half of the twentieth century. Leicester is a medium-sized town situated in the East Midlands region with a population of about 280,000. During the Industrial Revolution, Leicester was a prosperous town and was among UK's top industries and trading centres specialising in hosiery and textile production. The 1960s and 1970s saw a rapid decline of industry. While services became an important source of employment, as with other similar cities, there was a general decline in the city's prosperity. Currently, Leicester has smaller than average proportions of its workforce working full-time, part-time or in a self-employed capacity, as well as a higher percentage of unemployed.<sup>2</sup>

There is a long history of migration from South Asia and Africa to Leicester. In 1991, the population of Indian origin formed the largest single ethnic group in the city, with 22.3

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<sup>1</sup> This case study report includes information as per August 2008.

<sup>2</sup> A large proportion of the inactive group comprises students because there are two large universities in the city. There is a smaller than average number of retirees.

percent (60,300) of the total population. By 2001, this figure had grown to 25.7 percent (72,000). This figure ranks Leicester as having the largest Indian-origin population of any local authority area in England and Wales.<sup>3</sup> There are also large numbers of African-Caribbeans, as well as new arrival communities from Africa and the recent EU accession countries such as Poland. The variable spatial clustering, socio-economic profiles, services needs, and cultural values, as well as skills of these communities make the study of neighbourhood interventions in Leicester particularly interesting.

City politics, which reflect the importance of political parties in UK local governance, likewise make Leicester a suitable case for analysis from which UK-wide generalisations could be made. Although the city has a Lord Mayor elected for one year from amongst councillors, his or her role is largely ceremonial. The Leader and Cabinet system ensures that council party politics dominate executive decision making. Leicester city politics is characterised by a very long period of Labour administration (1979-May 2003) in recent years followed by high electoral volatility and party turnover in the council. Currently, out of a total of fifty-four councillors, thirty-eight are Labour, six are Liberal Democrats, eight are Conservatives, and two are Green.<sup>4</sup>

Industrial decline of the last few decades, coupled with the negative effects of the urban planning of the 1950s and 1960s, have led to pockets of extreme deprivation that now dot the city. Political stagnation at the city council level followed by volatility and cabinet instability in recent years has arguably also contributed to policy inadequacies with respect to regeneration. According to government indices of deprivation, several of Leicester's neighbourhoods have acquired the sad distinction of being among the most, or *the* most deprived, in the UK. Consequently, disadvantaged neighbourhoods in Leicester have found themselves the targets of central government regeneration initiatives. Two of these neighbourhoods which have been targets of distinct policy interventions—Braunstone and St. Matthews and St. Marks—form the basis of the Leicester case study.

### 1.3 Introduction of Case Study Neighbourhoods

#### *Braunstone*

Braunstone is a vast, overwhelmingly White British working class council estate, with a population of approximately 14,000 on the south-west edge of the city centre. Most of the housing is still council owned. It is an area of historic significance. Braunstone was mentioned in the Domesday Book and the site of the 13<sup>th</sup> century St. Peters Church where the prominent Winstanley Family who acquired the estate in 1649, were buried. As late as 1924, a county guide described Braunstone as a “curiously remote and isolated little village, with stately hall of brick, in a pretty park with water,” one with a “quaint, old-world character.”<sup>5</sup>

South Braunstone, located in the east but known as the South, and originally part of the Parish of Braunstone, developed as a settlement of skilled artisans servicing the Winstanley Family estate in the mid to late 19th century. Many of the settlers were of Scottish or Irish origin. Their compact settlement in one area reinforced an identity distinct from the then largely English city. In 1924, this area was purchased and extended as one of Leicester's first council housing areas, with large modern family homes built and home ownership also encouraged. The construction was part of Lloyd George's post WWI agenda of making England a “land fit

<sup>3</sup> Source: Leicester City Council website.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.leicester.gov.uk/your-council--services/council-and-democracy/local-democracy/political-make-up>

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.le.ac.uk/emoha/community/resources/braunstone/village.html>

for heroes” in which slums had no place.<sup>6</sup> The area became flanked by the wide boulevard-like Kingsway Road with a large village green. The area to the north, which boasts one of the city’s largest and most beautiful parks originally owned by the Winstanleys, was annexed by the Leicester City Council in 1935 and became Braunstone Estate. Many residents were settled here as part of the city authorities’ downtown slums clearing schemes. The remaining area originally called the Parish of Braunstone was renamed in 1977 as Braunstone Town. From the 1920s onwards in addition to council homes, it continued to maintain privately built homes.

In the post-World War II decades, the whole of the estate including the south deteriorated and became one of the most deprived and crime-ridden areas in the whole of the UK. The vast majority of its housing had been city council-run, and generations of its residents had been on benefits. In 1999, Braunstone had double the number of recorded crimes compared to similar areas in the East Midlands. Roughly 30 percent of its residents were not working, while the average annual income was £8,480. Almost a third of all households were single parent households. The mortality rates were also among the highest in the UK: according to the UK Standard Mortality Ratio, residents of Braunstone were likely to die younger than those in any other part of the city and county. Coronary heart and lung diseases, strokes and cancers, as well as high infant mortality and illnesses related to extremely high rates of teen pregnancies were among the factors contributing to the grim statistics.<sup>7</sup>

In Leicester, the estate has acquired the image of an unsafe, dilapidated, and even racist neighbourhood shunned by those on the city’s other estates. Within Braunstone itself, the north became known as “dodge city,” shunned by those in the somewhat less deprived south. The legacy of deprivation contributed to the separation—perceived and real—between the city and the estate.

#### *St. Matthews and St. Marks*

St. Matthews is situated in the Inner City area, to the immediate north-east of the city centre. It is however cut off from the centre by a dual carriageway and is not adjacent to any other residential areas. The population is 4,000. Historically, it developed as a small factory and slum housing area and the houses were turned into council housing in the 1950s. St. Matthews remains the most deprived neighbourhood in the whole of Leicester. In 2003, over 50 percent of households had an annual income of only £6,239, which is substantially lower than the UK national average of £14,161. St. Marks is separated from St. Matthews by a busy road. It originated as a settlement from demolished slum clearance areas in the 1960s.

The dual title of the estate is indicative of the artificiality of gluing two rather distinct estates into one awkward whole. St. Marks is an established, predominantly Asian (mostly Gujarati) (62 percent) and White British community with the Asians residing on the estate for some thirty years. The demographic here is “greying” with 44 percent aged 65 or over, which contrasts with the Leicester average of 36. The St. Matthews estate is predominantly White British, Black African (17 percent) and Asian with many Somali, West Indian, Portuguese, Russian, Montserratian, Zimbabwean, and Kurdish residents and new arrivals. The population demographic is substantially younger than in St. Marks, which is closer to the Leicester average. Education attainment is also higher in St. Matthews: while as many as 59 percent of St. Marks residents have no qualifications, the statistics are substantially lower for St. Matthews (47 percent). The Leicester average is 38 percent. While adjacent to one another, the two estates are divided by an important road artery, which reinforces the spatial separation

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.leicester.gov.uk/index.asp?pgid=1811>

<sup>7</sup> NDC Delivery Plan 2004-2008.

between the distinct communities. As one community worker put it, crossing over the road “feels like going into two different areas of the city: the dress and the way people look are different.”<sup>8</sup> St. Matthews and St. Marks are also geographically adjacent to another of the city’s main roads, Belgrave Road, also known in local parlance as the Golden Mile for the myriads of Indian gold, jewelry, and sari shops. Although Belgrave is not administratively part of the joint estate, the Asian community in St. Marks naturally gravitates towards it.

## 2 Policy Interventions in Two Neighbourhoods Chosen

### 2.1 Overview of the Two Interventions

#### *New Deal for Communities*

The New Deal for Communities (NDC), of which Braunstone was beneficiary, was established in the context of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal, which was to cover the period of 1999-2010 and targeted areas of extreme deprivation with populations between 5,000 and 24,000 residents (see Lowndes and Sullivan 2008, Smith et al 2007). Thirty-nine areas were selected and a funding of as much as 8.2 million Euros per neighbourhood per year was allocated. Key NDC goals were to reduce polarisation between the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods and other areas, improve housing and the physical environment, target access to employment and education, and improve health and community safety. Although the central government initiated and funded the NDC, it was to be implemented through local strategic partnerships with an important resident involvement component (Atkinson and Carmichael 2007). The position of elected local authorities, however, remained ambiguous (as in previous rounds of centrally funded regeneration initiatives under the Conservatives), with city politics seemingly overridden by national policy priorities backed by major investment. Neighbourhoods were invited to bid for a large pot of money allocated for a period up to ten years based on the severity of deprivation. The Braunstone estate in Leicester succeeded in winning NDC funding in 1999.

#### *Neighbourhood Management*

Leicester’s other neighbourhoods became targets for alternative forms of intervention, such as Neighbourhood Management (NM) which was being implemented in St. Matthews and St. Marks. Not only did these interventions receive considerably less funding than NDC, but they also varied in terms of their goals, institutional arrangements and procedures. The UK government identified twenty areas clustered in seven priority neighbourhoods consisting of the so-called Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) with a population of roughly 1,500 each that had fallen into the bottom 5 percent of the 2004 national Index of Deprivation. Indicators such as crime rates, employment, education, housing, and the environment had been used in compiling the index. St. Matthews and St. Marks were among the five of the seven neighbourhoods in Leicester in which the NM model was set up.<sup>9</sup> The NM initiative took effect in September 2006.

The government’s Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (NRU), now part of the Department of Communities and Local Government, launched the Neighbourhood Management (NM) Pathfinder Programme in 2001.<sup>10</sup> Although similar in spirit to some earlier interventions, NM was a relatively new approach, which aimed to improve public services, build community

<sup>8</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 17, 6 February 2008.

<sup>9</sup> *Neighbourhood Management: Spring 2007 Briefing*.

<sup>10</sup> In the first round 20 deprived neighbourhoods were selected in England for testing out the new NM model. In 2004, a further 15 Pathfinders were established in a second round of funding (Neighbourhood Management: An Overview of the 2004 and 2007 Round 2 Pathfinder Household Surveys: Key Findings 2007).



capacity, and promote socioeconomic renewal. The policy goal of the model was to bring together the local community and local service providers through a partnership. The partnership would be led by a dedicated Neighbourhood Manager and supported by an equally dedicated neighbourhood team.<sup>11</sup> Rather than investing in the development of entirely new facilities and delivery mechanisms (as in NDC), the emphasis here was on increasing coordination among existing service providers (e.g. in housing, urban planning, health, education) which did not all fall under the auspices of the elected local authority. By coordinating on a very local basis, and developing community engagement alongside, the aim was to improve not just the efficiency but also the quality of local services, as understanding of the scope for synergies, innovation and citizen responsiveness would be increased. If NDC was about creating and ushering in new structures and resources (a ‘clean sheet’ approach), NM was then about bending existing structures and resources. The Neighbourhood Manager would be the catalyst and broker for the ‘mainstreaming’ of a neighbourhood approach to partnership and community engagement.

In 2005, there were nearly 200 neighbourhood management partnerships UK-wide, with thirty-five funded NM pathfinders.<sup>12</sup> Areas subject to NM are eligible for up to £200,000 in the first year for the recruitment of key staff, establishment of partnerships and operational systems, as well as the development of a delivery plan. Once they become operational, these areas are eligible to receive on average £350,000 per year over a period of seven years. By the end of the fifth year of operation however, the government target would be that most of the running programmes supported by initial funding would become sustainable and improvements in services delivery would be attained through continued negotiation among service providers, consultation on resident priorities, and analysis of neighbourhood statistics.<sup>13</sup>

The key focus of NM is on improving public services, community capacity building, and renewal in a way that would “marry[ing] ‘top down’ processes to ‘bottom up’ needs and priorities.”<sup>14</sup> Within the framework of this intervention substantially less funding is allocated compared to NDC. In 2007/08 for example, the NM budget was £140,000.<sup>15</sup> Neighbourhood Management is however aimed at much greater sustainability as limited resources are put into the hands of the local residents, who decide on the types and nature of services that are best for the community.<sup>16</sup> Key organisations and partnerships at the city level are to work in a coordinated fashion to address issues in a holistic way.

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<sup>11</sup> (Neighbourhood Management: An Overview of the 2004 and 2007 Round 2 Pathfinder Household Surveys: Key Findings 2007)

<sup>12</sup> *Neighbourhood Management – Working Together to Create Cleaner Safer Greener Communities: A Collection of Case Studies*, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, March 2005.

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.neighbourhood.gov.uk/page.asp?id=581>

<sup>14</sup> *St. Matthews and St. Marks Neighbourhood Delivery Plan*, June 2007 (Leicester: Leicester Neighbourhood Management), p. 6.

<sup>15</sup> *St. Matthews and St. Marks Neighbourhood Delivery Plan*, June 2007 (Leicester: Leicester Neighbourhood Management), p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> In addition, low-cost awareness- and community-building initiatives have been undertaken such as clean-up days, resident “patch walks” or grow your own fruit and vegetable campaigns. In Braunstone now too, it is recognised as “the way to go” and a promising initiative that would ensure the sustainability of NDC that is now ending. Personal interview, Respondent No. 1, 14 January 2008.

### 3 Explaining and Interpreting Neighbourhood Intervention

#### 3.1 Braunstone

##### *Institutional Factors*

When Braunstone was awarded NDC money in July 2000, the non-for profit renewal company, Braunstone Community Association (BCA) was set up to manage and deliver NDC.<sup>17</sup> With members overwhelmingly composed of Braunstone residents, it was to target the key priority areas of crime and community safety; employability and enterprise; health and wellbeing; housing and environment; education and family learning; community development and youth inclusion.<sup>18</sup> A board was set up including nine Resident Directors, four Strategic Partner Directors, two Voluntary Sector Directors, and two Associate Directors. The nine Resident Directors were to be popularly elected. Each year three Directors, one from each of the areas they represent, were to stand down but could offer themselves for re-election.<sup>19</sup>

Among thirty-nine neighbourhoods UK-wide, Braunstone became the only estate that managed to keep the local authority formally at arms length, opting for accountability to other bodies. This choice reflected the history of pervasive council involvement on the estate on the one hand and its paradoxical sense of separateness from the city on the other. “They ruled your life”<sup>20</sup> is a statement one hears as often on the estate as the complaint that Braunstone had been “neglected” for decades. While a substantial share of council dwellers were beneficiaries of council services and resources—ranging from housing, to single parent and unemployment benefits—there was also a perception that many city initiatives bypassed Braunstone (Wright). Furthermore, as one Braunstone actor put it, “There was a feeling that statutory agencies were the ones who created all the problems so it was felt it would not be good to entrust them again with NDC.”<sup>21</sup> “The culture was that the city council is the problem here,” reported another actor with experience of work in Braunstone.<sup>22</sup>

Regeneration initiatives prior to NDC suffered from the perception that “people from above” were “parachuted” into the community with no prior consultation or awareness of its actual needs. Local community workers maintained that it was therefore paramount to ensure that any new regeneration bodies would be staffed by the local people.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>17</sup> It now has over 340 members. There are also 4 Strategic Partner Directors, 2 Voluntary Sector Directors, and 2 Associate Directors. NDC Delivery Plan 2004-2008. According to Angie Wright, there are now 9 directors

<sup>18</sup> Stated Aims and targets: “By 2008, our aim and targets are to ensure that: Overall crime in Braunstone is reduced by 10%; 75% of residents feel safe in the community; 20% of working age residents have some form of training qualification; Unemployment is within 2% of the city average, and there is a 50% increase in Small, Medium Enterprises (SME's) operating in Braunstone; 25% of Braunstone residents are involved in health prevention and improvement programmes; There is a 50% increase in residents that get involved in physical activity; 75% of homes in Braunstone meet Decent Homes Standards; public open spaces are improved and managed in a way that can be sustained in the future; The educational attainment of pupils at all key stages has made significant progress towards the city average; There is a significant increase in the number of people engaged in lifelong learning opportunities and acquiring formal qualifications; a third of Braunstone residents are engaged in community groups; 50% of young people are engaged in personal and social development activities.” <http://82.109.194.144/fmi/xsl/dta/profile.xml?&-recid=12836>

<sup>19</sup> The Strategic Partner Directors currently represent Leicester City Council, Leicester City West Primary Care Trust, Leicester Shire Connexions Service and the local Learning & Skills Council. The Voluntary Sector Directors are nominated by the local Voluntary Sector Forum <http://82.109.194.144/fmi/xsl/dta/profile.xml?&-recid=12836> (development Trusts Association Website).

<sup>20</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 3, 3 March 2008.

<sup>21</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No 7, 6 March 2008.

<sup>22</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 27, 4 March 2008.

<sup>23</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No 7, 6 March 2008.

The Government Office required NDC beneficiaries to work with a key “accountable body,” usually the local authorities. However, BCA opted to work with the Leicester Housing Association instead. Much of the misunderstanding came about from the government’s own rhetoric that NDC would be “resident-led” which was interpreted locally as a lack of any accountability to the statutory authorities.<sup>24</sup> Many respondents recalled how during the early stages of NDC the local authority itself got frustrated with Braunstone’s constant suspicions of any attempts at the local authority’s involvement in the operation of NDC: “You think we are rubbish, so do things on your own,” was the LCC’s reported response.<sup>25</sup>

The LCC then became a passive bystander as BCA descended into factionalism and squabbles involving allegations of corruption, wheeler-dealer affairs, and financial mismanagement. According to a senior executive of BCA at the time, “There was a gulf between the city and Braunstone and the local authority was so fed up that they were glad to go away.”<sup>26</sup> The local authorities’ separation from NDC management exacerbated the built-in inadequacies and poor design of NDC itself. Those involved with NDC at the time claimed that what the government tried to drum up as a “flagship” initiative turned into a series of implementation nightmares.<sup>27</sup> In an estate where generations lived well below the poverty line and had no experience with financial management, had low managerial skills, and poor self-confidence, the residents were now to manage nearly fifty million pounds of NDC funds. Virtually no specialised training was provided, while the few training sessions were largely “tokenistic” and “quick outputs”-oriented.<sup>28</sup> According to a private consultant that the government hired in 2000-2001 to do NDC-related training, “It was typical of the whole process: the request came in March to do the training and was to be done by May 1<sup>st</sup> and it involved everything—from how to hold a meeting to hiring and budgeting and covered lots of areas.”<sup>29</sup> The leader of a women’s organisation in Braunstone involved with the intervention also said, “At the start of NDC, because of all the unrealistic targets set, the whole process was a bit too much too quickly.”<sup>30</sup> A lack of experience with managing money also generated distorted or unrealistic expectations.

The fact that the city authorities had been distanced from the start ensured that NDC would differ from previous initiatives in that there would be more genuine local empowerment in designing neighbourhood interventions. Within three years, a new board was set up, which helped do away with factionalism, and resident experience with managing the estate began to pay off, generating confidence for greater involvement. Government plans to scrap NDC in Braunstone were set aside and NDC was to carry on for a total of ten years. The lack of the local authorities’ stifling bureaucratic intervention also ensured a degree of experimentation in policy design.

Flexibility is cited among the key reasons for success of bottom-up interventions compared to those of the statutory authorities. One youth worker maintained: “statutory authorities are different. . . but as a voluntary organisation we could be quite creative in how we deliver things [as] statutory restrictions are not there.”<sup>31</sup> Another youth worker lamented: “I find it disappointing that the city council youth services are constantly undergoing one review or another and are constantly being restructured due to political or other reasons or lack of

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<sup>24</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 27, 4 March 2008.

<sup>25</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 27, 4 March 2008.

<sup>26</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 13, 20 March 2008.

<sup>27</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 27, 4 March 2008.

<sup>28</sup> Personal interviews; NDC Delivery Plan 2004-2008.

<sup>29</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 27, 4 March 2008.

<sup>30</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 10, 13 February 2008.

<sup>31</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 6, 28 February 2008.

funding. What the BCA could do as an agency independent of the local authority is to be allowed to take risks and be innovative... Sometimes a bureaucratic authority like a local authority stifles innovation—it is not in their nature to take risks.” Echoing him, another community worker stated: “bureaucracies don’t like risks, but development workers do as life is risky.” According to him, NDC’s key advantage was its flexibility as “fuzzy is good.” “No one tells us what to do . . . no-one checks whether we are towing the party line or not,” he maintained.<sup>32</sup> According to one respondent, a small neighbourhood tenants association strove to be recognised by the local authority only to find itself bombarded with tons of “paperwork” and “city council jargon” with the staff backing out in horror refusing to work in the statutory authority’s format.<sup>33</sup>

### *Political Factors*

Although the Leicester city authorities took a largely hands off approach to NDC implementation in Braunstone, city politics shaped the perceptions and form of regeneration there in important ways. A variety of regeneration initiatives had been undertaken prior to NDC. As with other government interventions, they were short-run by design, usually spanning about three years. The choice of the specific policy intervention and its continuity became hostage to the shifting political constellations of the Leicester City Council. Community workers in Braunstone complained of how a Labour-dominated council would opt for one type of intervention, which would then be scrapped following the victory of the Liberal Democrats. Policy associated with the previous ruling party would be “poo poed” and previous initiatives scrapped, all within a matter of two to three years. As one local actor maintained, “the council used to be Tory/Liberal and didn’t support BCA as it was Labour initiated. They even didn’t want to be seen supporting that initiative and were distancing themselves from it to show that they’re not Labour. They never turned up at a board meeting for that reason too.”<sup>34</sup>

A major project undertaken in the context of regeneration, the building of a Leisure Centre, had been temporarily frozen. It was salvaged only because of a statutory loophole whereby a project could not be stopped if planning permission had been already obtained. City activists maintained the real reason for the obstruction of work on building the Centre was politics and the Liberal Democrats’ opposition to this Labour-supported project.<sup>35</sup> Roger Blackmore, council leader at the time was alleged to have said: “If I got in earlier, I would have stopped it.” Yet “when it turned out to be a success these same opponents made public statements about how they “saved the Leisure Centre,” one local activist mused.<sup>36</sup> As one city actor put it with regard to urban regeneration in Leicester: “It is very political and it is rubbish politics.”<sup>37</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 9, 6 March 2008.

<sup>33</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 3, 3 March 2008.

<sup>34</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 12, 11 February 2008.

<sup>35</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 8, 11 February 2008.

<sup>36</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 12, 11 February 2008.

<sup>37</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 27, 4 March 2008. The most recent initiatives reproduce this trend, said one community worker, who had also worked in the Leicester city government for 14 years: “There are 9 area committees in the city now with 3 wards each. . . It works like a big surgery: people come along looking for handouts. The Labour administration came in and said these area committees are rubbish so we are now talking about taking it down to ward level and we are talking about ward committees but that confuses people. I don’t think they have a great strategy about it. . . Some neighbourhoods border 2 or 3 wards and it becomes problematic if they are not in the same party or even in one party there are various camps and they have to sit in on meetings with each other. Some neighbourhoods fit within a ward but it only covers a small part of the ward.” Personal interview, Respondent No. 1, 14 January 2008.

These distinct and rapidly succeeding initiatives were highly disruptive and were hardly conducive to the kind of consistent and sustained long-term regeneration work that was required on the estate after years of decay. They contributed to local residents' mistrust of the city and their weak identification with the elected local authorities. "The politics was behind government decisions but actually it should be what works best for the area, and not what party supports it," complained one interviewee.<sup>38</sup> One city level executive actor confided and shared her embarrassment at having to go out into the community and present yet another city policy initiative in view of the already high levels of mistrust and skepticism: "I fear that next time I go to these communities I will have lost all credibility when I try to bring another policy."<sup>39</sup>

By this time however, NDC had been in place for nearly ten years and a shift in the neighbourhood-city dynamics was taking shape. Rather than contributing to the 'us and them' cleavage, these failed initiatives encouraged greater resident involvement at both the community and city levels. Despite the complications of the early years, NDC provided a push for confidence building and empowerment first at a community and then at the city level. The resident-led board provided such a platform, but also myriads of other forums and voluntary sector activities funded through NDC.

When city council elections were held in 2007, all three councillors elected from the estate had been resident directors on the board. While Councillor Michael Cook had had prior managerial and political experience, and Wayne Naylor had been active in the voluntary sector for a number of years, the outspoken Anne Glover exemplified community empowerment in a sense much more genuine than any of the government public relations glossy brochures could have hoped for. A woman "born and bred on the estate", she had been on benefits for many years and had little formal education. "Then NDC came about and it allowed people like me to take control of their destiny" and "I grabbed the opportunity," she stated. According to Glover, getting elected to the city council was a way to "get more things done" and to "change the perception of the neighbourhood at city level."<sup>40</sup> Numerous other local actors interviewed for the project confirmed this narrative of empowerment and how the election of the three board directors helped break down the barriers separating the city authorities from the estate. As one local actor put it, now that the city council has Glover, Naylor, and Cook, "we have started to influence things from the top down".<sup>41</sup> Perceptions of city politics too changed with this shift: while previously a provision existed that councillors could not sit on the resident-led Board of Directors so as "to keep politics out of the board", the BCA allowed a change to the rules following the 2007 Leicester city council elections.<sup>42</sup>

### *Civic/Legacies Factors*

Decades of ignorance regarding Braunstone at the city level bred an image of a hostile, welfare-dependent, and passive estate, and yet within Braunstone itself, community activism has been traditionally very strong. This legacy should be taken into account when discussing

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<sup>38</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 12, 11 February 2008.

<sup>39</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 26, 7 November 2007.

And an actor in the regional office of the national government maintained with regard to another intervention, NM: "Politics has a big impact—it impacted in the NM approach in particular as after the 2007 elections the new administration in Leicester had taken a lot of persuading to take the NM approach up and continue working on it. The reluctance was because they saw it as the previous administration's baby. [Who was doing the persuading?] Our office in particular but also others at a local level had to do a lot of persuading on the merits of the NM approach". Personal interview, Respondent No. 28, 3 March 2008.

<sup>40</sup> Personal interview, 11 February 2008.

<sup>41</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 7, 6 March 2008.

<sup>42</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 12, 11 February 2008.

the nature and course of the government regeneration interventions. The image of a council estate dependent on public handouts obscured the fact that Braunstone has “thrived on voluntary work”: clubs, societies, and self-help initiatives have always been around in Braunstone.<sup>43</sup>

Community identifications fostered a sense of pride in the neighbourhood—“the residents have been always passionate about their area”<sup>44</sup>—one that city level actors would be hard pressed to understand given the perceived and real decay and deprivation on the estate. This factor might explain why the Community Development and Inclusion with its stress on “ownership” of the regeneration programme became an important element of the NDC agenda.<sup>45</sup> This legacy of community activism helps explain why after an initial phase of mistrust of NDC, it took off so successfully. The Carnival and the Braunstone Bonfire, officially supported within the context of NDC in order to “raise civic pride and community spirit”<sup>46</sup> were actually rooted in the unique local traditions. Their authenticity therefore encouraged local residents to embrace these events.

This legacy also explains why empowerment and self-help became narratives so readily capitalised upon by the local residents. While the government trumpeted such tangible and measurable outputs of the intervention as an alleged reduction of child mortality, one activist however put it, “the real story to be told is how well they were able to engage with the citizens and not how they could tick a box. This is a key message but I fear it is not high enough up the ladder. It is easier to show a building or a bus than to say that we have achieved a huge amount of community engagement as they can’t really show it [measure it].”<sup>47</sup>

A number of interviewees also commented on the strength of the community spirit as compared to other neighbourhoods where they had been previously involved in regeneration. One community worker contrasted Braunstone with the divisiveness that existed in other areas: “If some group got money to work on something, the other would say how come we did not get it. There was no community spirit. If a project did not benefit their narrow area they were upset. . . The feeling here is that as long as it benefits the neighbourhood as a whole it is good.”<sup>48</sup>

Several respondents used the concept of “social capital” to describe the nature of the local community and explained the relative success of NDC. The concept of social capital was popularised by the UK government from around 2000 (Halpern 2005, Lowndes and Wilson 2001). A Neighbourhood Support Team community worker summarised the reasons behind community receptivity of this concept, which contrasted with other government initiatives which are perceived to be artificial: “Social capital . . . is not something you bring from above but something that *already exists in a community* (emphasis added). You can help in building it though.”<sup>49</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 3, 3 March 2008.

<sup>44</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 3, 3 March 2008.

<sup>45</sup> NDC Delivery Plan 2004-2008.

<sup>46</sup> NDC Delivery Plan 2004-2008.

<sup>47</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 9, 6 March 2008.

<sup>48</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 5, 25 February 2008.

<sup>49</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 9, 6 March 2008. At the same time some respondents speculated that voluntary activism characteristic of a council estate might wane as people become home owners and acquire stable employment. Personal interview, Respondent No. 3, 3 March 2008.

### *Socio-Demographic Factors*

The socio-demographic makeup of the community should be also considered an important factor in the analysis of the neighbourhood intervention. Generations of people have lived on the estate, often on the same street, fostering a strong sense of community identification with Braunstone. A parish audit of the St. Peters Church revealed strong inter-generational continuity in the residential makeup<sup>50</sup> in Braunstone. This “old style Coronation Street community” identity transcended race, religion or ethnicity. Respondents argued that an African-Caribbean family counting three generations on the estate would be regarded more authentically Braunstone than a white British one with only one or two generations.

This stable socio-demographic makeup precluded inter-neighbourhood mobility thereby possibly contributing to local residents’ interest in regeneration.

### *Spatial/ Infrastructure/ Anchoring Factors*

An important reason for success in regenerating the neighbourhood relates to spatial factors. As a vast estate with substantial open spaces, it provided room for architectural planning and construction of facilities that would change the nature of recreational and other infrastructure and external image and self-perceptions of the neighbourhood.

Cityscape planning contributed to the bridging of the North-South divide within Braunstone. In order to “take the negative tag off”, North Braunstone was renamed Braunstone Park, while the park itself was cleaned up to become the “jewel in the crown” in the centre of the estate.<sup>51</sup> This contrasted with the image of the park and surrounding areas of the past as full of burnt out cars, garbage, and litter.

## 3.2 St. Matthews and St. Marks

### *Institutional Factors*

The main difference with previous interventions in the neighbourhood is that the NM board became the key contact and coordination body through which residents would seek to influence the local authorities and other delivery agencies. The board had been set up following resident elections in both St Matthews and St Marks in 2007. A neighbourhood manager was appointed to oversee the popularly elected resident board. The Board comprised five councillors for the wards of Latimer and Spinney Hills; six residents elected from the St Matthews and St Marks housing estate each (a total of twelve); and representatives from agencies: the police; Taylor Road school; Sure Start St Matthews; Primary Care Trust; Councils Youth Service; Job Centre Plus; Councils Housing Department; and Tenants Association. The board was to meet monthly and meetings were to be held in both areas.

The board was to include a number of working groups (also called theme groups) carrying much of the work of Neighbourhood Management, such as organising a cleanup day or setting up a job fair. These groups were made up of agencies such as Housing, Sure Start and residents. According the NM Delivery plan, “It is hoped these could eventually be organisations in their own right, be resident led, constituted and capable of raising money and running services on the Estates. A very important part of neighbourhood management is to engage as many residents as possible in the decision-making processes.”<sup>52</sup> The key issues identified in the 2007 Delivery Plan were crime and community safety; health; education;

<sup>50</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 3, 3 March 2008.

<sup>51</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 1, 14 January 2008.

<sup>52</sup> *St. Matthews and St. Marks Neighbourhood Delivery Plan*, June 2007 (Leicester: Leicester Neighbourhood Management), p. 12.

housing, environment and transport; income and employment; community involvement; and young people.<sup>53</sup>

When the board was being set up, in addition to ensuring that an equal number of people were elected from each of the two estates (six), careful consideration was given to representation of the major ethnic and communal groups on the two estates. This was to prevent allegations of favoritism and over-representation of some minorities. While that was not the officially declared goal, respondents from the board maintained that combining the two estates together and making their residents sit on one board was also aimed at ensuring that St. Marks would participate and benefit from regeneration initiatives.

Generally, interviewees expressed support for a neighbourhood approach and juxtaposed it to the more “top down” city-led interventions. As with Braunstone, the local authority is a target of much criticism when contrasted with the more flexible “bottom-up” neighbourhood interventions, albeit on a much smaller scale. According to a community worker from St. Marks, “There are barriers between the city level and the community. . . The city authorities will always want to work in little boxes. Or say we will do it this way but actually they don’t as they have limits: oh, we can’t do this or that.”<sup>54</sup>

This bureaucratic factor, which had been highlighted in Braunstone, acquires particular salience with the new arrivals community as they are not familiar with the local institutions, rules and regulations and have to learn all the ropes from scratch. An example is setting up local leisure or cultural facilities as illustrated by an activist from a Somali cultural centre: “We have been struggling [to] theoretically and practically develop a knowledge base. You need this in this country where you are asked lots of questions like health and safety regulations. Our communities don’t know this as we come from a completely different country and culture.”<sup>55</sup> Says another local actor: “Language could be the most oppressive tool as when educated people meet with others like the educated white middle class and speak a language they don’t understand or when they are not so educated and when a long report is produced that people can’t understand.”<sup>56</sup> There is also a perception that the local authority skillfully uses community divisions and their collective action problems to mask its own inaction.<sup>57</sup>

At the same time, although the NM board is supposed to serve as the main liaising forum between the community and the city authorities, there appears to be little overall interest in its operation, although the new arrivals from St. Matthews are more engaged than the more established communities of St. Marks. The Neighbourhood Manager maintained that the original enthusiasm in taking part in the board elections the first time around would be hard to sustain as people were quick to realise that there is little money involved in this intervention. The result is often frustration even among board members as to the “little things” they have to deal with and squabble over, such as the positioning of a rubbish bin on the estate—an issue that generated disagreements and took a long time to resolve. The meager budget allocated within NM is not matched by the voluminous reporting requirements of the NM manager and board members, such as twenty page quarterly reports, which is likewise a source of frustration. Interviews with community workers revealed a low awareness of the NM board, its goals, and membership. For some, it is just “yet another layer of decision making” even

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 16, 28 March 2008.

<sup>55</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 14, 6 March 2008.

<sup>56</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 23, 27 February 2008.

<sup>57</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 14, 6 March 2008.



though “on paper it looks good.”<sup>58</sup> They lamented the amount of empty talk and consultation fatigue but with no real and tangible outputs: “You meet, you talk a lot, and that’s it, nothing happens afterwards. There are also no resources.”<sup>59</sup> There are also suspicions that it is another bureaucratic instrument of the local authority that serves its own purposes.

The local authority has also been accused of showing favouritism to some groups and not others, particularly in resource allocation. What reinforced the perception of discrepancy in resources allocation is that families with children get priority in housing allocation compared to single or childless households, which is more likely to be the case in the ageing St. Marks neighbourhood. This factor contributed to the perception that St. Matthews was already getting more than St. Marks, and this in turn doomed the half-baked attempt to generate a common neighbourhood and structure within the latest NM intervention. Less than two years that the board had been in operation, St. Marks decided to set up its own board. While there would be the same manager for the two estates, two sub-managers representing St. Matthews and St. Marks, respectively, would work under him.<sup>60</sup>

### *Political Factors*

Because of the distinct nature of the social and ethnic make-up of the St. Matthews and St. Marks estates, and the variable nature of involvement at the neighbourhood level, perceptions of the city council and its political influence also varied. The two communities—the Asians in St. Marks and the Somalis in St. Matthews—illustrate these differences. The Asians form the majority of the population in St. Marks. Although the Somalis constitute only 20 percent of the St. Matthews’ population, the community is an important factor in the estate both in terms of its perceived influence and also as characterising the issue of the new arrivals versus the more established immigrant groups.

The Somali new arrivals in St. Matthews have concentrated their energies at the neighbourhood level, pursuing their interests through the voluntary sector. At the same time, many respondents lamented that “not a single Somali” had been elected to the city council to represent their interests. Efforts of a Liberal Democrat councillor to engage the community through the creation of a Somali umbrella forum were regarded with suspicion. The councillor had reportedly sought to “unite” the community, which was perceived as interference with intra-community affairs. His efforts came to naught and there was suspicion of a “hidden agenda.” According to one activist, “there was a feeling he was dictating to people from another culture. The idea did not come from the Somalis themselves. . . .”<sup>61</sup>

By contrast, a councillor from St. Marks reported a high volume of contacts from her constituencies bypassing the NM board. Issues that ought to be addressed by the board got addressed to her, she lamented: “Our surgery is full of people with issues who could have gone to the neighbourhood board but they came to us because our area is underrepresented on the board.”<sup>62</sup> This also contrasted with Braunstone: a Labour councillor from that area reported that the volume of his councillor work has been reduced, as much as the local activism appeared to occur at a neighbourhood level.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 14, 6 March 2008.

<sup>59</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 24, 13 March 2008.

<sup>60</sup> Religion may be another factor: as one long-term resident and activist on the St. Matthews estate put it, “There are many whites and Indians on St. Marks and St. Matthews is geographically in the middle, so we can work together, but Hindu and Muslims don’t work together and on St. Matthews there are mostly Muslims.” Personal interview, Respondent No. 20, 17 March 2008. This contrasted with Braunstone, where NDC helped bridge the north-south divide because of an already strong Braunstone identity.

<sup>61</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 14, 6 March 2008.

<sup>62</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 22, 4 March 2008.

<sup>63</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 8, 11 February 2008.

### *Civic/Legacies Factor*

Even before the board had been set up to further NM, previous interventions revealed a marked passivity of St. Marks compared to St. Matthews. While St. Matthews is noted for its “strong entrepreneurial spirit” and an active voluntary and community sector, on the St. Marks estate, there are very few voluntary sector organisations and the Estate Management Board, which was to involve residents in the management of St. Marks, had been closed down.<sup>64</sup> This also became the perception at both the city level and among local activists at St. Matthews. “The problem is some groups just don’t want to engage,” says one St. Marks community worker.<sup>65</sup> An examination of the makeup of the two neighbourhoods revealed however that socio-demographic factors would provide a more appropriate lens for explaining variations in civic activism than civic legacies peculiar to the place as such.

### *Socio-Demographic Factors*

City authorities attribute the greater passivity of St. Marks compared to St. Matthews to the more established nature of the St. Marks estate—the predominantly Hindu Asian populations had lived there for thirty years, and the population is also aging, with young people moving out. The community illustrates what may be called “the life cycle” of activism.<sup>66</sup> One activist who had been among the wave of arrivals from South Asia and Africa in the late 1960s and 1970s, compared the current new arrivals in St. Matthews with the new arrivals to St. Marks at the time:

When I was young—we moved in the 70s—we had more energy, we wanted to know why there was racism. So we were saying we’re going to stand up for our rights and fight. We wanted to know where do we voice our political opinion and find out how the council works. In the early 1980s there were riots and then we got what we wanted and what we brought in was lots of opportunities for equality and investment. So that even in the planning stages with the city authorities we made sure that the process was fair. So I guess that the same is happening now with the Somali community as well.

St. Marks is characterised by old ways with more elderly people who are happy to be there. In St. Matthews you have young people with different needs. They have more energy as they have a whole life ahead of them. So they want to make sure they contribute to the place they live in. We did it in our times too. We were very active. The older people say: we’ve done our bit, and now you do yours.<sup>67</sup>

The fact that it was more difficult to get things done for immigrants at the time spurred a desire to get involved in city politics. The mobilisation of these communities to make their voices heard succeeded in establishing channels of representation and articulation of community interests at a city level. Leicester city council has since boasted many Asian councillors. The new Lord Mayor of Leicester is a councillor representing St. Marks. She is the first female Asian Lord Mayor in the UK. At the level of the community, activism however waned as it attained its aspiration to be represented and heard in the city as it aged, and as its residents progressed up the social ladder. There is a tendency for those who have “made it” to become home owners in Oadby, Rushey Mead, or other more “posh” areas with

<sup>64</sup> *St. Matthews and St. Marks Neighbourhood Delivery Plan*, June 2007 (Leicester: Leicester Neighbourhood Management), p. 7.

<sup>65</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 21, 26 February 2008.

<sup>66</sup> Used by a local authority respondent to compare Leicester’s various neighbourhoods. Personal interview, Respondent No. 26, 7 November 2007.

<sup>67</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 16, 28 March 2008.

large Asian communities. School and education facilities are also perceived to be better elsewhere, which encourages young families to move out.<sup>68</sup>

St. Matthews by contrast, experienced a dramatic population shift only within a matter of the last seven to eight years. The Somali new arrivals community is essential to the changing makeup of the estate, but also the nature of the activism of its residents, which is distinct from that of the St. Marks communities both in the earlier decades and now. The greater activism of these new arrivals is undeniable. While city authorities marvel at their facility for self-organisation and self-help (“they are desperate to engage”!),<sup>69</sup> respondents from St. Marks lamented their perceived savvy at getting resources and placing their concerns on the city agenda. The perceived discrepancy in the attention and resources that the Somalis secured from the city authorities compared with the more established communities became a source of friction among the various actors involved in the regeneration of St. Matthews and St. Marks. As one St. Marks actor, a city politician, put it, “New arrivals come as a priority and we have to welcome them but we cannot also neglect extant communities at St Marks. So this creates more hostility as people feel the new arrivals are getting more benefits. I say to people we should embrace all, but it is not the communities’ fault it is the system.”<sup>70</sup>

Actually, people outside the city and community levels have a perception of the Somali community as active and cohesive which is at odds with the Somalis’ own perception of their community activism and goal attainment at the city level. Somali activists themselves maintained that their community is disadvantaged because of a lack of experience with democracy in their home country. One activist mused at what he perceived to be the local business and political community’s concerns of competition coming from these new arrivals: “In reality, they are not a threat as they are so weakly organised. They randomly and by chance ended up in Leicester and still need help with community leadership. . . Lots of people in the Somali community are not prepared for a democratic election process. They are too emotional or careless.”<sup>71</sup> Says another community worker: “They are not used to being active. There are strong barriers in the sense of the system they are used to is a dictatorship and so they want things to be done for them. . . It is a slow learning process to become more active.”<sup>72</sup>

The outsiders’ perception of the Somalis as active also obscured Somali intra-community divisions. The highly educated elite segment of the Somali community contributed to the perception of the Somalis as possessing high levels of activism and community engagement. In Somalia, these individuals were of high status in the local social, economic, and clan hierarchies. It would be these kinds of individuals who were more likely to survive the wherewithal of migration following civil war. Moreover, many came to the UK via other West European countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, acquiring further education and language skills. According to the NM manager on the estate, politics and the confidence that comes with public office came naturally to these people, as some had been highly active politically in their home country, and have even held diplomatic posts in West European capitals. One board employee, a cashier, is a Sheikh, while another is a former Somali Ambassador to Germany.

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<sup>68</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 21, 26 February 2008.

<sup>69</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 26, 7 November 2007.

<sup>70</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 22, 4 March 2008.

<sup>71</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 14, 6 March 2008.

<sup>72</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 24, 13 March 2008.

The marked social and economic differences within the Somali community of immigrants, as well as the clan structure resulted in a plethora of community groups and spokespersons, each claiming to speak on behalf of the community as a whole when dealing with the NM board, the city authorities, or other actors. The community police office said: “We talk to one Somali leader who claims to have loads of influence over the whole of the Somali community but actually he has influence over one small group. So we find out that there are actually seven or eight different leaders.”<sup>73</sup>

While the diversity and activism of the Somali groups was remarkable, it was therefore as much a product of pressure to get things done for themselves and their children given the horrible circumstances of post-civil war resettlement, as it was of divisions within the community itself. Just as the Somalis as a group were perceived as getting more resources and attention from without, within the Somali community, some groups were resented for allegedly receiving disproportionately more than others. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this too however is changing according to community workers as there is a greater willingness of mutual dialogue involving the various clan groups.<sup>74</sup>

#### *Spatial/ Infrastructure/ Anchoring Factors*

Spatial and structural conditions of the St. Matthews and St. Marks estates were important in shaping regeneration interventions and outcomes. Unlike Braunstone, these were heavily built-up inner city areas with little potential for architectural planning that would radically change the nature of the cityscape. The few planning initiatives such as the demolishing of two high-rise dwellings which had become slums and re-housing residents in low-rise homes had made an important difference. Community police officers maintained that transforming the urban landscape in this way has had a “huge impact” on reducing crime.<sup>75</sup>

At the same time, planning and architectural schemes deemed too ambitious for the neighbourhood have so far enjoyed modest success. This happened to the Peepul Centre in St. Marks, an eerily giant leisure centre out of place in what continues to look like a storage depot adjoining council housing blocks. Some respondents reported its limited use due to the locals’ discomfort at such a “posh” place that they do not identify with.

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<sup>73</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 25, 7 March 2008.

<sup>74</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 17, 6 February 2008.

<sup>75</sup> Personal interview, Respondent No. 25, 7 March 2008.

## Appendix

### List of Interviews Conducted and Matrix for Coding Interview Respondents

Name	Neighbourhood	Date	Code of Respondents
Angie Wright, BCA	Braunstone	14 January 2008	1
Brian Quinn, BCA Services Centre, StreetWibe	Braunstone	6 February 2008	2
Chris Florence, St. Peters Church	Braunstone	3 March 2008	3
Dave Stevenson, Police	Braunstone	13 February 2008	4
Ellen Watts, Housing Office	Braunstone	25 February 2008	5
Laura Hill, BCA Services Centre (youth)	Braunstone	28 February 2008	6
Linda Grubb, Braunstone Working	Braunstone	6 March 2008	7
Michael Cook, Cllr.	Braunstone	11 February 2008	8
Paddy Mccullough, community support worker	Braunstone	6 March 2008	9
Sara Davies, CentrePoint	Braunstone	13 February 2008	10
Wayne Naylor, Cllr.	Braunstone	11 February 2008	11
Linda Glover, Cllr.	Braunstone	11 February 2008	12
Keith Beaumont, BCA	Braunstone	20 March 2008	13
Abdikah Farah, Somali Social Centre	St. Matthews	6 March 2008	14
Ahmed Bile, Leicester Partnership Rep.	St. Matthews	22 February 2008	15
Bharat Patel, Manager, Peepul Centre	St. Marks	28 March 2008	16
Brian Wheeler, NM Manager	St. Matthews and St. Marks	6 February 2008	17
Hanif Aqbany, Cllr.	St. Matthews	28 February 2008	18
Issaq Abdi, Head of Somali umbrella organisation	St. Matthews	28 February 2008	19
Jean Williams, Tenants and Elders Project	St. Matthews	17 March 2008	20
Jit Joshi, PCT worker	St. Marks	26 February 2008	21
Manjoola Sood, Cllr.	St. Marks	4 March 2008	22
Mohammad Dawood, Cllr.	St. Matthews	27 February 2008	23
Ruqia Farah, Community Mentor, gateway College	St. Matthews	13 March 2008	24
Steve Riley, Police	St. Matthews	7 March 2008	25
Cathy Carter	LCC	7 November 2007	26
Steve Morton, private consultant	LCC	4 March 2008	27
Mick O'Regan	GOEM	3 March 2008	28



# Politique de la Ville in Lille

*Michèle Breuillard*

## 1 Introduction: Public intervention as a European principle for housing policy<sup>1</sup>

Public authorities' intervention in housing has a long history in the EU member-states. Since World War 2, all the North-Western European and Nordic countries have developed housing public policy first or at least at the central government level. The Mediterranean countries have had to wait for democratisation of their regime in the 1970s to embark on the same public authorities' intervention. It is no wonder that the Europeanisation of national urban policies has taken place. Successive norms have been organised and published at the European level and they have been incorporated into decision-makers' logic at both the national and local levels (Fournis & Pasquier 2009).

The 'Urban' Programmes have focused on the economic and social regeneration of cities and areas in crisis. Furthermore, some small funding is directly initiated by the EU Commission so that some aspects of the European regional policy depend on a limited number of areas for a small pocket of money (Haspen 2000). The European 'model' of urban regeneration policy tends to integrate various dimensions of urban development: physical regeneration of dwellings and improvement of their environment, social inclusion, support for the local businesses, selection of dedicated areas suffering from heavy handicaps, as well as financial incentives to spur private-public partnership and participative democracy.

As for the European Court of Justice, it decided in 2001 that social housing associations would be aiming to answer the need for housing which has to be set outside of market rules. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly ruled that modern societies see housing as 'an essential need that should not be left to the will of market forces' (ECHR, 21 February 1986, *James and al. v./ United Kingdom*, applic. No 8793/79, Judgement of 21 February 1986) and that housing 'has a pivotal role among social and economic policies' (ECHR, 19 December 1989, *Mellacher and al. v./ Austria*, Applications Nos 10522/83, 11011/84 and 11070/84, Judgement of 19 December 1989).

The EU strategy has been conceptualised in a two-fold aspect: a right to be helped to live in a dwelling and to uphold human dignity, and a right to live in a house of his choice. The European Charter for Fundamental Rights which was agreed on at the Nice Summit in 2000 acknowledged, as a minimum legal framework for housing policy, that any individual has a right to get a financial allowance or any help 'so as to ensure dignity for all those who cannot afford to pay for their dwelling' (The European Charter for Fundamental Rights 2000: Art. 34, Sched. 3).

This basic principle has been adopted in France since 1990 when the Parliament voted for the Besson Act that stated that 'every person or family that has been experiencing difficulties,

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<sup>1</sup> This case study report includes information as per August 2012.

especially financial or personal ones, is entitled to be helped by public authorities to find a decent and independent home or to remain in it'. At the national level, the government policy has tried to address not just the population's needs, but also the need for social and ethnic inclusion ('*mixité*'). Since the 1970s after the first riots had broken out in the poor outskirts of the larger cities, French housing policies have been formulated to help people more in terms of offering a range of large and various flats that are well-located, easily accessible, socially included and geographically diverse, so that everybody could find a dwelling according to his own choice (Code de la Construction et de l'Habitat, Art. L.301-1). Policy aims are approximately the same in the EU member states and in France; they all had to change to adapt to new forms of logic under special circumstances: the urban crisis, privatisation and tendering-out policies, and also new urban policies including the French *Politique de la Ville*, which have taken place since the 1970s. Whether they are publicly or privately owned, social housing companies that build and/or manage 'council houses' have modernised and need to undertake more varied missions now. For example, they need to take into account safety, social work, public relations, inhabitants' participation in the management of housing, management of the environment, etc. In France, the common view is that social housing is a local (public) service as it is in most European countries and public intervention at the national level has been legitimised by administrative courts since the early 1930s. The principle of freedom for trade and industry should not prevent a municipality from taking initiatives in order to provide for the housing needs of its community if the private sector has failed to do so, in terms of number and quality of buildings. Furthermore, in 1980, the *Conseil d'Etat*, the supreme administrative court, acknowledged that the balance between the offer and demand for dwellings had not been reached yet in many ways, especially not in the case of the most vulnerable people, and that this persistent situation of crisis could justify for houses to be requisitioned according to the law.

## 2 The Institutional Context of France

France is a 'unitary, indivisible and decentralised Republic' (1958 Constitution, Art.1) and large powers, especially in the field of planning, transportation, social assistance and urban regeneration, were devolved to elected regional, *département* (provincial) and municipal councils in 1982-1983. In France, the decentralisation reform of 1982 created three tiers of elected government on top of central government offices. The country was divided into 22 regions (plus 4 overseas regions with dedicated statuses) with powers over planning and transportation. In 2004, a second wave of decentralisation reforms strengthened the role of the regions in relation to economic development, infrastructure, professional training, and the management of EU structural funds (on an experimental basis and only in Alsace).

Regions can be small or big, depending on the number of *departments* (ranging from 2 to 8) they gather in their area. *Départements as the second tier of local government* are more or less equivalent to provinces in other European countries<sup>2</sup>. In 1957 '*Régions de programme*' were structured as groups of '*départements*' in order to rationalize the working of the Treasury. *Départements* do not usually have town planning or housing responsibilities but they are responsible for road maintenance, environmental protection, economic and cultural development, as well as for social benefits and services to adults, families and children. That is why they are significant players in local land-use planning and are represented within the many public-public partnerships in urban regeneration processes. At the smallest level,

<sup>2</sup> They are actually called provinces in Belgium and the Netherlands since these countries have been structured according to the 'Napoleonic model'. Nord-Pas-de-Calais is one of the smallest regions by area, with only two *departments*.



communes with their responsibility for land-use planning and delivery of building permissions ensure a strong measure of local control over urban development.

Another characteristic of the French system is the central government's arm-length offices at the regional level (*'services déconcentrés de l'Etat'*). These are managed by high-ranking senior Civil Servants and headed by the local representatives of the Government appointed by the Prime Minister (*'Préfets'*) who are also in charge of controlling local authorities and enacting the Government's regional and sectoral policies.

These various tiers of central and local government are co-dependent and collaboration is very common. Territorial cooperation between communes has been encouraged by financial incentives since the end of the 19th century. Finally, it has to be underlined that much of the implementation of development policies is devolved to publicly owned companies created by local or national authorities (*'sociétés d'économie mixte' –either 'locales' or 'nationales'*).

### 3 From 1975 to 2010's: Experimenting with 'Politique de la Ville'

In Western European countries, the causes of the residents' living condition in large cities have been analysed as being self-evident. Public action to alleviate the problem has always been and still remains presumably benign. This has been reassessed in the EU Social Charter that calls for 'a Social Action Programme to tackle social exclusion in Europe'. Like in other European cities, there has been in France a strong element of public influence over the use of suburban space and over the redistribution of lower income groups to areas where they could not expect to live in according to their own financial means. What is typical of France is that there is not only an awareness of the existing problems of social exclusion as an acquired spatial dimension in the professional as well as the academic literature, but also a profound belief in the capacity of the French State to deal with it through the use of what is portrayed as a technocratic and efficient policy and planning machine. Alternatively, one could say that spatial segregation of the less favoured sections of the society and the herding together of the socially excluded is not 'a natural process but the result of the manipulation of legitimate public spatial management process to favour more advantaged groups' (Renard 1994).

Finally, France has been experiencing the end of suburban home ownership and some of the most acute social exclusion problems in Western Europe since November 2005 and would probably continue to encounter these throughout the next decade. This has led the government to rethink the whole process of intervention from both central and local government.

France had concentrated on land management to accommodate urban growth (*'Zones à urbaniser en priorité- ZUP'*) and economic development in the postwar years, in response to a period of planned industrialisation. A new regeneration programme called *'Habitat et Vie sociale (HVS)'* was invented as soon as in 1977, aiming at refurbishing some deprived social housing estates, especially the huge blocks of flats (*'Les Grands Ensembles'*).

In the period 1982-1988, the idea of directing a range of actions to defined urban areas experiencing deprivation was established in the form of a comprehensive strategy (*'Développement social des quartiers, DSQ'*) as a recognition of social and economic needs. But the response was primarily in terms of physical developments and improvements. Selecting districts to be improved through DSQ policy was a matter of negotiation between central and regional governments (each Prefect and the President of the Regional Council) in the context of decentralisation reform. DSQ programmes were co-financed by the central government and regional councils, although they were placed under the responsibility of the mayors in the related cities. At the same time, partnerships were encouraged between the

public and voluntary sectors in order to concentrate financial and technical resources in education, job-seeking services and crime prevention for the designated neighbourhoods.

Between 1988-1991, under Michel Rocard's Government after the re-election of President Mitterand, a more comprehensive urban regeneration policy (*'Politique de la Ville'*) was institutionalised with dedicated bodies and management at the central government level (*'Ministère de la Ville'*, *'Conseil national de la Ville'*, inter-departmental committees, etc.). Two principles were established: solidarity between richer and poorer cities through financial equalisation (*'Dotation de solidarité urbaine, 1991'*) and social cohesion (*'Loi d'orientation pour la Ville'*, 1991).

From 1989 till the near end of the following decade, long-termed contracted action plans (*'Contrats de ville'*) were signed by the central government and some communes to enact joint policies in social development. Also, the central government launched bids for financing expansive renovation programmes in the most deprived areas that were classified as '731 zones urbaines sensibles (ZUS)', '350 Zones de re-dynamisation urbaine (ZRU)', and '44 Zones franches urbaines (ZFU)', which were akin to enterprise zones.

In the period 1998-2000, larger joint (intercommunal) bodies were made compulsorily responsible for managing all aspects of *'Politique de la Ville'* in view of promulgating a social and sustainable development policy.

From 2002 to 2003, urban policy had been refocused at the level of city-districts (*'quartiers'*) following a highly critical report by the national court of accounts (*Cour des Comptes, 2002*) that had highlighted serious failures of *'Politique de la Ville'*. New contract-plans on urban renovation policies were co-signed by the new national agency for urban renovation (*'Agence nationale de la Rénovation urbaine, ANRU'*) and city councils and local social housing organisations (*'Offices des Habitations à loyer modéré'* (HLM)). The central government took back any financial resources regarding the built environment (building demolition and reconstruction or re-structuring at a large scale) as a process of recentralisation. Within 751 'ZUS', 200,000 dwellings would be destroyed, 200,000 would be rebuilt and as many would be re-structured under a five-year programme that combined central and local government's intervention. The idea was to 'destroy the ghettos'. Between 2004 and 2008, thirty billion Euros were to be spent on open spaces and green fields, new or renovated public equipments, road networks and public or private sector housing. A national agency is created to investigate application files and to finance successful bids. Social and economic assistance to the population in need became then a matter for usual legal processes or for local authorities' initiatives in a context of more decentralised responsibilities.

From 2005 onwards: After long lasting riots in the Parisian suburbs, the Villepin Government decided to reinforce financial and technical means for the strategy *Plan Borloo* which was called after Jean-Louis Borloo, the Minister for Employment, Social Cohesion and housing (La Documentation française, Dossier). The national agency for urban renovation (ANRU) was granted 25% more financial resources. Fifteen more *Zones Franches Urbaines (ZFU)* have been added to the designated list and those already existing were extended till 2011. As a recognition of immigrants' exclusion and the need to tackle the issue of discrimination, the *'Agence de la cohésion sociale et de l'égalité des chances (ANCSCE)'* was set up in January 2007. It was locally represented by the central government's envoys called *'préfets à l'égalité des chances'* and settled in the six most severely deprived regions around Marseille, Lille,

Lyon and Paris-Ile de France Region. A hundred million more Euros would be released to fund voluntary work in the neighbourhoods.

From its early beginning in the 1980s, urban regeneration policy has evolved from '*Développement social des quartiers (DSQ)*' to '*Grand projet de ville (GPV)*' and the '*Programme national de rénovation urbaine*', (Loi Borloo, 2005). In each selected city, major plans have been trying to transform the most deprived neighbourhoods into pleasant places to live in through demolishing or restructuring dilapidated housing, mixing types of accommodation in order to mix social classes, creating quality open spaces, building public utilities, encouraging new shops and new small business, as well as supporting communities with social work. Since its early days until the 2005 riots, the '*Politique de la Ville*' had remained uncertain and unsettled about its goals and definition, and also about its legal status as a policy as well. There was a lack of clarity between focusing on dedicated city-areas ('*quartier*') or embracing the urban area as a whole; between exclusive dedicated policy or more learning strategy; between self-centered development policy of such city-districts, or trying to raise the level of that development with that of other places with better living-conditions. (see Appendix 1)

However, one can see constant elements emerging from this span of time. The '*Politique de la Ville*' has always been a contracted policy relying on the collaboration and coordination of many central government/local authorities' departments, public services and state-owned financial institutions. There are 4 main fields within its scope: urban renovation, safety and crime prevention, social and cultural development, job creation and economic revitalisation. Strategies and action plans were contracted out due to the partnerships formed, making legal decision-making processes and implementation a rather complicated and difficult to be evaluated. (See appendices 3 and 4)

#### 4 Lille City and Lille-Métropole Communauté Urbaine: two interlocked councils

Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing and the towns, cities and villages around them on both sides of the Franco-Belgian border make up one cross-border conurbation with a population of nearly 1.8 million.

Like many other European cities that had gone through the industrial revolution, Lille had experienced rapid economic and urban growth in relation to various production sectors, but this was largely dominated by the textile industry and trade. (Baert and Fraser, 2003) However, the industrial crisis gradually impacted on the conurbation profoundly, generating serious problems of poverty and environmental degradation which underlined the challenge of social, economic, environmental and urban renewal. The beginning of the 1990s was marked by a series of events and decisions that resulted in the creation of a (re)development dynamics in the metropolitan area around Lille and the urban region beyond. The completion of the Channel Tunnel and the construction of a new railway station, Lille Europe, that was close to the city centre, created a new geographical position for Lille as the centre of the West European Capital cities 'triangle' made up of London, Paris and Brussels. As a result of its master plan (*schéma directeur*), Lille-Métropole was working through a strategy that was broken down into 5 major development challenges: International dimension, accessibility, quality, development, and solidarity. The implementation of this strategy reinforced the empowerment of the metropolitan authority when Pierre Mauroy, ex Prime Minister, ex mayor for Lille and ex president of the Regional Council was elected as the president of the joint (intercommunal) body, *la Communauté urbaine de Lille (CUDL)*, recently renamed as *Lille Métropole-Communauté urbaine*.

However, according to the French institutional framework for local government, the CUDL was established on a co-management basis between the municipal authorities on the one hand, and on the other hand among the central government, local authorities and the private sector for contracted per objective-partnerships (Pontier 1998). The Master Plan had defined a major objective: to rebuild the city and to recycle its resources. The '*Ville renouvelée*' policy had two supplementary and interlocked targets: a development strategy at the conurbation level and a series of specific projects implemented in the most damaged areas. At the metropolitan level, it involved limiting green field urban sprawl, priority investment in the existing centres and along the major urban corridors, and establishing real conurbation solidarity, especially through a common fiscal policy (a shared Business Tax of 383 million Euros in 2008). For the most deprived areas, specific projects should be implemented, defined according to the characteristics of each site, the local community's needs and possible development opportunities. Resources for their implementation were mobilised within an ambitious programme of improvement of housing and living environment as well as public transport (a combined system of underground trains and buses). Interestingly, education, training and culture were also on the list.

In addition, the development strategy was based on the implementation of a number of common projects to unify the different parts of the area. Initiatives have been taken at a city-wide scale in the forms of the following major developments undertaken in the aftermath of the completion of the Northern-Europe High Speed Rail link (*Ligne à Grande Vitesse*) between Paris, Brussels, Cologne and Amsterdam) in 1993 and the Eurostar line in 1994:

- Euralille: a shopping and trade centre opened in 1994
- Euratechnologies: a centre for training and research, information and communication technology. It had sought to attract around 65 to 85 companies as well as to provide 1,500 jobs when completed in 2008-2009
- Eurasanté: a research and business park specialised in health and nutrition that sought to attract 114 companies and to generate about 2000 jobs when completed in 2009 - 2011

Similarly, since 2004 when Lille was celebrated as the European Capital City of Culture, successive world-class cultural events of the 'Lille 3000' programme have been able to bring together the public and private sectors, leading to the involvement of the local communities to help change the image of the area. Lille has also become a listed city for Art and Heritage (*Ville d'Art et d'Histoire*).

New activity sectors and spectacular changes in parts of the built environment could account for the dramatic change that has occurred over the last two decades even if problems of poor housing and derelict districts still need to be solved. The French 'capital-city of Flanders' has grown into an attractive city for both business and tourism and it has also become a university city with nearly 100,000 students.

Lille is a highly populated area with a population density four times higher than the regional average (1,180 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> on 324 ha). The population growth has been positive between 1999 and 2006: +0.29% (Region: +0.08 %). It is also the youngest area in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region which is the second French region with the highest rate of young inhabitants. As the following table (Table 1) shows, Lille is an area exhibiting extreme contrast between parts of its population that is very poor in contrast to parts which contain also a very wealthy group of inhabitants.

**Table 1. The general social and economic context**

Lille City	226, 800 (estimated in 2004),
Lille-Métropole Communauté urbaine Area :	61,145 ha
Population :	1,105,085 inhabitants (source : National Census, 2008) 1,807 inhabitants/km <sup>2</sup>
Density:	34.83 km <sup>2</sup>
Eurométropole (cross-border metropolitan) area :	Over 3 million inhabitants
Total Population :	1,164,076 inhabitants (INSEE, National Census, 1999 up-dated in 2008)
Population on the French side :	
Every-day Commuters Inward :	70,000
Outward :	38,000
Average annual fiscal revenue :	21, 765 €(2,912 €above the regional average)
Total Employment	380, 000 (private sector only)
% working population :	56.9%
Rate (2011) :	62.2 %
Lille Area main sector (services) :	83 % of the private sector employment
Growth in employment (1997-2007) :	+ 2.4%
Unemployment rate (end of 2011)	
Lille area	9.8 % **
Region	19.0 %
Under 25 year-old :	14.8 %
25 – 49 year-old :	6.7 %
Over 50 year-old :	4.3 %
Welfare Benefit Recipients(‘ <i>Revenu minimum d’insertion</i> ’)	19 % of the population
Under 35 year-old :	43 %
Living on their own :	48 %
Recipients for over 5 years :	26 %
Illiterate people :	
Lille area :	15 %
Regional average	9 %
Population rate incorporated in the urban regeneration policy area:	
Lille city	12 %
Lille area	23 %

Source : [http://www.insee.fr/fr/regions/nord-pas-decalais/default.asp?page=themes/tableau\\_de\\_bord/TB02lmcu.htm](http://www.insee.fr/fr/regions/nord-pas-decalais/default.asp?page=themes/tableau_de_bord/TB02lmcu.htm)

## 5 The political context: Ville de Lille and Lille Métropole-Communauté Urbaine, two political organisations and one sole political leadership

Two major politicians, Pierre Mauroy and Martine Aubry, both members of the Socialist Party, have left their mark on the local arena with their own strong personality. Pierre Mauroy was a major political character both regionally and nationally. A Member of Parliament who then became a Senator, he was the first Prime Minister under F. Mitterand’s presidency, from May 1981 till July 1984. He was the mayor for Lille from 1973 till 2001 and chaired the council of the *Communauté urbaine* from 1989 till 2008. He had also been elected as a councilor for the *Conseil général* du Nord (Council of the *Département*), then also for the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Regional Council which he chaired from 1974 till 1981.

Martine Aubry was the first deputy-mayor from 1995 to 2001, a role that helped her to prepare for the succession of Pierre Mauroy as the mayor for Lille-City Council in 2001. In 2008, she stood for re-election as the mayor and also ran for election as the president of the council of Lille-Métropole Communauté urbaine (LMCU). Even though Pierre Mauroy did

not chair the LMCU council until 1989, he had been the first Vice-President since its establishment in 1968.

Interestingly, urban development and social exclusion had been highly discussed in the 2008 campaign manifesto, much more than in the previous municipal elections. Aubry, a top member of the Socialist Party and an ex-minister in charge of Employment, Social Affairs and also Urban Regeneration in the Jospin Government (1997-2002) had been criticised for not making social deprivation one of her priorities, and for spending too much resources on 'prestige' policies in the more affluent parts of the city.

Lille has many assets to favour economic dynamism and employment but it also contains a large deprived population as table 2 shows below.

### **Local authorities and policy makers**

The policy makers are mainly joint (intercommunal) bodies. Joint bodies, not municipal councils, have the responsibility of planning and providing social housing. La Communauté urbaine was compulsorily created in 1967 (*Loi d'orientation foncière, 1966, art.3*). It is made up of 85 municipalities. Forty percent of its population live in the four main cities (Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing, Villeneuve d'Ascq) that have more than 65,000 inhabitants. A densely populated area (1,758 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>), it is the second most densely populated area in France after Paris.

In the field of housing, CUDL shows a paradoxical profile. It has pioneered urban renewal since the 1990s probably because the problem was so acute then. Its policy had been called 'Renewed City' strategy and was based on the observed fact that some of the member communes had been experiencing overall deterioration in the economic field and also in the living conditions. Their industrial activities - mainly the textile industry- that had been flourishing so far were declining. The 'Strategy for a Renewed City' was an overall policy that wanted to reinvigorate the local communities. In a way, it was a kind of affirmative action to be enacted inside the area of a joint body from which, legally speaking, every member-municipality should equally benefit. The founding report was written in 1996 to provide for a spatial development plan. Conditions of living were one of the main stakes for the strategy. Housing was the very first aspect to be tackled because poor, old, uncomfortable, derelict dwellings were more numerous in these areas than anywhere else. A long process of gathering people with economic and social difficulties had been developing. The corner-stone of 'Renewed City' strategy had been the improvement of housing conditions through upgraded and restructured dwellings that were already existing, diversified housing offer to be adapted to the need for new buildings and urban improvement around the dwellings.

However, the CUDL had to wait for the second decentralisation reform in 2004 before it could be fully responsible for the enactment of its urban regeneration policy. According to the new law, the *Préfet* may delegate to mayors or the president of an inter-communal body the management of the central government's local stock of social houses or flats. The joint body can decide about a specific regime of economic assistance in the urban regeneration areas if the Regional council agrees to it.

## 6 Selection of the two case studies in Lille

The preliminary selection of neighbourhoods within the City of Lille will focus on 2 different cases. We are going for: (a) a neighbourhood with major central government funding for regeneration, and (b) a neighbourhood with a similar level of deprivation but mainly covered by city council-led initiatives. The latter will also prove to be multi-sectoral and involve some new resources at a larger scale. This will allow us to explore some social/cultural variables as well as the impact of different policy mechanisms and governance arrangements. Some of the criteria proposed for the RUN research could not be clearly operationalised in the French context, so I decided that I could use what may appear as a typically French ‘device’, that is a mix of institutional, legal and political criteria with the following justification provided:

First of all, there is no smaller administrative French structure than a commune. Towns or cities are the administrative units for the concrete enactment of contracted plans on urban policy (*‘Politique de la Ville’*). Similarly, *‘Politique de la Ville’* has to be enforced at the inter-communal level as well as to be enforced in priority action zones. But it is understood that in the related areas, the strategy will apply to the whole commune (in the case of thematic, not territorial action plans) and over each dedicated neighbourhood.

However, *‘Politique de la Ville’* has always been based on perimeters cutting across the cities and even sometimes across districts (*‘quartiers’*). These perimeters are more or less artificially drawn and they may appear as purely ‘technocratic’ processes. The fact is that they are delineated by the central government and remain mandatory for the designated local authorities. To give a clear picture, it has to be noted that Lille as a city is much smaller than Paris, Lyon or Marseille though it lies at the heart of the second larger French conurbation, and also of one of the most urbanised and industrialised region. It has grown through successive amalgamations of small villages that have kept their original names and ancient borders as they experienced different growths in relation to their own economic development. As a mixed city socially and culturally, and at the same time an industrial and ‘bourgeois’ city, it contains pockets of poverty and deprived accommodation next to the most expensive houses and blocks of flats. The historic and now posh district called ‘Le Vieux Lille’ exemplifies this. While it was nominated in 2007 as ‘the City of the future’ by the Financial Times and as ‘the Place to be’ by the Times, six out of its ten districts are involved in the long-term urban renewal strategy, encompassing nearly 65% of the population.

*‘POLITIQUE DE LA VILLE’* in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Region.

- Total central government co-funding in 2007: 22 million €
- 98 communes are enrolled in all kinds of urban regeneration strategies.
- 273 deprived areas are selected neighbourhoods.
- 500 voluntary institutions are working every year, as partners within *‘Politique de la Ville’* action plans.

*‘POLITIQUE DE LA VILLE’* in Lille-Métropole Communauté urbaine (LMCU)

- Total cost: 4.82 billion Euros (2008-2012).

**Table 2. Various Action Programmes in the Lille area**

Number of communes within Lille Métropole-Communauté urbaine	Total Population	Number of <i>Contrats de Ville</i> (CV) (2000 - 2006) and other action plans	Total number of related neighbourhoods	Number of <i>Contrats urbains de cohésion sociale</i> (CUCS, 2007-2012) (= Number of communes involved)	Other Action-programmes
87	1, 105, 085	8 CV <i>5 Grands Projets de ville</i>	42 (including 21 Priority Neighbourhoods in Lille <i>Grand Projet de Ville</i> )	16 CUCS	17 ZUS 3 ZFU

With the inclusion of 17 *Zones urbaines sensibles* (ZUS) and 3 *Zones franches urbaines* (ZFU) on top of the 16 CUCS, there has been a total of nearly fifty action plans for the period 2007-2012.

Six out of ten neighbourhoods are selected for the long-term urban renewal strategy. As the most deprived areas of LMCU, Faubourg de Béthune, Fives, Wazemmes, Moulins, Lille-Sud, and Bois Blancs are classified as ‘Zones urbaines sensibles’ (ZUS). Other criteria based on the percentage of coloured people, immigrants, foreigners (from inside and outside the EU) are not easy to tackle in France where statistics about races, ethics and religions are not allowed and very few questions dealing with these characteristics were asked in the National Census questionnaire which took place in 1999. Unexpectedly, some information was ready at hand on the official website of the Interministerial Office for Urban Policy (*Direction interministérielle de la Ville, before 2012*). They expressed no clear difference regarding ethnic differentiation in the deprived areas.

#### 6.1 The two selected districts: Bois-Blancs and Lille-Sud.

Both Lille-Sud and Bois-Blancs have been selected for Contrat de Ville, now CUCS. Bois-Blancs was the first area to experiment with decentralisation within the municipal council with the first ‘*mairie de quartier*’ opened in 1979. It was planned to become the place for the main development scheme in the coming future for Euratechnologie, an ICT hub to be established in a refurbished red-brick textile plant located on an island on the river Deûle, close to the underground network and to the city centre. A renovated and new residential housing zone was to be rebuilt to accommodate its poor, aging and unemployed population with some pockets of young, qualified lower middle-class inhabitants.

Lille-Sud is one of the two most deprived districts in Lille directly targeted by the Grand Projet Urbain (see the next table). It typically contains crumbling blocks of flats (*‘grands ensembles’*) that were erected in the seventies with a high proportion of unemployed people, displaying quite similar poverty symptoms as in Bois-Blancs. However, it is not entirely incorporated and only stands as one of the 14 ‘associated sites’ within which 6 other districts will partly benefit from the strategy<sup>3</sup>. For the period from 2008 to 2012, 1,230 flats and houses should be constructed anew, 1,600 refurbished (new windows, restored façade, better performing heating system, etc), 2,800 improved (*‘résidentialisés’*, that would be more secured with better decorated entrance and open spaces around the blocks of flats) and nearly 400 dwellings to be demolished.

<sup>3</sup> Other neighbourhoods include: Lille City-Centre, Fives, Saint-Maurice, Vauban-Esquermes and Wazemmes.



**Table 3. Information about Lille and its neighbourhoods**

	<b>CV Lille</b>	<b>All ZUS within CV Lille</b>	<b>Lille-Sud ZUS</b>	<b>Bois-Blancs ZUS</b>
<b>Population</b>	240,585 (National Census, 1999) 232,432 (local update, 2006)	57,946 61,438	7,536	20,000
<b>Unemployed (1999)</b>	16.4%	30.7 %	36.3%	18%
<b>No qualification (1999)</b>	21.4 %	35.4 %	42.1%	20%
<b>Under 25 (1999)</b>	37.2 %	43.1 %	47.0%	30%
<b>Foreigners (1999)</b>	5.8 %	12.9 %	17.2%	8.2%
<b>Single parent families (1999)</b>	15.4 %	24.1 %	29.4%	(not available)
<b>Council rental housing (1999)</b>	24.1 %	47.7 %	29.4%	50%
<b>Families paying no income tax (2007)</b>	41.9 %	62.5 %	72.4%	52.4%

Sources: INSEE RP 1999/DGI 2004 (*fiscal data*)/ Ministry of Interior (2005) / Education (2004) / Caisse Nationale d' Assurance-maladie (2006). <http://sig.ville.gouv.fr/zone/CS3114> .

## 7 Lille Urban Renewal Strategy

*Lille Grand projet urbain (GPU)* is a planning strategy for 2007-2012 with 2 areas of focus:

- 1) Renovation of publicly owned (social) housing: a contracted plan was signed by Lille City Council and Agence nationale de rénovation urbaine, a central government's agency, in August 2006.
- 2) Regeneration of deprived privately owned housing: a contracted plan was signed with the national agency for urban regeneration (*Agence Nationale de la Rénovation Urbaine*) in December 2007.

With a total cost 482 million Euros, Lille GPU aims at two priorities for its whole area: to build and to renovate. It seeks to build 3,400 new dwellings: 1,230 in Lille-Sud area, 360 at 'Porte de Valenciennes and the rest will be built in the other 8 areas of Lille City. 2,964 houses will be modified so as to improve privacy. 750 housing units in poor conditions will be demolished in both priority areas. Also, there were attempts to renovate or create new public utilities such as open and green spaces and streets as places for community life and to meet

inhabitants' needs (nursery and primary schools, social clubs, etc), and to offer accommodation for those who seek for a flat or a house. Moreover, shops have been encouraged to set up businesses in the area in order to ease daily life in the neighbourhoods.

The strategy aims at improving the quality of life in every part in the city, but with a special stress on two neighbourhoods which have been designated as priority: Moulins and Lille-Sud. It seeks to profoundly change the inhabitants' life in order to recreate a city atmosphere (*'recréer de la ville'*).

### **GPU was based on partnership with both local and national partners.**

(A) Local partners are:

- Lille City Council,
- Lille Métropole Communauté urbaine Council
- Public and private social housing trusts or associations
- Conseil général du Nord (*Département*, infra-regional tier of local government)
- Nord-Pas-de-Calais Regional Council

(B) National partners are:

- Agence nationale de la Rénovation urbaine (ANRU)
- Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations,
- Central government, notably the Ministry of Ecology, Power, Sustainable Development and Spatial Planning (*Ministère de l'Ecologie, de l'Energie, du Développement durable*) and its arm-length regional and local offices

Participative democracy and dialogue with local inhabitants is one of the principled bases for enacting GPU strategy. 3 initial public meetings are held in each of the 10 'quartiers' under the mayor's chairmanship, then inhabitants are called for meetings to give their advice while actions are being undertaken. Lille has been a pioneer in electing neighbourhood committees ('conseils de quartier') chaired by one of the deputy-mayors since 1978, long before they have become mandatory for bigger cities over 80,000 Inhabitants (Loi Vaillant Parliament Act, 2002)<sup>4</sup>. Local people are also invited to meet with technical support departments in the city council so as to discuss about the working of local services. Since 2006, one senior officer has been in charge of coordinating what has been called '*gestion urbaine de proximité*' (local urban area management) for the entire GPU. Urban policy and sustainable development is another aspect of GPU. Housing will be built or refurbished according to the sustainable development regulations (*Haute qualité environnementale*). Finally, social cohesion will be enhanced by a mixture of various categories of accommodation: council and privately owned houses as well as flats to be let out by tenants who can or cannot be granted public allowance, or to be bought by first-time buyers, etc.

### **Dedicated strategy and staff**

Urban renovation policy is based on contracted plans (called *Contrats de ville*, now *Contrats urbains de cohésion sociale*) to be developed along six main priority objectives that are assessed and defined in the plan:

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<sup>4</sup> Loi n° 2002-276 sur la démocratie de proximité . The act was passed on 27 February, 2002 and created compulsory community assemblies (*conseils de quartier*) in bigger communes.

- 1) Children and youth's achievement in schools and social equality
- 2) Citizenship, struggle against discriminations, and social work
- 3) Improvement of the built environment and housing
- 4) Economic development, employment, job-inclusion, and training
- 5) Health
- 6) Crime prevention

As part of Lille *Grand Projet Urbain* which expands to include the whole conurbation, Lille City Council has agreed with the central government on a contracted plan (CUCS) in view of two main stakes: to strengthen the relation between urban and social development and to develop public policy into a converging and coordinated strategy that favours the priority zones on the basis of priority directions for the comprehensive '*Politique de la Ville*'. The departments in Lille City Council have been reorganised so that each neighbourhood has its own dedicated senior officer playing the role of project manager and assistant staff. These members of the local governmental staff are in charge of defining and updating the assessed policy priorities on an annual basis. They also draw up a development scheme and run a network of local actors made up of both the voluntary and public sectors who help local actions and initiatives to develop. The actors consisting of local people who want to launch new project, business, etc, can ask for the help of advisory and supporting charities to find comprehensive solutions.

The specific principles for '*Politique de la Ville*' strategy have paved the way for new forms of public policies and institutional experimentations through partnership, contracting-out policy and co-financing, as well as comprehensive projects. Coherent and coordinated views are expected from central government departments and agencies (especially ANRU and ACSé), local authorities, the voluntary sector, and some private institutions that want to be involved. Every aspect of daily life for the inhabitants in the derelict areas must be taken into account and public policy is to concentrate on dedicated territories. Due to the importance of social exclusion factors that are concentrated in some places, some neighbourhoods are said to be priority zones. Networking in central government departments and agencies must secure an inter-ministerial vision. One very new aspect of this strategy is its tendency towards affirmative action as a way to restore equality. Finally, we can reinforce the importance –at least in the legal process and in theory - of participative democracy and inhabitants' and voluntary sector's participation in decision-making processes (see Appendix 5 for the Table: Policy-makers involved in '*Politique de la Ville*').

## 8 Conclusions

Many critics have commented on how complex and blurred the decision-making and financing processes are. Such critiques questioned the efficiency of '*Politique de la Ville*'. Every criticism questions how real, coherent or even relevant the transferred responsibilities from the central government to local authorities are. The experience of urban regeneration shows that there has been no devolved power, only a distribution of responsibilities among central government and public authorities, and among public authorities at the local level. Indeed, the strategy was invented alongside the first decentralisation reform. Responsibilities had already been or were to be transferred to local authorities and as for Education, Police and Justice, no decentralisation had ever been thought of. The distribution of powers is not a simple question as it proves to be less stable and irreversible than the principle of devolution in itself. It is the outcome of a negotiating process which has been first only vertical, between

the central and local government. Now, it seems to be horizontal as well, within municipalities and inter-communal bodies.

8.1 The issue of the distribution of responsibilities among local authorities remains an acute one. Various improvements are suggested. First of all, the way public money is to be granted to the voluntary sector must be quickly redefined. The way neighbourhood plans are mapped also needs to be reassessed; guiding and controlling policy enactment must improve in order to be more efficient. The fact is that 87% of the inhabitants living in renovation policy-affected communes said that they were not really satisfied with what has been done so far (CSA). Nearly 90% of them think the government is not concerned enough with urban regeneration and assistance to depressed areas. Only 8% see this issue to be a governmental priority. Figures drop down to 17% and 58% when the questions are put to the people who live in the 'renovated areas'. It remains to be seen if and how the present government and/or the newly elected President of LMCU will bring the final solution, socially, financially, and technically.

8.2 The issue of the distribution of responsibilities between central and local government raises several types of problem.

First it proves to be necessary to delineate each specific role for each player and to ensure a balance between the central government's obligation to think at the national level about one aspect of policy on one hand, and its respect for the local government's new responsibilities on the other hand. Secondly, in the long run, the balance in the distribution of powers has not always been clearly struck. *Politique de la Ville* also contributed to fuel more discussion about the role of inter-communal bodies and of communes. It can account for the attempted reinforcement of joint bodies as in the 1999 Act since no amalgamation process of small communes seems to be feasible in France. Also, because the city is not considered a proper organisation legally speaking, more dedicated organisations have to be created to fill in the gap. For example, inter-communal bodies, especially in larger conurbation like the Lille area are *the* new and major players in the field of urban regeneration.

Finally, contracted agreements are at the heart of the policy, and this raises another issue because contracts between public authorities are the main legal source of responsibilities that are distributed but these partnerships may open a larger debate about the various modes of public intervention or even the relevance of public intervention itself. Urban regeneration is not a responsibility for one or more decentralised local authorities in a decentralised state. It is rather an action plan that is enacted through the implementation of various legal responsibilities devolved to various public authorities. The urban strategy is therefore prepared for the next step in the decentralisation process. The more recent reforms that were initiated in 2004 and were still amended in 2009 had changed the exercise of power. The new model is one where one power is no longer restricted to one sole tier of the government and thus the various types of local authorities may be forced to compete against one another into bids. Some years after, the United Kingdom and the Single Regeneration Budget France had embarked into competing urban regeneration policies. In the case of the *Agence nationale de la rénovation urbaine (ANRU)* and the *Agence nationale de la cohésion sociale et pour l'égalité des chances (ANCSé)*, negotiations between different public authorities have replaced the central government's fixed and unilaterally decided funding in line with its own political priorities; clearly the *Conventions de rénovation urbaine* must conform with precise criteria to be authorised and funded. Their outcomes are assessed and contracted agreements provide for penalties if they are not fully implemented. Such partnerships limited the room for manoeuvre that was left to local authorities decades ago when cities or conurbations could

imagine their own policies through *contrats de ville* or *grands projets de ville*. As a report in the Senate (Sénat) expressed in November 2007, five years after the highly critical report of the Court of Accounts, the strategy should not be reduced to money-spending. The human aspect behind the formulation of a more comprehensive policy remains to be valued and its real impact and size are too difficult to figure out. '*Politique de la Ville*' needs to be objectively evaluated and in an in-depth manner before the government changes its strategy and goals once again.

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## Appendix 1: Maps of the Lille and the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Region



Source: fr.wikipedia.org





Source: lannuaire.service public.fr

## Appendix 2: Map of Urban Regeneration Policies Areas

Maps of the areas of the National Program of Urban Regeneration

Programme national de rénovation urbaine



(Source: Délégation interministérielle à la Ville) <http://i.ville.gouv.fr/divbib/doc/JM011PNRU2008.pdf>

### Appendix 3: Glossary

ACSé : Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances

ANRU : Agence nationale de rénovation urbaine

CUCS : contrat urbain de cohésion sociale

CV : Contrat de ville

CUCS : contrat urbain de cohésion sociale

GPU-GPV : Grand projet urbain, Grand projet de Ville

ONZUS : Observatoire national des zones sensibles

ZFU : Zone franche urbaine

ZUS : zone urbaine sensible

### Appendix 4: Inter-ministerial Office for Urban Regeneration Policy (Ministère de l'Ecologie, de l'Energie, du Développement durable et de l'Aménagement du territoire, 2007-2012)






## Appendix 5: Office of the General Secretary of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Urban Policy

(*Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel des Villes*)

(July 2012)

(Source: <http://www.ville.gouv.fr/?organigramme>, 192)



**Appendix 6: Policy-makers at European, national,  
local, business and citizen levels**

<b>European Union Commission</b>	<b>Central Government</b>	<b>Local authorities</b>	<b>Economic actors</b>	<b>Participative democracy</b>
European Regional Development Fund Objective 1	Zone franche urbaine	Regional Council		
European Regional Development Fund Objective 2		'Département' (infra-regional tier of local government)	Chamber of Commerce: support to business development in ZFU et ZAC)	
	ANRU	Commune or intercommunal authority	MEDEF(French Business Federation) : Training policy enacting	Community meeting (conseil de quartier) : consultation and proposals
INTERREG III	Opération Programmée d'amélioration de l'Habitat		Major firms (industrial or services sector)	<i>Atelier d'aménagement et d'urbanisme (Forum on land development and town planning)</i>
Urban 2	<i>Sous-Préfet à la Ville</i> (Préfet's assistant for urban policy)			<i>Association de Quartier</i> (local community assembly)
European Social Fund	Correspondant régional de la DIV			
Innovative actions	Inter-Regional Office of the Junior Minister for Urban Policies			

# Manchester Case Study Report

*Catherine Durose*

## 1 Introduction: Neighbourhood distress as a topic of concern<sup>1</sup>

### 1.1 Context of the emergence of neighbourhood as a site for policy action

Since 1997, New Labour has been in government in the UK. Primary concerns of their early administration were addressing issues of democratic renewal, improvement in public service provision and tackling social exclusion. The 'neighbourhood' was perceived as a key and appropriate site for policy action and governance. The 'neighbourhood' is a long standing feature of public policy in the UK, dating back to community development initiatives in the 1970s and the UK has been perceived as an international leader in neighbourhood-based working.

Four specific policy drivers have influenced the move to neighbourhood based working (Lowndes and Sullivan 2008):

- National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR): derived from the development of Indices of Deprivation which mapped the relative levels of deprivation across each ward. The strategy focused on the most deprived 88 wards or 'neighbourhoods' and provided resources in the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund for cross-cutting work to regenerate these neighbourhoods, tackle social exclusion and reduce inequalities across neighbourhoods. The Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (NRU) oversaw numerous programmes including the New Deal for Communities.
- Local government modernisation: Under the Conservative administrations of the 1980s, local government lost much of its autonomy and emerged with no coherent role. Initially, New Labour reforms focused on increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of service provision at the local level, but the scope of reform quickly increased as local government was seen as an important site for 'democratic renewal' and engagement with communities and citizens.
- Civil renewal: There are three core elements to this policy agenda: first 'active citizens'; second, 'strengthened communities'; and third, 'partnership'. 'Partnership' has become the new language of local governance and the communities are key stakeholders.
- New localism/ 'double devolution': These concepts broadly refer to the appropriateness and value of devolving power from central to local government and then to a range of stakeholders, including other public and private sector bodies together with community and voluntary sector groups.

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<sup>1</sup> This case study report includes information as per August 2008.

Since 1997, New Labour has introduced an almost bewildering array of area and neighbourhood based policies and initiatives. Adoption and adaption of these policies have varied widely as locally appropriate. Many of the neighbourhood based initiatives are now coming to the end of their allocated funding periods and actors across all levels of policy making and delivery are questioning where neighbourhood policy is set to go next.

## 1.2 Neighbourhood Conditions in Case Study City

Manchester is a large conurbation in the North West of England. Within the institutional framework of regional governance, the city council works in conjunction with the local strategic partnership, Manchester Partnership, the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) and the Government Office for the North West (GONW). In terms of carrying out economic development and regeneration, the city council works with the North-West Regional Development Agency (NRDA) and the umbrella group for organisations in Greater Manchester, Manchester Enterprises.

Manchester is a city that has widely been acknowledged to have undergone a radical regeneration and development in the last decade. This renewal of the city has been strongly led by the leader and Chief Executive of Manchester City Council together with partnership with the private sector and latterly developing partnerships across the public sector and to a lesser extent with voluntary and community groups. However, the central business district of Manchester is circled by large areas of socio-economic deprivation and the city ranks third in the UK for deprivation. The local authority is acknowledged nationally as a forerunner in urban regeneration. Some examples for further illustration are: undertaking one of the first government programmes for integrated area based regeneration, City Challenge in Hulme between 1992 and 1997; acting as a pathfinder authority for the New Deal for Communities programme from 1998 onwards; Housing Market Renewal Fund pathfinder (with Salford) from 1999; and in New East Manchester (NEM) providing the site for one of only seven urban regeneration companies (URCs) in the UK.

‘Neighbourhood’ is not a term widely used by Manchester City Council (MCC), where the ‘ward’ continues to be the primary geographical demarcation. Although MCC has had a strong, stable Labour majority since its inception in 1974, it continues to be a strongly political council in the sense that councillors continue to be asserted as the key conduits between communities and decision makers. MCC is still strongly wedded to representative forms of democracy which are deemed superior if not exclusive of more participative forms.

The sub-local form of organisation in Manchester is a system of ward co-ordination. Ward co-ordination began from Best Value pilots (initiatives to improve the efficiency or ‘value for money’ of public services provided by the local authority) within the city, that identified the potential for improvement in service delivery by working at the sub-local level. Ward co-ordination requires senior council officers to take responsibility for a particular ward and make decisions about variations in service provision within the ward in conjunction with councillors. The link to communities is often assumed, yet many community based workers, groups and activists dispute the strengths of these links.

The key form of community engagement in Manchester continues to be through tenants and residents’ associations (TARAs). Historically this reflects the extensive social housing in the city. TARAs are perceived as a legitimate and representative means of articulating community concerns. However, a number of TARAs have been ‘de-recognised’ by the council, a process

which many community groups and activists attribute to unwillingness on behalf of the council to engage in a perhaps critical dialogue with the community.

### 1.3 Introduction of Case Study Neighbourhoods

#### *Case study 1: Beswick*

Beswick is a neighbourhood to the East of Manchester's city centre and is predominantly a white working class area, although the ethnic composition of the area is rapidly changing with the influx of central and eastern European economic migrants together with refugee and asylum seeking communities. Beswick is part of a current and ongoing regeneration initiative, New East Manchester (NEM), which brings together a range of government and European funding streams - notably the New Deal for Communities (NDC) project, of which Beswick and Clayton were pathfinder projects - and cross sectoral partners. The regeneration of the neighbourhood has been ongoing since 1999 and strategies are now set until 2018. The NDC project in Beswick has received national acclaim for its community engagement strategies. However, there is currently concern for the sustainability of the level of engagement as the NDC funding is ending in 2008 and the initiative will be merged with the wider NEM which is more focused on physical and economic regeneration.

#### *Case study 2: Hulme*

Hulme is an inner city multicultural neighbourhood with a long and contested history of regeneration in the form of both city and government intervention. The area was the site for extensive slum clearance in the 1960s, and then one of the first areas where an integrated multi sectoral strategy for regeneration was implemented in the UK in the form of the City Challenge initiative which ran from 1992 to 1997. During the course of this initiative, Hulme underwent substantial physical and demographic changes aiming at increasing the number of families and young professionals in the area. In the decade following the City Challenge initiative, Hulme has continued to receive particular focus from Manchester City Challenge in an attempt to consolidate and develop the changes in Hulme, particular in terms of tackling economic deprivation, notably in terms of addressing unemployment through job creation from investment in the area. Hulme has a long history of community activism, notably on environmental and social issues which has manifested in ongoing tensions with the city council. City level actors are often dismissive of activists as 'unrepresentative' of their communities and as the 'usual suspects'.

The neighbourhoods for the case study were selected in order to provide an interesting comparison both in terms of the relative legacies of regeneration and ongoing regeneration intervention, but also due to their proximity to the central business district of the city and the differing ethnic composition. Yet both neighbourhoods were also clearly urban, deprived and have been the subject of previous evaluative scrutiny.

#### **Neighbourhood conditions**

At the start of the respective government programmes of intervention in urban deprived neighbourhoods, Hulme (City Challenge) and Beswick (New Deal for Communities) represented some of the most deprived wards/ neighbourhoods in Manchester.

Hulme has a long and contested history of regeneration, commencing as noted with the slum clearances of the 1960s. The legacy of this and subsequent cycles of regeneration are still strongly felt in the neighbourhood today. However, Hulme has widely been described as becoming 'normalised' since the regeneration programme of the 1990s, and statistically Hulme is no longer one of the most deprived wards in Manchester. However, there are

questions raised as to whether these statistics reflect the shifting demographics in the area rather than an improvement in the socio-economic situation of the pre-existing communities in Hulme.

In Beswick, the trajectory of regeneration is shorter as the area was not considered to be particularly deprived until the collapse of secondary industry in the area in the 1970s. Beswick and the neighbouring wards in East Manchester and adjacent areas in North Manchester were the subject of numerous unsuccessful applications for regeneration funding in the early 1990s. The New Deal for Communities initiative focused on a far smaller area for regeneration than these previous bids and this has been the subject of ongoing tension in the community as some community members feel that they are ‘missing out’ on the benefits of regeneration.

## 2 Policy Interventions in Two Chosen Neighbourhoods

### 2.1 Overview of the two Interventions

The two neighbourhoods differ in their current regeneration interventions. Beswick is currently in receipt of funding from the New Labour government’s New Deal for Communities initiatives, whereas a strategy for the ongoing regeneration of Hulme has been developed by the city council and partners as part of their overarching strategic regeneration framework.

#### *Beswick: New Deal for Communities*

New Deal for Communities (NDC) was one of numerous initiatives coordinated by the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (NRU) located in the then Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). NDC was a funding programme targeted at deprived neighbourhoods which aimed at reducing inequalities between those neighbourhoods and the national average, at the same time also seeking to improve outcomes on a range of issues, including health, employment and education. NDC Pathfinders were initiated in 1998, with a second round of funding starting in 1999. Manchester was one of the Pathfinder areas, securing funding of over £50m over the following ten years. The funding was subject to a competitive bidding process based on local multi-sectoral partnerships. The partnership board, which includes community members, is then key in steering the programme.

In Manchester, the NDC area is part of a wider package of funding applied for by local partnerships to facilitate the extensive and intensive regeneration perceived to be required for the area of East Manchester. Various funding initiatives, including Education and Health Action Zones and SureStart are encompassed in the umbrella urban regeneration company, URC, of New East Manchester. Whilst NDC funding ends in 2010, the strategic framework for NEM has recently been approved for continuation until 2018.

#### *Hulme: strategic regeneration framework*

The ‘district’ level strategic regeneration framework in East Manchester is replicated by local partners, led by Manchester City Council across the city with different framework developed for the North, West, South and South Central districts of the city. These strategic frameworks encompass the ward coordination system, but make little additional provision for community engagement in the process. Community participation in decision making is widely seen as being ‘ramped up’ in regeneration areas, where community buy in is recognised as important. In ‘non-regeneration’ areas, the role for community engagement is less accepted. In Hulme, the strategic regeneration framework is perceived as a process to complete the transformation

of Hulme and focused on concerns not fully addressed in the City Challenge programme of 1992 to 1997, in particular economic development concerns.

### 3 Explaining and interpreting neighbourhood interventions

Analysis of the Manchester case study drew on Lowndes and Sullivan's work on rationales for neighbourhood working (2008). They identified four rationales: *economic*, that neighbourhood working offered opportunities to challenge so-called 'dis-economies of scale' through personalisation and tailoring; *social*, organising services at a neighbourhood level would allow them to be more focused on the needs and aspirations of communities; *political*, elected representatives and the wider process of decision-making are more accessible at a neighbourhood level; and *civic*, neighbourhood working offered opportunities for community empowerment and greater voice in the issues that affect their everyday lives.

#### *City level agenda*

Manchester had a particular interpretation of the varying importance of these rationales (Durose and Lowndes 2010; see Durose and Richardson 2009 for a reflection of wider local government interpretations). The neighbourhood issues that dominate the agenda at the city level are primarily *economic*, both in the sense of attracting investment and tackling unemployment, as well as improving service provision. However it is also *political* in terms of maintaining the role and influence of councillors and of the city council at large in decision making. In contrast, the issues that dominate the agenda at the neighbourhood level are primarily *social* and concerned about capacity building, and also *civic*, seeking to foster social cohesion and engagement. The two sets of concerns are not mutually exclusive, but are indicative of the perspective of different levels within the city (Durose and Lowndes 2010).

In terms of area based priorities, the focus of neighbourhood intervention and regeneration is widely acknowledged to have shifted from Hulme and the adjacent area of Moss Side to East Manchester, including Beswick. However, the levels of deprivation in the city are such that strategic regeneration frameworks have been developed for all city districts. It is broadly predicted that areas of North Manchester will be next to receive focused attention in order to tackle deprivation.

#### *Strategy of intervention*

Intervention is often understood to be needs based, targeting the most deprived. However, in Manchester, most of the wards in the city are classified as deprived, many severely so. Intervention has therefore been based more on: opportunities in attracting government funding, for example City Challenge in Hulme and NDC in Beswick; public attention on a particular area, for example 'Gunchester' reporting focusing on Hulme and Moss Side in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a precursor to the City Challenge initiative; external events, for example the 1996 IRA bombing of Manchester city centre was seen to prompt a 'spoke model' for regeneration starting in the city centre, moving to East Manchester and now to North Manchester.

The objectives of regeneration are varied. Government regeneration initiatives in the 1980s often aimed for physical renewal accompanied by a process of gentrification. From the mid 1990s onwards, social and economic objectives for regeneration were developed. Under New Labour, an agenda of reducing inequalities between the most deprived neighbourhoods and the wider urban area was a key objective.

Manchester is seen as a national leader in delivering integrated urban regeneration programmes, starting with the regeneration in Hulme in the mid 1990s, and continuing in East Manchester from the late 1990s onwards. Leaders of Manchester City Council are eager to emphasise the strong working relationships they have developed with the private sector and latterly with public sector partners. The development of more inclusive partnerships involving the community and voluntary sector is ongoing.

#### *Resource availability*

Policies aimed at tackling social exclusion in the most deprived neighbourhoods in the UK have received over the last ten decades approximately £500 million per annum. Under New Labour, departmental budgets have been increasingly subject to centralised control by the Treasury. In turn government departments have been increasingly unable, or unwilling, to cede further control of finances to local government. The budgets for certain initiatives, for example the competitively tendered New Deal for Communities are devolved to project boards, but the focus and themes of the project are shaped centrally.

#### *Political and governance relationships*

At the city level, Manchester provides a good example of 'urban entrepreneurialism' (Cochrane et al 1996; Ward 2003) - a concept that refers to cities behaving like businesses, developing 'entrepreneurial measures narrated in entrepreneurial terms' (Jessop 1998, 80). The city level actors we interviewed took a pragmatic stance towards neighbourhood working. Neighbourhoods provided an appropriate spatial scale for integrated regeneration activities and, moreover, were the favoured locale for central government funded programmes. Neighbourhoods were an arena for the realisation of some key city level priorities. As David Harvey (1989, 6) notes, urban entrepreneurialism is a strategy that can be observed and examined at a range of spatial scales - 'neighbourhood and community, central city and suburb, metropolitan, region, nation state'.

City level actors were most attached to the economic rationale for neighbourhood working – that is, the benefits accruing from economies of scope: the bundling of a range of different services to maximise synergies and reduce duplication. Their narratives also touched upon the social rationale – the premise that a more holistic, partnership-based approach to service delivery allowed the council to better meet the needs of citizens. City level actors repeatedly identified the basis for the ward coordination system as lying in Best Value initiatives that aimed to improve service efficiency and effectiveness. Despite some rhetoric to the contrary, there was an absence of interest among city level actors in the political and civic rationales for neighbourhood working, related to a desire to protect vested political interests and corporate priorities. Manchester is a highly politicised city and senior elected members and council officers were clearly aware of the potential risks of engaging more with the community through neighbourhood working or, indeed, of empowering non-executive councillors to take more active roles at the very local level.

In stark contrast, the civic rationale dominated the discourse of actors at the neighbourhood level – both council officers and community activists. For them, the purpose of working at the neighbourhood level was to empower citizens and communities to take part in local decision making. The social rationale was also seen as important, but there was a desire to differentiate between the role of professional voluntary sector service providers and the interests and voices of community members themselves. The economic rationale was seen as important only in so far as it legitimated the case for localising service delivery. Neighbourhood level actors tended to be critical of the role of elected members in representing communities, particularly in poor areas, and there was little consciousness of the



political rationale for neighbourhood working. The focus on community engagement that accompanied central government initiatives (like New Deal for Communities, and City Challenge before it) had been vital in sustaining the civic rationale, but this was seen as under threat with the end of special funding and a return to 'business as usual' through ward coordination and the City Council's strategic regeneration framework.

The narrative of Manchester as an entrepreneurial city has shaped the city level approach to neighbourhood based working and regeneration. One senior city council officer, one of the Manchester Men' highlighted two important features of Manchester's approach: first, 'good local government' is about 'shaping places' that people want to live, visit and invest in; and second, Manchester has to see the whole of the North of England as its 'neighbourhood', in the sense of this being Manchester's 'catchment area' (for instance in terms of markets for labour, property, investment, leisure and retail)<sup>2</sup>. Within the discourse of urban entrepreneurialism, 'neighbourhood' becomes simply an arena within which individuals make choices (to take up residence or move out, to invest or develop). It does not feature as an actor in its own right, in the sense of expressing a set of collective interests or identities, or providing a basis for political or civic agency.

### *Neighbourhood legacies*

As noted, Hulme has an extensive history of regeneration dating from the 1960s. The perceived legacy of this regeneration is contested, with many city and neighbourhood based workers reflecting on the positive changes, but with the latter and the community articulating concerns that the pre-existing community has been neglected for the potential community that may now be attracted to live in the area. However, the pre-existing community is understood to be intensely territorial, focusing on the provision for their street or estate rather than taking a wider perspective on the changes.

Wider engagement of the community in the ongoing changes in the area is acknowledged by many to be dwindling since the direct regeneration funding for the area ended. One neighbourhood worker referred to this as the 'magnolia mentality' where residents end their involvement in the community once their own house has been improved. This is however also a reflection that the process of regeneration can be traumatic and draining and it is perhaps unrealistic to expect residents to maintain such a level of involvement over a long period of time.

Another possible explanation for the reduced level of community activism in Hulme is the ongoing difficulties that various tenants and residents' associations (TARAs) have experienced with the city council. One councillor – not in the ruling majority on the council – noted that in the five years that she had been a councillor, the council has 'de-recognised' eight TARAs in Hulme. 'De-recognition' refers to the process where a TARA is seen to have contravened or no longer meet the requirements to be an official TARA and receive funding from the city council. Many TARA members have argued that de-recognition is a result of their criticisms of the council. A long standing umbrella group for the TARAs in the area is now failing, in part as a result of an ongoing conflict with the council about payment of business rates.

Hulme is however an important site for new forms of activism, for example in environmentalist issues. Groups have been working towards bidding for 'eco town' status for Hulme, as a means of protecting some of the existing wild areas and lobbying for sites for

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<sup>2</sup> Senior city council officer (1)

green and sustainable industries. The community members involved in this sort of activism broadly came to Hulme in the period between the high rise developments of the 1960s becoming derelict and a site for squatting, and the regeneration of the area.

In Beswick, the legacy of regeneration is shorter, with significant changes only extending over the last ten years. With the NDC funding due to come to an end in the next two years, there are widespread concerns about the sustainability of the gains made since the start of NDC particularly in terms of the level of community engagement. The regeneration programme has also led to resentment within the area due to perceptions that some areas have disproportionately benefited whilst other areas have been neglected. There is also a perception from some community groups that the aim of the regeneration is to gentrify the area and re-locate the existing community in favour of attracting a different demographic; this process has also been termed 'social cleansing'.

## 4 Analysis I

- Why did intervention occur?

A neighbourhood approach emerged at the start of the 1997 New Labour administration and was a key part of the branding of the new government. New Labour set up a number of policy action teams (PATs) which involved bringing in practitioners with experience on the ground to constitute an evidence base for what was going on, particularly in deprived areas. PATs led to the setting up of the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU). Much of the work of the SEU was based on the understanding that social exclusion and deprivation had a spatial element. The 'neighbourhood' was seen as an appropriate site to tackle the processes of social exclusion, as it was a site based in part on spatial definition; it was a scale which evidence was available for; and it was an identifiable and recognisable unit, both in policy terms and for the wider community.

One of the key proposals which emerged from the SEU was the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR; SEU 2000, 2001). The NSNR identified priorities for action in relation to health, crime, employment, education and housing, targeting the eighty eight most deprived neighbourhoods in England, with the aim of narrowing the gap between deprived neighbourhoods and the rest of the country. A key element of the strategy was mainstreaming services to provide better outcomes in the most deprived areas. To achieve these improvements, the Government, local authorities and service providers "need to reallocate resources in their mainstream programmes to tackle deprivation better" (SEU 2001).

Implementation of the NSNR was co-ordinated by the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (NRU), supported financially through the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF), and overseen locally by local strategic partnerships (LSPs), as well as a locality wide umbrella group of cross sector stakeholders. The Neighbourhood Renewal Unit ran a number of the Government's cross sector regeneration programmes, including the Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder Programme which aims at developing inclusive local partnerships around neighbourhood based initiatives; the National Neighbourhood Management Network which is a network for individuals interested in planning or implementing neighbourhood management; and the Single Community Programme, which supports community groups through small grants.

The flagship programme coordinated by the NRU was the New Deal for Communities (NDC). New Deal for Communities is a funding programme targeted at deprived urban

neighbourhoods, with the aim of reducing inequalities between those neighbourhoods and national average outcomes on issues like health, employment and education. NDC Pathfinders (pilot programmes) were initiated in 1998, with a second round of funding starting in 1999. Funding was allocated through a competitive bidding process and required a cross sectoral partnership, including the community. NDC funding allocation was over ten years, a significant expansion from previous regeneration programmes and an acknowledgement of the entrenched problems in many deprived areas. Once established, NDC programmes were controlled by a NDC board, and importantly including local residents. Manchester City Council effectively led the partnership NDC pathfinder bid – building on several previously unsuccessful bids – for the small area of Clayton and Beswick in East Manchester.

‘Top down’ programmes such as NRU and NDC otherwise ‘bypassed’ the local authority level and linked central government with local cross-sectoral partnerships. Manchester City Council themselves have been far more reticent about adopting a ‘neighbourhood’ based approach to regeneration, adopting instead a more ‘entrepreneurial urbanist’ position, focusing on developing a vision for the regeneration of the whole city, working only in neighbourhoods as a means to achieve wider strategic goals.

## 5 Analysis II

Whilst ‘neighbourhoods’ are central to New Labour’s reform agenda, the turn to neighbourhoods is also significant in its complexity. The rationale and institutional design adopted in Manchester most closely reflects the ‘economic’ model for neighbourhood based work. City level actors repeatedly identified the basis for the ward coordination system in Best Value initiatives aiming at improving efficiency and effectiveness in service provision. However, from different actors, different rationales were articulated.

Manchester is a highly politicised city; elected members and council officers were clearly aware of the potential implications for representative democratic systems of engaging more with the community through neighbourhood based working, and the encouragement of more participative forms of decision making. As such, the mechanisms for involving the community are often limited and closed.

Regional and city level actors made only simplistic and often rhetorical reference to ‘civic’ and ‘social’ rationales for neighbourhood working. Whilst nominally committed to these rationales, city level actors often lacked a contextual understanding and the required skills to implement neighbourhood working that could deliver such outcomes. This situation and attitude was in stark contrast to actors at the neighbourhood level, particularly those with a community development role. The professional role of community development workers centres on ‘being on the side of the community’; many expressed a strong community to developing community cohesion and participation, seeing these ends as the key objectives for neighbourhood based work.

The focus on ‘neighbourhood’ as a site for policy action and governance has been notable in its absence from recent policy documents as central government seems to be moving more towards the language of ‘place shaping’ and ‘empowerment’. These two discourses reflect an ongoing attempt to find a coherent role for local government and for local partnerships to take responsibility for local social issues. Whilst ‘neighbourhood’ may continue to be an important site for local government, work at this level is no longer such as a focus or directive from central government.

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## Appendix 1: Background statistics on Manchester

### Background Information about Manchester

#### 1. CITY LEVEL

**Population** 44,200

*Registrar General's Mid Year Estimates 2005*

#### Heterogeneity

<b>Ethnic Groups</b>	<b>% of total Manchester population</b>
White	77.8
Mixed	3.2
Black	5.1
Asian	10.3
Chinese and others	3.6

*2004 experimental population estimates, Office of National Statistics (ONS)*

#### City wealth

<b>Mean annual gross pay (residence based)</b>	<b>£</b>	<b>Euros</b>
City of Manchester	21,001	30,173.49
North West England	21,147	30,383.26
UK	24,301	34,914.24

*Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2006, ONS*

#### Work status

<b>Work status</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Economically active</b>	Full time student (Further/ higher education)	53,915 <sup>3</sup>	
	Employed	311,800	
	Public sector		27.2
	Private sector		42.7
<b>Economically inactive</b>	Unemployed (of working age population) <sup>4</sup>		3.8 (City of Manchester)
			2.6 (Greater Manchester)
			2.6 (North West)
			2.4 (UK)

<sup>3</sup> Higher Education Statistics Agency 2003-4

<sup>4</sup> Unemployed claimants, May 2007 NOMIS, ONS, Manchester City Council Policy Unit (Analysis)

## Local and regional governance

### *Manchester City Council: organisational structure/ political composition*

Manchester City Council<sup>5</sup> is a metropolitan borough council with similar functions to a unitary authority. Manchester City Council is part of the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) who co-ordinate fire, police and waste disposal services. Manchester is divided into 32 electoral wards, each of which returns 3 councillors using a first past the post electoral system. Councillors serve a term of four years with a third of all elected members subject to re-election at every local election; the last of these elections was in May 2007.

Manchester has a Lord Mayor who is elected by the council and performs civic and ceremonial duties. Over the last decade, repeated calls have been made for Manchester to have an elected mayor with a role similar to that of Ken Livingstone in London, acting as a 'champion for Manchester' (BBC online 2005). Manchester City Council adopted a Leader and Cabinet system following the modernisation introduced by the Local Government Act 2000. This Act is widely seen to diminish the role of many elected members with ongoing discussion about how to convene a new role for councillors around the concept of councillors as 'local champions' (HO/ ODPM 2005).

The current council is led by Sir Richard Leese (Labour). The council has been controlled by Labour since its reconstitution in 1974 following the 1972 Local Government Act. The council has extensive administration and policy support led by the Chief Executive, Sir Howard Bernstein.

<b>Party</b>	<b>Number of councillors<sup>6</sup></b>
Labour	61
Liberal Democrats	34
Green	1
<i>Total</i>	96

### *Manchester Partnership*

Manchester's local strategic partnership is the Manchester Partnership<sup>7</sup>. LSPs are cross cutting bodies convened to provide 'joined up' and strategic leadership on a range of issues important at the local level. LSPs are part of complex multi-level governance arrangements in Manchester including area based initiatives, such as New Deal for Communities<sup>8</sup>; funding initiatives such as the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund<sup>9</sup>; and area and neighbourhood based initiatives. These arrangements are intended to facilitate and improve outcomes on a range of indicators around liveability, health, education, work, the environment and community engagement.

### *Government Office North West<sup>10</sup> (GONW)*

In the recent re-organisation of government departments, Beverley Hughes MP has been appointed as Minister for the North West, providing strategic leadership and responsiveness in the central government for the region. Formal administrative arrangements at the regional

<sup>5</sup> [www.manchester.gov.uk](http://www.manchester.gov.uk)

<sup>6</sup> After local elections 4 May 2007

<sup>7</sup> [www.manchesterpartnership.org](http://www.manchesterpartnership.org)

<sup>8</sup> [www.neweastmanchester.com](http://www.neweastmanchester.com)

<sup>9</sup> [www.neighbourhood.gov.uk](http://www.neighbourhood.gov.uk)

<sup>10</sup> [www.gonw.gov.uk](http://www.gonw.gov.uk)

level are administered by the Government Office for the North West (GONW<sup>11</sup>). The GONW is one of nine regional Government Offices in England representing and undertaking work on behalf of the ten central government departments concerned with domestic policy. The Government Offices also have overall responsibility for approving and administering various grant funds from the European Union.

Regional level governance also includes an assembly nominated by the 46 local authorities in the North West region. The eight such authorities established in England are now in the process of re-organisation and are being merged with Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), the relevant agency here being the Northwest RDA<sup>12</sup>. The role of these bodies is to lead on economic development and regeneration in the region. This merger is widely perceived as a u-turn on the earlier prominence given by New Labour administrations to English regional governance.

## 2. COUNTRY LEVEL

### **Towards governance**

The traditional understanding of 'government' in the UK focuses on the 'Westminster' model. The model emphasises a unitary centralised state characterised by 'parliamentary sovereignty, strong Cabinet government, accountability through elections, majority party control of the executive', and so on (Gamble 1990, 407). In the post-war era, however, there has been a shift from government by a unitary state towards governance by and through networks. In this period, the boundary between state and civil society changed. This can be understood as a series of discursive shifts from the hierarchies or bureaucracies of the post-war welfare state: through the marketisation reforms of the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s and to the emphasis now given by the New Labour governments to networks. An emphasis on networks contrasts markedly with the Westminster model of British government and this model is no longer able to capture the recent changes in British government; as such, a governance framework is now employed to reflect these changes.

Whereas 'government' is aligned with the organisational mechanisms of hierarchies and bureaucracies, 'governance' is aligned to the organisations mechanism of networks: 'governance refers to the informal authority of networks as constitutive of, supplementing or supplanting the formal authority of government' (Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 6). As such, networks are seen as a distinct co-ordinating mechanism. Networks are a long standing feature of British government and traditionally have been referred to as the sets of organisations clustered around a major government function or department. These may include professional organisations, trade unions and business; more recently, pressure groups, lobbyists and third sector organisations have all become prominent within policy networks. New Labour administrations have been explicit about perceiving governance through networks as a key way of re-defining the boundary between the state and civil society, and developing a more inclusive policy process. This more inclusive policy process is reflective of the notion that 'the classical hierarchical model of public administration does not work' (Hendriks and Topps 2005, 476). As a result, the process of governing is now carried out by numerous and various stakeholders operating in new public governance spaces (Hirst 2000, Rhodes 2000). This reduces government to 'only one of many actors' (Rhodes 2000, 63). This clearly presents a substantive and fundamental challenge to the conception of the UK as a

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<sup>11</sup> [www.gonw.gov.uk](http://www.gonw.gov.uk)

<sup>12</sup> [www.nwda.co.uk](http://www.nwda.co.uk)

unitary state; increasingly, it is viewed as a differentiated polity with complex multi-level governance arrangements.

### **Local government modernisation**

Manchester is an urban metropolitan authority or 'unitary authority'. This type of authority has control over leisure, environmental health, housing, rubbish collection and local roads; whole counties perform services like education, libraries, main roads, social services, trading standards and transport. Local council funding is comprised of central government grants, some based on the levels of deprivation in the area; council tax, a locally set tax based on property value and the proportion of revenue coming from this tax is quite low; business rates; and fees and charges from some services.

As implied, the UK has undergone significant reforms in recent years. Part of this has involved devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Local government modernisation has also been prominent in the reform agenda of New Labour governments, seeking to re-locate a role for local government following the reforms of the Thatcherite administrations.

The early part of the New Labour modernisation agenda for local government was focused on reforms in service delivery, notably Best Value and Comprehensive Performance Assessment. However, these measures have proven to be time consuming and onerous, differentiating little between councils and leaving little room for innovation. However, reforms in service delivery are only part of a wider package of reforms which aim at 'democratic renewal'. New Labour has differentiated themselves in contrast to their Conservative predecessors in their commitment to renew politics at the local level. The challenge defined by New Labour was to find ways of engaging people on their own terms and to develop active and meaningful involvement from communities in the policies and practices that affect them (Stoker 2004, 109). Other key policies have included the reform of the decision making structures in local government in order to allow a more transparent and accountable system.

### *Key legislation*

The Local Government Act 2000 aimed at strengthening the local executive by ending the committee system and moving to a council leader with a Cabinet drawn from local councilors. The recent Local Government White Paper, Strong and Prosperous Communities (2006), deals with the structure of local government. The White Paper proposes to strengthen the council executives, and provides an option between a directly-elected mayor who is a directly-elected executive or an indirectly elected leader with a fixed 4-year term.



**Appendix 2: Interviewees****RUN project: Manchester case study – interview sample****Central government (5)**

Department for Communities and Local Government

**Regional (3)**

Government Office North West/ North West Regional Development Agency

**City (12)**

Councillors, senior management, officers, Local Strategic Partnership participants, other key stakeholders

**Neighbourhood****Beswick (9)**

New East Manchester regeneration team, community groups and activists

**Hulme (12)**

South Manchester regeneration team, councillors, council officers, community development workers, police community support officers, third sector stakeholders, community groups and activists



# The Politics of Neighbourhood Regeneration in Paris

*Sophie Body-Gendrot*

## 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The study of neighbourhood regeneration is appropriate for Paris. The focus on unity as a value, as emphasised by the French, implies that they expect the state to play an important role in fighting inequalities, fostering social inclusion and sustaining policies alleviating social distress in specific neighbourhoods. Such social prevention policies which are more place-oriented than people-oriented have been sustained for the last thirty years. There has been recognition among Left, as well as Right wing national and local elites that neighbourhood distress was a problem hampering districts, cities and regions as a whole. This national policy, though called *politique de la ville*, but is yet focused specifically on targeted neighbourhoods, has been supported continuously, with less and less enthusiasm however.

## 2 Overview: Economic and Social Background<sup>2</sup>

### 2.1 The economic profiles of the City and of the region

As France's capital city and most important metropolitan area (Ile de France) in terms of population<sup>3</sup>, Paris (with 2,153,600 residents) enjoys a rather dynamic economic situation overall. It can be compared with London, Moscow or Istanbul. The region Ile de France is one of the wealthiest regions in Europe (Ronai, 2004). The Gross Industrial Product was 500,839 million Euros in 2006. 30% of the wealth of France comes from this region and 20% of its population. Yet compared with other metropolises, the size of Paris's intra muros appears as an anomaly as it is 105 km<sup>2</sup> vs London (1,579 km<sup>2</sup>) or Berlin (889 km<sup>2</sup>). The region is 12,000 km<sup>2</sup> with a density of 964 residents per km<sup>2</sup> (in 2007). It explains why numerous plans for a Greater Paris are currently being studied.

#### 2.1.1 Economic Health

Paris is a highly targeted city for foreign investments boasting of modern airports<sup>4</sup> and public transportation infrastructures<sup>5</sup>, highly innovative and competitive research poles<sup>6</sup> as well as thriving third-sector firms. In 2006, it ranked second in terms of international investments among European cities and only Tokyo outranked Paris in its accumulation of 500 Fortune

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<sup>1</sup> This case study report includes information as per August 2012.

<sup>2</sup> Numerous tables that show disparities between the city and the broader metropolitan region are provided in the appendix.

<sup>3</sup> This area has 11,700,000 inhabitants according to official sources, out of the national French population which is 63 million (APUR, 2008),

<sup>4</sup> 82,400,000 passengers in 2006

<sup>5</sup> 1 billion passengers in trains in 2008 including 700 million in the region with 6,000 trains a day stopping in 400 stations

<sup>6</sup> This includes 137,000 public and private researchers and 594,000 students in the region in 2005-6),

companies (52 vs 37). Greater London has 32 and New York 29 out of all the companies ranked by Fortune 500.

In 2006, the Gross Industrial Product of the Region represented over 28% of the national wealth yet with 19% of the French population and 22% of the jobs (APUR, 2008, 132). With 612,000 firms (2006) and 5,416,000 jobs, Paris ranked fourth among world metropolises after Tokyo, New York and Los Angeles (Gilli and Offner 2009, 57).

See appendix 1 for the following:

Table 1: Data from the Region in 2007 collected by national sources, INSEE, National Education, International Work Bureau.

Table 2: Evolution, structure, anticipation of the population in the Region.

Table 3: Gross Domestic Product of the Region vs France.

Table 4: Job distribution in the Region in 2005.

Table 5: Unemployment in the Region and in France 2005, 2006 and 2007.

Table 6: Distribution of incomes.

Table 7: Distribution of Public housing in the region.

Table 8: Public transportation.

## 2.2 Inequalities

In the Ile de France region and the city of Paris, inequalities are important. Disparities in access to adequate institutional services connecting distressed neighbourhoods in the periphery to more economically disadvantaged areas located in the central or western parts of the city, the so-called Golden Crescent localities, put constraints on development of Paris. As of mid-2004, the Paris metropolis included 1.9 million immigrant households from 160 different origins which comprised 17% of the population. Foreign immigrants in Paris's intra muros, which is 18.3 %, constituted over a fourth of the population in the problem areas (26.4%) according to data in 2007(Observatory of priority neighbourhoods 2007, 18). Contrary to London, Paris never made an asset out of its multiculturalism (Gilli, op.cit, 59).

Regarding unemployment (see table in appendix), the situation in France is worrisome since unemployment is one of the key factors leading to poverty and social exclusion. According to the State of European Cities Report, (DG Regio, 2007, 87) the unemployment rate varied enormously across European cities, ranging between 3% and 32% in 2001. There is no uniform trend in the spatial location of cities in terms of the level of unemployment, although North Western Europe performs slightly better than the south of Europe.

Not only is the rate of unemployment worth studying, but also intra-city variation. "One of the most striking indicators for a lack of social cohesion within any city is a significant variation between the unemployment rates of different neighbourhoods." (ibid, 90) This indicator is high in French, Belgian, and also South Italian and Hungarian cities, which might indicate strong spatial segregation of social groups in these countries.

In the region, 561,000 unemployed people were registered in 2005. The rate of unemployment was 7.5% in the second term of 2007. Paris lagged behind other French metropolises in terms of employment. The problem was especially acute between 1975 and 1999 when Paris lost 170,000 jobs (Insee, 2007). Paris's intra muros lost 6.4% jobs between 2000 and 2005, in contrast with the first ring of suburbs (+3.8%), outer ring (+2.8%), the Ile de France (IDF) region (+0.1%) and the rest of the country (+2.8%). However, 11,000 more jobs were gained in 2006 and 10,000 in the first six months of 2007. There are currently 55,600 more firms in Paris than at the beginning of 2001. Between October 2003 and 2008, unemployment had decreased by 28% (vs 18% at the national level) (Sauter and Missika, 2008). But since 2008, the unemployment rate in Paris (8.4% at the end of 2012) has been lower than at the regional

(8.5%) and national level (9.6%) A neighbourhood department such as Seine-Saint-Denis registers an unemployment rate of 12.2% in the first half of 2012.

### 2.2.1 Welfare

France remains a generous welfare state, fulfilling the dual role of a philanthropist and that of a stretcher bearer. At the national level, the budget allocated to welfare was 550 billion Euros in 2008, 5% of the GNP. Numerous forms of state redistribution help the French and the non nationals to establish their lives more firmly in the cities, and also support public services<sup>7</sup>. The number of households receiving minimum benefits (RMI) is high nationally and in the region. 10% of the population in the problem areas lived on welfare subsidies in 2007. (See appendix)

The demographic profile<sup>8</sup> of France can be partly attributed to these generous welfare measures, earned income credit and numerous public kindergartens and child care. The support for childcare facilities is important as 90% of three-year old children and 70% of two-year old depend on them.

### 2.2.2 Diversity

A most obvious recent socio-demographic trend in Paris within the last decade has been the visible presence of higher-income and skilled groups in the central and western districts of the city (Fijalkov and Oberti, 2001).

The exodus of the middle-classes to more affordable suburban neighbourhoods has slowed in the last few years and socially marginalised groups have remained in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. According to the 1999 census, the aging population in Paris had reached 19.6% (vs 16.6% for IDF). In contrast, there was a growth in the youth population which peaked at 25.2% in the IDF Region (vs 18.3% for Paris) (Merlin, 2003). Last but not least, there is a larger share of home-owners in the outer suburbs than in Paris or in the inner suburban ring where tenants tend to be a majority.

## 3 The national/local context

The role played by the city government is marked by the singular relations the City has interwoven with the French state. It means that the leverage the city has towards its distressed neighbourhoods is partly an outcome of decisions made at the national level, then reinterpreted by City Hall and in some limited ways by the decentralised City Halls, acting in interaction with neighbourhood institutions.

It is then of utmost importance to understand that the national government is a source of mandate, of directives and inducements, and that there has been thirty years of continuity in support to distressed neighbourhoods.

The law supporting such policy which is called *politique de la ville* is debated every three years in Parliament. As will be explained further, it is not a policy supporting the city but only specific distressed neighbourhoods. The state is indeed providing the budget for this form of territorial affirmative action and the funds are set aside by the minister in charge (currently the Minister in charge of the Cities). Due to a national evaluation derived from statistical data, some neighbourhoods opt out and others opt in at each evaluation.

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<sup>7</sup> The support rendered to these services has enhanced the reputation. For example, 88% of the French have a positive image of the police and of civil servants in general in 2007.

<sup>8</sup> For example, the fertility rate is 2 children per woman.

The weight given to the local sphere is to be emphasised. Although one must note that in France, the policy supporting distressed neighbourhoods in 1981 was not a bottom up conquest, but rather a decision from the central state to act differently (in a less centralised way) in order to be more efficient. The state technocrats were using other tools to reach their goal so as to force the state to act in an unusual way by another approach to the local sphere.

The evolution from policies of social prevention to policies of safety occurred at the end of the 1990s in France. Better communication at the European level also pushed France to harmonise its policies<sup>9</sup> with the neighbouring countries, despite the fact that safety remained a sovereign function of the state per se. Electoral concerns also grew, based on mayors' and public opinion's anxieties about crime and delinquency. Urban safety appeared as the number two priority in France after employment in the 1990s. French mayors who, at the beginning of the 1980s, would never have used the word "repression" were now requiring more police resources, more sanctions, and more local control. Other mayors with diversified political labels passed repressive measures, forbidding aggressive panhandling or imposing curfews. Such local ordinances were censored by the state council and the higher administrative court in France as a threat to civil liberties. However, most mayors observed a status quo: they were rarely overtly punitive and populist as they could not measure the impact of such rhetoric and measures on their constituents. The will to preserve the "social link" in France and to avoid playing one component of the local population against another seemed the safer course. It would explain the reluctance to negatively label offenders, according to their race or ethnicity, despite them being well-known as drug dealers. *Identity* in France refers usually to the micro-territory where people live.

The risk with this approach, characterised as either preventive or repressive, is that it relies exclusively on the partnership of public institutions, thus excluding the private sector, citizens and their social capital. The French interpretation of governance is public/public/public. As the state however attempts to 'steer' more and 'row' less, it authorises, licenses, audits and also inspects other partners' actions. Processes of control and verification allow those that "steer" to monitor and correct the activities of those that 'row', as Crawford remarked. Similar processes have been observed in other European countries (Crawford, 2001). It is difficult to evaluate the *politique de la ville* and to figure out the number of crimes and deaths (by overdose, divorces and disruptions) that have been avoided due to local policies of prevention. What experts have pointed out is that this policy did not keep the residents in the targeted neighbourhoods since those who could have already left the problem neighbourhood (about 10% over 10 years in the region). Many of them settled in detached homes in nearby areas where votes for the far right were important. Consequently, as revealed by the 1990 and 1999 censuses, the concentration of poor, insecure and isolated people in the targeted neighbourhoods actually increased. Those who had left were immediately replaced by poorer newcomers who found in these neighbourhoods, a first-entry site that they could not afford anywhere else.

There are also discussions regarding place-based interventions that will be targeted at the most deprived neighbourhoods. Such interventions are needed to correct market failures, empower residents, as well as to improve their access to mainstream job opportunities and other institutions of society (Vranken-De Decker-Van Nieuwenhuize, 2003, 61).

There are, however, other views contesting the potential of area-based policies stemming from wider societal perspectives. Such "... approaches simply displace problems between different neighbourhoods and do not add to the overall economic and social well-being of the city as a whole – they are the equivalent of rearranging the deck chairs of the Titanic...". This is all the more relevant as "... the causes of the problems and the potential solutions ... lie

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<sup>9</sup> This could be seen for instance in terms of crime prevention.

outside the excluded areas.” (Vranken-De Decker-Van Nieuwenhuyze 2003, 62) According to this view, the problems of the most deprived areas cannot be solved from within these areas. Instead, other interventions such as reducing poverty, increasing the level of education, the quality of housing, providing adequate services to the residents (such as community policing), etc, are needed.

Recent statistics confirm the magnitude and the widening of the gap separating, on the one hand the neighbourhoods targeted by the *politique de la ville*, and on the other hand, other neighbourhoods in the Parisian metropolitan area. These statistics consist of multiple inputs: unemployment, academic failure, poverty, feeling of insecurity, etc. It is not really surprising that these neighbourhoods would be perceived as failures, as the resources granted to this policy were never those of a Marshall Plan. General policies dealing with education, employment or welfare actually distribute fewer resources per inhabitant in the targeted areas than in other neighbourhoods. In some cases, the implementation of the *politique de la ville* has in fact been accompanied by a withdrawal of regular facilities, reinforcing the feeling among residents of being abandoned or ostracised (Epstein 1999, 128). This statement is confirmed in our field study.

What is frequently overlooked is that the policy supporting poor neighbourhoods has also been activated by the riots covered by the media. They occurred every year in the 1980s and 1990s, and still occur currently with less visibility though than in 2005 (Body-Gendrot, 2012; 2013). Funds have been distributed to neighbourhoods less for their criteria of distress than for their unrest potential. There is no link between deprivation and urban violence but deprivation is one of the contributing factors to turn certain neighbourhoods into powder kegs. In the last ten years, the economic situation has deteriorated in the former working-class areas of the region. Temporary, unstable and informal work among young people, women and immigrants has created a direct effect on overall working conditions. It has given rise to a “stretching downwards” of the distribution of wages and employment conditions, which had a disproportionate impact on the weaker sections of the workforce. Not all poor neighbourhoods are hit by violence though and the theory of relative deprivation is to be taken cautiously.

In comparison with American cities, it must be pointed out that the stronger regulatory environment, including protective legislation and the minimum wage, social welfare entitlements, more extensive state employment and the institutionalised role of organised labour in European countries, limit the polarising effects of market pressures. This happens not by sustaining professional employment within the state itself, although the “neo-liberal turn” in state policy is also linked with polarisation in this context too (Morlicchio, 2009). The deteriorating situation in the worst hit urban neighbourhoods comes from the worsening of the waged condition, a deterioration increased by the demands of the global economy and the mismatch phenomenon. The instability and the destabilisation of work, one of the bases of social integration, has turned a swath of the population into marginal or residual elements (Castel, 2000, 528) that only state welfare provisions could attenuate but not entirely remove. Social insecurity has been amalgamated with civil insecurity in public opinion, stigmatising poor neighbourhoods.

## 4 The local structure of politics and government

### 4.1 The mayor

For a long time, Paris did not have an elected mayor. The power of Paris has always been feared by the national state authorities. This suspicion is historically grounded. The capital of France, Paris, has been the city of uprisings, dating back from the Middle Ages to the end of World War II. Paris was the locus of the revolutionary power which had overthrown the

monarchy, then provided the site for another revolution in 1848, and had also witnessed the Commune revolt at the end of the 19th century (Harvey, 2003). The rebellious reputation of Paris made the various central powers that were in place, be it monarchical or Republican, distrust any form of Parisian local government. The annexation of neighbouring localities in 1860 increased the number of districts (*arrondissements*) from 12 to 20. After the revolutionary episode of the Commune in 1871, the city was deprived of a mayor. It was then weakly ruled by city councillors whose number grew from 36 to 60, then to 90 in 1935 (as the population was growing as well) until 1967. General de Gaulle wrote in his *War Memoires* that: should you let Paris have its own way, it would capture all the power of the country for itself. What he had in mind was the strong presence of Communist elected officials from the Parisian Region trying to impose their control over the central state in 1945. This is the reason why, even before the Paris Liberation, two state Prefects were appointed to rule Paris, one for the territorial department of Seine and one for the Paris Police.

Paris attained its autonomy as an administrative entity only in 1975, a long time after other large cities and became entitled to be run by an elected mayor. The elected President V. Giscard D'Estaing, a conservative who had benefited from the Parisian votes decided to give Paris an elected mayor, thinking that one of his allies would be elected. But his opponent, Jacques Chirac, was elected the mayor instead. The two strong men at the head of Paris thus became the new elected mayor on one hand and on the other, the Police Prefect. The number of city councillors at this time reached 109.

When F. Mitterand, a Left party member, was elected President of France in 1981, he wanted to give Paris a new status with twenty full-power districts. The conservative mayor of Paris, J. Chirac, fought this measure since this would have diluted his own power. As a compromise, he supported a specific law passed by Parliament granting the three major French cities, Paris, Lyon and Marseille, a special status. Despite the decentralisation laws giving more power to local authorities, the ability of the mayor to exert its influence over the municipal governance still remains limited in two major ways.

Firstly, the mayor of Paris's power is diluted by the twenty district mayors who are elected by the city councillors from the twenty Parisian districts. Some of them can become an oppositional force to the mayor. They are consulted on matters related to their districts (including land use and architecture); and they play an active role regarding the location of local infrastructures, the kindergartens' management, the location for tennis games, etc. Secondly, Paris is run by a Police Prefect who the mayor has no control over regarding police matters. His position was established in the 18th century and he is under the direct authority of the French government which appoints him. He is not accountable to the mayor of Paris and hardly to the Minister of Interior (Home Office) although he rules on matters of urban safety. While there is no municipal police in Paris, the city has more policemen per capita (one per 125) than New York (one per 205) and a better average ratio than in the rest of the country. However, the shortage of resources has given the mayor of Paris more leverage over the Police Prefect recently<sup>10</sup>. The Prefect has to present a budget request to the City Council. 45% of the Police Prefecture's budget comes from the city government.

Gradually, the leverage of the mayor on safety has been slightly extended by law. Fairs and open markets, street vendors, parks and gardens, noise, parking and car traffic in smaller streets are now under the supervision of the mayor.

This formal governmental structure however does not typically reflect the actual mayoral leadership style in Paris. Instead of a weak leadership, the mayor assumes a rather powerful role. When Jacques Chirac was at the head of the City Hall as a newly elected right-wing

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<sup>10</sup> For instance, the city lends some of its employees to this Prefect to do police work.



mayor in 1977, he set up a powerful political machine with clientelistic underpinnings that had caused the district mayors to be left with a merely consultative role (Lidgi, 2001). Most districts were run by conservative party mayors who formed a majority in the City Council. The leadership style was authoritarian and this tradition has been well anchored since then. The City Council has a twofold function given the status of Paris as both a city and a metropolitan *département* since 1964.

This evolution shows how Paris gradually came closer to the status of other French cities but not completely, since it remains ruled by two heads, one of them emanating from the state. The mayor is surrounded by 33 adjuncts and his own cabinet is made of 40 people. The mayor can run for elections endlessly as there are no electoral restrictions.

#### 4.2 The City Council

On the whole, the City Council has 517 members, out of which 163 are City councillors and the other 354 district councillors.

The City Council meets eleven times a year and decides on numerous issues concerning the city and the *département*, including the choice of neighbourhoods to be renovated. This is done according to data collected at the national level and also based on urban renewal decisions. District mayors design the territorial plans regarding their constituency; public services cooperate with each Adjunct in charge of security, prevention and social issues. The City Council decides on the selection of neighbourhoods. The implementation of urban policies is then carried out by social and economic development teams in each district, under the supervision of neighbourhood councils carrying out the residents' demands.

#### 4.3 Ballot form and party system

Local elections took place in 2001 and 2008<sup>11</sup>. The next ones will take place in 2014. Every six years, the candidates for the City Council are elected in two rounds on the basis of partisan lists established in each of the constituencies. The goal of the first round is to acquire an absolute majority (50% and one more vote at least) in order to get half of the seats. If no list gets an absolute majority, a second round takes place two weeks later. It is during this length of time that all kinds of arrangements and partisan alliances may occur. Only the candidates on the lists with more than 10% of the votes at the first round can run again. The party getting the most number of ballots gets half of the seats and the other parties are allocated seats according to a proportional representation system, provided they get more than 5% of the ballots. During the first round, there may be as many as twenty programmes with a candidate at its head to choose from, ranging from the green party to the party for the President, to women's lib parties or anarchists' parties. Some candidates placed first on a list of names may receive less than ten ballots and others, three hundred or so. Once the 163 councillors are elected one week later, the election of the mayor and the district mayors will take place during a public session but the choice is kept secret. To work efficiently, the city councillors regroup themselves into nine commissions.

Before the 2008 elections, the socio-democrat party and its allies made up 52 members of the City Council while the conservative party had 53 members. The mayor formed an alliance with the greens (17 members). At the extreme left of the political spectrum, the communists had 11 members and their allies 7. There were two factions at the centre (10+5) and non registered party members (8). All of these added up to a total of 163.

But the poor image of the socio-democrat party in the country at that time hurt the mayor's performance at the local election of March 2008. After the second round, due to his alliance with the greens, the mayor was re-elected with 57.7% of the votes for the city councillors but

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<sup>11</sup> These elections should have taken place in 2007 but were delayed due to national elections in 2007.

28% of the Parisians had clearly voted for the green party and not for the party of the mayor. European elections took place in June with the same electoral system. The green party came in first in 13 districts out of 20 and it bypassed the socio-democrat party in the region. Regional elections for a council and the president took place in March 2010. Although the elected president came from the same party as the Mayor of Paris, he became the latter's competitor regarding, for instance, Greater Paris.


#### 4.4 Neighbourhood-level structure

Compared with other French cities, Paris has lagged behind in terms of civic participation. In 2002, neighbourhood councils were legally created under the auspices of the Vaillant law that was passed regarding local democracy in cities over 80,000 residents. Vaillant is the district mayor of the 18<sup>th</sup> district. Since 1977, the city had remained extremely centralised. The policy favouring civic participation has always suffered a very low visibility which is a French feature. Until 1983, two thirds of the district councillors were members appointed by the mayor and only one third was elected - a way to eradicate political opposition to the mayor at the City Council level and in the districts devoid of resources.

Yet in the 1980s, local concerns at the neighbourhood level trickled up. Political stakes became more and more local and the neighbourhood appeared as a new political arena on its own with the promotion of ideas and potential solutions. This shift in favour of local democracy explained how the Left was able to bring its mayoral challenger, B. Delanoë to City Hall and won.

Seven experimental neighbourhood councils were created between 1995 and 1996. They managed local issues and deepened civic life. After 2002, neighbourhood councils were given a consultative role, in particular over decentralised urban policies. They are currently chaired by a new category of officials, representing neighbourhoods' interests. The residents sitting on the councils have to be French or European citizens. They are expected to bring forward proposals and initiatives to a new entity called the Parisian Observatory of Local Democracy (see chart 1). A few other councils at large have also been created at that time, one on students' life, one on non-European residents and one on youth. 1900 community centres, day care centres, sports centres, etc, have been decentralised and managed by these sub-governments.

Chart 1. Power distribution in Paris



In practice, none of the 121 neighbourhood-level structures looks alike. The neighbourhoods have different histories, profiles and structures of power. The council meetings bring together the elected officials, the community organisations and the residents drawn at random among voluntary citizens. In a few districts including the 18<sup>th</sup> district, non national residents can participate in a specific council for foreigners. The councils have a voice on leisure, security, and environmental issues. On the management of streets and with a small budget, they can also fund some local projects.

The distrust observed by the French state towards the City of Paris is mirrored by the distrust of elected officials at large towards the neighbourhood structures. They fear either an excessive politicisation of local life or clientelism. Some observers complain that top down trends creating these decentralised bodies may void bottom up modes of civic organisation.

Rhetorically, the current mayor B. Delanoë has favoured participatory democracy supporting "useful disorder". "When I say disorder, it means that I accept the fact that it regularly challenges the plans", he said; "disorder strengthens representative democracy". The central level at City Hall suggests, proposes, coordinates plans while the local levels enforce and adjust them to neighbourhood specificities (Rullier, 2004).

In practice, participatory democracy is less developed in Paris than in other large North European cities. Due to the presence of numerous poor immigrant families who do not vote and are disenfranchised, the local neighbourhood tools have not enough resources to favour their inclusion. The demographic composition of Paris shows an imbalance, with numerous stable neighbourhoods made up of a majority of white middle-classes benefitting at the expense of a few decaying neighbourhoods in the North-East and South of the city. In other words, the demands of middle class citizens for participation are more easily taken care of by

neighbourhood councils. The reason is simple. Political representation in Paris is skewed. In towns which have fewer than 500 residents, there is one elected official for 23 voters, in those which have over 40 000, there is one for 1000 voters but in Paris only one for over 13,000 voters (Hervieu and Viard, 2001).

If the sub-government arrangements suggested by C. Stone and al. (2009) are applied to Paris, the RUN policy suffers from inadequacies. Community-level institutions are only consultative; they are not policy-making and the constituencies addressed by this policy are marginal.

## 5 Important players.

### 5.1 Elected officials: the impact of the region

The cleavage between Paris intra-muros and the surrounding localities is historical. These localities are situated on three ring roads according to their distance from the centre. Since 2001 however, the city government of Paris has established loose links with surrounding localities. There are 1280 localities in the Region and 7 geographical *departments* (Paris is both a city and a department). The first ring is made up of 21 localities, representing one million residents. The second ring contains 400 localities. The project of the Greater Paris was launched by the President of France in 2008 with the aim to overcome the institutional, social and cultural fragmentation that had been caused by having so many departments and localities, as each comes with a mayor and a city council. However, its implementation meets continuous obstacles, including financial and political ones.

In an attempt to counter the state projects, the mayor of Paris has thus launched the project of Paris-Métropole which includes 200 localities with a Left majority. This structure aims to counter the influence of the region on numerous issues. Regional elections generate intense political manoeuvring.

The region (IDF) has important powers impacting on Paris. It formulates a master plan for the region and makes decisions regarding the transportation system with the approval of the national state. The syndicate of public transportation for the region (STIF) since 1959 and the RATP (Régie autonome des transports parisiens) report to the state but the schemes for buses and subway lines are developed both at the metropolitan or regional levels. 800,000 people commute to Paris from the periphery every day and 300,000 Parisians leave the city to work at the periphery<sup>12</sup>. The city owns canals that reach 120 localities, rivers and aqueducts, as well as garbage substations both managed by the city and 88 other localities. This garbage treatment concerns 8 million residents and four plants in adjacent localities. The city also owns cemeteries, parks and lots yielded to the national state and utilities. They are located in the adjacent periphery. The city also manages 20,000 units of public housing spread across 34 localities but at the same time managed by the Paris central office of public housing, OPAC (Office public d'aménagement et de construction) as well.

Charters have been signed between the city and these adjacent localities aiming to achieve better cooperation. The first charter was signed in 2002 with Montreuil, north east of Paris, followed by 6 charters the following year and ten more afterwards. On the whole, 425 actions of cooperation involving 120 localities started between 2001 and 2006. They were first approved by the city councils of these cities and then by the Paris council. They may affect the covering of the ring road around the city, electric tramways extension, sports centres, recreation spaces, cultural events, etc. Nevertheless, these forms of agreement remain very limited and fragile. The region has not played a structuring role as expected and numerous

<sup>12</sup> Information obtained from [www.syctom-paris.fr](http://www.syctom-paris.fr) and [www.siaap.fr](http://www.siaap.fr).

cities either pass agreements reflecting a polycentric pattern or deal directly with the state, while the region deals with semi-rural or rural entities.

This situation explains why the Greater Paris project, supported by the President of France, could generate a recentralisation of the state in terms of decision-making, bypassing elected officials who clutch on to their patches of power. A Prefect was appointed to head the Greater Paris and his transportation schemes competed with those of the region at a smaller scale. The problem for the implementation of the Greater Paris project comes from the lack of funds from the central state and consequently, due to the need to negotiate for necessary political compromises with elected officials in the region. The new elected majority on the Left seems reluctant to pursue the ambitious transportation scheme designed by the previous President's team.

## 5.2 The central administration in Paris

The originality of the law with regards to the promotion of local democracy in 2002 was that it implemented not so much decentralisation but rather state 'deconcentration'.

The leash of the French state on Paris did not become looser however. As said before, two Prefects - administrative and Police, keep an eye on the city. A very concentrated mode of operation still marks the Parisian administration and it is frequently acknowledged as such by top administrators.

Due to a strong vertical tradition, the state administrations act as "chimneys" to the central executive power rather than as partners of the mayor, the district mayors and their adjuncts. They ignore the democratic principle of accountability to the city. "Most of them complain that they are too often directly submitted to elected officials and to their cabinets either for a specific issue or for directions. They emphasize that should they be consulted, due to their technical expertise or to information clarification, the direct contact with the cabinets of elected officials, whoever they are, should always be prohibited...This type of proximity biases the hierarchical circuit, disturbs daily work and creates a malaise" (Spitz, 2004,119). Administrators think highly of themselves because they emanate from the powerful, centralised state, and because they supposedly embody the common interest. Most of them have resented the recent developments that are in favour of consultative bodies and local autonomy at the neighbourhood level. A greater number of partners disrupt the pyramidal model of the central services in the Parisian administration which would lose their monopoly, for instance on architectural and urban planning, education or the police. For their part, although elected officials acknowledge the competence and efficiency of the administration, they nevertheless complain about its extreme rigidity and inability to modernise itself. However, the mobilisation and efficiency of the administration to cope with catastrophes is excellent as seen in 2002, after a land collapsed under a schoolyard during the digging of a subway tunnel in the 13th district. The administrations dealing with patrimony and architecture, education and transportation reacted very rapidly and mobilised quickly with a partnership with the district city hall. The school children were transported to other schools, the mode of transportation taken care of, tents were set up in a nearby park, explanations were provided to parents and residents, and public meetings were organised (Spitz, 2004, 123). A similar mobilisation of the administration staff was observed during the heat wave of summer 2003. Paris registered fewer deaths than other large cities. The same campaign repeated again summer after summer.


The argument articulated in this study however, is that administrative isolation hampers elected officials' innovation and management and slows down their efficiency. Opaque competition and rivalries are encouraged by periods of change and adjustment, mutual distrust and controls mar the relationships among partners, especially with newly elected officials.

The question on who decides is never solved. Although the mayor of Paris is elected for six years, the weight of state administrations concerning decision implementation should not be overlooked.. The role of mayoral adjuncts depends on the strength of the district mayor.

### 5.3 Non-profit and City-wide advocacy groups and alliances

There is no long-standing non-profit organisation that meaningfully deals with housing and neighbourhood issues. Numerous groups are active during city hall sessions or demonstrating in public spaces. Some of them defend the poor and exert pressure for more public housing; others take side with undocumented immigrants, gays, artists, the elderly, and the handicapped. Some are directly linked to political parties: SOS-racism, Human Rights league (the Socialist party) or Secours populaire (the Communist party), and others such as Emmaüs are not. As in all large French cities, alliances of power brokers are made visible when issues (environment, traffic, pollution, high rise towers, research, sports, youth, and culture) are discussed in the media.

The case of private security agencies working for the public housing managers will illustrate the weight of such actors. The map below shows the different arrondissements in which these private actors dealing with security (groupe parisien d'intervention sur la sécurité) intervene.



Eight public housing managers in Paris have joined up to hire local teams of security. In 2004, City Hall terminated its contract with another private security agency which had been supervising all the public housing projects in the city after numerous dysfunctions had been revealed. The Mayor turned to the public housing managers and required them to take charge of this issue. The Groupe Parisien d'Intervention sur la Sécurité (GPIS) team patrols and responds to tenants' calls between 6.30 pm and 5 am when the janitors are no longer in charge. It manages 390 sites and 66,000 units and is part of the security contract signed by the City of Paris.

The mission of the GPIS is to ensure that the sites are secure and quiet. It assumes order maintenance by intervening in the private premises while the police are in charge of law enforcement for areas such as the public space. The GPIS is not allowed to intervene in the public space. The residents who distinguish between both agencies do not understand why the GPIS cannot act in certain circumstances (like stopping and searching), and would expect them to do so.

A contract has been made between the GPIS and the police. The police tell the GPIS where to go and where not to go, according to the seriousness of the incidents. They also communicate with each other informally while on the field. Conversely, the GPIS sends back the calls that exceed their competence.

The major problems assailing public housing projects pertains to drug deals, the illegal occupation of space, noisy regroupings and all that is related to the underground economy. In our Southern case, meetings related to community urban management take place every month and are very lively. The GPIS cooperates with the local development team. A difficult issue concerns the illegal occupation of basements where youth squat. They may be the tenants' children or, most often, their friends who are not from the neighbourhood. They cause nuisance and use graffiti, for instance, to mark their territory.

#### 5.4 Social housing as a tool for public policies

France occupies a middle rank in Europe in terms of social housing. The Netherlands has a higher percentage of social housing (34%) and Spain lower (5%). Unlike the USA where access is determined by very low income and thus stigmatised, the access to social housing in terms of income is wide and 70% of the French households are eligible. Social housing is thus segmented and specialised according to age profiles for instance. Paris does not possess the concentration of marginalised households that one may find at the periphery of the city usually. The Paris office of social housing (OPAC) is in charge of social housing projects at the periphery where households with heavy social handicaps are relegated to, keeping tenants with fewer problems in Paris.

Several laws have contributed to maintain a socially mixed balance in social housing in France:

- The law Besson (1990) that created a "right to housing" and emphasised the need for a social balance.
- An omnibus law on the city (LOV, 1991), also called the 'anti-ghetto' law, requiring each locality over 200,000 residents to have 20% of social housing, or else to pay a penalty if this is not achieved. In practice however, after elections won by the conservatives in 1993, this measure was defeated by the Senate and therefore not enforced. Periodically, debates would be raised about the non-enforcement of this law but these debates would take place according to the power balance between political forces.
- In 1998, a new category of social housing was created with the subsidising of rent that was intended to mix the types of tenants within the buildings via various financial supports.
- The law for City and Urban Renovation (SRU) was passed on August 1, 2003, requiring 20% of social housing to be enforced per locality with over 1,500 inhabitants in the Parisian region and over 3,500 in the other regions. It met with little success in practice as the city governments would rather prefer to pay fines than to lose their middle-class constituents. With the new socialist government in 2012, there are discussions related to higher fines and a 25% requirement but these measures would not be popular.

14.3% of all housing in Paris is social housing. 43% of social housing is located in the three Eastern districts of Paris while the wealthiest districts (7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup>) have only 1.2% of social housing<sup>13</sup>. The turnover of tenants is under 5% in the social housing projects<sup>14</sup>.

By adding several amendments to the City contract, City Hall gave itself the means of developing a city policy aimed at neighbourhoods that would be identified as top priority for social housing based on geography, and also at populations facing major social hurdles. A programme intending to build 4,000 units a year until 2020, most of it for social housing, implies that the City will do more (25%) than what is required by the state (20% of social housing in each large locality) (Bacqué et al. 2009). At the same time, the City wants to maintain the middle classes in the city as well as to be perceived as exerting a "social leadership" in the poorer areas. Social housing is thus a tool used for these goals by the City.

## 6 Policy actions – strategies and tools

### 6.1 A national policy, la politique de la ville

The national will to regenerate French urban restless neighbourhoods as seen in the *politique de la ville*, coincided with the return to power of the Left in 1981 after the Presidential election of F. Mitterand which ushered back a Left majority in Parliament. The Left had been in the opposition since 1958 when General De Gaulle became President.

1981 was marked by disorders in large social housing projects in a distressed neighbourhood, the Minguettes (*les Minguettes*), at the periphery of Lyon. Youths of immigrant origin were stealing cars and joyriding all night long around the projects before burning the cars in the presence of TV crews. French citizens were stunned by what they saw on television as there had been no general awareness that the public housing projects could be a source of trouble, although the boredom of life in social housing was beginning to be documented. Moreover, the prevailing idea at that time was that immigrant workers were not to stay in France. Therefore, the problem of their social integration was not studied seriously. However, some political elites knew that since the immigration influx had been stopped at the end of the 1970s, immigrant workers had been bringing their large rural families to France. Unable to commute regularly as in the past, they were now settling in France for good in dreadful environmental conditions.

The Minguettes events thus gave birth to a social policy of prevention, labelled *politique de la ville*, in the 1980s. *Politique de la ville* was not meant to be an urban policy for a city as a whole but a policy targeting problematic neighbourhoods in social housing projects and dealing with education, health, employment, crime, and social integration. It was a comprehensive utopian policy aiming at "changing life". An exalted atmosphere surrounded this new urban policy which was based on an etiological approach, with affirmative territorial actions targeting deprived districts characterised by numerous social housing projects.

The familiar idea whereby public policies contribute to construct an environment on which they are supposed to act was thus confirmed. Territories and populations to be helped have been identified as such from the top; the "social" issue now called urban, has emerged from common beliefs and systems of interpretation of reality within which public and private actors can insert their actions (Frigoli, 2009,127). The characteristics of this *politique de la ville* were: to be territorially targeted, intentional, cross-sectorial, mobilising local actors and

<sup>13</sup> Data gleaned from website, [www.paris.fr](http://www.paris.fr).

<sup>14</sup> The waiting list for this housing is officially reaching 100,000 households, but this figure is to be taken cautiously as there is no list of those dropping out.



calling for partnerships. It was cross-fertilising due to a diversity of stakes and problems, and was based on interactions, negotiations, and contract between various public partners.

A number of consultative groups were appointed by the Prime Minister and his government with a specific emphasis on the integration of youths, crime prevention and the economic development of specific neighbourhoods. The consultative groups included a large number of Left mayors who advocated more bottom-up actions and citizens' participation, more flexibility and innovation, a more comprehensive approach, the involvement of numerous sectors (including public education) and a concern for citizenship. In contrast to a punitive approach or crime prevention, this policy did not blame the poor for being a burden to the taxpayers. It was thought that helping the poor and their neighbourhoods, linking them to the mainstream, and putting them on par with the rest would benefit the whole city as well as the French society. Amartya Sen's capability approach, which has a wide following in Europe, follows this line of thought, attributing importance to the capacity of welfare systems, and more generally to the social context, to compensate for individual deficits in the conversion of resources into "capabilities" (Sen 1985; 1999).

From 148 targeted neighbourhoods in 1984, the *politique de la ville* soon extended to 500 in 1988 for clientelist reasons and for social peace. This umbrella policy was based on diagnosis and proposals emanating from local authorities with the help of national experts, governmental services and heads of various bodies. Despite the diversity which resulted from this consultation, the *politique de la ville* served as a model, a prototype in terms of transversal experimentation and as an ideal for numerous centralised policies.

A hypertrophy of social prevention policies marked the 1980s, with each mayor fighting to have his/her share of the national bounty (i.e. subsidies and staff). Such prevention policies did not bring about any awareness of the macro-mutations affecting industrial cities in terms of segregation, crime, disenfranchisement, and global complexity. On the field, actions were never targeted enough, goals and practices were not tightly articulated and inadequate tools were used to address the major trauma caused by post Fordism<sup>15</sup>. By the end of the 1980s, these original forms of social prevention were diluted, the physical rehabilitation of social housing projects and urban development were chosen by the mayors rather than the social integration and mobility of families.

Then a third phase of the *politique de la ville* took place. In France, property crimes were increasing in the more affluent consumption society and a general feeling of insecurity prevailed in the more individualistic and fragmented society. The crime problem was associated with the neighbourhoods supported by the *politique de la ville* where immigrant families had numerous children who were depicted as idle and potential delinquents. The Left was perceived as being "soft" on crime and unable to communicate its preventive policies. Consequently, numerous Left mayors lost the local elections in 1987. The return to power of the conservatives after 1993 actually coincided with signals that the French model for social prevention had required reforms and changes, leading many politicians, both on the left and on the right, to call for more repressive schemes and crime prevention. While preventive projects were pursued more or less throughout the 1990s aiming at urban and economic development, the '**Local Security Contracts**' (CLS) which were signed as early as 1997. This marked the return of the National Police as a major actor who then attempted at "community" policing in the neighbourhoods. Inequalities and poverty issues disappeared from the national rhetoric and political agenda.

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<sup>15</sup> Some of the issues that characterised the post Fordist era would be the high rate of unemployment and also deep cultural transformations due to immigrant families concentrated and isolated in high risk neighbourhoods with fewer public services than elsewhere.

Two Italian scholars, Nicola Negri and Chiara Saraceno (2000, 185-186), interpreted such a change taking place in numerous European countries as “a re-definition of the main emphasis of political concern, from the lack of resources to the risk of social disintegration, from the need to provide resources to the need to contain conflicts and deviant forms of behavior, from the investigation into the causes underlying the persistence of poverty in affluent societies to the investigation into the risks of welfare and the misdoings of welfare beneficiaries, from attention focused on the causes of unemployment to the reasons why the unemployed and welfare beneficiaries remain as such”. This does not mean that the majority of scholars on poverty share this view, but it does reflect the prevailing intellectual climate.

#### 6.1.1 A policy by contract

Sixteen neighbourhoods representing a total population of 350,000 people and mainly concentrated in the North-Western and Southern parts of Paris were selected for the 2007-2009 period (then extended further) and put under contract (*Contrat Urbain de Cohésion et Solidarité*). The contract intends to alleviate the marginalisation and hardships of these territories as well as to transform their image and status in the eyes of the residents and the Parisians in general. Officially, the goal is to renovate dilapidated areas and to modify their look, fundamentally and durably (with a transformation of the perceptions as well) in order to impact on the lives of their populations.

A new model of governance is thus emerging: it falls within the scope of the double processes of institutional reform and of decentralisation initiated by the state, and would be implemented both by the City and the concerned neighbourhoods in order to make the best out of the resources needed to implement the RUN programmes.

The French State, via *Délégation à la politique de la Ville et de l'intégration* (DPIV), has created **local development teams** (EDL) in each concerned neighbourhood, backed up by a task force, the *Mission Intégration*. These teams were created in the hope to deal with immigrant related issues in the targeted neighbourhoods. In practice, what the interviews revealed is that the image and the missions of these teams are not always clear, therefore triggering a rapid turnover in the leadership. One of the problems comes from their disconnection from the tools of local democracy that was set in place after 2002 (see above).

#### 6.2 The policy of "large" urban renewal operations (GPRU)

This policy is developed more or less for the same territories as those of *politique de la ville*. While *politique de la ville* is seen as addressing the social issue, the policy of urban renewal takes care of the physical problems of the derelict areas.

A state **Agency for Urban Renewal** (ANRU) was funded in 2003 by the French Parliament with a budget of 14.5 billion Euros to be spent over the next 10 years. This national policy planned the demolition of 200,000 units which would be replaced by 60,000 smaller medium sized four story buildings. 110,000 other units should be renovated by 2013. This programmed had targeted 530 problem neighbourhoods. The budget was derived from various sources of funding and dealt with by this single agency, ANRU. So far, this policy has proven efficient, meaning that the dates are respected and the demolition/reconstructions are taking place. What should be underlined here is that France has started first with the comprehensive policy, followed by a move towards building renewal as a second stage, before turning to crime prevention as a priority. These stages are not as clear-cut as they seem to be since there was also building renovation during the comprehensive stage. Moreover, as said above, the social measures of the *politique de la ville* have not been terminated completely but they have been given less resources.

At the Paris level, 11 priority zones have been selected by the City. These are located between the outer boulevards (at the edge of the city) and the ring external boulevard (see map below. The sites in red are those selected for this study). In March 2002, the city of Paris signed a contract with several partners: the state, the Region, the public bank (Caisse des Depots), the immigrant fund Acsé (former F.A.S.I.L.D.). The goal of this programme of urban renewal was to break the enclaves that these zones<sup>16</sup> form and to improve their standards of living. The priorities as formulated by the City were:

- The environment: housing.
- The facilities, the public spaces and the green spaces, public transportation, security and cleanliness.
- Neighbourhood life: services for children, teenagers and people with problems as well as support to community centres.
- Economic development: stores, access to jobs, etc.
- Solidarity with neighbouring localities: common actions and exchanges<sup>17</sup>.

Map: the 11 sites for urban renewal



**Les Olympiades (XIII)**  
**Bédier - Porte d'Ivry - Boutroux (XIII)**  
**Plaisance - Porte de Vanves (XIV)**  
**Porte Pouchet (XVII)**  
**Porte Montmartre - Porte de Clignancourt et Secteur Porte des Poissonniers (XVIII)**  
**Secteur Paris Nord-Est (XVIII)**  
**Cité Michelet (XIX)**  
**Saint Blaise (XX)**  
**Porte de Montreuil - La Tour du Pin (XX)**  
**Porte de Vincennes (XII et XX)**  
**Porte des Lilas (XX)**

Source : [www.paris.fr](http://www.paris.fr)

Each GPRU site benefits from a global programme formulated by all the partners and approved by the City Council. It is called the "territorial project". It describes in details, all the planned actions intended to boost the area and improve the residents' standards of living. For such actions, myriads of partners are involved: the City of Paris which finances and steers the GPRU, the district mayors who elaborate the programme on their sites, manage it and inform the public, other partners such as the Police Prefect of Paris, the national agency for urban renewal (ANRU), the Region Île-de-France, the public bank Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, as well as the national agency for social cohesion and equal opportunities

<sup>16</sup> 200,000 residents live in them, over 7 districts.

<sup>17</sup> For more information, please refer to

[www.paris.fr/portail/Urbanisme/Portal.lut?page\\_id=161&document\\_type\\_id=5&document\\_id=612&portlet\\_id=2469](http://www.paris.fr/portail/Urbanisme/Portal.lut?page_id=161&document_type_id=5&document_id=612&portlet_id=2469)

(Acsé). They contribute to the funding and participate in the orientations. Experts appointed by the City, such as the Chief of the Urban Project<sup>18</sup> who is involved in operations related to building (public space, facilities, housing). The chief of the project *Politique de la Ville*, who is a link with the social policy and deals with human resources (social, economics, schools and job) also communicates with the residents of the districts via the Local Development teams that he heads. Furthermore, there are also architects, sociologists, etc, who are involved.

The proposals are numerous.

In the South of Paris, the urban renewal goes as follows:

Bédier/Boutroux:

2005: Construction of an apartment building.

2005: Reconstruction and extension of a day care center,

2007: Completion of the apartment building, the day care center, and a shared garden of 500 m<sup>2</sup>.

2009: Destruction of a tower (T2), a former apartment building located at Porte d'Ivry.

2016: Completion of the programme.

In the North:

Porte Montmartre/Porte de Clignancourt :

2002-2003: Concertation among partners as well as social diagnosis. Appointment of a plural disciplinary team to help those in charge and to coordinate decisions.

2004: Approval of the territorial programme. Appointment of the teams in charge of the preliminary studies on each space.

2006: The Paris Office of Public Housing (OPAC) leads the programme.

2007: Competition opened for the projects planning.

2008: Day care centre started being built

2009: Other housing programmemes start.

2014: Completion of the programme.

Financially speaking, the city of Paris had invested 211 million Euros in the *politique de la ville* in 2007, out of which 139 million Euros was for the functioning and 72 million Euros allocated for the investments. By contrast, 87 million Euros have been spent on the sites for the urban renewal GPRU programme. The expenses can be deconstructed as such:

- The urban contract of social cohesion: in signing this with the state, the city has committed itself to spend 76 million Euros between the period of 2007-09, an average of 25.3 million Euros a year.
- Current expenditures for the *politique de la ville* in the priority areas had reached 183.1 million Euros in 2007<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>18</sup> He/She belongs to the bureau of Planning within the City apparatus.

<sup>19</sup> source: « Communication on the effort of the Paris community regarding the *politique de la ville* in 2007 and the plans for 2008 », Delegation to Politique de la Ville and Integration.

### 6.3 The policy of sustainable development

One should add that the new policies for sustainable development were also enforced for the same territories. According to C. Jacquier (2008), integrated policies for sustainable development are based on three types of cooperation. The first type is the horizontal (territorial) cooperation between territories and local authorities. The second type is the vertical cooperation (cooperation among various levels, multilevel, state, region, etc.). The last type and the most recent one is the transversal cooperation (multisectoral). “This approach arose out of the dissemination of demands for sustainable development and the implementation of integrated approaches for urban development when the time came to break off with an approach by sector to the implementation of policies: sectorization of public policies (housing, planning, safety, social measures, education, culture, etc.), sectorization of services, agencies and bodies responsible for these activities. It should go from an “apparatus”-type organization (framework) to a “network” of players-type organization (partnership, interdepartmental partnership, cross-ministry cooperation, co-production between players). Of all the various forms of co-operation, this last one is no doubt the most difficult to implement and all the countries confront a resistance on this issue. ... No one is really ready to let go a fragment of their power and of territory. The transversal co-operation would therefore be a way of getting around the traditional function of the administrations (organized according to the apparatus logics) by the networking of players that make them up.”

And yet, social development initiatives are still a major lever to open up enclaved neighbourhoods, bringing back the debate regarding the classical opposition between two options: addressing places or people’s needs. This does not inevitably imply choosing one or the other, but rather managing both at the same time, with forms of territorial affirmative action. It consists of developing an alternative approach to American-style affirmative action mechanisms, not only taking race and ethnicity into account, but also with a French approach of equity. It advocates the use of social and/or geographical criteria to redress inequities. According to researcher L. Davezies who wrote extensively on French territories, “fighting against poverty implies implementing both blind territorial actions (as for minimum social allowance meant to redress the conditions of poor households wherever they may be), and policies aimed at stimulating the development of territories generating or undergoing specific situations of poverty” (Davezies, 2002). As this research is inclined to show like other international studies, pulling down or rebuilding operations are not always suitable solutions to address the challenges facing the neighbourhoods, whichever the option (Lelévrier, 2003).

Indeed, urban renewal operations address, in part, the real estate objectives and interests of public housing managers trying to attract better-off “clients”. Building public housing generates new segregation phenomena between the recently settled inhabitants and the old ones. Dysfunctional lifestyles are not addressed and all in the community suffers from them. Therefore, these operations should be supported by grassroots efforts aiming at the socio-economic integration of the new populations and the emergence of a feeling of shared (national/local) identity.

### 6.4 The policy of safety

The same RUN territories are targeted in the national policy and strategy of safety. As said before, at the end of the 1990s, when policies of social prevention proved to be inefficient in terms of political communication, a culture of result was required from the police and justice institutions. The government acting within their sovereign domain took up this issue to demonstrate their efficiency. More policemen were sent to sensitive neighbourhoods and were required to contain disorders in saturating the public space and stopping and searching

suspicious individuals, while prosecutors were required to be tougher with juvenile delinquents. Although the forms of violence were of low intensity, juveniles could nevertheless make community life unbearable on one hand. But on the other, police harassment created tensions and frustrations, therefore turning some neighbourhoods in powder kegs.

An unintended consequence of urban renewal programmes was indeed possibly the development of "riots" in specific areas as demonstrated in 2005. This plausible correlation has been postulated by R. Epstein (2009) who explored possible links between urban renewal operations and riots which happened in 300 neighbourhoods in the fall of 2005. He found out that riots broke out in more than 85% of cities which had signed urban renewal agreements (and in 66% of *politique de la ville* areas). The most violent events took place in troubled spots in which investments in urban renewal were the largest. The idea that he developed was that these operations had made families more insecure and unable to prevent their children from participating in destructions. Although these operations were still at the study stage and not yet implemented, his field work on the sites revealed that an atmosphere of distrust prevailed among residents, and that the public decision-makers were not even trying to inform them about their future, much less to involve them in the planning. The residents were in a state of anger due to their powerlessness at preventing changes impacting on their lives and at the inability to make decisions regarding these changes. The zones which erupted in 2005 had never witnessed such riots before in the last twenty years.

From the description of the policies above, it appears that integrated policies (through area-based and horizontal interventions) are not easy to develop and cannot be effective in an exclusively top-down system. Taking steps towards sustainability and more integrated urban policy should be a sign of political will. It should include the involvement of citizens, of the civil society, of NGO's and of the business community. This would be the way to find new balances, to bridge conflicting interests and to overcome the obstacles of too much silo thinking, isolated sectoral policies and lobbying of sectoral interests (Tosics, 2009). This option is however not chosen.

## 7 Positioning neighbourhoods selected for in-depth examination

The targeting of sites for public intervention is seldom a straightforward process in the sense that some of them can be incorporated within wider better-off areas, as one practitioner had told us; and therefore they might not be visible at first glance, whereas others have more salient features that make them directly eligible for selection. The identification of neighbourhoods relies mostly on the consideration of cumulated urban and socio-economic disadvantages that exacerbates each other, rather than on mere social disadvantages. Such neighbourhoods are usually characterised by physical decay that call for intervention. In some cases, functionality by residents can also contribute to delineate the area's borders, implying that shopping centres can be included as well.

As Martin Horak has reflected<sup>20</sup>, it is always of major importance to look at the motivations justifying the territorial choice of neighbourhoods meant for territorial affirmative action. Social and physical indicators are self-explanatory but so are strategic choices which eventually will influence the identity of the neighbourhood. In the Paris case, one should distinguish between choices made by Délégation Interministerielle à la Ville (DVI), a governmental body in charge of sensitive neighbourhoods and those of Délégation à la Politique de la Ville et à L'intégration, also a governmental body that works via the Observatory of Neighbourhoods. Both are national bodies but the stakes for each differ

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<sup>20</sup> Unpublished RUN-research template by Martin Horak, November 2008.

because the funds which are allocated to them usually depend on the number of residents they target. The data presented here also emanate from a technical body attached to the city, **the Parisian Workshop of Urbanism** (APUR). The data shown in the Appendix have been given to us by APUR. The ethnic and racial origins of the residents are never taken into account and just the nationals and foreigners are differentiated. There are no data on the languages spoken at home.

Based on the analysis of the neighbourhoods' descriptions within the *Politique de la Ville*, as shown on the City of Paris website ([www.paris.fr](http://www.paris.fr)), we have created the following table (Table 9, APUR 2006, 2) showing the selection of neighbourhoods in order of appearance according to their level of distress in 2004 (the selected neighbourhoods for our study are in red):

Table 1

Neighbourhood	Population	% Unemployment rate	% Single-parent families	% Low-income families	% Public housing	Level of distress
Porte de Vanves, Plaisance, Raymond Losserand	37318	12.0	34.8	12.0	47.9	LOW
Les Périchaux	2643	11.6	34.8	15.6	77.0	LOW
Olympiades, Villa d'Este	18665	13.5	26.0	14.3	45.4	LOW
Ternaux-Jacquard	4946	14.3	28.3	10.4	3.3	LOW
Porte Saint Denis, Porte Saint-Martin	59917	15.9	23.0	14.2	8.5	LOW
<b>Portes du sud</b>	<b>15784</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>31.8</b>	<b>16.0</b>	<b>52.8</b>	<b>LOW</b>
Porte de Montreuil, St Blaise	27276	16.7	34.4	19.7	53.2	MEDIUM
Belleville, Amandiers	37275	17.3	27.2	19.8	36.2	MEDIUM
Fontaine-au-roi	25545	18.7	27.6	19.3	14.8	MEDIUM
Curial-Cambrai, Alphonse-Karr, Riquet	34628	17.7	28.4	22.7	56.8	MEDIUM
Porte de Clichy, Porte de Saint-Ouen	12662	18.6	34.9	20.0	54.4	HIGH
La Chapelle	34627	19.1	30.3	23.2	31.1	HIGH
La Goutte d'Or	22017	23.1	27.8	27.2	15.3	HIGH
Fougères	2950	16.4	31.4	30.8	94.7	HIGH
Alsace-Lorraine, Solidarité Prévoyance	5342	21.9	40.1	29.6	83.7	HIGH
<b>Porte Montmartre/Porte de Clignancourt</b>	<b>8795</b>	<b>22.4</b>	<b>43.2</b>	<b>32.6</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>HIGH</b>
All neighbourhoods	350 390	17.0	29.7	19.0	36	MEDIUM
Paris	2 125 851	12.0	25.8	10.8	14.5	LOW

In Porte Montmartre/ Porte de Clignancourt (PMPC), the first chosen neighbourhood (shown in red), social distress is aggregated as high as shown in the table. The other chosen neighbourhood, Portes du Sud (shown in red), has a rather low level of disadvantage in comparison to the average priority zone.

## 8 The Paris urban policy in priority neighbourhoods

Since 1995, neighbourhoods to be regenerated have been classified as such by the City of Paris, and also as Zone Urbaine Sensible (ZUS) by the Government, that is the DIV. Officials have worked with schools, evaluating the number of children repeating their classes, and also with health authorities to evaluate the health problems of the residents as well as the mortality rate in the area. Work has been done with the unemployment agency (ANPE) and the welfare agency that is responsible for granting subsidies to dependent families. This process of selection is not specific to Paris; **it is a national mode of neighbourhood selection. When the differential between an area and other surrounding areas is negatively high, the neighbourhood is classified as a problem area (ZUS), thereby targeted for help.**

The City of Paris signed its first city contract for 2000-2006 on the basis of a multiparty funding from the state through the Délégation interministérielle de la Ville (DIV), the Region Ile-de-France, the Welfare agency (Caisse d'allocations familiales -CAF), as well as the Fonds d'action et de soutien pour l'intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations<sup>21</sup>. The previous mayor, J. Tibéri, who belonged to a conservative majority had refused to sign such a contract while, by contrast, B. Delanoë, the current social democratic mayor, wanted to take advantage of it in order to support poorer populations in Paris and to govern a more socially mixed city. According to him, his aim "was to fight social and spatial inequalities to bring more social justice and solidarity to Paris"<sup>22</sup>. Between 2000 and 2007, real estate prices in old buildings which had already risen by 54% on average had reached 59% in the poorer neighbourhoods (18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup>) located in the eastern end of the city. The households protected themselves by not moving and this created more demand for scarce housing.

The two selected neighbourhoods for the study, "Porte Montmartre – Porte de Clignancourt" neighbourhood (North) and "Portes du Sud" (South) are characterised by a lack of identity, a form of indifference that the French political culture expresses towards local democracy. In the North, the residents claim that they have never been asked what they wanted. Moving out of the neighbourhood for a better life is based on individual choices. The availability of public transportation in Paris cannot compensate for the lack of residents and of jobs that the poor areas suffer from. Yet staying in Paris rather than moving to a better comfort zone at the periphery is a choice expressed by the numerous residents we have talked to. This is not the case in the poorer problem areas at the periphery where three residents out of four would like to move out (Ipsos poll, April 4, 2011).

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<sup>21</sup> This has been now replaced by the Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances (ACSE) (see [www.cohesionsociale.gouv.fr/eclairage/fiche-3-agence-nationale-pour-cohesion-sociale-egalite-chances-765.html](http://www.cohesionsociale.gouv.fr/eclairage/fiche-3-agence-nationale-pour-cohesion-sociale-egalite-chances-765.html))

<sup>22</sup> Statement taken from the mayor's website [www.paris.fr](http://www.paris.fr).



## 9 Neighbourhood Political Dynamics

### 9.1 Site 1. Porte de Clignancourt-Porte Montmartre

The Porte Montmartre – Porte de Clignancourt (PCPM) neighbourhood is located at the edge of Paris in the Northern part of the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement, between the Boulevard Ney and the Paris ring road along the City of Saint-Ouen, in the ancient fortification zone. The district is famous for its flea market which is the most touristic spot in Paris, according to a local official from the district. Together with Porte Pouchet, it stretches over 100 hectares (247 acres) and is squeezed between the two large boulevards.

#### 9.1.1 Neighbourhood life in three historical stages:

1. Throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century, this territory was agricultural. In 1840, fortification walls that linked one fort to the other for the defence of Paris were built during the Second Republic, Railroads (with a railway station East of Paris and another North of Paris) gave the sector a boost with the subsequent advent of international transportation. Porte Clignancourt represented the Northern apex of the city, facing Porte d'Orléans in the south. The village of Clignancourt became the 18<sup>th</sup> district after its annexation, with its own City Hall. Housing then was dense and homogeneous among visible vacant lots.

2. After the end of the First World War in 1919, the military walls were eradicated. Paris and Saint-Ouen became better connected for several reasons, one of them due to the presence of the flea market and another due to the types of housing which looked alike. 70 % of the housing was built between 1915 and 1948, with most being built during the interwar years. This neighbourhood thus became filled with public housing projects.


Cheap public housing (Habitat Bon Marché-HBM) was built on the bulldozed zone of the military walls which was 150 meters wide. The choice of the sites followed the new subway lines which ended at Porte de Clignancourt. For instance, the public housing project, Cité Montmartre, was built between 1920 and 1930 west of Porte de Clignancourt. In the eastern part of the area, a large fire station emphasised the dual character of the neighbourhood: densely populated in the West with working class households concentrated in public housing projects and sparsely populated in the East with numerous vacant lots.

In 1939, a tunnel was dug to enlarge the circular ring boulevard and a lot of trees were cut. Poorer populations settled in the area despite the ban forbidding construction due to defence reasons. They were nicknamed “zoniers”, the term *zone* and Red Belt (referring to the influence of the Communist Party on the working class during the two World wars) having negative connotations.

In 1943, 250 meters of additional territory were acquired from the army by the city. The “zoniers” were evicted and a green belt project linking Paris to Saint-Ouen was designed. At the same time, 20% of the area was set aside for more public housing between Porte de Clichy and Porte Poissonnière.

3. Built in the 1950s, 70% the high public housing projects are still visible at each gate of Paris in that zone, although they have become obsolete. 66% of the medium sized (between 40 and 70 square meters) apartments are now too large for the older tenants. From an environmental point of view, these high towers are a disgrace. For instance at Porte de Clignancourt, the tower is ten floors high and its massive façade blocks the view of the adjacent streets. Nearby, a stadium could signify a break in the landscape but the discontinuity of the so-called green belt is obvious everywhere in the area.

This discontinuity in the urban landscape is also due to the construction of the speed ring belt marked by five exits at the Northern edge of Paris, thus depriving pedestrians of walking spaces and making the area inhospitable.



### 9.1.2 Economic indicators<sup>23</sup>

The site Porte Montmartre/Porte Clignancourt (PMPC) shelters 6% of the 18th arrondissement's population (11,914 residents out of 184,581 residents) and represents 4% of the housing (118,000 units, including 102,918 main dwellings). 24% of the public housing projects in the 18<sup>th</sup> district are concentrated there (16,260 units). The area is not dense<sup>24</sup> despite being occupied by the railway tracks and the cemetery of Montmartre. Most residents are working class and employees, either young or very old.

According to the statistical profile of the population in the area (see Appendix 2), single-parent families make up 43% of the whole (vs 26% in Paris) population. 32% of the population on the site are under 20 years old, and 20.3% immigrants (17% are not French). If their children and grand-children were taken into account, the immigrant population would appear highly concentrated in this area. The proportion of elderly people is also important, as 19.2% are 60 years old or over vs 17.7% in the district (20% in Paris).

In 2007, the number of long-term jobless (over a year) households was 33.8%, vs 39.4% in the city and 38% in the RUN policy neighbourhoods. 16% of the households lived on public redistribution (vs 5.4% in Paris and 9.9% in the RUN neighbourhoods).

In 2007, the employment density was showed to be inferior to the average in Paris, (39 jobs per hectare vs 153 per hectare in Paris) and the employment rate was equally low: only 0.3

<sup>23</sup> From an ANRU document of 2007.

<sup>24</sup> It is 13,750 per km<sup>2</sup> vs 30,000 per km<sup>2</sup> in one of the densest districts of Paris

jobs per working person living there (vs 1.4 in Paris). These figures could be due to the mostly residential character of the site.

The main employment hub is the Bichat Hospital (3,555 jobs) and educational institutions. Public jobs are abundant (for instance, the extension of the University of Sorbonne has created 360 jobs but they are unlikely to be given to the residents of the area). The private sector provides only 38% of all the jobs and the firms are small, with less than 5 employees on the whole. The main sectors are: trade (33%), property business and services to companies (17%), and local social services (11%). As compared with the neighbourhood and Paris in general, these sectors are over-represented here.

**Local trade density** was low: 109 firms vs 5,278 in the district and 63,496 in Paris in 2005. Trade was mainly concentrated along the Boulevard Ney and the Avenue de la Porte Montmartre, with a large share of food stores (25% of the total of trades, vs 12% in Paris). Commercial vacancy was relatively high: as 20% of commercial premises were vacant vs 11.5% in Paris in 2005,.

Globally, according to the ANRU document gathering statistics from various official sources, the local shop sector is running out of steam, defeated by the competition led by brand names in nearby neighbourhoods, and it fails to get the most out of external elements of the site or to take advantage of the flea market. For example, there are no coffee shops or restaurants along Boulevard Binet which could potentially boost the local shop sector.

**The economic and social situation is far less favourable than in the other Parisian neighbourhoods.** According to the data provided by the welfare agency Caisse d'allocations familiales in 2004, low-income families were considered those living with less than half the median income (735 Euros per month in 2004) and they accounted for nearly one-third of the households (29.7%) vs 21.5% in the RUN areas of the city, 17.8% in the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement, and 10.8% in the city as a whole.

The unemployment rate is one of the highest in Paris and in the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement. In 1999, there were 4,082 active households (vs 102,707 in the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement and 1,128,579 in Paris). 18% of them have precarious jobs (vs 14% in Paris). 71% of the active population were employees and workers in Paris (44% in the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement and 35% in Paris). Only 8% of the active population were executives (vs 25% in the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement and 35% in Paris) and their percentage was diminishing. 10% of the jobs in the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement were located in this area, most of them in the public sector.

### 9.1.3 Education

According to the data provided by the Public Schools Bureau at City Hall (DASCO), prospects of **school integration** are also below average, with 23.3% of the students lagging behind, vs 19% on average in the other neighbourhoods, and 12.7% in Paris. At the end of their 4<sup>th</sup> form (Adopting the UK standards), only 54% of the students pass their GCSE vs 70% in Paris. The percentage of youths who do not graduate reaches 8.3% vs 6.8% on average in the RUN neighbourhoods and the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement (only 3.9% in Paris).

The state of children's health illustrates local difficulties: over one-third of them in Year 3 of primary school suffer from untreated tooth decay (35% vs 26% in Paris).

Public schools suffer from a very negative image and are thus facing a detrimental rate of departures especially from households with a higher than average income. High School Utrillo is one of the four Parisian high schools supported by the government who has launched a programme called "Ambition to succeed in High School".

#### 9.1.4 Evolution

From the data collected by the Observatory of Neighbourhoods set up at the Parisian Workshop of Urbanism, it is possible to trace the evolution of the area since 1999.

The improvement in the indicators is clearly slower than in the other neighbourhoods: the **percentage of unemployment benefits recipients skyrocketed between 2001 and 2004**, increasing by 83.5%, vs +29.5% on average in the other neighbourhoods, +23.4% in the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement, and +27% in Paris. Likewise, the percentage of **low-income households (+18.2%) grew twice as much** as in the rest of the district (+7.8%), and Paris (+8.1%). Furthermore, the number of low-income single-parent families is higher than elsewhere and increases constantly (over 5% on average a year).

In terms of urban planning, Porte Montmartre – Porte de Clignancourt is characterised by two major urban fractures:

- The inner and external ring roads which are major sources of environmental and noise pollution
- The absence of a green belt corridor.

In 2001, a **partnership** was formed between this district and the neighbouring locality Saint-Ouen as they shared five entry gates and the flea market. A document signed on March 2003 defined the goals, the issues and the modes of cooperation. Information, savoir-faire and thoughts were to be shared as well as pragmatic actions intending to improve the environment, to enhance the assets and reinforce the coherence of public measures decided by the two cities in terms of transportation, housing, training, jobs and environment.

In February 2005, Porte Montmartre/porte Clignancourt was selected by the Ministry in charge of Housing and the City and became an administrative priority area in order to speed up the programme of urban renewal. This move, as demanded by the Paris Mayor, was deemed as derogation,

Flats without modern conveniences are unusual, comprising 1.7% of the total housing stock, vs 10% on average in the city policy neighbourhoods and Paris, according to the INSEE data. Admittedly, this housing stock consists almost exclusively of public housing units (92.4%), with 60.3% being 3-room apartments that are considered small in size, as compared to Parisian standards.

#### 9.1.5 Crime

The high number of criminal offences can probably be attributed to the presence of the nearby flea market. In fact, criminal offence ratios are almost twice as high there as in the RUN areas (93 offences per 1,000 inhabitants, vs 50 per 1,000 inhabitants in 2004). Thefts and damage of public and private property are significant in numbers. Likewise, the presence of sex workers and drug addicts remains a problem in this neighbourhood and like street gatherings, contributes to the feeling of insecurity among the residents, as confirmed by the interview with the police chief in charge of crime prevention in this area.

There can be two postulations to explain why tensions are generated at Porte Montmartre. Firstly, a grocery store that is opened all night attracts a lot of people, engendering problems of noise, alcohol and violence. The GPIS are frequently called and face confrontations, especially early in the morning. Secondly, part of the area is a site for drug traffic with a lot of addicts and prostitutes and requires the joint intervention of the GPIS with the police.

### 9.1.6 Budget

For 2004-2013, 758,000 Euros had been proposed to the National Agency of Urban renewal<sup>25</sup> for the whole urban renewal project. This concerns 314 demolitions, 314 reconstructions, 1,216 rehabilitations in 490 neighbourhoods. **Porte Montmartre – Porte de Clignancourt forms the first priority intervention zone in the city**, compared with other neighbourhoods, according to the data contained in the budgetary documents presented at the City Council Paris. A total of 20,960,997 Euros was invested in 2005. The Bureaus of Housing, Youth and Sports, Welfare, Health and Economic Development were also involved. In 2012, 395 neighbourhoods had passed an agreement with the Agency of Urban renewal and in 100 of them, the urban renewal programme was at a cost of over 30 billion Euros. 6 additional billion Euros are to be found for the programme to continue.

### 9.1.7 Residents' participation

The Porte de Clignancourt neighbourhood hosted the first Information/ Mediation/ Multiservices (PIMMs) Center. Its goal was to gather different public services, such as the post office, utilities, etc, in a one-stop centre located at the Bichat post office. While it may seem strange to find out that 30,000 Euros have been spent to start a community “hammam” located at the Porte de Clignancourt, one of its main objectives was actually to involve the inhabitants and/or organisations representing them in the different development plans aimed at upgrading their living environment. Over 300 inhabitants contributed to design the project on the ground. This participation helped to take into account the inhabitants' needs and also fostered relationships among the inhabitants as well as with the representatives of organisations and institutions.

A local development team (EDL) has been present in the neighbourhood since 2001, ruled by the ‘Services 18’ association. This team, whose co-funding came both from the state and City Hall, was given the status of city employees in 2006. Its activities are however slow.

**Housing and living environment** are by far the highest priority sector of intervention in the neighbourhood. For instance in 2004, 5,250,000 Euros in input and 5,000,000 Euros in current expenditures were invested in this sector for solely the neighbourhood of Porte Montmartre – Porte de Clignancourt.

### 9.1.8 An insider's view<sup>26</sup>

The interview of the local Parliament member, C. Caresche, from the Socialist Party offers a good summary of the assets and liabilities of the site. This interview is important because Caresche played an important part in the decision to renew the site of the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement. He has been an elected official since the 1990s in this area. In 1995, he was asked to be part of the team of D. Vaillant, the district mayor. In 1997 he became elected at the National Assembly

He shared with me an account of a mentally unstable woman who had come to see him as he was her local representative. She complained about her living conditions in the public housing tower Porte de Clignancourt. He paid her a visit and became aware that the noise was unbearable, the common rooms shared by the tenants had no roofs, the apartments were very damp and in poor condition. The tower had been built to shelter the French colons fleeing Algeria (after 1962) and it was meant to be temporary. Therefore, the infrastructures were light, and at the time, the fast speed ring did not exist. (It was built after 1965).

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<sup>25</sup> This entails 156,000 Euros for pre-operation studies for each gate, 287,000 Euros for the elaboration and completion of the programmes and 315,000 Euros to lead the programmes.

<sup>26</sup> Interview N°X, National Assembly, July 08.

Caresche decided to get involved and introduced a RUN project that the City Council approved. There was a general awareness at City Hall that the edges of the city were derelict and that since one Parisian out of eight lived there due to cheap housing, something had to be done to retain this population in the city. For the elected officials, the goal is still to bring added value to the area, especially when the circular tramway is built after 2014.

The process of renewal was extremely long, he said. In order to find out what the tenants wanted, the interviews with them took a long time since they were very cautious at first and were also afraid to be evicted. But when they understood that they would be able to stay in the area if they wanted, 90% of them supported the demolition of their tower.

The 18<sup>th</sup> district is poor but it benefits from public amenities such as good public transportation, sports centres, educational facilities, and the flea market. As for the Parisian Office of Public Housing (OPAC), it has developed a policy of transformation for its buildings. They are now divided in smaller units, each with its own separate door, with gardens and private roads. Security guards are seen patrolling the premises.

**What this area is missing is an identity, jobs and more social mixing.**

**The liabilities** come from crime, drugs, prostitution, and the underground economy. The crime problem is not as serious as in the *banlieues* or in other parts of the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement, like La Chapelle. Yet in Paris, the cooperation between the Police Prefect accountable to the national government and the City Hall is weak, marked by cleavages. “For instance, numerous planned CCTVs could be working within three months in the area if there was a will to do so. Instead, it will take two years”, a local official from the district said. **The police, the national education, and those in charge of *politique de la ville* are huge bureaucracies which act on their own, in isolation.** It is very true especially regarding urban projects targeting the high school premises, which is managed by the region. In most intergovernmental meetings, the region-level representatives will hardly speak to city officials. No wonder the urban choices made by the civil servants are perceived as technocratic by the principal. What would be the point of creating a boarding-school next to where drug selling points are located?

There are rarely any private actors involved as this sector has no economic vitality and local business representatives complain that the local population cannot afford to buy anything in their stores. Architects and planners have had little say about this area, while public administrators have been omnipotent. “The problem is that they sit in their office and are disconnected from the people’s daily life. They lack pragmatism”.

**The assets** may come in the future. There is an agreement at the political level (city, region, the state) that North East of Paris should be developed in a large scheme called the Greater Paris. This would bring about the following:

- 1) Good railway transportation with two major international railway stations that will attract a lot of people and jobs.
- 2) There are vacant lots or lots which could be used for residential buildings for households with diversified incomes. “The whole area is like a “gruyere” cheese, full of vacant lots that should be regenerated since more population is expected to move in the area where rents remain cheap”, someone told us. This is not the case in the rest of Paris, a very dense city, with 20,000 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>.
- 3) The proximity of other localities (Saint Ouen, Clichy, and Aubervilliers) could facilitate job creations.

The City Council in July 2008 approved the creation of 50 m high (187 feet) towers. Until now, towers were limited at 37.5 m (123 feet). This authorisation can translate either into more apartments for modest households which will not be forced to leave Paris, due to the price of the housing market; or into swapping office buildings and residential buildings' locations, Caresche said. Putting office towers at the edge of Paris would allow people to go back and live in the centre districts of the city from which they had been displaced by the firms, mostly in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This swap would restore the vitality of core districts which vanishes once offices are closed.

#### 9.1.9 A justified selection

In the 18th arrondissement (district), three zones were eligible for regeneration: Porte Clignancourt/Porte Montmartre (PCPM), la Goutte d'Or and La Chapelle. "They presented the worst statistics in terms of unemployment, drugs-crack dealing due to the proximity with the outskirts of Paris, prostitution, and dilapidated housing", as informed by the person responsible for the regeneration programme. The immigrant populations, generally poor with numerous children, are very visible on the streets with numerous prayer-rooms in the area and some streets are closed to cars on Fridays because people praying would overflow onto the streets.

#### 9.1.10 Assets

The mayor of 18th arrondissement, Daniel Vaillant, is a key resource. Born in 1949, he was trained as a biological technician. He became involved in politics and having followed the ideas of F. Mitterrand in 1966, he soon became a militant at the Socialist Party. He moved up within the party apparatus and was required to run for elections in the 18<sup>th</sup> district along with B. Delanoë in 1981 who became the district mayor. He coordinated Delanoë's campaign in 1995. All along the 1980s, he became aware that fear of crime was an important issue for the residents and that the conservative party had captured the issue. He could see when walking through the streets of the district that drug dealing was visible, that an open market for stolen goods was attracting hundreds of people and that nothing was done about it. He later became a Minister of Interior who was in charge of the police at the end of the 1990s when the Left was in power.

Currently, as district mayor, he is powerful due to numerous acquaintances and networks such as the freemasons whom he can mobilise if needed. He is still very close to the current mayor B. Delanoë. This is not the case for the other site in the South, because the rather new mayor does not know the political ropes as well as Vaillant does.

There are also civic, ad hoc and militant organisations as well as some migrant groups which get mobilised now and then.

Since 2003, a special effort has been led by national authorities to mitigate civil unrest. Six prefects have been in charge of equal opportunity since December 2005. The number of free enterprise zones has reached 100. A programme called "educative success" has been launched to fight student truancy and to improve the closed environment children live in. There have been 350 Prefect adjuncts in sensitive zones since 2008.

A city programme, the bureau of time, offers leisure activities to 9-10 year old children and to teen-agers. At the Goutte d'Or, a nearby area south of PMPC, 25% of the families are single parent families. 70% of these families have more than three children. 35% of the children do not speak French at home. Some immigrant families are too poor to pay for the programmes

at the leisure centre especially when the family experiences hardship, therefore some children are denied<sup>27</sup> the opportunity to meet other children, according to the leaders of the programme.

#### 9.1.11 The renewal of Porte Montmartre

The map shows that Porte Montmartre is located between Hospital Bichat and Porte de Clignancourt. The RUN programme intends to demolish the public housing tower along the circular ring. First, before the demolition, a building has been provided nearby in order to relocate the residents. It has been built along with other buildings for mixed income residents (2,240 m<sup>2</sup> out of 5,000 m<sup>2</sup> total). A public library, a social centre with a small day-care centre and a health clinic are located at the eastern part of the zone. Also, a new day-care centre facing the main entrance of the building on a green lot, a health house and a multi-service centre where the tower used to be are also there. A kindergarten is also planned.

#### 9.1.12 The renewal of Porte Clignancourt

Part of the problem for planners in the area comes from the flea market shared both by Paris and Saint Ouen since that generates traffic, prostitution and delinquency. It is estimated that international visitors and tourists come three times a week to this site.

The decision to demolish the public housing tower along the circular ring was made by a partnership with two aims. On one hand, it seeks to reorganise the southern part of this zone rapidly by building housing to relocate the tenants, improve the schools and educational facilities, create a hotel and improve the green landscape. On the other hand, it also hopes to reorganise the northern part on the green belt, to improve the relationship with the flea market, protect the site from traffic noise, as well as to deter Northern suburban residents from using their cars when they enter Paris, by creating a large parking lot.

#### 9.1.13 The technical governance

In each site, two heads: one for the team in charge of urban renewal and the other for the team in charge of *politique de la ville*, have to coordinate the actions at Porte de Montmartre and Porte de Clignancourt and to do it with the bureau of the city in charge of public housing. In order not to overlap tasks, each of the heads manages different fields. The local development team (EDL) with a staff of three also intervenes in the programme.

##### *Example of tenants' consultation Porte Montmartre*

Between 2002 and 2004, after it was decided to renovate dilapidated buildings and maybe to demolish the tower of 83 apartments in this area, OPAC asked the city bureau for architectural renovation to provide studies and make diagnoses

**Public hearings** were organised by the local officials and the staff carried out dialogues with the tenants at the foot of the tower, while OPAC started to interview tenants on a one on one basis for one hour usually. This was to find out whether they wanted to stay in the area or move to a public housing unit in another district, what kind of help as well as material support they would benefit from in order to be able to pay for higher rent, etc. In principle, tenants have to vote and to approve the demolition if any urban renewal is to occur, before the urban studies are launched. It is a decision made by the mayor of Paris, B. Delanoë. Here, 16 meetings took place and 300 residents attended them.

The study provided the profile of the tenants. In the tower of Porte Montmartre, 92% of the tenants approved the destruction of their tower which will take place in 2010. This was because they were bothered by the noise coming from the fast speed traffic on the circular

<sup>27</sup> The most common excuse was that the parents have no time to bring them to the learning centres.



ring, their homes had not been renovated, and they were looking for better standard housing. A tenants' organisation tried to oppose the destruction but it received little support.

For the following few months, proposals were elaborated by the OPAC bureau in charge of planning, taking into account the residents' view points and requests. They were then approved by the local authorities from the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement.

The mayor, D. Vaillant, together with his staff and the Saint Ouen authorities got deeply involved in the process which was approved by the City Council in February 2004.

At Clignancourt, the tenants of the 57 units of the tower were mostly senior people who had moved in during the 1960s. After that, their children had moved out to live elsewhere. The apartments with four or five bedrooms have become too large for them but they have been reluctant to leave this level of comfort for much smaller units. These 57 units were to be rebuilt.

**Cost** The global budget allocated by the city for this renewal programme amounted to around 23 million euros for 2001- 2007.

#### 9.1.14 Future visions

In place of the first demolished tower, City Hall has decided to implement a kindergarten, a day-care centre and a social centre. Now that the day-care centre has been built in 2008, the building where the former day care centre was situated has been demolished and became a site for construction.

#### *The issue of public transportation*

All the interviews revealed the hope for an electric tramway to go through the area in 2013. This tramway will stop nearby at Porte de la Chapelle (see map).

This form of public transportation has proved to be a success south of Paris, mixing populations, helping them to move in and out of the district. It would be beneficial here as well and would contribute to change the negative image of the area.

#### *The issue of education*

Education offers another opportunity. The Sorbonne has decentralised its undergraduate programmes in this site. Until 2013, public work will enlarge and modernise the buildings, creating a large campus north of Paris. A cafeteria for students is planned with a large auditorium and library. Some facilities, like the sports centre will be open at certain hours to the residents.

## 9.2 Site 2: Portes du sud: Bédier-Boutroux

Unlike the Northern site which forms a unique urban enclave, Portes du sud is made of a few interspersed territories located in the southern 13<sup>th</sup> arrondissement. They are respectively: **Bédier-Boutroux**, **Brillat Savarin** and **Amiral Mouchez**. This paper concentrates on Bédier-Boutroux, the most documented. Their physical structure is not as salient as that of the other site. There is no doubt that the local actors working in each site are different, which makes it more difficult for the head of the local *Politique de la ville* team to have a shared and unified vision of Portes du sud. There is only a planning team head for Bédier-Boutroux, given that there is some overlap between the *Politique de la Ville* and Great Projects on Urban Renewal (GPRU) boundaries, unlike the case for Brillat Savarin and Amiral Mouchez.

**Bédier-Boutroux**<sup>28</sup> (B-B) is caught in between the Boulevard Masséna of Paris and the speed ring road along the suburban city of Ivry. Co-operation agreements regarding the coverage of the ring road in particular are well under way. The ring road has been built at the location of the fortifications previously built between 1841 and 1844. B-B stretches from Porte d'Ivry to Porte de Vitry and is also circumscribed by two sport facilities on its edges.



In late 2001, a Social Programme related to a Territory (PST) was created by both *Politique de la ville* and the urban renewal projects (GPRU) in order to promote better co-ordination of the social actions carried out by different actors concerning a specific neighbourhood, especially regarding prevention, parenthood and child care. It was an experimental governmental initiative that was later used as a basis for the social part of the Bédier/Porte d'Ivry GPRU.

In 2002, based on a social survey conducted during the previous year and also on the analysis of economic and urban indicators, B-B was entitled to become a priority area. In 2005, following an updating of distressed areas after no more than five workshops had been held, it was decided that B-B should be kept **for territorial affirmative action**. The current and former planning local team heads were interviewed, as well as the head of the *Politique de la Ville* local team.

#### 9.2.1 Neighbourhood life in three historical stages<sup>29</sup>

1. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, this land was agricultural, and then became fortified for defence purposes.
2. Once the fortification zone was bulldozed in 1919, cheap housing (HBM) was built to house the working-class.
3. Then, two decades later, a green belt 250-meter wide, dedicated to light infrastructures such as sport playgrounds and public parks, substituted the precarious housing which had illegally proliferated there. Next to them, OPAC public housing buildings were for the most part built in the 1950s, among which included the Bédier-Boutroux neighbourhood. Other imposing facilities like the fire station or an industrial building (Le Bastion-Masséna) came to life in the 1970s.

The main urban concern about B-B is that **its diverse functional parts are neither integrated to each other nor into the urban fabric**. Public spaces, which are wide enough to make it a green neighbourhood, appear to have no clear status and are likely to be spoiled by garbage. Connection to the core of Paris and its surroundings is easy with the subway line 7, the opening of the tramway station linking the east to the west, and bus roads.

<sup>28</sup> Urbanists will rather call it Joseph Bédier/ Porte d'Ivry, which merely reflects the different boundaries of the neighbourhood, depending on whether the territory is analysed from a social (*Politique de la ville*) or urban (*Direction de l'Urbanisme*) perspective.

<sup>29</sup> GPRU document, p.5.

Even though the site is located near thriving economic nodes like Chinatown or Paris Rive Gauche, it does not seem to benefit from its advantageous geographical position. Curiously enough, it is much easier for its residents to reach the neighbouring town Ivry by walking south across the ring road than to move up to other parts of Paris, since Boulevard Masséna, with a lot of car traffic, is perceived as an obstacle to their mobility. The proximity to the ring road has been a generator of **noise and air pollution**, posing a great concern for 63% of its residents. Illegal parking is also a matter of discomfort. The Tower Bédier is to be demolished soon.

### 9.2.2 Socio-economic profile of the residents<sup>30</sup>

**Bédier Boutroux has experienced a population loss** since the 1970s. In the 1990s, the drastic drop amounted to 11.9%, which ran counter to the 13<sup>th</sup> arrondissement trends (+0.3%). The aging of the population may account for it, in the sense that younger adults of the 20-34 age category (-28,4%) choose to move out. It raises the issue of care for the elderly. Mental health has been reported as a serious problem by the current head of the local planning team. Moreover, many households are small or led by a single person. In 1999, as a result of successive immigration waves from Europe, North Africa and Asia, there were 12.96 % foreigners (or non national persons) out of a total of 3,061 inhabitants.

Nearly **two thirds of the population were low-skilled**. Within the working group, 45% of the residents are employees and 19% of them belong to the working-class. The unemployed represented more than 15% of the population in 1999, a high proportion as compared to the figures for Brillat Savarin (around 12%), which were closer to the Parisian figures. Moreover, 2.64% of the residents depend on social welfare (*Revenu Minimum d'Insertion*), whereas only 1.97% did so in the entire 13<sup>th</sup> arrondissement. Poverty is thus concentrated in the low-income neighbourhood.

Economic activities are rather limited. This is due to the **over-occupation of the premises by public buildings and infrastructures** such as kindergarten, maintenance services, social security center, and social hostels for young migrant workers and Transport Automobiles Municipaux, etc. This leaves little space for other uses. There is a gas station nearby which usually attracts drug sellers in the evening, according to a police note (2008), an industrial warehouse (chemistry, leather, etc.), and a few shops at the foot of some residential buildings. In total, there are fewer than fifty economic firms.

The wider GPRU site, which includes Bédier-Boutroux, is characterised by the overrepresentation of public housing (91%). Bédier-Boutroux has 413 housing units in twelve buildings owned by OPAC, which date back to 1957. According to the current head of the local planning team, there are now 4,400 residents. There is a residential stability: more than 70% of the residents have lived there for more than a decade.

### 9.2.3 Urban renewal in Bédier Boutroux

In 2003, a modernisation programme of the built environment was implemented, with financial subsidy from the State. It aimed at refurbishing the entrance halls, the common lots and the private apartments. A couple of years later, it was the cluster of buildings called BCDE that was targeted to receive safety improvement measures. The social centre was relocated to B-B, and is now more visible.

### 9.2.4 Budget

For B-B at this stage, it is very hard to disentangle the part that specifically applies to this priority area since to date, there has been no document that sums up the budget for this small

<sup>30</sup> GPRU document, p.17.

territory as compared to the wider area Joseph-Bédier/Porte d'Ivry. What are available are only budget prevision tables from an urban renewal bid.

#### 9.2.5 Residents' participation

Prior to demolition, consultation meetings were organised with the residents and a social survey was conducted by OPAC – a mandatory step in the urban renewal process. 81% of the tower residents who were interviewed said that they wanted to be relocated to the new building that will replace the former one. There **are very few grass-root associations** (only one tenant group), the only visible ones being those supported by the city politics. Few bottom-up pressures are exerted on the decision-making process.

Neighbourhood councils are an innovative means of getting to know residents' quality of life demands concerning urban projects. One of us attended an evening meeting in May 2008 in the 13<sup>th</sup> arrondissement for a section which partly overlaps the Portes du Sud territory. Mostly well-educated residents join such networks, even though they can hardly influence the way local urban policy is articulated or implemented. One of the representatives of the council suggested that [after the May 2008 municipal elections], they should “get closer to an elected official who heads up the programme leaders”. Put simply, they need to know which political actors can really be helpful to them. Another idea was to mobilise other neighbourhood councils in the same district, so that more pressure would be put on the arrondissement mayor, especially regarding urban projects “for which [they fear they] can hardly do anything”. Furthermore, the dissemination of leaflets, which inform of the progress of a specific urban programme, is a way of being accountable to their fellow residents in the district. However, low-income residents rarely participate in such councils given their lack of social capital. The general feeling is also that the residents of Bédier Boutroux are very much on their own.

**The Café Associatif** is an interesting initiative that was put in place in Bédier-Boutroux in order to prevent intergenerational conflicts. It started at a time when a right-wing mayor Jacques Toubon was still in office for the 13<sup>th</sup> district, in the fall of 2000. Following a meeting with the police, prevention leaders, local officials and a state representative, local actors convened and decided that something should be done for the youths so that they could have an identified place to gather peacefully rather than to hang out in public spaces. This was how the Café Associatif was launched. However, this experience came to an end four years later, when the staff was intimidated by some of the youths and also because internal management problems surfaced, according to the head of the local team. But it was also quickly added that “there was something like anchored solidarity in this neighbourhood between the diverse actors, because those very people that launched the project never severed this partnership deal in hard times, even to go by themselves.” During the 2003 draught which had caused the death of thousands of elderly Parisians, solidarity was there in B-B. No single elderly resident passed away that summer.

Prior to this initiative, the *espaces de quartier* (or the Neighbourhood friendly spots) was one of the first city political efforts to create community social offices in the south of the 13<sup>th</sup> arrondissement. In Bédier-Boutroux, they were vandalised, then closed and later replaced by the community Café. The former head believed that there must be something going on with the transient youths in the poorer *banlieue*. The lack of real mobilising forces in the community must have therefore greatly impaired the initial success of the project.

### 9.2.6 Liabilities

The front of the welfare centre in Bédier-Boutroux, in August 2008, revealed bullet holes on the door.



(Picture taken by V. Levan)

As noted earlier, on the one hand, the elderly (defined as over 60) are a dominant group in this neighbourhood. They often retreat into the private sphere of their housing which might well have some negative impact on community life in the future, according to the current city politics head. On the other hand, the youths use public spaces to a great extent due to a lack of adequate gathering places. According to a confidential note written to the police commissioner of the district, they use the public school playground and can be very noisy. During wintertime, they stay in the lobbies of the public housing buildings and often cause damage to the site after they have taken drugs. These youths, 'a minority of the worst', thus generate fear of crime. There have also been some violent incidents against the caretakers which might have been harmful to the community. However, such “minor” incidents happen everywhere else in Paris, the local police chief told us. Not surprisingly, residents’ main expectations focus on the opening up of the neighbourhood to the external environment that would then reduce their feeling of neglect and abandon. In 2000, the former head of the planning team conducted a survey regarding the major concerns in this neighbourhood<sup>31</sup>. Safety and noise pollution ranked first (58%). The former head clarified those findings: “[the fears] were mostly about the youths’ future: what would happen to them? We’re worried about them. (...) We would like them to have better education opportunities, better job prospects. Their fears concerned the very children whom they had seen growing up.” So far, the economic or social development opportunities have been very limited for them. Bédier Boutroux has thus become the priority area being targeted for intensified social development actions.

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<sup>31</sup> The response rate was 27%.

### 9.2.7 Assets

Given the high proportion of old people among the residents, the local actors have tried to respond to the demands for services emanating from this age category. The **Point Paris Emeraude** (Or the Paris Emerald Unit) is such a service designed to alleviate their social isolation by directing them to adequate city social services (medical and cultural services) or by providing them with health advice. Intergenerational relations are also cultivated when old residents are integrated into local schools during children's meals for instance. It is a well-identified human presence on the site. It is often when offer meets demands that a project can be successful, as illustrated well by the **community gardens** which are private lots reserved to the residents, and where they can grow vegetables. Although participation has been low, "it was a success right away" as the participants seemed to enjoy it, the former head who had initiated this project had proudly said. As for the youth group, the launch of a **Boutique Pédagogique** (Or a Learning Shop) aims at offering the youths training opportunities in the business field. Moreover, a decentralised unit (**Régie de quartier**) that will be employing local residents and which also provides a maintenance and cleaning services is yet to open. This unit has worked in the nearby neighbourhood Olympiades and seems to provide high-quality services as compared to those provided by private firms. A **local Television network** under the auspices of local residents was launched in 2009 connecting two sites from the district including Olympiades and the nearby city of Ivry.

The opening of the **Tramway on the south ring road** in 2007 was a milestone allowing Bédier-Boutroux to be connected to other southern neighbourhoods of Paris. Some of the residents were at first a little frustrated when they had to use two tickets: one for the tramway and one for the bus respectively, to be able to reach other areas. But the problem has been solved. Now, the same ticket can be used on both buses and tramways for one hour and a half. Other projects are in the pipeline and are expected to make the neighbourhood more visible and attractive to outsiders. A few examples of these would be the restructuring of Avenue de la Porte d'Ivry and the public square next to Tower Bédier as well as the emergence of a dynamic pole where Piazza Dr Yersin is located.

## 10 Local governance and interplay of actors

Compared to the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement, urban renewal in this distressed area is not really planned for on the mayor agenda in the 13<sup>th</sup> arrondissement. Political support and will are therefore lacking terribly, which is enough for even the most promising programme to fail, especially when there is a strong mayoral regime. A former head of the local team is convinced that the mistrust of the staff (she was one of them) who used to work with former conservative mayor Jacques Toubon has played a role in this marginalisation of low-income neighbourhood urban stakes. She further shared that: "One of the most important conditions (for success) is **the support of politicians**. I did not have it when I was working in the 13<sup>th</sup> district. In terms of local (central) politics, it was okay. But as for the elected officials in the 13<sup>th</sup> district... to be honest, you can't do anything if you don't have their support. So it's been very tough. They have to be there. They have to give you the feeling that they are strongly supportive of it, that they are behind it...The fact that I had been appointed by the former local administration was enough for them to be distrustful of me".

The heads of local teams are civil servants, meaning that they do not lose their job if a politician from another party comes to power at city hall. It should logically translate into continuity, but not for local politicians. Hence, this is an odd situation in which the mayor of Paris (B. Delanoë) is willing to make a drastic change in favour of urban politics, whereas the local mayor (S. Bliscot, then J. Coumet) does not rank it as a priority. In other words, even though it is the mayor of Paris that has the power to establish intergovernmental partnership

with the State, the local mayor remains a central political figure on issues related to urban renewal. This is very well summed up in the words of the current city politics local head<sup>32</sup>: “The decision may be central, [in the sense that] it is the mayor of Paris that has a say on selecting or not such area within that framework of a partnership with the State. But the implementation is local and we have to work a lot with local mayors.”

Another issue which has surfaced as an obstacle is change. Little had been done so far for public housing prior to 2001. A methodology for the governance of urban renewal in priority areas was thus to be “invented”, which has generated some resistance on the part of civil servants reluctant to change or adapt their working practices. The technical complexity of the issues also generated delays and confusion due to their novelty. For instance, in the nearby neighbourhood Olympiades in the 13<sup>th</sup> arrondissement, it took more than four years to define the conditions for the intervention of the city because negotiations were necessary. In the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement, the difficulties were much less significant since the elected officials had an extended experience of urban regeneration previously. Jérôme Coumet, the current mayor in the 13<sup>th</sup> arrondissement, was the youngest Parisian mayor (40 years old) to be elected in May 2008. Urban politics is thus far from being a smooth process.

To local constituents, **delays make politicians unaccountable**. That is why local development teams were created and their two heads act in a complementary way. The socio-economic actions put in place by the team of *Politique de la Ville* actors are more likely to have an impact in the short term, than the more ambitious urban restructuring (Grand Projet urbain) that has been implemented by the urbanism counterparts.

Last but not least, private economic actors may seem to have been excluded in this process of renewal but they actually have a discrete presence through the urban operations conducted by mixed-economy firms (*sociétés d'économie mixte*). There are more than twenty of them in Paris, and they are usually run by local elected officials as a symbol of their public monitoring. They are tools used by local political authorities for implementing the local urban policy. The city of Paris owns roughly 60% of their capital and banks own the other 40%. Mixed-economy firms often take charge of the marketisation of the rights to build on lands bought by the City of Paris (*Zones d'Action Concertée*). There are ZAC in the neighbouring sectors of Bédier-Boutroux.

## 11 Research issues

Ethnic and racial statistics are banned by the French law. This lack of ethnic statistics makes international comparisons difficult, although there is no doubt that immigrant populations widely concentrated in the two studied neighbourhoods are both assets and liabilities.

It is difficult but maybe not impossible to get crime data. The new Police Prefect forbade us to interview local police chiefs although we managed to interview policemen, but statistics provided by the central Headquarters are hard to get and the lack of cooperation has been obvious. Besides, police precincts boundaries seldom coincide with those of the *Politique de la Ville* administrative wards.

There is no foundation which intervenes in RUN neighbourhoods and few salient private actors. Pretty much all of the dynamics of action comes from the public sector.

Much of our data pertains to the city of Paris and not so much to the districts. There is also hardly much data on the sub-neighbourhood level.

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<sup>32</sup> These civil servants are directly accountable to the central mayoral administration.

## 12 Temporary summary

Urban renewal operations often create a new urban divide between the most upwardly mobile households that have the capacity to leave their original neighbourhood and the other households that have to wait patiently for the construction of new buildings in the area. The imperatives of the policy of social mixing in Paris create tensions between old and new residents in a neighbourhood. Two researchers (Tanter and Toubon, 1999) have denounced the assumption that preferential access to public housing for immigrant and /or low-income families should be made difficult, because a well-balanced population with territorial legitimacy or an "entitlement of situations" is likely to prevent conflicts and many other types of failures. This idea, they said, has pernicious effects. Conversely, promoting social mixing within the urban landscape entails encouraging the mixed influx of populations in the neighbourhoods. The approach is to convince "captive" families to leave their neighbourhoods and to engender the arrival of households with a different social and ethnic profile. It does not work easily.

The role of the district mayors in Paris consists of supervising the urban renewal operations launched by the state, and promoting, at the same time, a local urban management that is likely to gain approval among the residents. The city of Paris has implemented an "Observatory of neighbourhoods" in order to evaluate the impact of the efforts made, notably in terms of financial resources. This evaluation had to be done because the City policy is accountable to the City Council. The local development teams (EDL) have a unique role to play in the identification of the levers of action and intermediaries in the neighbourhoods. In 2002 however, a report by the French Accounts Court (Cour des comptes) delivered a very harsh evaluation of *politique de la ville*. Another report was issued in 2012 with the same conclusion: these RUN policies failed in their goals to bring about more equity among neighbourhoods and funds were distributed without efficiency.

Consequently, one of the goals of the Urban contract of Social Cohesion (CUCS) that is in charge of replacing the former contracts involving Urban sensitive zones (*politique de la ville*), is to intensify efforts, giving emphasis to:

- 1) Job creation and economic development, social links, access to citizenship and rights, and the improvement of the environment education health, anticrime measures and culture.
- 2) A territorial redefinition that seeks to focus on serious problems and to achieve better coordination of actions
- 3) Specific populations such as immigrants, youths, women and senior citizens.

**It thus appears that at least three types of policies related to distressed neighbourhoods in Paris overlap: those concerning urban renewal, those strengthening social integration via economic development and local democracy and security policies.** According to researcher Renaud Epstein, "a disconnection (takes place) between the investment in housing infrastructures, taken over by the state within a centralized process on one hand, and on the other, the social interventions referred to common law policies or left to the sole initiative of local authorities" (Epstein, 1999). The state is indeed involved in destruction/reconstruction operations while the City and district mayors deal with social problems, and the state with crime.

Another viewpoint confirms that there is "no doubt that in the fluctuations of the policy makers' priorities for the empowerment of neighbourhoods, after an emphasis put on local dynamics, economical revitalization, or even reassuring measures, the pendulum now swings back to the global restructuring operations of the neighbourhoods" (Damon, 2004:10).



### 13 Main findings

It is our assumption at this stage of research that one of the two neighbourhoods (the Northern site) will fare better than the other. It is due to the stability of the local political elites and to their clout at the city and national levels. There is also more planned development for the Northern side of Paris at the city and regional levels. The Northern neighbourhood is a more socially homogenous neighbourhood. From the civil society point of view, a priori organisations have more *savoir faire* in the Northern neighbourhood compared with the ageing and fearful population in the Southern neighbourhood.

A major issue is the current lack of funds at the French State level which could discredit social regeneration policies due to their lack of efficiency. Yet so many public jobs are associated with public *politique de la ville* and with the GPRU that it does not seem to be a possible option for the government to try and reduce funding in the near future. The city leadership on the Left also makes it unlikely that such policy should be abandoned. But currently, funds redistributed from the top to the localities can be heavily cut, as the state has to reduce the budget deficit at the European Community's request. There are few visible private actors and no foundation intervening in the RUN neighbourhoods. Leaving these neighbourhoods to the care of the police to prevent unrest is a band-aid approach. As mentioned previously, community police work is disregarded among the French policemen as a "dirty job" left to rookies. The issue of stop and search is hot and police unions adamantly refuse to be accountable to the residents. The turnover of poor populations in distressed neighbourhoods makes it difficult to mobilise populations for a better future.

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## Appendix 1

### Tables

**Table 1. Data from the Region Ile de France**

La région Île-de-France représente 18,8 % de la population française et 28,4 % du PIB national.

Superficie (en km <sup>2</sup> )	12 012
Population en 2007 (Insee, estimation au 1 <sup>er</sup> janvier)	11 577 000
Densité de population en 2007 (hab/km <sup>2</sup> )	964
PIB en 2006 (en millions d'euros courants, Insee)	500 839
Nombre d'entreprises en 2006 (Insee, 1 <sup>er</sup> janvier)	612 000
Emploi total en 2005 (Insee)	5 416 800
Nombre de chômeurs (au sens du BIT) en 2005 (Insee)	561 000
Taux de chômage <sup>(1)</sup> au 2 <sup>e</sup> trimestre 2007 (Insee)	7,5 %
Effectifs <sup>(2)</sup> de la recherche publique et privée en 2005 (MESR)	137 700
Effectifs de l'enseignement supérieur 2006-2007 (MEN)	594 100
Trafic aérien des aéroports parisiens en 2006 (nombre de passagers, Aéroports de Paris)	82 400 000
Exportations en 2006 (en millions d'euros, Douanes)	65 302
Importations en 2006 (en millions d'euros, Douanes)	110 064
Emplois créés par de nouvelles implantations d'entreprises en 2006 (ARD/AFII)	9 001
Créations d'entreprises en 2006 (Insee)	68 124
Défaillances d'entreprises en 2006 (Insee)	8 517

(1) Les séries de chômage publiées ici ne prennent pas en compte les nouvelles séries de taux de chômage nationaux publiés par l'Insee au mois de novembre 2007. Ces séries traduisent essentiellement les variations du nombre de demandeurs d'emploi en fin de mois de catégorie 1, 2 et 3 hors activité réduite inscrits à l'ANPE. La publication de nouvelles séries de taux de chômage localisés est prévue pour la fin du 1<sup>er</sup> trimestre 2008.

(2) En équivalent temps plein

**Table 2. Evolution, structure, anticipation of the e population in the region****Évolution de la population par département entre 1999 et 2005**

	Superficie (km <sup>2</sup> )	Population		Variation absolue de population 2005/1999 <sup>(1)</sup>	Densité de population en 2005 (hab/km <sup>2</sup> ) <sup>(1)</sup>
		1999	2005 <sup>(1)</sup>		
Paris	105	2 125 000	2 168 000	43 000	20 648
Seine-et-Marne	5 915	1 194 000	1 260 000	66 000	213
Yvelines	2 284	1 354 000	1 394 000	40 000	610
Essonne	1 804	1 134 000	1 189 000	55 000	659
Hauts-de-Seine	176	1 429 000	1 531 000	102 000	8 699
Seine-Saint-Denis	236	1 383 000	1 485 000	102 000	6 292
Val-de-Marne	245	1 227 000	1 293 000	66 000	5 278
Val-d'Oise	1 246	1 105 000	1 153 000	48 000	925
<b>Île-de-France</b>	<b>12 012</b>	<b>10 952 000</b>	<b>11 472 000</b>	<b>520 000</b>	<b>955</b>
France métropolitaine	543 965	58 518 000	61 132 000	2 614 000	112

*(1) Estimations au 01-07**Du fait des arrondis, les résultats pour la région ne sont pas égaux à la somme des départements.**Source : insee, recensement de la population de 1999 et enquêtes annuelles de recensement de 2004 à 2007***Structure de la population selon la tranche d'âge au 01-01-2005***(en %)*

	0-19 ans	20-39 ans	40-59 ans	60-74 ans	75 ans ou plus
Paris	19,4	35,5	26,0	11,0	8,2
Seine-et-Marne	28,8	28,6	28,2	9,6	4,8
Yvelines	27,8	27,7	28,0	11,0	5,5
Essonne	27,8	28,3	27,7	11,0	5,2
Hauts-de-Seine	25,2	31,5	25,9	10,5	6,9
Seine-Saint-Denis	29,1	29,5	26,6	9,7	5,1
Val-de-Marne	26,0	29,7	27,1	10,7	6,6
Val-d'Oise	29,4	28,6	27,8	9,4	4,8
<b>Île-de-France</b>	<b>26,1</b>	<b>30,4</b>	<b>27,0</b>	<b>10,4</b>	<b>6,1</b>
France métropolitaine	24,9	26,9	27,4	12,8	8,1

*Source : insee, estimations de population***Estimations de population des dix principales communes hors Paris au 01-07-2005**

	Département	Population
Boulogne-Billancourt	Hauts-de-Seine	110 300
Argenteuil	Val-d'Oise	102 400
Montreuil <sup>(1)</sup>	Seine-Saint-Denis	100 600
Saint-Denis	Seine-Saint-Denis	96 600
Créteil	Val-de-Marne	89 000
Nanterre	Hauts-de-Seine	87 800
Versailles	Yvelines	87 100
Courbevoie	Hauts-de-Seine	84 000
Asnières-sur-Seine	Hauts-de-Seine	82 800
Vitry-sur-Seine	Val-de-Marne	82 500

*(1) L'estimation est basée sur les enquêtes de recensement de 2005 à 2007.**Source : insee, enquêtes annuelles de recensement de 2004 à 2007*

**Table 3. Gross Domestic Product of the Region vs France****Produit intérieur brut**

	Île-de-France			France métropolitaine
	2004	2005	2006	2006
PIB en valeur <sup>(1)</sup>	467 014	482 850	500 839	1 762 379
PIB par emploi <sup>(2)</sup>	87 299	89 606	92 329	71 433
PIB par habitant <sup>(2)</sup>	41 112	42 188	43 370	28 721
PIB en volume <sup>(3)</sup>	432 493	440 170	446 096	1 566 661

(1) En millions d'euros courants

(2) En euros courants

(3) En millions d'euros constants

Source : Insee, comptes régionaux, base 2000. Données 2005 semi-définitives, données 2006 provisoires

**Valeur ajoutée****Valeur ajoutée par secteur d'activité**

(en millions d'euros)

	Île-de-France			France métropolitaine
	2005	2006	2006 (%)	2006 (%)
Agriculture, sylviculture, pêche	630	541	0,1	2,0
Industries agricoles et alimentaires	3 216	3 177	0,7	1,8
Industries des biens de consommation	13 533	13 817	3,1	2,3
Industrie automobile	4 670	3 987	0,9	0,8
Industries des biens d'équipement	9 086	8 189	1,8	2,5
Industries des biens intermédiaires	7 773	8 173	1,8	5,0
Energie	9 123	9 467	2,1	2,1
Construction	15 881	17 806	4,0	6,3
Commerce	41 915	41 093	9,2	10,0
Transports	19 324	19 865	4,4	4,2
Activités financières, activités immobilières	96 280	99 438	22,3	18,8
Services aux entreprises	102 855	109 460	24,5	16,8
Services aux particuliers	36 268	37 581	8,4	5,6
Education, santé, action sociale, administration	71 768	74 178	16,6	21,6
<b>Total valeur ajoutée</b>	<b>432 322</b>	<b>446 773</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>1 572 128</b>

Source : Insee, comptes régionaux, base 2000. Données 2005 semi-définitives, données 2006 provisoires

**Table 4 Job distribution in the Region in 2005**

<b>Emploi</b>							
<b>Population active en 2005</b> <span style="float: right;">(structure en %)</span>							
	Agriculteurs exploitants	Artisans, commerçants, chefs d'entreprise	Cadres, professions intellectuelles supérieures	Professions intermédiaires	Employés	Ouvriers	Ensemble
<b>Île-de-France</b>	<b>0,2</b>	<b>4,5</b>	<b>26,3</b>	<b>25,3</b>	<b>28,7</b>	<b>15,0</b>	<b>100,0</b>
Hommes	0,3	6,3	30,4	23,4	16,4	23,2	100,0
Femmes	0,0	2,4	21,5	27,5	42,8	5,8	100,0
<b>Province</b>	<b>3,0</b>	<b>6,1</b>	<b>11,2</b>	<b>21,8</b>	<b>30,1</b>	<b>27,8</b>	<b>100,0</b>
Hommes	3,9	8,0	13,6	21,1	12,0	41,4	100,0
Femmes	2,0	4,0	8,4	22,6	51,2	11,8	100,0

*Il s'agit des données issues de l'ancienne méthodologie. Les données de la nouvelle enquête emploi ne sont pas disponibles au moment de la rédaction de ce document.*  
 Source : Insee, enquête emploi en continu 2005

**Structure de la population active occupée**

	Effectifs		Évolution 2005/2004 (en %)	Structure 2005 (en %)	
	2004	2005		Île-de-France	Province
<b>Population active occupée</b>	<b>4 927 000</b>	<b>4 972 000</b>	<b>0,9</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>100,0</b>
Hommes	2 601 000	2 646 000	1,7	53,2	54,4
Femmes	2 326 000	2 326 000	0,0	46,8	45,6
Moins de 29 ans	968 000	976 000	0,8	19,6	19,4
30 à 49 ans	2 781 000	2 817 000	1,3	56,7	55,5
50 ans ou plus	1 178 000	1 179 000	0,1	23,7	25,1
Non salariés	372 000	405 000	8,9	8,1	1,6
Salariés	4 555 000	4 567 000	0,3	91,9	88,4
<i>dont emplois précaires</i>	477 000	518 000	8,6	10,4	12,7
– contrat à durée déterminée + intérim	381 000	410 000	7,6	8,2	9,4
– apprentis, stages et contrats aidés	96 000	108 000	12,5	2,2	3,3
<i>dont emplois stables</i>	4 078 000	4 049 000	-0,7	81,5	75,7
– hors État, collectivités locales	3 116 000	3 115 000	0,0	62,7	57,5
– État et collectivités locales	962 000	934 000	-2,9	18,8	18,2
Catégories socio-professionnelles					
<i>dont : – cadres et professions intellectuelles supérieures</i>	1 298 000	1 327 000	2,2	26,7	11,7
– professions intermédiaires	1 258 000	1 280 000	1,7	25,7	22,4
– employés	1 403 000	1 403 000	0,0	28,2	29,2
– ouvriers	731 000	685 000	-6,3	13,8	26,5
Secteurs d'activité					
<i>dont : – industrie</i>	557 000	577 000	3,6	11,6	17,9
– construction	252 000	234 000	-7,1	4,7	6,8
– tertiaire	4 079 000	4 120 000	1,0	82,9	70,4

*Il s'agit des données issues de l'ancienne méthodologie. Les données de la nouvelle enquête emploi ne sont pas disponibles au moment de la rédaction de ce document.*  
 Source : Insee, enquêtes emploi en continu 2004 et 2005

**Taux d'activité en 2005**

	Île-de-France	Province
Hommes	66,8	60,5
Femmes	54,5	48,1
Moins de 29 ans	48,4	50,8
30 à 49 ans	88,9	88,3
50 ans et plus	39,0	29,8

*Il s'agit des données issues de l'ancienne méthodologie. Les données de la nouvelle enquête emploi ne sont pas disponibles au moment de la rédaction de ce document.*  
 Source : Insee, enquête emploi en continu 2005

**Table 5. Unemployment in the Region and in France 2005, 2006, 2007****Chômage****Nombre de chômeurs (au sens du BIT) et taux de chômage**

	Effectifs 2005	Taux de chômage			
		Île-de-France		Province 2005	France métropolitaine 2005
		2004	2005		
<b>Ensemble</b>	<b>561 000</b>	<b>10,0</b>	<b>10,1</b>	<b>9,8</b>	<b>9,8</b>
Hommes	281 000	10,2	9,6	8,8	9,0
Femmes	280 000	9,8	10,8	10,9	10,8
15 à 29 ans	180 000	16,0	15,6	17,7	17,3
30 à 49 ans	275 000	8,8	8,9	8,1	8,3
50 ans ou plus	106 000	7,5	8,2	6,4	6,7
<b>Catégories socioprofessionnelles</b>					
<i>dont</i> : - cadres	93 000	5,7	6,6	4,0	4,9
- professions intermédiaires	90 000	7,2	6,6	5,2	5,5
- employés	152 000	9,5	9,8	10,4	10,3
- ouvriers	128 000	14,8	15,7	12,0	12,5
Sans diplôme ou CEP	156 000	15,1	14,6	15,1	15,0
BEPC, CAP, BEP	139 000	9,2	10,3	9,1	9,3
Baccalauréat	93 000	9,9	10,1	9,0	9,2
Bac + 2	61 000	7,4	7,9	6,2	6,6
Diplôme supérieur	112 000	7,9	7,9	6,5	7,0

*Il s'agit des données issues de l'ancienne méthodologie. Les données de la nouvelle enquête emploi ne sont pas disponibles au moment de la rédaction de ce document.  
Source : Insee, enquêtes emploi en continu 2004 et 2005*

**Taux de chômage en fin de trimestre <sup>(1)</sup>***(en % de la population active)*

	2 <sup>e</sup> trimestre 2006	3 <sup>e</sup> trimestre 2006	4 <sup>e</sup> trimestre 2006	1 <sup>er</sup> trimestre 2007	2 <sup>e</sup> trimestre 2007
Paris	9,5	9,1	8,9	8,6	8,3
Seine-et-Marne	7,2	6,9	6,7	6,5	6,2
Yvelines	6,6	6,3	6,2	6,1	5,8
Essonne	6,6	6,2	6,1	5,9	5,6
Hauts-de-Seine	7,9	7,6	7,4	7,2	6,9
Seine-Saint-Denis	11,9	11,6	11,2	11,1	10,7
Val-de-Marne	8,3	8,1	7,9	7,8	7,5
Val-d'Oise	8,9	8,6	8,5	8,4	8,0
<b>Île-de-France</b>	<b>8,5</b>	<b>8,2</b>	<b>8,0</b>	<b>7,8</b>	<b>7,5</b>
France métropolitaine	9,0	8,7	8,6	8,3	8,0

*(1) Voir glossaire*

*Source : Insee, séries corrigées des variations saisonnières - données provisoires  
Avertissement : les séries de chômage publiées ici ne prennent pas en compte les nouvelles séries de taux de chômage nationaux publiés par l'Insee au mois de novembre 2007. Ces séries traduisent essentiellement les variations du nombre de demandeurs d'emploi en fin de mois de catégorie 1, 2 et 3 hors activité réduite inscrits à l'ANPE. La publication de nouvelles séries de taux de chômage localisés est prévue pour la fin du 1<sup>er</sup> trimestre 2008.*

**Demandeurs d'emploi au 30-06-2007 <sup>(1)</sup>**

	Catégories 1, 2 et 3				Catégorie 6
	Ensemble	Moins de 25 ans (en %)	50 ans ou plus (en %)	Longue durée (en %)	Ensemble
Paris	116 705	5,2	19,4	37,7	16 399
Seine-et-Marne	41 309	15,3	17,7	25,2	7 786
Yvelines	43 205	11,8	19,1	28,2	8 566
Essonne	35 501	12,5	17,5	24,0	6 092
Hauts-de-Seine	58 999	8,0	18,9	30,9	9 936
Seine-Saint-Denis	80 611	11,1	17,6	30,7	12 466
Val-de-Marne	52 110	10,4	17,9	30,8	7 355
Val-d'Oise	49 002	12,8	18,0	30,2	9 521
<b>Île-de-France</b>	<b>477 442</b>	<b>9,9</b>	<b>18,4</b>	<b>31,2</b>	<b>78 121</b>
France métropolitaine	2 398 434	14,4	17,6	29,6	483 087

*(1) Voir glossaire**Source : ANPE*



**Table 6. Distribution of incomes**

<b>Revenus</b>						
<b>Salaires annuels bruts moyens<sup>(1)</sup></b>						
	<i>(en euros courants)</i>					
	Hommes 2005	Femmes 2005	Ensemble 2005	Ensemble 2004	Évolution 2005/2004 (en %)	Écart relatif IDF/province 2005 (en %)
Cadres	69 132	53 520	64 230	61 821	3,9	22,1
Professions intermédiaires	34 213	31 661	33 014	31 969	3,3	10,3
Employés	22 489	22 658	22 597	21 859	3,4	9,4
Ouvriers	23 690	19 589	23 128	22 522	2,7	6,8
<i>dont : qualifiés</i>	24 960	22 640	24 767	24 091	2,8	8,7
<i>non qualifiés</i>	20 143	17 344	19 410	18 949	2,4	2,0
Ensemble	40 418	32 116	37 115	35 977	3,2	37,9
Province	28 633	23 906	26 916	26 120	3,0	-
France entière	31 420	26 136	29 451	28 581	3,0	-


(1) Les salaires bruts intégrant l'intéressement et la participation.

Champ : salariés à temps complet, hors chefs d'entreprise, apprentis, stagiaires et emplois aidés, hors fonction publique d'État et collectivités territoriales

Source : Insee, DADS de 2004 et 2005 (salaires au lieu de travail)

**Table 7. Distribution of public housing in the region**

Parc de logements sociaux en 2006



**Table 8. Public housing****Transports collectifs en 2005 et 2006***(en millions de voyages)*

	2005	2006	Évolution 2006/2005 (en %)
Métro	1 372,7	1 409,5	+ 2,7
RER (lignes A et B)	444,5	451,9	+ 1,7
SNCF Île-de-France <sup>(1)</sup>	633	655	+ 3,5
SNCF France entière	975	1 013	+ 3,9
Île-de-France / France entière	64,9 %	64,7 %	- 0,2 point

*(1) Couvre les 8 zones de la carte orange**Sources : RATP - SNCF*

## Appendix 2

## Statistical Profile of Porte Clignancourt-Porte Montmartre

	PORTE MONTMARTRE / PORTE DE CLIGNANCOURT / M		TOTAL CUCS		18e arr.		PARIS	
Surface (en ha)	43,4		735,2		449,8		7 824,1	
Surface des espaces verts ouverts au public (en ha)	2,6		29,3		12,6		1 610,5	
<b>Démographie</b>								
Population totale (sans double compte) (RP 1999 - INSEE)	12 746	100,0%	300 321	100,0%	184 581	100,0%	2 125 851	100,0%
Nombre d'immigrés	2 586	20,3%	79 295	26,4%	40 940	22,2%	389 540	18,3%
Nombre d'étrangers	2 269	17,8%	66 153	22,0%	35 213	19,1%	308 266	14,5%
Nombre de jeunes de moins de 25 ans	4 097	32,1%	90 560	30,2%	46 519	25,2%	551 396	25,9%
Nombre de personnes âgées de plus de 60 ans	2 441	19,2%	48 111	16,0%	32 709	17,7%	417 091	20%
Nombre de familles avec enfants de moins de 25 ans (RP 1999 - INSEE)	1 880	100,0%	39 966	100,0%	20 916	100,0%	244 514	100,0%
Nombre de foyers monoparentaux	698	37,1%	12 199	30,5%	6 269	30,0%	63 080	25,8%
Population totale de 15 ans ou plus	10 432	100,0%	248 081	100,0%	157 802	100,0%	1 838 215	100,0%
Population sans diplôme	2 555	24,5%	51 853	20,9%	25 809	16,4%	208 967	11,4%
<b>La précarité</b>								
Nombre de ménages (RP 1999 - INSEE)	5 386	100,0%	140 113	100,0%	99 689	100,0%	1 110 912	100,0%
Nombre d'allocataires du RMI (CAF 2004)	860	16,0%	13 903	9,9%	8 460	8,5%	59 970	5,4%
Population totale (RP 1999 - INSEE)	12 746	100,0%	300 321	100,0%	184 581	100,0%	2 125 851	100,0%
Population des foyers à bas revenus (CAF 2004)	3 787	29,7%	64 629	21,5%	32 782	17,8%	228 731	10,8%
<b>L'activité économique et chômage</b>								
Nombre total de demandeurs d'emploi en fin de mois (Cat.1) (ANPE 2006)	1 126	100,0%	23 015	100,0%	13 161	100,0%	112 026	100,0%
Nombre de demandeurs d'emploi de longue durée : 1 an et plus	381	33,8%	8 890	38,6%	4 902	37,2%	44 144	39,4%
Nombre de commerces en activité (APUR BDCOM 2005)	109	100,0%	5 278	100,0%	4 889	100,0%	63 496	100,0%
Nombre de locaux vacants en Rez de Chaussée (APUR BDCOM 2005)	27	19,9%	1 168	22,1%	899	15,5%	8 276	11,5%
<b>La petite enfance et l'éducation</b>								
Nombre total d'élèves en primaire (Ville de Paris - DASCO 2002)	759	100,0%	14 899	100,0%	7 511	100,0%	77 285	100,0%
Nombre d'élèves en retard (au moins 1 an)	154	20,3%	2 989	20,1%	1 393	18,5%	9 789	12,7%
Nombre de candidats présents au brevet des collèges Public (Rectorat, 2005)	109	100,0%	1 759	100,0%	880	100,0%	13 388	100,0%
Nombre de reçus au brevet des collèges Public	51	46,8%	1 010	57,4%	528	60,0%	9 450	70,6%
<b>Le logement et le cadre de vie</b>								
Nombre de résidences principales (INSEE - RP 1999)	5 386	100,0%	140 113	100,0%	99 689	100,0%	1 110 912	100,0%
Nombre de résidences principales sans confort (sans WC et / ou sans douche)	190	3,5%	14 752	10,5%	12 029	12,1%	110 821	10,0%
Nombre de logements SRU gérés par les bailleurs sociaux (Etat - DULE 2004)	4 704	87,3%	56 583	40,4%	17 266	17,3%	164 997	14,9%
Nombre de demandeurs d'un logement social (Ville de Paris - DLH 2005)	1 152	21,4%	20 203	14,4%	11 407	11,4%	86 824	7,8%
Nombre d'immeubles du plan d'éradication de l'habitat indigne (OEHI 2006)	2		519		298		1 107	

### Appendix 3

#### Documents or issues to be explored and considered

- The convention between the National Agency for Urban Renewal and the sites at 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement. It details the city goals for 2 of the 11 sites (100,000 residents) benefiting from the GPRU programme in 2007-2010, the profile of populations the physical and social dysfunctions, the type of housing, the financing with maps, time schedule and statistics. Document from the City of Paris, July 2007, 77 pages.
- The 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement mayor's 2008 municipal election booklet entitled *Le 18<sup>ème</sup> passionnément*, which is an overview of past policies (2001-2008) and future policies (2008-2014) in case of election.
- The 13<sup>th</sup> arrondissement mayor's blog.
- GPRU Porte Montmartre-Porte de Clignancourt. A 2004 Document from the City of Paris containing 70 pages of: Description of the history of the district, its environment, social characteristics, jobs profile, assets and liabilities, stakes, strategies, actions and time schedule.
- GPRU Joseph Bédier/Porte d'Ivry. A 2004 Document from the City of Paris containing 60 pages of: Description of the history of the district, its environment, social characteristics, jobs profile, assets and liabilities, stakes, strategies, actions and time schedule.
- The local City of Paris newsletters for the 13<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissements, as well as the newsletters of the neighbourhood councils.
- A confidential note from the Police on Portes du Sud, which defines the disorders issues in all sectors (2008).
- Interviews conducted in the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissements but not explored:
  - From the local mayor adjunct in charge of housing
  - From a public high-school principal
  - From the local team head in charge of economic development
  - From a police chief adjunct in charge of prevention
  - From the leader of one tenants' association
  - From the president of the local businesses' association
  - From the public housing manager in charge of social development
  - From two janitors of public housing project
- Interviews conducted in the 13<sup>th</sup> arrondissements but not explored:
  - The mayor adjunct in charge of urban operations
  - The mayor adjunct in charge of public safety
  - The former and current heads of local urbanism teams on Bédier-Boutroux
  - The current head of local urbanism team for Olympiades
  - The local team Politique de la Ville head for Portes du Sud
  - The police commissioner of the 13<sup>th</sup> arrondissements
  - The representative of a community association
  - The night teams in charge of public safety

# Prague Case Study Report

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## 1 Is the focus on neighbourhood appropriate in the Czech (Prague) context?<sup>1</sup>

The word “neighbour” (“soused” in Czech) is used very commonly in the general language, but it is not particularly well defined. Usually it refers to a person/family that lives close/next to one’s residence. Being “a neighbour” of someone is primarily defined as being spatially close to someone but not necessarily connected with someone by social interactions, communication, common values, etc.,.

The term “neighbourhood” is not well established in the Czech context at all. Although a literal translation of the word “neighbourhood” into the Czech language is possible (the corresponding Czech word is “sousedství”), the meaning of this Czech word is somewhat unclear and most commonly refers to a very small spatial unit consisting of a several adjacent houses/apartments. The Czech term for “neighbourhood” describes most usually just a group of not more than several neighbours. The term never refers to any community, geographically localised within a city, town or suburb. The term is never related to any spatial unit of local government or spatial unit of state administration.

We did not find the Czech term for “neighbourhood” in any policy documents we have studied so far. If the policy documents refer to any geographically defined parts of the cities, they usually refer to “city districts”, “boroughs”, or “quarters”. These terms refer to territorial units that are mostly defined by their administrative functions, or sometimes are also defined historically.

## 2 Intergovernmental context

### 2.1 General structure of Czech local governments

Sub-national public administration in the Czech Republic has two arms: state administration and territorial self-government. *State administration* is characterised by its limited autonomy in decision-making, vertical hierarchy, prevalent monocratic way of decision-making and the fact that most positions are taken up by appointment. *Territorial self-government* is an expression of the right of the population living in a territory to independently manage the territorial affairs within the scope defined in the Constitution and legislation. The basic status of territorial self-government has been laid down in the 1992 Constitution of the Czech Republic which stipulated that in terms of the territorial self-government, the territory of the country is divided into municipalities which are the basic territorial self-governing units, and regions which are the higher level territorial self-governing units. They are independently administered by their elected Councils - Municipal and Regional respectively, while other self-governmental bodies are derived from the Councils. The territorial self-governing units

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<sup>1</sup> This case study report includes information as per December 2009.

are corporations of public law entitled to possess their own property and manage financial means according to their own budget. The territorial self-government is not hierarchical and its authorities are not subordinated to the state which can intervene in territorial self-government only in cases provided by law and for reasons of upholding the law.

The City of Prague is special in a sense that it is the only municipality in the Czech Republic that is at the same time a self-governing municipality and the region. Beside its “normal powers”, the city council of Prague has also powers of regional parliaments. Prague is a *de jure* single municipality but the law allows the Municipal Council to make decisions about its internal structure provided that the city issues a statute, which must include at the minimum: the delineation of the City District boundaries, the powers and responsibilities of the city and the City Districts, and specification of the relations between the authorities of the city and authorities of the City Districts. Prague had more or less decided to respect administrative city parts that existed under the Communist government; it has just changed their status and made them equal in terms of their powers and responsibilities. Thus, the outcome was the creation of the 57 City Districts.

## 2.2 Financial system of Czech local governments

Although municipal governments receive a wide leeway in terms of self-governing competencies and large legal independence, their position is much more restricted in terms of finance. As we will discuss further, municipalities have limited room to control the financial flows to fulfill their legal duties, both on the side of revenues as well as expenditures. The redistributive role of the state in financial affairs is very strong. The tough central control over the finance of municipalities is partly an inherited consequence of the Communist regime and partly an intentional measure aimed at preventing the rise of social inequalities among municipalities. Although there is a fierce political struggle over the extent that the tax system should redistribute money from wealthy to poor individuals (e.g. the centre right national government introduced flat rate income taxes in 2008, a measure angrily opposed by the parties of the Left), there has been interestingly no attempt to change the heavily egalitarian redistributive system of municipal finance from either left or right governments.

## 2.3 Municipal revenues

The total amount of municipal revenues as well as their structure poses constraints for the municipal policy and redistribution of the resources. Tax revenues of municipalities are highly redistributive in the Czech Republic. This is obvious from the general structure of municipal budget revenues that is summarised in Table 1.

**Table 1: Structure of municipal budget revenues in the Czech Republic and the share of individual categories of revenues in total revenues (year 2006)**

		Share of total municipal revenues in 2006, in %:
<b>Current revenues:</b>		<b>83.1</b>
Tax revenues		53.2
	- shared taxes (*)	18.6
	- value added taxes	10.1
	- physical persons income tax from depending activities and benefits of office	(***)
	- physical persons income tax deducted by special rate	14.0
	- legal persons tax**	3.1
	- 60 % of physical persons income tax from entrepreneurship	(****)
	- exclusive (own) taxes(*)	2.0
	- property taxes	2.4
	- corporate income tax in cases, when the taxpayer is a municipality	(***)
	- 30 % share on physical persons income tax from entrepreneurship distributed according to the place of residence of the entrepreneur	(***)
	- 1.5 % share on physical persons income tax from depending activities and benefits of office (distributed according to the rate between the number of employees in the municipality as of 1st December of the previous year and the sum of employees of all the municipalities of the Czech Republic)	1.0
	- local fees	2.2
	- administrative fees	9.6
Non-tax revenues	- consist of revenues of business activities of established institutions, revenues from outcomes of own business activities, from rental of property, from gifts, from collected penalties etc.	20.3
Non-investment subsidies	- for special purpose	10.4
	- without special purpose	5.0
<b>Capital revenues</b>		<b>16.9</b>
Investment subsidies	- for special purpose	0.9
	- without special purpose	0.7
Capital revenues	- from sale of fixed assets (mobile and immobile)	0.7
	- from sale of shares and other equities	0.7
	- received credits	0.7
	- others	0.7

(\*) This structure of allocations is pursuant to the Act No. 243/2000 Coll. which was valid between 1.1.2001 and 31.12.2007.

(\*\*) When the taxpayer is a municipality itself, the municipality obtains 100 % of the tax income. In all other cases, the tax returns are shared among state, regions and municipalities.

(\*\*\*) Include also 1.5 % of share on physical person's income tax from exclusive tax revenues, because the data source of that calculation did not allow distinguishing them.

(\*\*\*\*) Include also 30 % share on physical persons income tax from entrepreneurship distributed according to the place of residence of the entrepreneur, because the data source of that calculation did not allow distinguishing them.

Source of data for calculations: State Final Bill 2006 (available from [www.mfcr.cz](http://www.mfcr.cz)).

The main logic underlining the financing of municipal budget is redistribution and equalisation. This can be illustrated by the fact that two main resources of municipal budgets are those who are not controlled by the municipalities themselves: the shared taxes and subsidies for either non-investment or investment purposes. It is worth to mention here that although municipalities have revenues from property taxes (only the ownership of land and real estate are taxed), the tax rates are determined centrally without relation to the actual prices and set generally very low. Similarly, although there are some local taxes that can be imposed by municipalities, it does not include the income tax and the set of applicable local taxes is determined by national laws as well as the respective tax rates. Generally, Czech municipalities are highly dependent on the revenues over which they have no control.

The way the municipalities get their share of the tax money is quite complex. Income taxes from both physical and legal persons as well as the value added tax (VAT) are collected by the state and then the majority of them are redistributed in accordance to the adjusted population size. The adjustment formula favours municipalities with larger population size. *Shared taxes*, comprising about 45 % of total financial resources flowing to municipality budgets, are allocated without any relation to the real economic wealth of the municipality, the income of their inhabitants or the actual municipal policies. The second most important source of municipal revenues, *investment and non-investment subsidies*, come mainly from state budget via various ministries, state funds or regional budgets and creates approximately 31 % of total municipal revenues. In the Czech Republic, a number of subsidies such as subsidies to the social care institutions or contributions to the school system are bounded and can be spent exclusively for a specified purpose. Their amount is fixed at the national level and their allocation should ensure the operation of the institutions which are, according to the Act on municipalities, taken care by municipalities. This is the case of maternity and primary schools, centres for social care or social housing for senior citizens, support of people in social need etc. The municipalities are owners of some institutions (e.g. primary schools); they are responsible for their good operation, but the resources for its operation and salaries of the staff came to municipal budgets from the state as subsidies with special purpose and municipalities just administer their cash flow. Therefore, the subsidies for special purpose reduce considerably the autonomy of municipal representatives to make independent decisions.

The third most important source of revenues of Czech municipalities is *the investment subsidies*. Municipalities are not legally entitled to this kind of subsidies. They are allocated to municipalities by the state (or rarely the regions). They are mostly allocated to a special purpose. The investment subsidies for special purpose are usually used for the reconstruction, construction of buildings (e.g. schools, sport equipment) or infrastructure. A financial contribution to the municipal budget is often a prerequisite for the use of these subsidies. The subsidies must be completely spent within the respective fiscal year. In general, the system of investment subsidies suffers from the unclear rules of redistribution and lack of objective criteria for their allocation (Peková, 2004).

A special type of subsidy is the so-called contribution towards performance of the state administration. This contribution can be understood as a subsidy from the state budget whose purpose of use has not been prescribed, although it is expected to be used in relation to the performance of tasks in delegated competence (e.g. issuing the national identity cards or passports by selected larger municipalities). The municipality, however, is not obliged to use



these subsidies for a prescribed purpose provided they exercise the delegated competences without problems.<sup>2</sup>

Only about one quarter of the municipal revenues is more or less dependent on municipal decision making or characteristics of its population. The characteristics of the inhabitants of municipalities are taken into account in some specific cases. 1.5 % of the total amount of physical persons income tax collected from employees by the state is distributed in accordance to the number of employees in the municipality and not in accordance to the simple population size of municipality. Similarly, 30 % of the income tax collected by the state from the self-employed is distributed according to the place of residence of the self-employed and not the population size. Nevertheless, the amount of money redistributed in that way is rather small.

*Local fees* in the Czech fiscal system are also under tight state control. Municipalities are authorised to collect such local fees by a special national law in which nine types of local fees are listed. These nine types are: a dog fee, a spa and accommodation fee, a fee for the use of public space, a admission fee, an accommodation capacity fee, a fee on permission to entry by a motor vehicle into selected areas and parts of towns, a fee on operation of gaming and betting machines, a fee on operation of the system of gathering, collection, transport, sorting, use and removal of domestic waste and a fee on the increase of value of building land by a possibility of its connecting to a distribution system of water or to a sewerage. The state sets the maximal rate of each fee which cannot be exceeded. It is the decision of a municipality regarding which fee will be collected by the municipality. In general, the revenue from the local fees represents a marginal proportion of about 1 % of the total municipal revenues.

*Property tax* (only from land and real estate) is also limited by an imposition of a maximal level as declared by the Act on property tax (Act No. 338/1992 Coll.). The tax rates are set as progressive according to the population size of the municipality. Plenty of owners of real estate in various categories are exempted by the law from paying the property tax. These are the people under the poverty line, the physically handicapped owners regardless of their incomes, the physical persons who are owners of newly built houses (they are exempted for a period of 15 years after the completion of the house). In total, the property tax contributes to municipal budgets by only about 2 %. Although the law allows some freedom for the municipalities to determine the level of property tax rate, the municipalities often ignore it and use the minimum rate declared by the law, as the rise of property taxes is considered by local politicians to be an extremely politically unpopular step with little financial gain.

*Administrative fees* are also exclusive revenues of municipalities. They are collected for operations related to the activity of municipalities that act as administrative authorities on behalf of the state (e.g. for issuing of a building permission). The actual fee is always determined by law. They represent 2 % of the total of municipal budget.

*Non-tax revenues* consist of revenues derived from business activities of established institutions, revenues from outcomes of own business activities, from rental of municipal property, from gifts, from collected penalties, etc. These non-tax revenues account for about 10 % of municipal revenues.

*Capital revenues* (without considering investment subsidies) account for less than 7 % of the total municipal budget revenues from which the major part is represented by sale of municipal property.

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<sup>2</sup> The contribution towards performance of the state administration is mostly understood as a partial compensation of personnel and material expenditures that arose due to the territorial self-governing units' performance of the state administration, and its amount differ according to the scope of delegated powers.

## 2.4 Municipal expenditures

The primary role of municipal expenditures is to ensure the operation of public assets which are entrusted to municipalities (see the details of municipal competencies in Appendix 1). Economists usually distinguish between two types of municipal expenditures. The first type is represented by *expenditures linked to provision of proper public assets* from which all inhabitants of the municipality would benefit. Such expenditures are covered exclusively from shared or entrusted taxes (in the case of the Czech fiscal system, the only entrusted tax is the property tax). They are represented mainly by expenditures for the following:

- Municipal government themselves, for its proper operation.
- Treatment of negative externalities (e.g. waste management, construction and operation of sewage water treatment plants).
- Public parks.
- Public roads, pavements, etc.
- Public street lights.
- Public security (only some of the municipalities finance the creation of a municipal police while the majority of other municipalities use the services of the state police).

This type of municipal expenditure can be characterised as current expenditures (for operation and small reparations) or capital expenditures (investment to constructions and purchase of fixed assets). For the fulfillment of their tasks, municipalities can fund non-profit organisations or they can delegate its operation to a private entrepreneur.

Another type of municipal expenditures is represented by *expenditures linked to provisions of mixed public assets* which are usually not used by all citizens (e.g. primary schools, public transport). A part of such expenditures may be covered by users; the rest is covered by public sources. As the mixed assets are a part of public assets under the delegation of municipalities, their expenditures are often co-financed or fully-financed by state budget. The following assets can be considered as mixed:

- Education: municipalities are operating maternity and primary schools.
- Social programmes: operation of subsidised housing for senior citizens, drug prevention actions, etc.
- Transport services: subsidies to private companies that operate public transportation system to a private operator.
- Transfers to households that include social security benefits.

The expenditures of this type are usually covered by more different sources of finance. These sources can emanate from the state budget through various ministerial and special funds or be derived from the own sources of the respective municipality. Unfortunately, it is often impossible to identify the proper source of money from the municipal budget data.

Table 2 provides a basic idea as to how the money from municipal budgets is spent.

**Table 2: Structure of municipal budget expenditures in the Czech Republic and the share of individual categories of expenditures in total revenues (year 2006)**

Type of expenditures	Share of total municipal expenditures in 2006, in %:
<b>Current expenditures</b>	<b>66.6</b>
Wages and salaries of employees and other payments for work	8.9
Statutory insurance premiums paid by employer	2.9
Purchase of material	1.7
Interest payments	1.0
Purchase of water, fuel, energy, services and other purchases	18.9
Non-investment subsidies to enterprises	6.2
Non-investment subsidies to non-profit and similar organisations	3.0
Non-investment transfers to semi-public and similar organisations	12.0
Transport services	0.6
Non-investment transfers to households	6.3
- include social security benefits	6.1
<b>Capital expenditures</b>	<b>33.4</b>
Investment purchases and related expenditure	28.0
Purchases of shares and other equities	0.5
Investment subsidies to enterprises	2.8
Investment grants to semi-public organisations	0.8
Investment grants to non-profit organisations	0.2

Source of data for calculations: data from the Ministry of Finances of the Czech Republic (available from [www.mfcr.cz](http://www.mfcr.cz) ).

Current expenditures represented in all of the above mentioned categories are obligatory expenditures ensuring the operation of municipal office and other institutions under the municipality competences. On the other hand, capital expenditures represent the investments. They are usually one-off actions of long-term investment, most often to investment purchases and related expenditures. Capital expenditures may include incentives for enterprises with the aim to raise attractiveness of municipality.

### 3 The local structure of politics and government

#### 3.1 The local government of the City of Prague

As far as the structure of the government of the City of Prague is concerned, a body that independently manages the city of Prague is the *Council of the Capital City of Prague*. The council decides on the matters that belong to the sphere of independent competence of the city of Prague and, if entrusted by law, also within transferred competence powers. The Council has 70 members<sup>3</sup>. They are elected by the citizens of Prague for a four-year term of office. The system of proportional representation is used in the Council elections, allowing voters to

<sup>3</sup> According to the Act No. 131/2000 on the Capital City of Prague, the number of members of the council can vary between 55 and 70. Decision about the actual number of councilors is made by the previous Council of the Capital City of Prague before the election.

either choose a party list or to pick individual candidates from different party lists or combine both methods. Before the elections, the city is usually divided into several multi-members electoral districts in which elections are held separately. The City District government has power to design electoral districts. This is a source of extensive temptation to misuse this power in favour of ruling party/parties and against the opposition. This is why the electoral districts were re-designed several times and, consequently, the number of electoral districts varied from 1 (the whole city = 1 electoral district, 70 seats were distributed) to 10 (whole city = 10 electoral districts, about 7 seats distributed in each electoral district). Thus, although the system of proportional elections is used in Prague city elections, the electoral race might be influenced by the existence of some moderate relations between the candidates and specific parts of the city. However, elected city council members are neither legally nor in political practice considered the representatives of particular territorial units within the city. The key for anyone's electoral success is rather the strong position within the party (and, hence, the top position on the party candidate list) than the popularity of the candidate among voters in any particular neighbourhood/city part.

Once the Council is elected by popular vote, the Council itself elects from among its members the Board of the Capital City of Prague, the mayor, and deputy mayors. *The Board of the Capital City of Prague* is the executive body of the municipality. The Board has 11 members and consists of the mayor, the deputy mayors, and other board members. The board is accountable to the Council. *The mayor of the Capital City of Prague* represents the municipality externally and is accountable to the Council. The mayor of Prague also performs the function of the president of the region<sup>4</sup> if not stated by law otherwise, also among other duties convenes sessions of the Council and Board and usually presides over it, as well as fulfils tasks of the independent competence entrusted to him by the Council or by law.

Other bodies of the city of Prague listed in the Act No. 131/2000 on the Capital City of Prague are the Offices of the Capital City of Prague, special bodies of the Capital City of Prague and the Metropolitan Police of the Capital City of Prague.

*The Office of the Capital City of Prague* is an administrative body that fulfils its tasks under the auspices of its independent competence which was entrusted by the Council or the Board and it also performs delegated power. The office of the Capital City of Prague is headed by the Director of the Office of the Capital City of Prague<sup>5</sup>, who is appointed by the Mayor after prior approval by the Minister of the Interior. The function of the Director of the Office of the Capital City of Prague is incongruous with the function of a member of the either low or upper chamber of the Czech Parliament, with a member of the Council of the Capital City of Prague, or with a member of a Council of any of the Prague districts. The director also cannot perform a function in any political party or political movement. The Council can establish committees as its advisory bodies and the municipal board is authorised to establish commissions as its initiative and advisory bodies.

### 3.2 Local Government of City District

According to the Charter of the Capital City of Prague, Prague is divided into 57 City Districts with their own elected bodies.<sup>6</sup> Governments of the City Districts are of very similar structure as the government of the City of Prague itself. The position and conduct of a *Council of a City District* and its rights, obligations and decision-making are directed by the

<sup>4</sup> The President of the region is a counterpart of a mayor at the regional level, who is, similarly as a mayor, elected by a council of regions from among its members.

<sup>5</sup> It is similar as in the case of Czech regions. In the case of municipalities, the Mayor stands in the lead of the municipal office municipal office.

<sup>6</sup> Prague is not the only city in the Czech Republic that is divided to municipal districts. Several other large "statutory cities" also have their municipal districts.

same regulations that applied to the Council of the Capital City of Prague with some exceptions stated by law or the Charter of the Capital City of Prague. The same is true in the case of the Board of City Districts, Mayor of City Districts, Offices of City Districts, the Committees of Council of City Districts, and Special Bodies of City Districts.

The number of members of individual Councils of City Districts varies according to the size of population and the total area of the relevant City District. In the smallest districts with a population fewer than 500 inhabitants, citizens elect between 5 and 9 councilors; in the largest districts with a population higher than 70 000 inhabitants, the number of councilors vary between 35 and 45.<sup>7</sup>

A Council of a City District elects from among its members a Mayor of a City District and a Deputy Mayor of a City District, as well as other members of a Board of a City District.

A *Board of a City District* is elected by councilors in the City Districts which have at least 15 members of a Council. The number of members of a Board of a City District varies between 5 and 9 and cannot exceed one third of the total number councilors. In the City Districts where the board is not elected, the Board's tasks are performed by a Mayor or a Council.

Similarly as in the case of the City of Prague, the City Districts also have their Offices of City Districts. An *Office of City District* consists of the mayor, the deputy mayor (or deputy mayors), a Secretary of an Office of the City District (provided that this function is established, otherwise it is performed by a mayor), and employees of an Office of the City District. A *mayor* stands in the lead of the City office. For the offices of the City districts that are in charge of performing an extended scope of delegated power, the position of a Secretary of an Office of the City District is always established. In other City Districts, establishing the position of a Secretary of an Office of the City District is decided by the relevant council of a City District. The rights and obligations of a Secretary of an Office of the City District are directed by the same regulations that are also applied to the director of the office of the Capital City of Prague, if it is not stated otherwise by law.

Apart from being divided into 57 independent City Districts, Prague is also divided into 22 so-called "Districts of administration" that are in charge of performing the state administration in its territories. In practice, the tasks are performed by the *Office of City District* in 22 largest City Districts.

### 3.3 Budgets of the City of Prague and budgets of City Districts

The total budget of the Capital city of Prague consists of the budget of the City of Prague itself and the sum of budgets of City Districts. According to the 2008 budgets, income and expenditure of the City of Prague itself represented about 80 % of the total budget of the Capital City of Prague, while the sum of budgets of City Districts represented about 20 % of the total budget.

In spite of a large degree of political autonomy for Prague and its political strength, Prague's municipal finances are highly dependent on the state. The largest share of income of the Capital City of Prague is drawn from taxes, especially from so-called shared tax revenues (income taxes and value added taxes).

**Tax revenues** – include shared taxes, property taxes and fees.

*Shared taxes.* The way municipalities generally get their share of the tax money is generally quite complex but it is even more complex in Prague with its two-tier government structure. Income taxes as well as the value added tax (VAT) are collected by the state and then redistributed to municipalities and regions. These tax money flows to the budget of the City of

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<sup>7</sup> Decision about the number of councilors is made by the previous Council of the respective city district.

Prague and part of that is then transferred to the budgets of City Districts as a transfer from the budget of the City of Prague.

*Property tax.* The only tax whose proceeds go exclusively to municipalities is the property tax. In the case of Prague, this tax is the income of City Districts in which the property is located. It should be repeated here, however, that it is the state that determines the applicable tax rates and not the municipalities.

*Local fees.* Revenues from local fees are collected both by the City of Prague and City Districts, but are generally regulated by national laws which state which fees are applicable and also set the maximum amount to be collected for a particular type of fee. There are several types of fees:

- *Administrative fees* are collected to support operations related to the activity of administrative authorities (e.g. for issuing of a building permission). The actual fee is always directly determined by law.
- *Fees concerning environment* involves mandatory payments for utilising the environment (storage of waste, waste-water disposal etc.).
- *Fees for providing selected services* are basically set to cover real expenditures connected with the service provision.

**Non-tax revenues** create the generally small part of the revenues. Non-tax revenues consist of revenues from business activities of established institutions, revenues from outcomes of own business activities of municipalities, from rental of municipal property, from collected penalties, etc.

**Capital revenues** create an even smaller part of the budget. Generally, it refers to the revenues gained by means of a sale of property, by a credit or in the case of municipalities, by an emission of communal obligations.

**Transfers and subsidies** can come from the state, regions, other municipalities, or from abroad. In the case of the City of Prague, transfers include transfers from the City of Prague to its own City Districts and vice versa. However, it should be mentioned that transfers between different city funds are classified as “transfers” in respective budgets although it represents a mere “accounting exercise” in many cases. Some subsidies such as the contributions of the state to the elementary and secondary schools cannot be used by the municipality for any other than specific purpose. Cities, in fact, only administer and distribute the state money to the respective beneficiaries. A special type of subsidy to municipal budgets is the so-called contribution to the performance of the state administration functions.<sup>8</sup>

The structure of revenues is different in the City of Prague and individual City District budgets. Shared taxes represent the largest source of income for the City of Prague, while transfers are the main source of income for City Districts (84% of the total income). It is important to note, however, that 50 % of these “transfers” are in fact only accounting exercises (in 2008 budgets), while 43% are transfers from the budget of the City of Prague and the remaining 7% are direct transfers from the state (contribution to the performance of the state administration and contributions to the school system).

Information about the structure of municipal budgets in Prague is summarised in Table 3.

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<sup>8</sup> The contribution towards performance of the state administration is mostly understood as a partial compensation of personnel and material expenditures that arose due to the territorial self-governing units' performance of the state administration, and its amount differ according to the scope of delegated powers.

**Table 3: The structure of income of the Capital city of Prague and City Districts**

	Total budgets of the Capital City of Prague	Sum of the budgets of City Districts
Tax revenues	86.49%	13.09%
Non-tax revenues	1.77%	2.46%
Capital revenues	0.01%	0.05%
Other resources (transfers)	11.73%	84.40%
Total	100.00%	100.00%

Source: Prague City Budget 2008

## 4 Characteristics of the City, region and Neighbourhood in the socio-economic context

### 4.1 Types of City Districts

Functionally and morphologically, the 57 City Districts belong to several different categories. There is no consensus about how City Districts should be classified within the professional community. Here we refer to the classification recently developed by social geographers Ouředníček and Sýkora (2002) that seems to be the most suitable for our purpose. Ouředníček and Sýkora distinguished among four different categories of City Districts: the city centre, inner city, outer city, and city periphery (see Table 4).

**Table 4: Basic statistical data about Prague City Districts by types of districts**

<b>TYPE OF DISTRICT</b> <b>Name of City District</b>	<b>Population</b> <b>03/01/1991</b>	<b>Population</b> <b>12/31/2008</b>	<b>Population</b> <b>growth/decline</b> <b>2008/1991</b>	<b>Area (km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	<b>Density</b> <b>(per km<sup>2</sup>)</b>
<b>CITY CENTRE</b>					
Praha 2	61,873	48,575	79	4.19	11,593
Praha 1	42,590	30,343	71	5.5	5,517
<b>INNER CITY</b>					
Praha 9	44,541	50,364	113	12.98	3,880
Praha 5	76,768	83,573	109	27.83	3,003
Praha 6	109,833	100,600	92	41.54	2,422
Praha 10	120,755	111,685	92	18.53	6,027
Praha 4	143,708	130,287	91	24.19	5,386
Praha 8	112,790	102,021	90	21.8	4,680
Praha 3	81,927	72,991	89	6.5	11,229
Praha 7	46,224	40,843	88	7.12	5,736
<b>OUTER CITY</b>					
Praha 14	24,627	44,639	181	13.91	3,209
Praha 13	35,917	58,204	162	12.94	4,498
Praha 17	19,731	25,365	129	3.26	7,781
Praha-Petrovice	5,305	6,169	116	1.79	3,446
Praha 15	27,454	29,902	109	10.25	2,917
Praha 11	86,425	78,519	91	9.79	8,020
Praha 12	59,840	54,876	92	23.32	2,353

Table 4 continued:

TYPE OF DISTRICT Name of City District	Population 03/01/1991	Population 12/31/2008	Population growth/decline 2008/1991	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Density (per km <sup>2</sup> )
<b>CITY PERIPHERY</b>					
Praha-Újezd	494	2,516	509	3.7	680
Praha-Křeslice	235	771	328	3.43	225
Praha-Běchovice	1,605	4,038	252	6.83	591
Praha-Kunratice	3,321	8,089	244	8.1	999
Praha-Přední Kopanina	319	712	223	3.27	218
Praha-Šeberov	1,240	2,666	215	5	533
Praha-Štěrboholý	799	1,705	213	2.97	574
Praha-Kolovraty	1,451	3,066	211	6.49	472
Praha-Koloděje	628	1,206	192	3.75	322
Praha-Benice	256	467	182	2.77	169
Praha-Vinoř	1,851	3,350	181	6	558
Praha-Dolní Měcholupy	1,013	1,788	177	4.76	376
Praha-Nebušice	1,849	3,104	168	3.68	843
Praha-Březiněves	557	917	165	3.39	271
Praha-Lipence	1,305	2,134	164	8.21	260
Praha-Dubeč	1,843	2,971	161	8.5	350
Praha 22	4,314	6,812	158	15.62	436
Praha-Satalice	1,395	2,186	157	3.8	575
Praha-Čakovice	5,561	8,644	155	10.19	848
Praha-Libuš	6,878	10,460	152	5.26	1,989
Praha-Řeporyje	2,189	3,316	151	10.16	326
Praha 21	6,147	9,209	150	10.14	908
Praha-Dolní Chabry	2,269	3,382	149	4.99	678
Praha-Troja	805	1,193	148	3.38	353
Praha-Lysolaje	769	1,119	146	2.48	451
Praha-Řáblice	2,113	3,048	144	7.38	413
Praha-Slivenec	1,870	2,570	137	7.59	339
Praha 19	4,669	6,149	132	5.99	1,027
Praha-Zličín	3,053	3,972	130	6.83	582
Praha-Klánovice	2,339	2,939	126	5.9	498
Praha-Dolní Počernice	1,780	2,190	123	5.76	380
Praha-Zbraslav	7,530	9,186	122	9.85	933
Praha-Suchdol	5,107	6,167	121	5.12	1,204
Praha 20	12,162	14,571	120	16.93	861
Praha 16	7,053	8,201	116	9.31	881
Praha-Velká Chuchle	1,592	1,833	115	6.02	304
Praha-Královice	290	334	115	4.96	67
Praha-Nedvězí	218	249	114	3.81	65
Praha 18	14,432	16,433	114	5.61	2,929
Praha-Lochkov	565	592	105	2.72	218

Source: own calculation based on the data obtained from the Czech Statistical Office

The city centre consists of 2 City Districts comprising the oldest parts of historical Prague. The districts of the city centre combine residential functions with the commercial and administrative ones. Although the city centre is a residence for less than 7 % of Prague inhabitants, it concentrates almost 25 % percent of city jobs. In the long term, the residential role of the city centre is in decline – between 1991 and 2008, the city centre lost about one quarter of its population. Despite that, the city centre still keeps its important residential



functions and the population density in one of its two City Districts is the highest in the whole city. Socially, the city centre has always belonged to the affluent parts of the city.

The inner city consists of 8 large City Districts. These City Districts mostly comprise compact blocks of multi-store houses built during the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century developments that were supplemented by the small neighbourhoods of luxurious villas belonging to the pre-Communist rich. During the Communist era, these City Districts were the most neglected in terms of physical repairs of houses and investment into technical infrastructure. The inner city is the most populated area characterised by relatively high population densities and slight population decline in the last fifteen years. Some of its parts are being gentrified while others are in danger of degradation and might become a place of concentration of poverty.

The outer city is composed of 7 City Districts, mostly consisting of high-rise pre-fabricated residential blocks that were constructed under the Communist rule for the middle class citizens to solve the acute housing shortage in 60s, 70s and 80s. These city parts were notorious for the low quality housing stock, lack of jobs, amenities and infrastructure, and generally bad image of sole “ugly dormitories”. That is why, soon after the regime change, many predicted the massive flight of the middle class inhabitants out of this area, followed by a quick physical and social deterioration of these City Districts. What actually ensued was different. Firstly, the migration outflow of the more well to do was much less intensive than was predicted; people living in these City Districts evidently did not consider their housing environment to be as bad as what many outsiders thought. Secondly, many apartments in the pre-fabricated high-rise blocks were sold to former tenants during the process of housing privatisation and later became a reasonable housing option for many young middle class families that could not afford to buy an apartment in the city centre or the inner city but wanted to become owners. Some of the City Districts in the outer city also offered land for further housing development that was not available in the inner parts of the cities, and, consequently, became a target area for the most massive housing development of the post-Communist era. That is why the outer City Districts have gained rather than lost the population during the last fifteen years.

The remaining 40 City Districts can be considered the city periphery. 29 of them are in fact former rural communities that were amalgamated with the city of Prague in one of the several waves of city expansion in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. These City Districts have very low population density (about 270 people per square kilometer). Although the territories of these City Districts account for almost one third of the City of Prague territory, the total share of Prague citizens living in this territory is as low as 3.5 %. The rest (11) of the City Districts are “mixed” functionally as they combine former suburban settlements with some newer higher density housing development and, correspondingly, their population density is somewhat higher (over 600 inhabitants per square kilometer). The majority of the peripheral City Districts underwent an intensive process of construction of new family houses, making them the fastest growing parts of the city in terms of population growth. This, in fact, was an integral part of “suburbanisation within the city limit” that accompanied “the proper suburbanisation” characterised by the migration of the former Prague citizens to newly developed colonies of family houses outside of the city limits.

#### 4.2 Core indicators of social distress by City Districts

Following the common guidelines as outlined in the RUN research projects, we collected as many indicators of social distress that were available. The list of actual indicators and their definitions is provided in Table 5.

**Table 5: Indicators of social distress in City Districts and their definition**

What is measured	Specific indicator	Unit of measure
Unemployment	Unemployment rate	% unemployed
Poverty	Poverty rate	A composite index (% of households receiving welfare payments + % of households receiving housing subsidies)/2
Housing conditions	Housing value	A composite price index (index house price + index rent + index land price)/3 (Prague=100)
	Housing blight	% of dwellings of substandard quality (as defined by Czech Statistical Office)
	Overcrowding	Average living area per person
	Tenure distribution	% of dwelling inhabited by owners % of rental dwellings
Demographics	Minority population	% of non-citizens
	<i>Foreign born</i>	<i>not relevant (= non-citizens)</i>
	Educational attainment	% of adults without high school diploma
	Children	% of population under 15
	Retired	% of retired
<i>Ethnic heterogeneity/ homogeneity</i>	<i>Index of ethnic heterogeneity</i>	<i>Not relevant – all City Districts could be classified as predominantly white</i>
Social disorganisation *	Crime rates *	Registered crime per 10000 inhabitants *
Institutional viability *	Number of civic organisations *	Number of civic organisations per 1000 inhabitants *
<i>Quality of services</i>	<i>Quality of local services</i>	<i>It is an irrelevant indicator in centralised Czech system of local finance redistribution</i>
Political activity	Electoral participation	Average turnout in elections of City District Councils
		Average turnout in national elections

Note: The categories/indicators/units of measurement marked by asterisk are not available for the 57 City Districts. They are only accessible for a different type of intra-city territorial units.

Table 6 summarises the values of individual indicators for each of the City Districts. It also includes the values of respective indicators for the whole city of Prague as well as the respective coefficients of variations (calculated as standard deviation/average \* 100 %) as an approximate measure of the inter City District variation of individual indicators.

Table 7 provides the values of relational indexes calculated for each City District as Index = (indicator value City District/indicator value Prague)/ indicator value Prague \* 100.

**Table 6: Overview of the core indicators of distress by City Districts – basic indicators (see text for definitions of indicators)**

City District	unemployment 12/2004	poverty 2006	housing value 2006	housing blight 2001	Over crowding 2001	Home owners 2001	Tenants 2001	Non citizens 2005	Low education 2001	Children under 15 2007	Retired 2007	Political activity local elections 1998-2006	Political activity national elections 1998-2006
Praha 1	3.52	2.22	219	3.00	22.1	8.2	86.3	7.7	26.7	11.0	21.9	41.65	68.16
Praha 2	4.21	2.55	127	2.34	20.8	15.2	81.3	9.1	25.7	10.2	23.5	38.17	64.46
Praha 3	5.28	3.11	84	2.04	18.0	27.4	69.2	6.7	34.5	10.8	24.8	35.62	64.26
Praha 4	3.91	2.22	81	0.65	18.0	59.4	35.3	6.9	34.0	10.7	26.5	38.46	66.73
Praha-Kunratice	4.03	2.22	72	1.58	22.6	72.9	18.6	15.4	43.9	16.9	15.3	50.09	73.10
Praha 5	4.04	3.47	90	3.51	19.1	33.3	61.0	9.0	34.1	12.9	19.1	38.56	65.93
Praha-Slivenec	3.85	3.47	40	4.49	24.8	84.2	6.7	6.5	59.9	14.6	21.3	47.50	70.86
Praha 6	2.86	1.89	96	0.78	19.5	44.1	48.5	7.7	29.4	11.6	26.1	46.08	72.46
Praha-Lysolaje	4.03	1.89	34	5.50	21.1	82.5	5.8	11.3	40.4	17.8	19.8	65.54	73.40
Praha-Nebušice	2.57	1.89	65	2.33	26.5	72.5	12.5	25.0	40.2	20.4	15.9	56.07	70.04
Praha-Přední Kopanina	2.69	1.89	53	4.17	24.0	78.5	7.6	42.3	50.5	13.3	14.8	54.47	81.18
Praha-Suchdol	2.07	1.89	78	2.68	21.5	78.3	11.8	10.8	29.5	13.7	21.3	52.92	72.59
Praha 7	5.53	3.02	94	2.31	18.9	19.8	76.3	7.9	34.9	11.7	24.3	36.17	65.57
Praha-Troja	3.65	3.02	90	2.27	26.7	66.3	20.1	26.6	37.0	16.0	18.6	63.80	73.26
Praha 8	4.19	2.47	76	1.02	17.4	55.1	41.0	6.1	34.3	11.8	21.1	34.92	63.69
Praha-Březiněves	1.89	2.47	34	1.74	24.2	77.8	8.7	11.9	41.3	14.8	19.0	64.30	78.35
Praha-Řáblice	3.73	2.47	61	4.54	21.9	76.4	14.1	7.9	45.0	18.7	23.8	55.29	71.10
Praha-Dolní Chabry	4.01	2.47	61	3.36	22.4	83.1	4.4	7.6	51.2	17.0	21.6	52.88	70.55
Praha 9	4.97	2.62	73	0.69	16.8	56.4	38.8	10.2	43.1	12.0	23.9	33.53	63.06
Praha 10	3.71	2.58	78	0.53	17.9	49.3	46.2	6.9	39.3	10.8	29.1	38.57	67.38
Praha 11	4.57	2.83	65	0.08	16.1	51.4	45.0	5.1	41.5	11.1	14.9	36.86	67.32
Praha-Křeslice	3.54	2.83	65	0.91	23.7	66.4	16.4	5.8	41.1	18.3	12.5	71.72	75.16
Praha-Šeberov	4.75	2.83	63	2.63	25.2	81.4	5.6	9.3	57.6	18.4	16.5	60.26	72.93
Praha-Újezd	3.66	2.83	75	1.19	22.7	81.9	7.8	5.5	40.1	19.5	11.2	53.69	69.81
Praha 12	4.74	2.84	64	0.35	16.5	73.6	20.5	5.5	41.9	10.6	14.4	35.16	66.27
Praha-Libuš	4.22	2.84	77	1.35	18.8	60.7	32.8	15.6	43.4	12.1	11.2	39.79	68.04

Table 6 continued

City District	unemployment 12/2004	poverty 2006	housing value 2006	housing blight 2001	Over crowding 2001	Home owners 2001	Tenants 2001	Non citizens 2005	Low education 2001	Children under 15 2007	Retired 2007	Political activity local elections 1998-2006	Political activity national elections 1998-2006
Praha 13	3.88	4.08	83	0.19	16.7	55.8	40.0	9.2	39.0	14.4	9.0	34.87	63.85
Praha-Řeporyje	3.32	4.08	71	7.12	22.8	76.9	9.1	23.7	57.0	13.7	20.0	51.01	70.07
Praha 14	6.41	5.57	64	0.51	17.0	53.8	39.7	8.9	45.9	16.1	14.2	30.48	62.71
Praha-Dolní Počernice	5.71	5.57	64	5.12	22.1	84.0	5.4	7.3	49.7	13.4	23.6	57.64	72.76
Praha 15	3.43	2.51	65	0.41	16.6	60.3	34.5	6.4	46.3	11.9	14.4	35.70	67.42
Praha- - Dolní Měcholupy	2.83	2.51	66	2.21	24.6	84.3	4.7	15.7	55.9	14.8	19.8	59.87	75.08
Praha-Dubeč	1.62	2.51	53	4.15	22.0	79.5	11.5	6.3	54.0	15.5	18.0	59.48	71.30
Praha-Petrovice	3.40	2.51	65	0.18	16.6	87.2	10.4	4.4	40.7	14.3	8.9	42.10	66.44
Praha-Štěrboholý	2.88	2.51	57	2.46	25.8	87.1	3.7	22.8	58.9	15.2	18.1	57.94	76.13
Praha 16	2.66	2.67	61	1.94	19.9	65.6	26.8	10.9	56.1	12.5	20.6	50.22	73.64
Praha-Lipence	3.84	2.67	61	6.98	23.2	79.7	5.4	8.7	55.4	17.1	19.4	53.12	72.96
Praha-Lochkov	2.89	2.67	61	7.04	21.5	78.4	8.5	6.1	69.2	16.7	23.0	50.98	69.53
Praha-Velká Chuchle	3.10	2.67	55	2.88	21.7	63.7	22.3	6.5	45.5	14.1	21.4	61.65	75.17
Praha-Zbraslav	2.47	2.67	64	1.73	20.0	61.0	28.0	8.4	41.7	14.8	18.2	45.56	69.65
Praha 17	4.17	4.09	67	0.25	16.0	38.2	57.2	6.1	49.0	13.1	10.7	34.35	63.15
Praha-Zličín	3.08	4.09	70	1.36	18.9	51.7	38.7	16.6	53.6	11.6	16.6	44.84	65.44
Praha 18	4.57	2.61	64	0.37	15.2	34.9	61.7	3.5	47.7	12.2	14.5	37.15	66.86
Praha 19	3.56	2.40	48	2.61	20.3	64.9	27.4	8.5	49.9	14.8	26.3	50.74	74.09
Praha-Čakovice	4.78	2.40	62	1.91	19.2	65.8	25.8	8.4	52.3	14.1	22.7	44.78	70.69
Praha-Satalice	5.59	2.40	62	5.23	22.1	63.4	21.3	8.8	56.5	18.0	23.6	57.64	74.05
Praha-Vinoř	4.71	2.40	55	2.18	20.2	67.4	20.0	12.2	49.3	15.0	16.1	50.26	71.31
Praha 20	4.19	2.80	57	2.11	18.5	67.8	21.7	5.9	49.4	14.1	15.9	40.18	70.64
Praha 21	4.67	3.60	45	1.84	22.4	60.8	29.6	7.5	48.3	15.4	14.8	42.31	69.81

Table 6 continued

City District	unemployment 12/2004	poverty 2006	housing value 2006	housing blight 2001	Over crowding 2001	Home owners 2001	Tenants 2001	Non citizens 2005	Low education 2001	Children under 15 2007	Retired 2007	Political activity local elections 1998-2006	Political activity national elections 1998-2006
Praha-Běchovice	4.53	3.60	53	2.86	22.3	70.2	14.5	21.3	40.6	7.4	24.1	60.57	74.77
Praha-Klánovice	4.33	3.60	53	0.87	27.1	81.3	8.4	6.3	44.0	17.4	20.9	61.78	75.53
Praha-Koloděje	4.08	3.60	53	1.69	28.5	86.8	3.4	10.8	60.9	16.8	20.2	66.78	75.41
Praha 22	3.87	4.24	54	4.43	20.1	64.7	25.2	5.7	49.9	14.8	21.1	47.31	67.97
Praha-Benice	4.55	4.24	26	0.00	28.8	83.0	5.2	3.6	41.7	14.8	18.2	74.32	76.78
Praha-Kolovraty	3.57	4.24	48	3.14	22.5	81.2	5.0	4.2	54.9	20.4	19.2	59.58	74.40
Praha-Královice	1.28	4.24	48	4.76	22.3	71.4	19.0	12.4	50.7	12.7	21.3	51.08	73.60
Praha-Nedvězí	1.53	4.24	51	6.10	22.8	72.0	19.5	4.9	48.4	10.0	18.5	73.67	76.32
<b>Praha – total</b>	<b>4.21</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1.25</b>	<b>18.3</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>47.2</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>21.1</b>	<b>38.74</b>	<b>66.70</b>
<b>variation coefficient</b>	<b>27.6</b>	<b>28.1</b>	<b>39.0</b>	<b>75.6</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>28.6</b>	<b>81.3</b>	<b>66.9</b>	<b>19.8</b>	<b>19.7</b>	<b>23.8</b>	<b>22.6</b>	<b>6.1</b>

**Table 7: Overview of the core indicators of distress by City Districts – relational rates (Prague =100)**

City District	unemployment 12/2004	poverty 2006	housing value 2006	housing blight 2001	Over crowding 2001	Home owners 2001	Tenants 2001	Non citizens 2005	Low education 2001	Children under 15 2007	Retired 2007	Political activity local elections 1998-2006	Political activity national elections 1998-2006
Praha 1	84	80	46	240	83	581	183	101	77	86	104	93	98
Praha 2	100	91	79	187	88	313	172	120	74	80	111	101	103
Praha 3	126	111	119	163	102	174	147	88	100	85	118	109	104
Praha 4	93	80	124	52	101	80	75	91	98	84	126	101	100
Praha-Kunratice	96	80	140	126	81	65	39	203	126	133	72	77	91
Praha 5	96	124	112	280	96	143	129	118	98	101	91	100	101
Praha-Slivenec	91	124	247	358	74	56	14	85	173	115	101	82	94
Praha 6	68	68	104	62	94	108	103	101	85	91	124	84	92
Praha-Lysolaje	96	68	294	439	87	58	12	149	116	140	94	59	91
Praha-Nebošice	61	68	153	187	69	66	27	328	116	160	75	69	95
Praha-Přední Kopanina	64	68	189	333	76	61	16	556	145	105	70	71	82
Praha-Suchdol	49	68	128	214	85	61	25	141	85	108	101	73	92
Praha 7	131	108	107	185	97	240	162	103	101	92	115	107	102
Praha-Troja	87	108	112	181	68	72	43	349	107	126	88	61	91
Praha 8	100	89	132	81	105	86	87	80	99	93	100	111	105
Praha-Březiněves	45	89	292	139	76	61	18	157	119	116	90	60	85
Praha-Ďáblice	89	89	164	363	84	62	30	104	130	147	113	70	94
Praha-Dolní Chabry	95	89	164	269	82	57	9	100	147	134	102	73	95
Praha 9	118	94	137	55	109	84	82	134	124	95	113	116	106
Praha 10	88	92	128	42	102	96	98	90	113	85	138	100	99
Praha 11	108	101	155	6	113	92	95	67	120	88	70	105	99
Praha-Křeslice	84	101	155	73	77	72	35	76	118	144	59	54	89
Praha-Šeberov	113	101	160	210	73	58	12	122	166	145	78	64	91
Praha-Újezd	87	101	133	95	81	58	16	72	116	153	53	72	96
Praha 12	113	102	157	28	111	65	43	73	121	84	68	110	101
Praha-Libuš	100	102	131	108	98	78	70	204	125	95	53	97	98
Praha 13	92	146	120	15	110	85	85	121	112	114	43	111	104

Table 7 continued

City distrikt	unemployment 12/2004	poverty 2006	housing value 2006	housing blight 2001	Over crowding 2001	Home owners 2001	Tenants 2001	Non citizens 2005	Low education 2001	Children under 15 2007	Retired 2007	Political activity local elections 1998-2006	Political activity national elections 1998-2006
Praha-Řeporyje	79	146	141	569	80	62	19	312	164	108	95	76	95
Praha 14	152	200	157	41	108	88	84	117	132	127	67	127	106
Praha-Dolní Počernice	136	200	157	409	83	57	11	96	143	106	112	67	92
Praha 15	82	90	154	33	110	79	73	84	133	94	68	109	99
Praha-Dolní Měcholupy	67	90	152	176	75	56	10	206	161	117	94	65	89
Praha-Dubeč	38	90	189	332	83	60	24	83	156	122	85	65	94
Praha-Petrovice	81	90	154	14	110	54	22	58	117	113	42	92	100
Praha-Štěrboholy	68	90	176	197	71	55	8	300	170	119	86	67	88
Praha 16	63	96	165	155	92	72	57	144	162	99	97	77	91
Praha-Lipence	91	96	165	557	79	60	11	114	160	135	92	73	91
Praha-Lochkov	69	96	165	563	85	61	18	80	200	131	109	76	96
Praha-Velká Chuchle	74	96	183	230	84	75	47	85	131	111	102	63	89
Praha-Zbraslav	59	96	157	138	91	78	59	110	120	117	86	85	96
Praha 17	99	147	149	20	114	124	121	80	141	103	51	113	106
Praha-Zličín	73	147	143	109	97	92	82	218	154	91	79	86	102
Praha 18	109	93	156	29	120	136	131	47	138	96	69	104	100
Praha 19	85	86	207	209	90	73	58	111	144	117	125	76	90
Praha-Čakovice	114	86	161	153	95	72	55	110	151	111	108	87	94
Praha-Satalice	133	86	161	418	83	75	45	115	163	142	112	67	90
Praha-Vinoř	112	86	182	174	91	71	42	160	142	118	76	77	94
Praha 20	100	100	176	168	99	70	46	77	142	111	76	96	94
Praha 21	111	129	221	147	82	78	63	98	139	121	70	92	96
Praha-Běchovice	108	129	188	228	82	68	31	279	117	59	114	64	89
Praha-Klánovice	103	129	188	70	68	58	18	83	127	137	99	63	88
Praha-Koloděje	97	129	188	135	64	55	7	141	176	133	96	58	88





It is clear from both tables that the level of variation among City Districts depends on individual indicators of distress. In general, however, it can be noted that the overall intra-city inequalities are not as dramatic as in many large cities in Western Europe or North America (Hoffman–Martinot and Sellers 2005). The highest level of spatial disparities within the city concerns housing blight, tenure distribution and the percentage of non-citizens. But none of these indicators refers to inequalities that could be easily attributed to the concentration of poverty in the context of the Czech Republic. The inner City Districts have historically much higher percentage of rental housing than peripheral City Districts but they should not be considered as poorer or socially deprived because of this. Moreover, the share of rental dwellings in inner city is decreasing over time as the process of privatisation of municipal houses continues. The privatisation clearly leads (and will continue to do so even more in the future) to the decrease of differences in tenure distribution among City Districts.

Housing blight, measured by the share of substandard quality dwellings, is also not ideal for measuring district deprivation. The share of substandard quality dwellings is generally quite low in individual City Districts (ranging from 0 to 7%). It is highest in the peripheral City Districts whose quality is nowadays being substantially improved by continuing “suburbanisation within the city limits”.

Finally, despite the fact that some City Districts already represent substantial concentration of the non-citizens, these districts also include both concentrations of relatively poor blue collar immigrants from the East (some inner city and outer City Districts), and the concentrations of relatively rich white collar immigrants from the West (some gentrified parts of historical center and inner city as well as some of the most attractive “inner suburbia”). Contrary to the general idea that non-citizens in big cities are the poorer immigrants, three types of non-citizens can be found in Prague: “rich immigrants” mostly working for international companies and institutions, “poor immigrants” working in unskilled labour positions and “immigrants similar to Czech population” whose professional and social structure is similar to that of the Czech population. These three groups settle in Prague in different patterns but it is not possible to distinguish them by using the available statistics.

It is also worth mentioning that the values of the individual indicators of social distress do not correlate very tightly. The reason is simple: there is no proper “concentration of poverty” that exists in some parts of contemporary Prague, where the values of all (or almost all) indicators would be constantly pointing to social distress. Instead, some City Districts are concentrations of substandard housing, while others have problems with overcrowding; and still other City Districts have unfavourable demographics or more poverty than the average.

In brief, spatial patterns of individual problems as measured by different indicators are not necessarily overlapping in the territory of Prague. Despite that, it is surely possible to identify “the bad” City Districts that tend to be below average in most of the measured conditions. First of all, we excluded measures that cannot be unambiguously considered as indicators of deprivation: the share of housing blight<sup>1</sup>, the share of homeownership<sup>2</sup> and the share of non citizens<sup>3</sup>. Then we used two different methods. First, we simply calculated an average value of the relational rates<sup>4</sup> from Table 7. Second, we calculated the rank of each City Districts as

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<sup>1</sup> Due to its small size and rapid decrease since the last census where the data came from.

<sup>2</sup> For historical reasons, the share of homeowners is the lowest in the most attractive historical parts of the city where it can hardly be considered a sign of social deprivation.

<sup>3</sup> It is not possible to distinguish between the “rich” and the “poor” immigrants.

<sup>4</sup> We excluded two of the measures: the housing blight and the homeownership. The percentage of substandard dwellings is low even in the “worst districts” and it is decreasing very rapidly since the last census where the data came from. The share of homeowners is the lowest (due to historical reasons) in the most attractive historical parts of the city where it can hardly be considered a sign of social deprivation. Moreover, the privatisation of municipal housing is quickly increasing the homeownership rates.

measured by each particular indicator and then calculated the “average rank”<sup>5</sup> of the City Districts. The City District that had the highest score of social distress as measured by both of the above mentioned methods are listed in Table 8.

**Table 8: Twenty Prague City Districts with the highest level of social distress (two separate methods of distress measurement used)**

City District	Adjusted global index of deprivation	City District	Adjusted average rank
Praha 14	126	Praha 14	43.2
Praha-Benice	118	Praha 9	38.7
Praha 17	114	Praha 17	38.2
Praha 21	112	Praha 22	38.0
Praha 7	112	Praha 3	37.1
Praha 3	112	Praha 7	36.5
Praha 18	112	Praha 21	36.1
Praha 22	111	Praha 18	35.6
Praha-Slivenec	111	Praha-Čakovice	35.0
Praha-Dolní Počernice	111	Praha 11	34.1
Praha-Kolovraty	110	Praha-Satalice	33.7
Praha 9	109	Praha 20	33.6
Praha-Satalice	108	Praha-Lochkov	33.5
Praha 19	108	Praha 13	33.3
Praha-Čakovice	106	Praha 12	33.1
Praha-Lysolaje	106	Praha-Slivenec	32.9
Praha 11	106	Praha-Zličín	32.7
Praha-Zličín	105	Praha 8	32.6
Praha 5	105	Praha 19	32.5
Praha-Lochkov	104	Praha-Dolní Počernice	32.2

Note: The City Districts that were classified as belonging to the 20 most distressed units by both methods of classification are highlighted in the table.

It is clear from the table that the most distressed City Districts can be found in any part of Prague apart from the historical downtown. Spatially, no concentration of the distressed City Districts can be found in any particular area of the city.

For the Prague case study, the City District Prague 11 (Jižní Město/South City) and the City District Prague 3 (Žižkov) were selected. They are not the worst districts, but they had above-average scores for most indicators of distress (see previous tables). The important reason for the selection of these particular City Districts for closer examination was the fact that some regeneration projects have been actually carried out there. Symptomatically, we did not find any regeneration projects actually carried out in City Districts that had the highest scores of the global index of deprivation (e.g. Prague 14 or Prague 17).

## 5 Regeneration of urban areas in Prague: Key document analysis

We have analysed a large number of documents adopted by various institutions at the level of state, at the level of the City of Prague, and at the level of City Districts (for list of analysed documents see Appendix). We have selected key documents that shape strategic plans of the city as well as document that somewhat tackle the socio-spatial problems within the city.

<sup>5</sup> The other method suppresses the extensive effect of indicators that have high intra-city variability.

## 5.1 Strategic plan of the City of Prague

The most general strategic policy document of the City of Prague is the Strategic Plan of the City of Prague. The first version of the contemporary Strategic Plan was prepared by the city administration and adopted by the city council plan in 2000; a new amended version was adopted in 2008. The Strategic Plan is aimed to provide policymakers the long-term strategy of city development covering the period of 15 to 20 years. It covers various areas of the city life, namely: the position of Prague within Europe, its competitiveness, the quality of life of its inhabitants and visitors, natural and urban environment of the city, the city infrastructure, security, administration, and participation of citizens in the development of the city. For each of the mentioned areas, strategic goals are defined as well as activities leading to fulfillment of the goals. The Strategic Plan is a mainly political document; the political representation is not legally bounded by the Plan in its practical policies.

In analysing the Strategic Plan of the City of Prague, we concentrated on how the Plan tackles the social and socio-spatial problems within the city. The first observation is that the Strategic Plan deals with the City of Prague as one territorial unit. Both strategic goals and activities are formulated at the city-wide level. Only descriptive or analytical information are presented by individual City Districts. There is no systematic effort to deal with the individual City District or any specific neighbourhoods in terms of strategies or policies. The Strategic Plan only rarely mentions some specific types of areas within the city – examples are “brownfields”, “prefabricated housing estates”, or “historic downtown”. The Strategic Plan assumes that individual City Districts will develop their own development programmes and strategies. The second observation noted the fact that social problems and their spatial aspects are not covered systematically by the Strategic Plan. In fact, the Strategic Plan does not differentiate the social or socio-spatial problems as issues which should be systematically dealt with. There is one chapter devoted to these issues. Social problems are often mentioned in the Plan only in the form of examples illustrating some other types of problems. Generally, the Strategic Plan is quite optimistic as far as the social problems within the city are concerned. Social situation is never evaluated as problematic or critical. Terms like “social segregation” or “residential segregation” are not mentioned in the document at all. The Strategic Plan deems the “social stability of Prague”, “balanced social structure”, and “social heterogeneity of population” favourably. Among the strengths of the city the Strategic Plan explicitly lists:

- Social stability.
- Balanced social structure of territorial communities.
- High level of social heterogeneity as one of the factors that decreases the danger of degradation of housing stock and preventing the development of socially problematic neighbourhoods.
- The existence of the “mass middle class” which the majority of Prague citizens belong to.
- High proportion of highly educated population in comparison with the nation-wide average.
- Low share of poor families in comparison with the nation-wide average.

The Strategic Plan also explicitly mentions the potential social problems:

- Ageing of the Prague population; high proportion of single member households constituted of old widows.
- Increasing income inequalities.
- Increasing share of long-term unemployed among the total unemployed.

- Low employment of disadvantaged social groups.
- The increase of the number of people dependent on social welfare
- Low level of social integration of people threatened by social exclusion
- High level of social pathology in some parts of the city (namely criminality, drug addiction and vandalism).
- Rising level of xenophobic attitudes of the local population, the rise of racism and extremism.
- The decreasing interest of the public in public affairs.

Both the strengths and weaknesses of the City of Prague are rarely connected with any territorial dimension of the city. Only three territorially defined areas within the city are explicitly mentioned as problematic:

- Prefabricated housing estates – a high proportion of apartments in Prague are located in housing estates characterised by low construction and technical quality, underdeveloped services and lack of job opportunities. Prefabricated housing estates are considered as locations potentially endangered by social degradation.
- Many public spaces are considered devastated and dirty.
- Brownfields are repeatedly considered as a problem.

Most of the programme goals defined by the Strategic Plan are formulated in a very general way. Strategic goals concerning social and socio-spatial issues are scattered throughout the whole document. They do not constitute a separate chapter within the document and also lack a form of coherent policy plan. From different parts of the document, the following goals could be picked up and classified into several groups. The classification of the groups is made by the authors of this report and not by authors of the Strategic Plan:

### *1. Quality of life*

- Ensure good quality of life in the city as an attractive and socially balanced community.
- Ensure the equal access of the inhabitants of the city to education, employment, housing, health care, and services.
- Respect the principle of sustainability of the city development (that includes also the social aspects of economic development).

### *2. Prevention and solution of social problems*

- Pay special attention to the development and sustainability of jobs for social groups threatened by unemployment.
- Provide social rental housing to people (under certain conditions) who are not able to secure adequate housing by their own means (and being in such situation is not a consequence of their previous misbehavior).
- Construction of new apartments by the city to be used for support of some important functions of the city and people in need.
- Support long-term programmes of social prevention.
- Support and activate socially weak groups of citizens, people in need, and people in state of emergency.
- Support institutions that provide help to people in need.

- Solve the problems of homelessness and the presence of beggars as well as to build help centres for the homeless.

### *3. Balanced development of communities*

- Maintain the favourable social structure of the city inhabitants, develop and maintain the balanced structure of territorial communities in terms of the age structure of inhabitants, housing, services, and variability of jobs.
- Create conditions for maintaining the social heterogeneity of city territory, undertake new social housing projects around the whole city territory, and to prevent the creation of socially problematic neighbourhoods.
- Support the social integration and the development of neighbourhood communities.
- Preserve the identity and character of local communities as well as the minorities.
- Support the integration of immigrants namely through the inclusion of their children in local schools.

### *4. Regeneration of prefabricated housing estates*

- Create real conditions for revitalisation of housing estates by investments in infrastructure.
- Support the creation of jobs in the housing estates.
- Revitalise the public space within housing estates.
- Reduce monofunctionality of housing estates through the support of new investments.

### *5. Security*

- Ensure a secure environment for both citizens and visitors.
- Prevent the creation of local foci for criminality.
- Map localities with higher level security risk.

### *6. Participation in the preparation and implementation of development strategies*

- Develop active cooperation of public and private sectors based on the principle of public-private partnership.
- Ensure the participation of the public in preparatory phases of all important development projects.

Although the term “residential segregation” is not used in the Strategic Plan, the potential problem of socio-spatial segregation is mentioned several times in relation to social heterogeneity, integration of migrants or support for social integration. The Strategic Plan considers socio-spatial segregation as a possible future problem of the city, but not as an actual problem of the city.

## 5.2 Programme Declaration of the Board of the Capital City of Prague for period 2006-2010.

Programme Declaration of the City Board is the document that defines policy priorities of the political representatives of the winning parties between two consecutive local elections. The Declaration is divided into several thematic sections that are further divided into individual policy priorities. For each policy priority, the list of actual policy goals is prepared and a schedule of its implementation is created. The Declaration is thus a sort of political “road map for the city development in the covered period”. The position of Prague is assessed very optimistically by the document. Prague is described as a unique, prosperous and internationally renowned city that is the most dynamic and the most economically developed

territorial unit in the Czech Republic, ranked thirteen in terms of being the most developed region within the European Union, the city with low unemployment, highly qualified workforce, strong entrepreneurship and environment that makes the city attractive destination for tourism. The main goal and strategic vision are described as: “The City internationally renowned, prosperous and successful. The City which is safe, friendly, inhabited by self-confident and responsible citizens, who are interested about the future of their city and who are willing to participate in the administration of public affairs. The City Board will work to create harmonious development of Prague, respecting natural environment, creation of the city of equal opportunities, contemporary city with quality and reliable infrastructure, efficient, easily accessible, and friendly public administration that create good conditions for education, the development of new technologies and successful business” (preamble).

Similarly as the Strategic Plan, the Programme Declaration also concentrates at the city-wide level. The Declaration defines ten priorities of the city in detail – modern public administration, safe city, modern and economical traffic infrastructure, healthy and clean city, economic policy, financial management, social, housing and health policies, education and leisure, culture and tourism, as well as international relations. For our project, the most relevant is the priority of “social, housing and health policies” under which the following goals (among others) were formulated:

- Articulate concept of social policy emphasising community planning of social services.
- Prepare concept of family policy.
- Adopt an action plan against homelessness.
- Cooperate with individual City Districts to support the construction of homes with day care services for the elderly.
- Financially support (through the grant system) non-government organisations that provide social services.
- Support programmes and activities of organisations dealing with the minorities.
- Support programmes of education for providers of social services and introduce a system of quality measurement of social services.
- Continue the process of privatisation of municipal rental housing stock.
- Increase rents in municipal rental housing according to the quality and location of municipal rental flats.
- Develop a system that supports families in social need by helping them to secure adequate housing.
- Support the regeneration of prefabricated housing estates in cooperation with the respective City Districts.
- Maintaining the multi-functional character of the historic city centre including the preservation of residential functions in the historic center.
- Support the educational programmes for students with special educational needs and their integration in the common schools.
- Support programmes of crime prevention among children and young people.
- Support programmes aimed at leisure as a tool preventing the development of social pathology among children and youth.
- Further develop a comprehensive system of illegal drug misuse prevention.

As it is clear from the list of goals, they are formulated very generally. None of them (with the only exception being the regeneration of prefabricated housing estates) is connected with any particular territory within the city. Even the priority of the “regeneration of prefabricated housing estates” does not concentrate the attention to any particular territory or neighbourhood. It is implicitly assumed (and sometimes explicitly stated) that such policies will be developed in cooperation between the City of Prague and its City Districts. Regeneration efforts of particular areas are mentioned only in the case of the regeneration of some brownfields.

### 5.3 Other important documents

The other important policy documents that were analysed were the Medium-Term Plan of the Development of Social Services of the City of Prague, the Concept of Family Policy and the Concept of Housing Policy.

#### 5.3.1 Medium-Term Plan of the Development of Social Services of the City of Prague

Two main goals of the Medium-Term Plan are to implement important changes in the quality assessment of the social services in Prague and to establish a new system of service management in the field of social services. The document tackles the problem of the division of competences in social services between the City of Prague and individual City Districts. Each City District is obligated by the plan to set their own priorities as far as the social services are provided in their particular territories. It is also emphasised that social services can be effectively provided only when the whole system is coordinated and when city and City Districts cooperate with other service providers. The document explicitly mentions two socio-spatial problems of Prague. One problem pertains to the aging of the population that affects predominantly the historical centre of the city; the other problem is the gradual deregulation of rents in the rental sector that will lead to housing affordability problems for many lower income households living currently in more attractive parts of the city.

#### 5.3.2 Concept of Family Policy of the City of Prague 2009-2010

The Concept of Family Policy is aimed to implement objectives concerning families from the Programme Declaration of the Board of the Capital City of Prague. The term “Family Policy” is defined very broadly in the document. There is a variety of activities that are eligible for financial support under the umbrella of this Concept – social services, healthcare, criminality prevention, education, sport, culture or even tourism. The main goal of the Family Policy in the City of Prague is to “support the functionality of families, quality of family life, suitable environment for families that enable their individual members to implement own life strategies to accomplishment of parental plans” (page 7). The main idea of the Concept is that policies should support well functioning families that serve as the best prevention of “negative social phenomena”. Most of the activities and specific programmes that are mentioned by the Concept are not localised. There is one exception to the general rule – a programme supporting the creation of preparatory classes in elementary schools for kids from socially disadvantaged groups should concentrate on schools in which a “higher concentration of pupils from different socio-cultural environment is typical. However, there is neither any indication as to which schools might belong to the supported ones nor any reference to any particular part of the city where such schools might be located.

### 5.3.3 Concept of Housing Policy of the City of Prague for period 2004 +

The Concept of Housing Policy describes thoroughly the housing situation in the City of Prague but concentrates mainly on municipal housing which is owned and managed by the City of Prague or individual City Districts. The Concept also provides basic prognoses concerning the future development of demographic and social composition of Prague's inhabitants. Social and socio-spatial issues are mentioned in three separate contexts.

#### A) Help for those who are unable to secure housing by their own means

This Concept assumes that it is the personal responsibility of Prague's citizens to fulfill their housing needs. The document recognises, however, that some people might be unable to do that. It stresses that help should be provided by the city only to those who "did not cause the problem themselves". The housing market is characterised as not developed enough and deformed by the rent regulation. These are the reasons why the people with lower-middle income experience such difficulties in finding a solution for their housing problem on their own in Prague. In accordance to the Concept, the City should assist three different groups threatened by the housing problems with three different types of programmes:

- Affordable rental housing for people whose incomes are not high enough.
- Specially equipped apartments for the handicapped and other people who cannot live in "other apartments".
- Rental housing for people who are necessary for "securing necessary functions of the City and its development".

#### B) Regeneration of prefabricated housing estates

Attention is devoted to the problems of "prefabricated housing estates" as one of the type of localities within the city. No attempt is made to name or determine any specific neighbourhood of city part. The Concept emphasises the technical deficiencies of the housing stock in housing estates as well as the lack of facilities in such residential areas. The document stresses the importance of "complex solutions" for prefabricated housing estates that must include the "increase of functionality of housing stock, improvement of energetic efficiency, durability and physical look of buildings". The regeneration of large housing estates must include beside modernisation of the housing stock, also the "changes of urban design".

#### C) Balanced development of neighbourhoods

In this part, the Concept emphasises the prevention of the development of "the socially deprived boroughs and neighbourhoods". The Concept explicitly states that one of the key long-term goals of the City of Prague is "the preservation of socially heterogeneous composition of inhabitants in boroughs." It is claimed that the construction and renting of municipal housing by the City of Prague must be done in a way that avoids the "creation of the isolated islands of financially weak social groups". The idea of the balanced development of neighbourhoods includes also an effort to maintain residential functions in the historical downtown.



## 6 Positioning neighbourhoods selected for in-depth examination

### 6.1 Prague 11 – Jižní Město (South City)<sup>6</sup>

Jižní Město (South City) is the largest housing estate in the Czech Republic. In the 1960s, the planners working for the Communist government searched for areas suitable for the building of large residential complexes. The area of today's Prague 11 was selected as one of such areas. The building of the housing estate of South City started in 1970<sup>7</sup>; the first inhabitants moved into their new flats in 1976.

According to the original concept, it should have been a self-supporting area with higher standard of civic amenities and a sufficient number of job opportunities. The original plan was to build a new garden city with a high level of independence from the City of Prague. It should have consisted of three parts, each for 16.5-19.5 thousand inhabitants. However, these plans were changed several times. Due to a lack of financial sources, only flats and few civic amenities of basic standard were built. The number of residential buildings was increased and the augmented number of inhabitants made the pressure on insufficient amenities even higher (Bartoň 1998, 2007). Finally, the housing estate became a typical “bedroom community” of the Communist era and an absolute majority of its inhabitants commuted daily by public transport to the inner City Districts. The serious problems with inadequate capacities of the public transport for such a large residential complex was solved in the 1980 when South City was connected to the downtown by the new underground line. At the end of the Communist regime, South City represented the largest housing estate in the country. It consisted of either state-owned or cooperative-owned pre-fabricated high-rises for more than 80,000 inhabitants. The popular image of the housing estate South City was generally quite bad among the general public - the housing estate became a symbol of megalomania of the Communist planners, a place considered by most outsiders as ugly, anonymous, and lacking any genius loci.

After the breakdown of the Communist government in 1989, the housing estate of South City has often been used as an example of “how not to build a city in a future” by post-communist politicians. Many of them, supported by views of some of the experts predicted mass emigration of local inhabitants from the South City, and warned against the possibility of quick deterioration of the housing estate. These fears, however, did not materialise in practice. Although the number of inhabitants of South City declined, the scope of decline was marginal. In January 2009, the population register estimated the number of inhabitants to be about 79,000. Although there has been a long-term tendency of decline in the social status of the inhabitants living in housing estates (some of the well-to-do households tend to move from housing estates to newly constructed colonies of single-family houses in suburbs or to a historical downtown), the consequences of the change are still far from dramatic. The available data show that the share of the households receiving welfare payments living in the South City is around Prague's average. Similarly, the average unemployment rate in South City is close to Prague's average as well. The average education of the local inhabitants is somewhat lower than in the historical downtown and the inner city parts, but it is comparable to that in the other outer city parts. The demographic structure of the South City inhabitants is quite favourable - the economically active population is overrepresented there while the proportion of both children and retired is lower than that in other parts of the city. The most specific feature of the City District Prague 11 is its physical environment in which

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<sup>6</sup> A small minority of the population of the City District Prague 11 lives in family houses outside of the housing estate of the South City. Our interest is, however, focused on the housing estate South City. As the housing estate South City comprises almost all inhabitants of the City District Prague 11, we therefore sometimes use the statistical data characterising the City District Prague 11 to describe the housing estate South City.

<sup>7</sup> The area of the present City District Prague 11 became a part of the City of Prague in 1968.

prefabricated high-rise buildings dominate. Although the apartments in these buildings all have standard amenities (and they are therefore classified as “standard quality dwellings” by the Czech Statistical Office), the quality of apartments is not very high. It is reflected in the lower popularity of flats in the prefabricated high-rise buildings and, consequently, by lower market prices of such flats that are cheaper in comparison with the flats in multi-storey houses in the inner city or with family houses on the city periphery.

Politically, the position of South City within the City of Prague has improved dramatically after the regime change in 1989. While under the Communist rule, the housing estate of South City was just part of one of the then existing ten City Districts. Local political activist who supported the decentralisation of administrative powers towards the existing City Districts and requested more administrative power for the housing estate of South City itself were very successful. Given its large population size, South City was separated from the existing City District and became an independent City District within Prague quite soon after the change of political regime in 1990 (as the City District “Prague – South City”, the name of the district was changed into Prague 11 in 1994). In November 1990, the population of the newly created City District elected its own political representation that had obtained quite a large set of powers from the City of Prague. The Council of the City District thus had become the key institution that formed the development of the housing estate South City in the next two decades. Citizens of the City District gained the possibility to influence the composition of the local political elite through direct elections every four years.

Somewhat surprisingly, people living in the housing estate South City do not consider the locality as a particularly bad place to live in. In interviews that we had conducted with the most relevant actors involved in the regeneration policies in the City District, respondents named not only problems but also strengths of South City. The most important strength was considered the location of the residential complex that is surrounded by parks and green areas and yet is well connected with the centre of the city by both public transport (underground) and highway. The heterogeneous structure of inhabitants (both in terms of income and demographic composition) is also considered a plus. Families with young children are relatively numerous and they tend to stay as permanent residents. The housing estate South City is, in the opinion of respondents, not considered by local inhabitants as “the last resort” for those who cannot afford to live in other parts of Prague, but, at least for some, a residence of choice. Given the fact that South City is located at the higher elevation on the outskirts of Prague and there is no industrial activity in the South City territory, the quality of air is very good compared to many other parts of the city and, consequently, the frequency of respiratory diseases among children is low.

The most important weakness of South City is, in the opinion of respondents, its “incompleteness”. The area is composed almost exclusively of high-rise residential buildings and premises offering other functions are mostly missing. One shopping mall was built after 1989 but it is not large enough to provide space for all services that are needed by the large number of local residents. Although some apartments or storage rooms in the residential high-rises were transformed into non-residential premises and used as offices or small shops, the services are still underdeveloped in the area. Lack of adequate parking space for the growing number of cars (that was not anticipated by the designers of housing estate) is mentioned as a serious problem as well. The unclear ownership structure of many of the un-built areas within the housing estate<sup>8</sup> prevents the public administration from the construction of large public garages for local citizens. Criminality is also highlighted as a problem, although not as the most serious. The Municipal Police and State Police have some local branches in the South

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<sup>8</sup> Caused by the restitution of land to descendants of pre-Communist owners and consequent wave of legal disputes over the ownership among different claimants.

City. Additionally, the places that are considered the most risky in terms of potential criminality (parks, some streets) are patrolled by a private security company that was hired by the City District.

## 6.2 Prague 3 - Žižkov<sup>9</sup>

The contemporary City District Prague 3 consists of the historical City District Žižkov and also a part of the historical City District Královské Vinohrady. However, we focused our attention on Žižkov only. Žižkov came into existence in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as a rapidly developing residential suburb for working class families. It became an independent municipality in 1877; four years later, it obtained the status of an independent city. In the last pre-WWI census, the population of Žižkov reached 72,000, which made the city the fifth largest city in the Czech Lands of that time. In 1922, Žižkov became amalgamated with Prague during the large administrative reform organised by the government of the newly established Czechoslovakia. Even within Prague, Žižkov maintained its blue-collar character and quick population growth. In 1930, the population size of Žižkov reached its historical high (93,000 inhabitants). Since then, the population started to decline steadily. Despite its working-class character, the city borough was almost exclusively residential. There were no bigger factories but a considerable part of this city contained privately owned apartment houses offering rental housing for blue-collar workers, craftsmen and self-employed tradesmen. The image of Žižkov as a residential area providing housing of substandard quality to “lower-middle class” was not changed by the nationalisation of the housing stock and lasted throughout the whole period under the Communist rule. Under the Communist rule, nationalised rental apartments were often used to settle the uneducated Roma immigrants who moved in several waves from Slovakia to Prague. The low quality of housing stock was generally recognised as a problem by the city planners. This finally led to a plan that aimed to thoroughly regenerate Žižkov by the demolition of part of the historical houses and their replacement by the “modern pre-fabricated buildings. A smaller part of the plan was realised in 1980s but the whole plan was abandoned immediately after the collapse of the Communist government in 1989.

After 1989 Žižkov underwent substantial changes. Spatial proximity to the historical downtown of Prague, its own hilly relief and specific architectural character of late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century houses helped Žižkov to gain new attractiveness. It attracted both developers who invested in the repairs of historical houses and construction of new ones and more-well-to-do inhabitants who started to move to Žižkov. Although signs of gentrification in Žižkov could be observed in the last two decades, it still has the characteristic features of being the “problematic” part of the city. The level of unemployment as well as the share of households receiving welfare payments is above Prague’s average. There is also a high number of divorced people and a relatively high proportion of retired low income population. Despite ongoing reconstruction of the housing stock, the share of flats with substandard quality is still above average there. Žižkov is one of the localities that have been traditionally referred to as a concentration of the poorest and the least educated ethnic group in the Czech Republic - Romanies.<sup>10</sup> One of the localities listed on the *Map<sup>11</sup> of socially*

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<sup>9</sup> Žižkov represents about 80 % of the area of the City District Prague 3 and comprise about 75 % of its inhabitants. We therefore, sometimes use the data describing City District Prague 3 to characterise Žižkov.

<sup>10</sup> Romanies do not have the status of immigrants as they moved from Slovakia and settled in Žižkov as Czechoslovak citizens during the existence of Czechoslovakia, with the majority of them coming after the WWII and some of them during the 1970s. In last two decades, a decrease of the Romanies population in Prague was noticed. The number of Romany residents in Žižkov is decreasing especially due to both public housing privatisation and rent deregulation. Romanies, as compared to the other tenants, are less able to buy the privatised flats they live in and have a greater problem than other inhabitants to pay the increasing (albeit still regulated) rents. Many Romanies who had been unable to cope with the rising cost of living in Prague were thus

*excluded or by social exclusion endangered Romanies localities* is located in the Žižkov area. The number of Romanies living in Žižkov is estimated to about 2,500. Most Romanies receive only an elementary education (usually 8 to 9 years of schooling). Even in prosperous Prague, the unemployment rate is estimated to be as high as 85 % and the majority of Romanies live on welfare benefits. However, according to the information shown in the mentioned map, poor Romanies do not constitute one larger spatially excluded community; rather, they live in individual rental houses scattered around the residential area. In the last two decades a visible decrease of the Romany population in Prague was noticed. The number of Romany residents in Žižkov is decreasing especially due to both privatisation of the public housing and the deregulation of rents. As compared to other tenants, Romanies are less able to buy the privatised flats they live in and have a greater problem than other inhabitants to pay increasing (albeit still regulated) rents<sup>12</sup>.

People living in Žižkov do not consider the district of residence as a typical “distressed neighbourhood”. We have made interviews with the most relevant actors involved in the regeneration policies in Žižkov. They claimed that Žižkov has several strengths. The most often mentioned strength is a relatively stable population that is able to create a sense of community. People living there do not feel alienated from each other despite the fact that they live in a large city. The city part is described as having “a specific atmosphere”; some respondents mentioned about a special “genius loci” of the place. There is an enormous number of pubs and vibrant night life that attract artists and people with a “bohemian life style”. The City District representatives actively promote culture and some public festivals and events organised in the Žižkov territory have no parallel in other parts of Prague. There are numerous civic associations and NGOs and some of them are local ones whose activities are exclusively focused on Žižkov.

The most important weakness of Žižkov was considered to be the growing tension between the increasing attractiveness of the neighbourhood and the social composition of its inhabitants. The deregulation of rent in regulated rental sector combined with the arrival of richer people substantially increased the pressure on the financially and socially weaker groups of local inhabitants, namely the Romanies and old people depending on (low) pensions as their sole source of incomes. The other problem that was often mentioned is increasing number of bars that operate gambling machines and pawnshops. Such premises are usually opened 24/7 and increasingly become a meeting place not only for pathological gamblers but also illegal drug dealers and users, also serving as centers of sale/resale of valuables stolen by pick-pockets and other thieves.

## 7 Policy actions, strategies and tools

To get more detailed information about the policy actions, strategies and tools of neighbourhood regeneration both at the level of Prague and within two model territories (South City and Žižkov), we analysed important strategic, conceptual and other documents at both the level of the City of Prague and that of the two selected Prague districts. Information gleaned from the web pages of the City of Prague and City Districts which contain relevant information and local press was analysed as well. We also conducted interviews with 23

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offered to relocate outside of Prague. Some evidence exists that some of them contributed to the development of the poverty enclaves in the old industrial cities of North Bohemia where housing is very cheap.

<sup>11</sup> Links to the map: for Prague [http://www.esfcr.cz/mapa/int\\_pha.html](http://www.esfcr.cz/mapa/int_pha.html) ( Žižkov is here as the locality A ), or for the Czech republic [http://www.esfcr.cz/mapa/int\\_CR.html](http://www.esfcr.cz/mapa/int_CR.html)

<sup>12</sup> Many Romanies who had been unable to cope with the rising cost of living in Prague were thus offered to relocate outside of Prague – some evidence exists that some of them contribute to the development of the poverty enclaves in old industrial cities of North Bohemia where housing is very cheap.

respondents out of which 16 were from the “local level” of individual districts, 7 were from “the City of Prague wide level”. 8 respondents were elected politicians (7 at the City Districts level, 1 at the citywide level), 6 officers were concerned with the regeneration agenda (3 of them at the City Districts level, 3 at the citywide level), and 2 experts who were hired by the City of Prague and a City District respectively. 3 respondents were representatives of not-for-profit organisations, 2 were independent experts - one was a representative of an educational institution, the other was a representative of the local office of a state institution). We summarise our findings in several subsections.

### 7.1 Existence of regeneration policies and the explicit formulation of regeneration policies

The City of Prague has no policy that could be labeled as “neighbourhood regeneration policy”. No special chapter in the city budget exists under the “regeneration label”. Neighbourhood regeneration is practically nonexistent as an issue in the local politics<sup>13</sup>. One of the main reasons for the absence of explicit regeneration policies at the level of the whole city is the fact that no part of the city (City District, quarter, neighbourhood) can be easily labeled as a “deprived area”, an area in which all types of social problems occur and which reinforce each other by negative feedback. Some City Districts have more social problems than others but differences from the “Prague average” are far from dramatic. Political representation of the City of Prague does not consider any of the City Districts as areas that deserve special attention. The individual City Districts are rather socially heterogeneous; it is therefore difficult to give them a label of “elite” or “deprived” district. Relatively small socio-spatial differences within the City of Prague decrease the sensitivity of city representatives to socio-spatial problems. In such a context, there is no political demand for the formulation of regeneration policies and other spatially defined policies. The spatial concentrations of both affluence and poverty exist within the city, but they take the form of small spatial units usually consisting of just a few houses or blocks of houses. The socio-spatial deprivation is thus understood by the City of Prague’s politicians as an essentially micro-local problem that should be taken care of by the representatives of individual City Districts. It is therefore more usual that problematic localities or particular regeneration policies are mentioned by the documents issued by the individual City Districts.

### 7.2 Strategy of regeneration

Taking into account that no easily identifiable “deprived city parts” exist in Prague, one cannot be surprised that the City of Prague does not have any explicitly defined and territorially targeted regeneration strategies. Some policies that relate to regeneration are mentioned in the policy documents of the city, but they are usually only implicitly present in individual “sectoral policies” of the city and they are not part of the explicitly territorially targeted policies.

The most specific strategic documents that mentioned problems of physical regeneration were ‘The Analysis of Prague Prefabricated Housing Estates’ from 2001 and ‘The Citywide Concept of Regeneration of Prague’s Prefabricated Housing Estates’ from 2002. Both documents were prepared by the “City Development Authority”. The City Board only “took note” of both documents but did not adopt any specific regeneration policies concerning prefabricated housing estates. Both documents defined regeneration quite broadly as “the improvement of living conditions and quality of housing for inhabitants of prefabricated housing estates and inclusion of housing estates among the city parts that have ‘full value’”.

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<sup>13</sup> The only exception to this general rule was the policy aimed at regeneration of neighbourhoods that were badly damaged by catastrophic floods in 2002. This policy was understood as a necessary “emergency measure” caused by the natural catastrophe. This regeneration policy, however, was considered temporary and was directed exclusively towards the physical regeneration of the housing stock and the infrastructure.

The regeneration strategy was the product of the analysis of 54 largest prefabricated housing estates in Prague (all housing estates with more than 300 dwelling units). The analysis used data from population census, population registers and other sectoral statistics. Special fieldwork research and expert survey were conducted as well. The analysis proved that while the masterplan of housing estates always incorporated good connection to the centre of Prague by public transport as well as enough services and recreational areas, the architectural design was never followed in practice. Thus, all the housing estates are somewhat “incomplete” which deteriorate their quality as residential areas. The basic strategy of regeneration thus consists of the idea that the physical regeneration of high-rise residential buildings is not enough and must be accomplished by the building of recreational facilities and construction of premises for local services. The population living in prefabricated housing estates is not considered a threat for the future of such areas – their social status and income are not substantially different from that of average citizens of Prague. The majority of the residents in housing estates expressed satisfaction with their place of residence. Potential danger of mass emigration of well-to-do residents from housing estates did not materialise. The documents proposed to concentrate regeneration effort towards housing estates with “the high development potential” (characterised for example by good location and “above average social potential”) because there was a high probability that regeneration might prevent high and costly future risks. The documents mentioned that the regeneration of the most problematic prefabricated housing estates (those with low potential and high risks) could be successful only if the regeneration would be a complex, systematic and long-term process. It was, however, noted that it could be a very costly policy.

Some city documents also mentioned a strategy concerning the prevention of socio-spatial exclusion and spatial concentration of poverty. The City of Prague highly appreciates the relative social equality among different City Districts. The general strategy of the city is thus to maintain social heterogeneity of neighbourhoods and to prevent the creation of spatial concentrations of socially excluded. But such ideas are only briefly mentioned in the most general way in city strategic documents. There have not been any specific policies or programmes that seek to implement such strategies in practice. Also, such general strategic goals are usually not taken into account when sectoral policies are implemented. Some sectoral policies, namely housing policy (privatisation of social housing combined with the deregulation of rents) or educational policy (e.g. support for elite secondary schools), might potentially lead to gentrification of some city parts and the impoverishment of others, leading to concentrations of poverty in specific neighbourhoods. Such unwanted “by-products” of sectoral policies are rarely considered when these policies are formulated and implemented. The adoption of the *Medium-Term Plan of the Development of Social Services* might represent a turning point in terms of how the social consequences of sectoral policies are taken into account and how individual social programmes and policies are to be coordinated at the City level. The Plan emphasises the necessity to plan the development of social services that should reflect the needs of particular groups of inhabitants as well as the needs of particular neighbourhoods. Sectoral policies (namely family policy, educational policy, drug prevention policy, criminality prevention policy, integration of minorities, and services for handicapped) should be coordinated at the city-wide level. The Plan stresses the necessity to integrate policies of individual City Districts into a broader strategy of the City of Prague.

In sum, the regeneration strategies:

- do not concentrate on the most deprived areas but rather try to boost “those closest to being self-sustaining”
- clearly emphasise the physical conditions over the focus on people
- more often form comprehensive approaches in theory but concentrate on selected points (not necessarily those strategically important leverage ones)
- more often than not represent loosely connected and not coherent efforts.

### 7.3 Regeneration policies and relations between the City of Prague and the City Districts

Most of the documents do not pay any attention to the relations between the City of Prague and City Districts in the field of regeneration. We were, however, able to derive some information about that topic from interviews with relevant actors. An absolute majority of respondents claimed that politicians and officials working at the city-wide level see themselves as providers of “strategic visions”, “overall general concepts”, and “main goals” of the neighbourhood regeneration, while politicians and officials working at the level of the City Districts regard themselves as people responsible for the practical planning and implementation of regeneration projects and programmes. From the city-wide level point of view there are no particular parts of the city or City Districts that should be given any preference by the townhall of the City of Prague. Each City District should concentrate on its own specific problems and should develop their own regeneration policies. Support from the political representation of the City of Prague for the regeneration efforts of individual City Districts is not systematic and does not have coherent form. Some respondents claimed that the support of the City of Prague consists of general statement that “regeneration should be supported and regeneration policies should be implemented”. Some respondents claim that as far as regeneration policies are concerned, the City of Prague serves as a “regional administrative unit” while individual City Districts have a role of municipality, although in de jure terms, the City of Prague is the municipality and City Districts are just subdivisions within the municipality. The Master Plan of the City of Prague does provide some conceptual guidance to City Districts within their regeneration effort, but it is not very specific. More often, the City of Prague issues only documents that are not legally binding for the City Districts and these, thus, represent “only suggestions”. Respondents also stated that the City of Prague regularly consults all documents in their preparatory phases with the representatives of City Districts.

### 7.4 Goals and substantive focus of regeneration policies

The regeneration policies, if any, are more targeted towards the physical regeneration than “social regeneration”. There is no important difference in the goals and substantive focus of regeneration policies (if any) at the city-wide level and at the level of City Districts. Regeneration policies are to some extent spatially targeted. The Master Plan of the City of Prague concentrates on the physical regeneration towards the prefabricated housing estates, without determining which particular housing estates should be given special attention. In practice, physical regeneration includes both regeneration of residential rental houses and the regeneration of public spaces around houses. In the documents, the goals of regeneration politics are generally stated as follows:

- Creation/maintenance of balanced structure of local communities in terms of demographic structure of inhabitants, type of housing, social services and variability of jobs.
- Maintaining social heterogeneity of neighbourhoods, e.g. preventing the creation of socially excluded neighbourhoods by the dispersion of new social housing projects around the territory of the whole city.
- Support of social integration, development of local communities, preservation of identity and character of local communities.
- Integration of immigrants, namely the inclusion of their children in local schools.
- Support of organisations that provide help to people in need and emergency situations.
- Support and activation of socially weak groups of inhabitants.
- Providing municipal social housing to those who are unable to secure their own housing themselves
- Prevention and prosecution of criminality.

In practice, regeneration policies are much less comprehensive than the documents suppose. The following table lists sectors and describes to what extent is the focus on them as stated in the regeneration policies and the projects that are realised in practice:

Housing and physical renewal	<i>Strong component</i>
Community cohesion, intergroup relations	<i>Weak component</i>
Integration of immigrant communities	<i>a non-component</i>
Deconcentration of the poor (other than the simple relocation of the poor outside of Prague)	<i>Weak component</i>
Business and economic development	<i>Weak component</i>
Crime prevention or suppression	<i>Strong component</i>
Human capital development	<i>a non-component</i>
Child care/early childhood development	Universally available in Prague, no need for specific policy in any neighbourhood
Youth programmes	<i>Weak component</i>
Social services, counseling, emergency assistance	<i>Strong component</i>
Health, healthy life styles	Universally available in Prague, no need for specific policy in any neighbourhood
Public transportation	Universally available in Prague, no need for specific policy in any neighbourhood
Social capital formation	<i>a non-component</i>
Cultural facilities and activities	<i>Weak component</i>
Other	



## 7.5 Tools of regeneration

The tools of regeneration vary. The most important difference is between the tools for physical regeneration and tools for social regeneration. The City of Prague and individual City Districts seek to combine participation of public and private sectors in regeneration projects. In the regeneration of residential areas, the city seeks to engage the home owners. Due to the fact that the city and City Districts themselves own many residential buildings, they are therefore important actors of physical regeneration. The tools of physical regeneration are mostly market oriented. They include grants and loans to homeowners for repairs and refurbishment of houses, providing financial incentives to private investors for the construction of new dwellings on top of the existing prefabricated high-rises. The sale of municipal rental apartments to tenants via various privatisation schemes is also considered part of the physical regeneration as it is assumed that new apartment owners would take more care of their apartments and would invest more into repairs and maintenance of their flats.

On the other side, neither the City of Prague nor the individual City Districts invests too much in the construction of new social rental apartments. The number of new social rental houses constructed by the city is very limited. The construction of new social rental houses by municipalities is almost never part of the regeneration projects. The main reason why the city constructs the new rental housing is not to improve the situation in regenerated neighbourhoods but to provide affordable housing for people in need and for the key city personnel. The city does not seek to engage local inhabitants into regeneration projects – local inhabitants are usually only informed about the regeneration projects. Local citizens do not initiate regeneration project nor do they have an important influence on the priorities of regeneration. In rare cases, the sociological survey or public opinion survey is used in the preparatory phase of regeneration to get some information about the views of local inhabitants. The monitoring of the regeneration progress or indicator tracking is not performed.

The tools of social regeneration are mostly oriented toward the enhancement/expansion of services that are provided to inhabitants of regenerated neighbourhoods. The City of Prague and City Districts seek to combine the efforts of both the professional services provided by their own agencies and that of non-profit organisations that provide social services. The relation between the city and non-profit organisations can be best characterised as partnership. The city provides direct subsidies to NGOs as well as support them through providing reasonably priced office space or for free. NGOs provide the city with their professional workers, new ideas, know-how, and networks of cooperators willing to work as volunteers. NGOs proved to be more effective in dealing with potential clients of social services than the professional organisations founded by the city. NGOs are also capable of raising finances from private and other non-city sources (like foundations, European funds, private donor, etc.). In the field of social regeneration, the participation of potential clients in the preparation and planning of particular activities and programmes is not usual. The representatives of the target populations are, however, sometimes, among the volunteers and part-time workers hired by the NGOs. The regular monitoring of the regeneration progress is not performed.

To summarise information about the tools of regeneration, one can list the tools that are most often used in the regeneration projects in Prague as the following:

### Market oriented:

- Reliance on the private sector for renovation and redevelopment.
- Grants and loans to owners of regenerated housing stock.

Enhanced/expanded services:

- Governmentally operated housing (i.e., social/public housing) – Traditionally a large part of housing stock but decreasing role due to rent deregulation and privatisation of social rental housing.
- Professional services provided by staff in municipal and state agencies.
- Professional services provided through contracting out to NGOs.

Reliance on community-based organisations:

- Occasional and limited involvement of community residents in programme design and implementation.

Strategic planning:

- Mostly not used as a tool.

Knowledge enhancement and dissemination:

- Occasional information dissemination, public-information campaigns, surveys concerning almost exclusively projects of physical regeneration.

## 7.6 Financing of regeneration

In Prague's context, it proved to be extremely difficult to find regeneration projects that would fit into the condition of "finance additionality". Many regeneration projects are in fact financed from the budgets of the City of Prague or the budgets of individual City Districts. In the budgets, respective items are strengthened by the decision of city politicians to be able to cover "extra expenditures" exceeding the business as usual expenditures. But it is very difficult to properly distinguish between the "normal budget" from "extra budget". The regeneration project does not seem to have its own special label within the budget. We identified, however, other sources of money for either physical or social regeneration that are not part of the city budget. Regeneration of the residential buildings is often financed by their owners.<sup>14</sup> The City District created its own special financial fund (outside of the normal allocated budget) for supporting the regeneration of the City District Prague 11. Also, special state programmes are used. Some of the projects in the educational, social or cultural sector were supported by the EU funds.

Quite recently the project Bezpečné Jižní Město (The Safe South City) was introduced. This project became the umbrella for many policies and activities of the City District Prague 11. The main aim of the project is the permanent and systematic increase of safety and suppression of criminality in the City District area. The project is a reaction to the results of a survey among residents who have highlighted safety as the most important problem to solve. Some of the respondent we interviewed claimed that this project is only a broad cover under which the City District council and board can transfer money to anybody according to their will.

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<sup>14</sup> After 1989, state owned houses were transferred to municipalities. Nowadays, some houses are still owned by the municipality, while others have been privatised, most often with the private ownership transferred to the former tenants. Besides that, a large part of the housing stock is still owned by housing cooperatives. Due to the fact that these houses were built in the seventies and eighties, restitutions do not concern the buildings themselves but lands on which these houses were built.

Activities that are realised in Prague 3 can also receive grants from the City of Prague authority. Some activities are financed by church or charity organisations. Prague 3 has its own Renewal and Development Fund which is primarily intended for physical regeneration. Activities, especially in the social area, can also be supported by the European Union's funds. The project Podpora Romů v Praze (Support of Romanies in Prague) which covered education and employment opportunities is a good example. The project was financed by the EU's Equal Initiative Action 3. The principal recipient of the project grant was the civic association Slovo 21. The City of Prague, the City District Prague 3, the local elementary school and two other not-for-profit organisations were the other partners of this project which was focused on the lifetime education of Romanies and on improving their position in the job market. Within this project, a considerable number of activities in Prague 3 were realised.

The short duration of grants could be considered as the main obstacle that complicated the development of regeneration projects. The majority of grants, especially in the area of social regeneration are allocated on the annual basis. A specific problem is a tendency by the grant agencies and other financial sources to prefer "fashionable" topics. It is sometimes difficult to receive grants for long-lasting activities or to repeatedly receive grants for activities that have already proven their usefulness since they are lacking the image of being "something new".

#### 7.7 Policy actions, strategies and tools – an overview

- Emphasis on the physical versus social - tending towards an emphasis on the physical but with a social component.
- Developing and drawing on resident capacity versus reliance on intensified professional services - strong emphasis on professional services.
- Operating largely within a market paradigm or emphasising community-building - strong reliance on the market.
- Loosely aggregated efforts not based on any apparent overarching strategy.

## 8 Agenda Standing

Our search for policy interventions aimed at improving the conditions in a distinct residential area suggests that it might be impossible to identify the "proper neighbourhood policy" in the City of Prague that would be "territorially targeted, intentional, cross-sectoral, and resource additional" at the same time. It seems that the socio-spatial differences are not considered very important so far; there seems to be no clear consensus about which parts of the city should be considered the "problem areas". From what we know so far, it seems that little attention has been paid to socio-spatial inequalities within the city by city politicians and officials since there is a relatively high level of socio-spatial equality in the city. In the media, there are hardly any references to "distressed residential neighbourhoods" in the same sense that we use in the RUN project; references to socio-spatial inequalities (if any) are rather targeted at the super-high real estate prices in some neighbourhoods, the emergence of gated communities or the enclaves of the rich. If there is a reference to any place where problems of different types may concentrate, it usually concerns places with a high occurrence of criminality (e.g. park in front of the main railway station), concentrations of homeless beggars (e.g. tourist sites in historical downtown), or places where street drug dealers operate (various places in the centre of city, which has changed several times over time as a consequence of the police activity). In all of the above mentioned cases, the reference is not connected to residential neighbourhoods but rather to places of spatial concentration of some activities.

The priority of regeneration in the local political agenda is different in the two model areas that we were studying in detail.

The (physical) regeneration of South City became one of the priorities of the political agenda of this City District Prague 11. Between 1999 and 2001, the conceptual document concerning regeneration was created that analysed the current state and possibilities of further development. Regeneration often appears in the City District's documents and on the agenda of City District meetings. Regeneration is supervised directly by the mayor of the City District and the topic of regeneration is often part of his communication with the media. A special department for the regeneration of South City was created as a part of the Section of the territorial development of the Office of the City District. Regeneration is understood as the process in which the City District Prague 11 makes an effort to improve the quality of life of the inhabitants such as to increase the standards of living, improve functional and aesthetical quality of objects and of the living environment. It is perceived as a costly and long term operation which has to be accomplished by the parallel processes of social, cultural and economic changes in the area. Interviews with respondents confirmed that in practice, regeneration has been predominantly focused on the improvement of physical conditions. Regeneration of both residential buildings and areas around and between them is considered as the key process in regeneration effort. The common view is shared that a good physical shape of the environment is a necessary premise on which socially orientated projects can also be built. With a pleasant environment, the residents would like to stay in during their free time and also display good behavior in such surroundings.

Regeneration does not have such a prominent role in the Prague 3 City District as in the Prague 11 City District. Part of the regeneration activities is considered as a standard part of the day-to-day activity on the City District agenda and is financed by the City District budget, also in the form of grants. Although the policy of regeneration does not hold such an exclusive place on the district agenda as in the case of the City District Prague 11, special policies that focused on regeneration, both social and physical, can still be found in the City District Prague 3. The term regeneration is used mostly in the context of physical regeneration. To illustrate this, the approved programme of regeneration that focused on monument preservation and a programme of regeneration of housing stock that was part of the Strategic plan of the City District Prague 3 would be mentioned. Although the term regeneration is not used in this context, it is obvious that a lot of strategic goals of this City District can be covered under the "social regeneration" label.

In the Strategic documents of this district, there are several strategic goals that refer to social regeneration of this area. Social and physical regeneration are perceived as two mutually blending aspects of the regeneration policy that cannot be separated. Physical regeneration is considered as a condition for the improvement of the social situation of disadvantaged groups and for suppression of criminality. Problems with accommodation are considered as a part of social problems experienced by disadvantaged groups. The study of documents and interviews with respondents however confirm that Prague 3 has not formulated any universal "policy of regeneration", and that there are rather a series of activities, linked to a certain extent, that are primarily focused on solution of individual problems.

Generally, it could be said that regeneration is not an integral part of the overall development strategy for the city. Prague is believed by local politicians to be a rich city without any substantial spatial concentrations of the poor. In the eyes of these local politicians, Prague should position itself in the international market as the city that is the ideal place of residence for middle and upper middle classes, consisting both professionals and members of business elite, both domestic and international. Regeneration does not have an explicit place in the local policy. The issue of regeneration is seldom raised in city council discussions of the

development strategy or covered in the narrative sections of budget documents. The Mayor never discusses about regeneration in messages on the “state of the city”.

Regeneration projects concerning physical regeneration are often driven by “objective” needs of housing repairs as perceived by both the local politicians and professionals. The key actors are usually elected politicians. To some extent, physical regeneration is driven by the availability of financial resources derived from the state-wide level. Social regeneration projects are mostly driven by the activities of non-governmental organisations that work in the area of social services. Local politicians at the level of City Districts somewhat reluctantly support such activities but they are not very active in identifying new target groups and their needs. Politicians at the city-wide level consider themselves as being “too far” from the local problems. Quite often, new activity in the field of social regeneration is “generated” by the existence of state or even European funding needs.

## 9 Potential major players

Actors involved in the regeneration policies do not establish one mutually connected network. Simply speaking, two networks of actors that are not too connected to each other exist – the network of actors involved in physical regeneration and the network of actors involved in social regeneration. These two networks are only loosely connected by the local politicians (both city-wide and City District ones) who are members of both networks. The physical regeneration network also includes high officials from the City of Prague townhall and high officials from the respective City District office who have activities connected with physical regeneration on their agendas, representatives of housing cooperatives as major owners of prefabricated high-rise buildings, and to some extent also the representatives of major construction companies and developers who see the physical regeneration as a good chance to broaden their entrepreneurial activities.

The social regeneration network also includes high officials from the City of Prague town hall, the offices of respective City Districts, representatives of groups of “professionals” who serve as fundraisers, as well as the specialists who conduct analyses and prepare strategies of concepts. A special type of actor in social regeneration is one particular elementary school in which a majority of the students are Romanians. This school is engaged in a considerable number of projects aiming to help students from socially and culturally disadvantaged environments and to increase their opportunity for further studies. Not-for-profit organisations are also considered as very important actors in the area of social regeneration. Different types focus their attention on different groups. Most often their activity is focused on helping the socially disadvantaged, old people and families with children. Also a lot of them specialise in working with the Romanians.

It is possible to say that the members of both networks are continuously changing but the speed of change is not very dramatic. Actors from among the elected politicians change most frequently. Prague is a long-term electoral stronghold for the right-oriented Civic Democratic Party and thus the party regularly secures electoral victories in both city-wide and City District elections. Despite the continuity of the party in power, every local election leads to personnel changes among the office holding politicians. The actors from among the higher officials, as well as the actors from NGOs, are changing much less frequently. The respondents in our interviews claimed that the network of actors involved in regeneration policies is not closed, but rather open for newcomers. Inclusiveness of network is, however, dependent to a large extent on the decisions of local political parties and political affiliations of prospective members of the network.

The following list summarises the main types of players that are involved in the regeneration policies and projects in Prague:

- A. Elected officials
- B. Career government professionals (planners, managers, policy specialists, etc)
- C. Nonprofits and other contractors
- D. Business groups

## 10 Cleavages, coalitions, and alignments

According to the respondents, the relations among actors in regeneration networks are rather cooperative than competitive. There are no identifiable groups of politicians who would compete against each other because of their different views about regeneration. There are several reasons for the absence of political conflicts over the strategies and goals of regeneration. The first reason is that the strategies and goals of regenerations are not explicitly defined so there is obviously less conflict over an issue that has not been well defined. The second reason could be attributed to the fact that one political party clearly dominates in both city-wide and City District politics – the existence of “one colour local governments” clearly decreases the probability of political conflict over strategies and goals of regeneration.

Respondents claimed that the actors involved in physical regeneration (politicians, officials, experts, homeowners, representatives of construction companies, and developers) rather cooperate than compete. The relations among the actors involved in social regeneration (politicians, officials, experts, and representatives of NGOs) are less “idyllic”. Although different actors cooperate, they do not necessarily share the same views. Actors from outside the city administration (independent experts, NGOs) think that local politicians and officers working at both the city-wide and the City District level tend to underestimate the scope of social problems and do not give these problems enough attention. Respondents who are independent from the local politicians claimed that the low standing of social issues on the political agendas of local authorities in Prague can be best illustrated by the fact that no local politicians want to have social problems on their political agendas. Only “second-rank” politicians receive agendas that are connected with social affairs. Some respondents claimed that because all local political representatives are members of right-oriented parties, they do not want to give high priority to social agendas. The image of such agendas is that they entail helping the poor people who are not typical voters of their party. Thus, any high level of activity for right-oriented local politicians towards the helping of disadvantaged people could be considered as a waste of taxpayer’s money by their own voters. Respondents from outside the local administration suspect that the true goals of the local politicians are different from those that are publicly declared. These unspoken goals might include the attempt to “clear” the city of “problematic inhabitants”. Thus, local politicians are suspected of tolerating the existence of processes that lead to the removal of the people who cause the problem out of Prague. None of the local politicians whom we interviewed suggested that this is the true goal of “social regeneration” in the city. However, it is worth to note that all the strategic documents we have studied include a lot of “official optimism” about the future of the city, and its individual City Districts respectively. All documents implicitly assume that the social situation in city/City District will improve in the future and that the existing social problems will be solved (or disappear) and the social status of local inhabitants will be constantly rising. It seems that the future vision of Prague is one whereby it is a city in which only successful (in terms of educated, healthy, etc.) people live. There is evidently no space for the poor and

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disadvantaged in the future city. Prague does not seem to be well prepared for the fact that the development in some of the city parts will probably be exactly the opposite of what is assumed by the general visions of future development.

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# Regenerating Urban Neighbourhoods (RUN): an overview for Rotterdam <sup>1</sup>

*Julien van Ostaaijen*

## 1 Introduction<sup>2</sup>

Rotterdam is the second largest city of the Netherlands and is known for ‘leading the bad [Dutch] lists’, referring among others to low levels of employment and safety. The municipal government of Rotterdam is determined to adequately deal with these problems and in the last decade, several ‘neighbourhood approaches’ have been formulated one after another quite rapidly. This research addresses the question why and how these neighbourhood approaches have emerged. This research is part of a larger collaboration to compare neighbourhood approaches across a large number of European and North American cities, known as the Regenerating Urban Neighbourhoods (RUN) project. The aim of this project is to provide a better understanding of the politics of a particular kind of policy intervention, especially with regards to sub-city residential areas experiencing distress. This article displays results of that research for the city of Rotterdam (the Netherlands). These results presented are based on the content of the ‘RUN research protocol’, ‘RUN common template’, and ‘RUN thoughts and issues’ by Clarence Stone.

### 1.1 General observations/conclusions regarding Rotterdam’s neighbourhood approach

- **Fifty years of neighbourhood policy**  
At the national Dutch and Rotterdam levels, there have been many encompassing efforts to improve the living environment of citizens; and the neighbourhood in the last fifty years has been the chosen area of focus.
- **Evolution of neighbourhood policy**  
Neighbourhood policy in the Netherlands and Rotterdam has developed from an approach mainly aimed at the physical dimension such as rebuilding and economic policy to one directed at the conditions of the inhabitants of deprived areas, as reflected in issues such as unemployment and poverty. This change has also interacted with the way ‘deprivation’ has been judged: from the physical aspect of neighbourhoods (state of dwellings) to the socio economic position of its inhabitants (employed, poor) and their feelings (social isolation, safety).
- **Accumulation of neighbourhood policy**  
There has been a quick turnover of programmes at the national as well as the local level. Even though not everything changes at once or completely (therefore *accumulation*), especially the ‘front’ of the neighbourhood approach at national and local level since it seems to depend strongly on electoral outcomes.

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<sup>1</sup> The author would like to thank Koen van der Krieken for the neighbourhood data, and Anne Kouwenberg and Laurey Mulder respectively for their help in analysing the neighbourhoods of Tarwewijk and Afrikaanderwijk.

<sup>2</sup> This case study report includes information as per October 2009. Some literature updated in 2012.

- **National and local government interplay**  
 There has been interaction between the national and local governments regarding neighbourhood policy. The national government is an important actor. It sets up the agenda and provides most of the municipal funding. But the local government is the important link: The local government (often in the form of several aldermen) translates the national programmes into local approaches. Moreover, it directs the municipal services that are indispensable for implementing policy in the neighbourhoods. Rotterdam also has a system of municipal districts which are not unimportant as well as they have competences pertaining to public space and welfare, but in general are relatively weak organisations.
- **Sectorisation**  
 At the moment, *sectorisation*, referring to the participation of different (mainly governmental) actors at the local level each with its own portfolio, aims, and competences, is considered one of the most pressing problems that challenges the formulation of an adequate and integral neighbourhood approach at all levels. At both the national and local levels, actors increasingly believe that neighbourhood approaches should be integral to break this trend. This requires good cooperation between active actors in the neighbourhood so as to ensure their efforts are complementary and not at all contradictory.
- **Rotterdam neighbourhood policy**  
 Action directed at the neighbourhood (and to some extent: breaking or coping with sectorisation) seems to depend strongly on initiatives and sudden ‘opportunity windows’, not only at the municipal level (e.g. Liveable Rotterdam; Rotterdam Presses On), but also at the neighbourhood level (e.g. Pendrecht Presses On and Vital Pendrecht). Behind these initiatives however is a strong institutional setting of national and local attention for the neighbourhoods. This attention is translated into programmes (paper) and institutional structures (organisations).
- **Bounded citizens’ participation**  
 Despite the general Dutch discourse, there is a tendency that sometimes policy is made for citizens, but not with citizens. The bureaucratic structures of many neighbourhood approaches leave only little room for genuine participation of the citizens; and often the way in which their opinions can change policy is limited. On the other hand, citizens often are reluctant to participate when asked to.
- **Citizens’ initiatives**  
 Despite the foregoing, the most interesting activities emerge when citizens take action themselves, e.g. the Vital Pendrecht initiative (see Section IX ‘mapping of potential major players’).
- **The role of housing corporations**  
 The role of housing corporations, which are more or less independent and private organisations that build and rent out reasonably low priced dwellings, has increased in importance. Especially in the neighbourhoods under study, they own and rent out by far the largest part of the neighbourhood’s housing stock. In Rotterdam, these housing corporations increasingly engage in the social development of these neighbourhoods as well, but this is rather a national development.

## 1.2 Ideas for the comparison of cities

- **Multi level government/governance**

The role of both the national and local (Rotterdam) governments is important. Formally, there is no hierarchy between the two (even though there is hierarchy in regulation) and it is widely acknowledged that one cannot function without the other. In practice, local government has to take national programmes and regulation into consideration and receives most of its income from national government. But Rotterdam's local government (mainly the board of mayor and aldermen) functions as important link and translates those programmes for the neighbourhood level as well as instigates its own programmes. How is this in other cities? Are there differences between countries or continents?

- **Citizens' participation**

There is a strong discourse of citizens' participation in the Netherlands and Rotterdam where several projects have been implemented. Also, the amount of surveys and questionnaires to ask citizens for their views on policy has increased since 2002. However, any genuine influence on changing policy seems limited and is generally restricted to influence regarding implementation. This being said, it is not always or only the fault of the government; citizens themselves are not always eager to be involved. And when they do, it is sometimes disconnected from governmental actions and vice versa. It is possible to elaborate more on this. I am also curious about the participation of citizens in the neighbourhood policy of other cities.

- **Evolution in policy strategies**

At the national and Rotterdam levels, the government has always been involved in the neighbourhoods. Both in the Netherlands as well as in Rotterdam, this has developed from efforts mainly aimed at the physical dimension such as rebuilding and economic policy after the Second World War to a policy that was several decades later directed at the conditions of the inhabitants of deprived areas as well, as reflected in issues such as unemployment and poverty. This change also interacts with the way 'deprivation' is judged: from the physical aspect of neighbourhoods (state of dwellings) to the socio-economic position of its inhabitants (employed, poor) and their feelings (safety). Can similar developments be witnessed elsewhere?

- **Neighbourhood networks**

Which actors and persons are important at the neighbourhood level? In Rotterdam, these are, apart from the housing corporations, mainly public organisations or bodies such as representatives of the board of mayor and aldermen, the district board, and several municipal services. The way these networks operate and what they can achieve depend strongly on the individuals that are part of these networks and their relationships among each other. Again, their relationship with the citizens is also an interesting point of discussion and at the individual level this seems better arranged than at the institutional level.

## 2 Why is studying neighbourhood policy appropriate? An orientational discussion

In 2009, the neighbourhood is the focus of policy attention. The national cabinet under the leadership of Prime Minister Balkenende (2007-) promises to launch ‘an offensive’ to develop forty Dutch ‘problem neighbourhoods’ (*probleemwijken*) into ‘powerful neighbourhoods’ (*krachtwijken*). A state Minister (‘secretary’) of ‘Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration’ has this objective in his portfolio. This objective follows a long line of national attention to neighbourhoods and neighbourhood development, and the attention for the neighbourhood as a place where politicians meet citizens, societal problems are being dealt with, and cooperation between governmental, non-governmental actors and citizens becomes concrete (see also ‘legacies of earlier neighbourhood policy’).

However, what defines a neighbourhood is much harder to describe and mainly depends on what people regard a ‘neighbourhood’ to be (WRR 2005: 20-22). Moreover, there are some translation and interpretation problems. The English word ‘neighbourhood’ can be translated in Dutch to mean both *buurt* and *wijk*. And while the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) regards *buurt* as a subjective concept determined in the minds of people and the *wijk* as the administrative unit either established by the (municipal) government, the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) regards *buurt* as the smallest (administrative) unit and defines it as ‘part of a municipality, that from a cultivation perspective or its social-economical structure, is marked. Here, being marked means that one function, for instance, housing, working (e.g. industry), or recreation (e.g. nature), is dominant, but the CBS adds that ‘a combination of functions can also occur’ (CBS website 12/102009).

Rotterdam adheres to this CBS classification, which means that there are 98 neighbourhoods with some considerable differences in the number of inhabitants, ranging approximately from zero (in some of the harbour territories) to about 25,000. The neighbourhoods in this research have fewer inhabitants: Pendrecht (11,726), Afrikaanderwijk (9,112) and Tarwewijk (11,219). All of the research data is from 2009 and derived from the Rotterdam neighbourhood monitor<sup>3</sup>. However, there are also exceptions due to research or survey reasons where the municipality ignores certain (harbour) neighbourhoods and combines other low inhabited ones. For example, this has been done for constructing the municipal safety index (*veiligheidsindex*) to indicate the level of safety in the city. The municipality has surveyed about 60 in order to construct the safety index. Different neighbourhood definitions can thus co-exist. For some national projects, such as the previously mentioned ‘powerful neighbourhoods’ programme, the minister uses postal code areas to define neighbourhoods.

## 3 The citywide dimensions of socio-spatial inequality

Rotterdam is established as a ‘dam’ near the river ‘Rotte’ in the thirteenth century.<sup>4</sup> In the period 1880-1914, big investments in the harbour had helped to develop Rotterdam into the most important European harbour city. Rotterdam profited among other things from the industrialisation of the German *Ruhr* area and the increase in transportation possibilities. Due to the growth of the harbour, Rotterdam became an attractive city for immigrants to work in. Rotterdam grew from 110,700 inhabitants in 1850 to 318,500 in 1900. Houses were quickly built to fulfil the growing demand. Rotterdam also expanded and neighbouring municipalities became part of the growing city.

After the First World War, the unilateral view on the harbour backfired with the defeat of Germany. Rotterdam was faced with an economically ruined hinterland, which showed that

<sup>3</sup> *buurtmonitor*, <http://rotterdam.buurtmonitor.nl>, seen on 12/10/2009.

<sup>4</sup> Unless stated otherwise, the information in this historic overview is largely based on Van de Laar (2000) and Harding (1994).



Rotterdam needed a more diverse economical structure. The harbour played an important factor in this and became a place for industrialisation. The first petroleum harbour opened in 1929 and the first refinery by Shell in 1937.

On the 14<sup>th</sup> May 1940 during the Second World War, Rotterdam experienced its blackest day. The German bombardment had destroyed practically the entire inner city. The bombardment and the fires caused by it had killed 1,100 people, made 78,000 people homeless, and destroyed 25,000 homes and 7,000 commercial and industrial buildings. Most of what was left of the harbour was then destroyed in the final phases of the war.

After, but also during the war, Rotterdam was very involved in rebuilding the city. Just as it was a national example of the ruins of war, Rotterdam also became a national example of rebuilding. For Rotterdam, the reconstruction of the harbour and the city centre were the main priorities and the Rotterdam harbour played an important role in the rebuilding of the Dutch economy whose recovery was surprisingly rapid. During these decades in Rotterdam, the phrase 'deeds, no words' was uplifted to a form of religion and the image of Rotterdam as a city of workers fitted a national policy of rebuilding the nation (Van de Laar 2000, 481). Already in 1962, Rotterdam had replaced New York as the largest port in the world (measured by tonnage handled). The harbour maintained this position until 2004 when it had to hand over the title to Shanghai. Apart from services such as transshipment, storage and distribution, the oil petrochemical complex, and shipbuilding, other 'supporting' and 'dry' services like the emerging insurances sector had also contributed to the success. In 1960, Rotterdam had achieved a peak in its population size with 730,000 inhabitants. The city's economic goals as reflected in its new infrastructure had materialized with the new city centre: 'The city centre was completely rebuilt on a grid system, in functionalist style, with wide boulevards suitable for heavier car traffic, and almost exclusively for commercial, retail, cultural, and public administrative uses. New housing did not appear in the inner city, rather it was developed in districts beyond the inner ring and outside the municipality completely' (Harding 1994: 22).

The 1970s was a time of decline in employment. The recession of the 1970s and the growing economic importance of areas outside the old core centres affected Rotterdam badly. The economy of Rotterdam that still depended heavily on its harbour and harbour related activities was affected by fierce competition, for instance, from the Pacific Rim. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the shipbuilding industry lost around 80% of its workforce. These consequences of the recession were reinforced by the emergence of new technology that made fewer personnel necessary for operating harbour equipment. The high point of people leaving the city was around 1973 when 34,000 people left the city annually (Burgers 2001). In 1985, Rotterdam experienced a population low of 571,000.

After 1985, a slow revival was witnessed, stemming from a complex background. A revival of world trade and new demographic factors were part of the reason that the economy had recovered. The late 1980s also witnessed a strong rise in service sector companies. The sector grew between 6% and 10% a year, business services (often related to the harbour) grew more than 30% between 1985 and 1989. New headquarters such as companies like Unilever, Robeco, Shell, and *Nationale Nederlanden* (insurance company) emerged in the city centre. Unfortunately, most of these developments did not lead to an increase in employment. Most of the investments in the harbour and harbour related industries were not dependent on intensive labour. And the employment that was created was often for high skilled personnel that did not live in the city but close by or in the suburbs. In 1975, people living outside the city occupied 137,000 of the 340,000 jobs in Rotterdam, about 40%. In 1995, this was 54%,

181,000 out of 330,000 (Burgers 2001). Table 1 to 6 contain data on the relatively low (economic) status of Rotterdam and the neighbourhoods<sup>5</sup> as discussed in this paper.

**Table 1: percentage unemployed**<sup>6</sup>

	1998	2002	2003	2004	2006	2008
Netherlands	5.1	4.1	5.4	6.5	5.5	4.0
Rotterdam	-	8.0	8.6	10.4	8.4	6.1
Pendrecht	-	9.7	11.7	15.4	11.3	8.4
Tarwewijk	-	12.2	14.0	17.5	12.7	8.7
Afrikaanderwijk	-	13.9	14.1	16.1	15.5	13.0

**Table 2: percentage of people receiving welfare payments**<sup>7</sup>

	2002	2003	2004	2006	2008
Netherlands	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.1	3.5
Rotterdam	7.6	7.7	7.4	7.1	5.4
Pendrecht	11.0	11.1	10.8	11.3	9.5
Tarwewijk	12.6	12.1	11.0	11.1	8.2
Afrikaanderwijk	12.7	12.5	13.3	13.2	9.9

**Table 3: number and percentage of people below official poverty line**<sup>8</sup>

	2002	2003	2004	2006	2008
Netherlands	1,237,000	1,343,000	1,313,000	-	-
Rotterdam	45,621 7.6	46,150 7.7	44,115 7.4	41,635 7.1	31,549 5.4
Pendrecht	1,360 11.0	1,366 11.1	1,345 10.8	1,387 11.3	1,131 9.5
Tarwewijk	1,496 12.6	1,466 12.1	1,318 11.0	1,246 11.1	888 8.2
Afrikaanderwijk	1,175 12.7	1,160 12.5	1,244 13.3	1,244 13.2	922 9.9

<sup>5</sup> Sometimes different sources apply different definitions (e.g. regarding unemployment or welfare payments). In that case, we took data for Pendrecht as the starting point and looked for the most similar definitions at the municipal and national levels.

<sup>6</sup> CBS Statline, consulted 12/11/2008; RotterdamDATA, consulted on 12/11/2008 and 29/10/2009.

<sup>7</sup> CBS Statline, consulted 16/11/2008; *Rotterdam Buurtmonitor*, consulted on 29/10/2009

<sup>8</sup> *Armoedemonitor*, consulted on 16/11/2008, *Rotterdam Buurtmonitor*, consulted on 29/10/2009, RotterdamDATA, consulted on 16/11/2008

**Table 4: average housing price in Euros <sup>9</sup>**

	1995	1998	2002	2003	2004	2006
Netherlands	-	79.000	132.000	133.000	134.000	201.000
Rotterdam	-	-	-	84,031	85,642	139,245
Pendrecht	26,572	39,975	59,343	60,051	63,391	97,740
Tarwewijk	20,169	30,391	44,890	44,965	46,078	80,712
Afrikaanderwijk	25,905	40,733	58,049	58,133	59,464	98,937

**Table 5: percentage of abandoned houses <sup>10</sup>**

	1990	1995	1998	2002	2003	2004	2006	2008
Netherlands	4.1	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7
Rotterdam	-	-	-	8.0	8.0	8.0	9.0	9.0
Pendrecht	-	4.0	3.0	8.0	9.0	7.0	11	7.0
Tarwewijk	-	-	-	18.0	17.0	16.0	20.0	20.0
Afrikaanderwijk	-	-	-	7.0	8.0	6.0	8.0	4.0

**Table 6: percentage home owners / tenants <sup>11</sup>**

	1995	1998	2002	2003	2004	2006	2008
Rotterdam	20/80	20/80	22/78	23/77	25/75	27/73	31/69
Pendrecht	9/91	11/89	14/86	14/86	17/83	20/80	24/76
Tarwewijk	24/76	19/81	21/79	21/79	22/78	23/78	28/72
Afrikaanderwijk	2/98	1/99	4/96	5/95	5/95	8/92	10/90

Apart from unemployment, there were other developments that became more visible in the last few decades of the 20th century. One that cannot be disregarded was the large influx of immigrants. In the 1960s and 1970s, Rotterdam, like many (large) Dutch cities, experienced a strong influx of migrants from the Mediterranean. Migrants from Turkey and Morocco were soon followed by immigrants from the former Dutch colonies (Surinam and the Antilles) in the 1970s. They often came to live in poor pre-First World War houses while the more prosperous people moved to the suburbs. Later, they would also move into the post-Second World War neighbourhoods. Rotterdam and these neighbourhoods have housed many minorities and foreign-born people as compared to the Dutch average, as shown in Tables 7 and 8.

<sup>9</sup> Nederlandse Vereniging van Makelaars (NVM), consulted on 16/11/2008; Rotterdam Buurtmonitor, consulted on 29/10/2009; CBS Statline, consulted on 16/11/2008; Vereniging Eigen Huis, consulted on 16/11/2008

<sup>10</sup> CBS Statline, consulted on 16/11/2008; Rotterdam Buurtmonitor, consulted on 16/11/2008 and 29/10/2009.

<sup>11</sup> Buurt Informatie Rotterdam Digitaal, consulted on 3/1/2009 and 29/10/2009.

**Table 7: percentage of minorities**<sup>12</sup>

	1995	1998	2002	2003	2004	2006	2008
Netherlands	-	16.7	18.4	18.8	19.0	19.3	19.6
Rotterdam	34	37	43	44	45	45	46
Pendrecht	27	37	54	56	58	60	63
Tarwewijk	49	56	67	69	71	72	72
Afrikaanderwijk	72	75	81	82	82	84	85

**Table 8: percentage foreign born (Western / non-Western)**<sup>13</sup>

	1995	1998	2002	2003	2004	2006	2008
Rotterdam	9 / 25	9 / 28	10 / 33	10 / 34	10 / 35	10 / 35	10 / 36
Pendrecht	10 / 17	10 / 27	10 / 44	9 / 47	9 / 49	9 / 51	10 / 53
Tarwewijk	9/40	9/47	8/59	8/61	8/63	9/63	9/63
Afrikaanderwijk	7/65	6/69	6/75	6/76	6/76	6/78	6/79

For a more precise look into the origins of the people living in Rotterdam, the situation in 2006 has been observed<sup>14</sup> more closely:

Population: 588,718  
 Heterogeneity: 317,943 (individual and both parents born in the Netherlands)  
 52,329 from Surinam  
 19,701 from Dutch Antilles  
 45,415 from Turkey  
 36,831 from Morocco  
 17,774 from Southern Europe  
 66,464 from other non-industrialised nations  
 32,261 from other industrialised nations

In Rotterdam, there seems to be an interrelation between unemployment, poverty, a low education, and the number of ethnic immigrants. The unemployment has been especially high among lowly educated groups and immigrants and many of them live in the city's older neighbourhoods. In the first annual report on poverty released in 1996, out of thirty Dutch neighbourhoods which had the highest number of people living on welfare, fifteen were situated in Rotterdam. The largest proportions of immigrants (Burgers 2001) were found in these same neighbourhoods. Also, the level of education in Rotterdam has been quite low. In 2006 and 2008, 38% of the population had only received primary education.<sup>15</sup>

Rotterdam has also been housing relatively many single household families with children. In 2008, the percentage of single household families with children in the Netherlands was 6.4%.

<sup>12</sup> CBS Statline, consulted on 3/1/2009; *Buurt Informatie Rotterdam Digitaal*, consulted on 3/1/2009 and 30/10/2009

<sup>13</sup> CBS Statline, consulted on January 1/12009; *Buurt Informatie Rotterdam Digitaal*, consulted on 1/12009 and 29/10/2009

<sup>14</sup> Centre for Research and Statistics, *Key figures Rotterdam 2006*, Rotterdam 2006, consulted on 1/1/2006.

<sup>15</sup> CBS Statline, consulted on 1/1/ 2009; *Buurt Informatie Rotterdam Digitaal*, consulted on 2/1/2009; RotterdamDATA, consulted on 2/1/2009

In Rotterdam, it was 10.2%.<sup>16</sup> In general, Rotterdam can also be considered a young city (see table 9).

**Table 9: percentage of young people in Rotterdam<sup>17</sup>**

	2002	2003	2004	2006	2008
Netherlands (-20)	24.5	24.5	24.5	24.3	24.0
Rotterdam (-19)	23.2	23.4	23.2	23.0	22.6
Pendrecht (-19)	26.4	27.1	27.1	26.6	26.5
Tarwewijk (-19)	27.1	27.1	26.8	26.2	26.3
Afrikaanderwijk (-19)	32.6	31.9	32.0	31.1	29.7

And finally, Rotterdam also faces safety problems. Research reports showed that Rotterdam in the 1990s had increasingly become an unsafe city (Intraval 2000; Intraval 2001). The percentage of people in Rotterdam that considered public order and safety as one of the three largest problems increased from 38% in 1988 to 73% in 1994 (City of Rotterdam 1997: 6) and citizens increasingly displayed more public protest against problems of safety (Van Ostaaijen 2010; Tops 2007). During the end of the century, some of Rotterdam's social problems became hard(er) to ignore and the new mayor, Ivo Opstelten (1999-2009) did not hide them. In his new year's speech in 2000 he mentioned: 'But, I can see you think: what about safety, the vulnerable groups in our society, the unemployment, and poverty. Isn't Rotterdam the city that leads the wrong lists? You are right: another image of Rotterdam is that our city more than proportionally shares large city problems. We do not cover this up' (Van Ulzen 2007: 23).

### 3.1 Summary

Around the turn of the century, Rotterdam could be labelled a city that 'leads the bad lists'. This was due to the fact that Rotterdam, in relation to the Dutch average, had high levels of unemployment, poverty, and safety problems. These could be due to the fact that Rotterdam also provides housing for a relatively high percentage of immigrants. These groups generally cluster in the city's older and somewhat deprived neighbourhoods<sup>18</sup>.

## 4 Overview of the Rotterdam neighbourhoods selected for detailed study

### 4.1 Pendrecht<sup>19</sup>

Pendrecht is a neighbourhood that was built shortly after the Second World War to supply the growing housing need of Rotterdam. At the moment, there are about 12,000 people living in Pendrecht. Most houses are rental homes and most of them (about 4,500) are owned by a local housing corporation, *De Nieuwe Unie*. Pendrecht has been referred to as a 'stamp neighbourhood', meaning that it has been built out of standard houses that are 'stamped' over

<sup>16</sup> CBS Statline, consulted on December 31/12/2008; *Buurt Informatie Rotterdam digitaal*, consulted on 31/12/2008.

<sup>17</sup> It is noted that there are different criteria for what constitutes as young. CBS Statline, consulted on 7/12/2008; Rotterdam Buurtmonitor, consulted on 30/10/2009

<sup>18</sup> These neighbourhoods are often characterised by the presence of small, often old and mostly rented housing.


<sup>19</sup> Eefke Cornelissen, researcher from Tilburg University, is one of the researchers closely involved in Pendrecht (see further on). She has made much of her personal unpublished notes about the neighbourhood available.

the neighbourhood. The neighbourhood feels large but retains an intimate atmosphere. According to the standards set at the end of the twentieth century, the houses are however quite small and the neighbourhood is quite monotonous. But until about the beginning of the 1990s, it was a place where people wanted to live, though with much social control.

By the end of the century, the deprived conditions of the houses reinforced the unattractiveness of the neighbourhood. However, the houses did appeal to the less privileged. In the 1990s, Pendrecht experienced an influx of non-Dutch immigrants in particular. This happened relatively late, but when it happened, it happened fast (see also table 8). Within ten years, the number of Dutch inhabitants decreased from 90% to 50%. This led to a sort of cultural cleavage between the 'original', 'Dutch' occupants who have reached pension age and the newer, often non-Dutch and younger occupants who have moved in. As a city district employee has explained: 'part of the population is old and white, the other young and black' (Van den Brink 2007: 237).

According to a district politician, the changes in Pendrecht are not unique, but the speed of the changes is. He further added that the original inhabitants have seen their neighbourhood change in ten years from a middle class neighbourhood to a deprived neighbourhood with facing problems such as nuisance, security issues, pollution, health hazards, and language and learning delays. Due to a shortage in the housing market, many of the 'less fortunate' cannot move elsewhere, leaving them trapped in their own neighbourhood. In 2009, the Minister of Housing, Neighbourhoods, and Integration presented a list of deprived (postal code) areas which his policy would pay extra attention to. Pendrecht was number two on that list and the first entry (NICIS 26/2/2009) for a Rotterdam neighbourhood. The 'area manager' in Pendrecht commented on what he saw as the largest problems in Pendrecht:

There is a lot of anonymity ... That is because people are all trying to get by. There is also a lot of criminality. People start to live there to better mind their business ... That is for me the most important reason such a neighbourhood deteriorates so fast. If you put too many people together that only are occupied with themselves, and try to get by, and have a lot of problems ... it will go wrong. They will always inhabit the old and cheap houses, because that is where they can go (Van Bergeijk et al. 2008: 157).



*Figure 1 (left): the location of Pendrecht within Rotterdam (Dutch Wikipedia, consulted on 3/8/2008)*




*Figure 2 (right): a view of the neighbourhood (www.kei-centrum.nl, consulted on 23/2/2009)*

## 4.2 Tarwewijk

Just like Pendrecht, Tarwewijk falls under the district of Charlois. Tarwewijk is a much older neighbourhood compared to Pendrecht. It was built between 1900 and 1930, mainly for newcomers that came from other parts of the country to work in the harbour. The demography of Tarwewijk changed profoundly in the 1970s and 1980s<sup>20</sup> when foreign labourers from the Mediterranean region and Surinam had replaced the middle income population who had then moved to quieter areas (Rotterdam 29/10/2009). A large part of the housing stock in Tarwewijk consists of rental homes and 73% of the neighbourhood inhabitants are from a non-Dutch background. Most of them are between 20 and 54 years of age and in only 30% of the households are children present.

According to the earlier mentioned list of most deprived Dutch neighbourhoods from the Dutch Minister of Housing, Neighbourhoods, and Integration in which Pendrecht was ranked second, Tarwewijk was number nineteen. This list was based on 18 indicators divided over the following four themes (NICIS 26/2/2009): social-economical setbacks (income, employment, education), physical setbacks (small, old, and cheap dwellings), social problems (citizens' surveys, destruction of public property, neighbourhood nuisance, fear of becoming the victim of a crime), and physical problems (citizens' surveys, temptation to move elsewhere, nuisance from things such as noise, stench, dust, and traffic).

There have nevertheless been some positive developments in *Tarwewijk*. Since 2004, the number of people who receive welfare has increased and the number of house ownership has reached 28%.



*Figure 3 (left): the location of Tarwewijk within Rotterdam (Dutch Wikipedia, consulted on 13/10/2008)*



*Figure 4 (right): a top view of the neighbourhood (www.visade.nl, consulted on 13/10/2009)*

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
<sup>20</sup> These changes had thus happened earlier than Pendrecht that had for quite some time been regarded a 'good' neighbourhood.



### 4.3 Afrikaanderwijk

Afrikaanderwijk is situated in the district of Feijenoord, and like Pendrecht and Tarwewijk, is located on the city's south bank. It has been built around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The reason for the neighbourhood's construction was similar to that of Tarwewijk, which was to house many of the (harbour) labourers who had come from other parts of the country. Nevertheless, in the 1960s and 1970s, many non-Dutch guest labourers had also moved in. Afrikaanderwijk was one of the first Dutch neighbourhoods where the number of non-Dutch inhabitants has increased to over 50%. In 1972, the neighbourhood made national news for being the stage of 'racial riots' when some neighbourhood inhabitants threw the furniture of ethnic immigrants onto the street (Dekker and Sensius 2001; Geurz 2006).

In 1994, the neighbourhood had about 10,500 inhabitants, and after a slow decrease this rose again to 9,314 in 2008. Afrikaanderwijk is also a young neighbourhood. In 2008, about 29.7% of its inhabitants were 18 years or younger. A little less than 10% depended on welfare payments and 90% of the houses were rental. Many of the inhabitants were of Turkish decent (34%). Other groups were Dutch (15%), Surinamese (13%), Moroccan (13%), and other non-Westerners (11%). Afrikaanderwijk is part of an area that the Dutch Minister of Housing, Neighbourhoods, and Integration has placed at number 33 on the previously mentioned list of most deprived Dutch neighbourhoods (NICIS 26/2/2009).



*Figure 5 (left): the location of Afrikaanderwijk within Rotterdam (Wikimedia, consulted on 13/10/2008)*



*Figure 6 (right): maquette of the neighbourhood (www.skyscrapercity.com, consulted on 23/2/2009)*



## 5 The local structure of Dutch and Rotterdam politics and government

### 5.1 Competences

Formally, the Dutch national government, the twelve provinces, and (at the moment) 441 municipalities govern the country together and there is no formal hierarchy between them<sup>21</sup>. Dutch municipalities have two tasks: implementation of national policy and the administration of internal affairs pertaining to the Dutch Constitution and the Dutch Municipal Law for instance. It is hard to determine which category do municipal activities and competences fall into as different amounts of policy freedom can be attached to both. For example, a municipality is obliged to have a local plan for infrastructure (implementation of national policy), but the way this plan looks like, or in other words, where they decide to build, is – within national and provincial legislation– a competence of the municipality<sup>22</sup>. And when performing autonomous tasks such as making municipal regulations, a municipality still has to take national rules into consideration, which indicates a very low practical level of policy freedom (Derksen and Schaap 2007: 105).

Regarding the interaction between national and local governments, the general understanding is that national government is dominant and more importantly, that both cannot function without each other. In many policy fields, this mutual dependence becomes obvious as on the one hand, the national government depends on the local governments to implement national policy and fulfil basic tasks in areas such as safety, police, and welfare provision. Yet on the other hand, the local governments are bounded by national regulation and depend on the national government for the large part of their income.

### 5.2 Money

National government provides the majority of the municipalities' income (36 billion Euros, 83%). The other part is the municipalities' own income (5 billion, 13%). This consists of sewage and property taxes. Other income can come from other taxes and services, like dog tax, parking income, and the provision of passports (Derksen and Schaap 2007). The income municipalities receive from the national government can be divided into a general donation and specific funds attributed to specific tasks (welfare being the largest). In 2006, 21 billion went to general donation; 16 billion was further distributed through specific funds (Netherlands Court of Audit 2006). The funds attached to the national government's neighbourhood programmes are specific funds. This means that the money is 'earmarked' and it can only be spent for the purpose of the national government or certain departments.

### 5.3 The municipal council, the municipal board of mayor and aldermen, and the mayor

The Dutch local government has a collective form of leadership. Every Dutch municipality has a representative body, the municipal council. The size of the council depends on the number of inhabitants of a municipality. Every four years, the citizens directly elect the municipal council through a system of proportional representation. The council is made up of people that are formally elected on their own, but take the seat on behalf of a political party or 'list'. After the municipal council election, generally a coalition is formed between a number of political parties that have a majority of seats in the municipal council and decide to govern the municipality together. They (but formally 'the council') can determine the general direction of the municipal policy and distributes the money to the municipal board of mayor and aldermen, the day-to-day government of the municipality. The aldermen are also

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<sup>21</sup> There is only hierarchy in regulation, meaning municipal regulation cannot contradict provincial or national regulation.

<sup>22</sup> The municipality enjoys a relatively high level of policy freedom.

appointed by the council (again read: 'the political coalition'). In practice, that board that consists of the mayor and aldermen, is dominant over the council because the implementation of provincial and national policy often goes directly through the board; the municipal council has hardly any role in policy preparation and implementation, and the board has the formal control over the civil service (Derksen and Schaap 2007, 71-72). The Dutch mayor is appointed by the national government for six years and is supposed to have a role outside day-to-day party politics. Apart from chairing the municipal council and the municipal board, a mayor's legal competences include public order, the police, the fire department, and the coordination of government actors in case of a calamity.

#### 5.4 Civil service

On average, municipalities have a large civil service. This varies from a few hundred civil servants in small municipalities to several thousands in big cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The number of civil servants has been increasing considerably throughout the years. In 1851, Amsterdam employed 1,364 civil servants. Halfway through the 1980s, this had increased to 30,000. One of the reasons for this was not only the growth of municipalities, but more importantly, the growth of municipal tasks (Derksen and Schaap 2007: 122). While in the 19th century, the local governments mainly carried out tasks such as maintaining the public order<sup>23</sup>, the local governments nowadays are responsible for a wide array of tasks regarding welfare, social affairs, education, housing, and so on. This has not only caused an increase in the number of civil servants but also an increase in specialisation. This becomes apparent when taking a closer look at the municipal services, as these days most municipal bureaucracies are divided into different professional services. There are services for housing, social affairs, infrastructure, safety, etc. These services can be very different from one other and there is not much contact or cooperation between them (see John 2001). This can lead to forms of *sectorisation*, referring to the functioning of the sectors or organisations without much productive contact or harmonisation between them.

#### 5.5 Rotterdam local government

The Rotterdam municipal council (45 members) is directly elected by the citizens of Rotterdam. With a few exceptions, the entire city also falls under the district rule. This means that next to the (municipal) council and (municipal) board, Rotterdam has 11 directly elected district councils and district boards appointed by the district councils. The number of inhabitants of a district varies from 5,000 to 90,000. It is up to the municipal council and municipal board to determine which of their competences they would give to the districts. The council and board can also decide to take competences back. When they consider it in the interest of the city, they can also overrule the districts. In general, it is regarded that the competences of the Rotterdam districts are relatively small, but they have been given important tasks regarding the 'living environment', such as maintenance of public spaces and the well being of citizens, relevant policy themes for neighbourhood approaches.

#### 5.6 Rotterdam local government as mainly (semi-)public governance

Even though Rotterdam has a history of public private cooperation, the role of businesses has diminished over the decades and the role of political parties has become stronger. In the 1990s, the post-war committees of harbour and politicians were a thing of the past (see Section II: 'legacies of earlier Dutch and Rotterdam neighbourhood policy'). Even though public-private cooperation was the underlying basis of many urban projects in the 1980s and 1990s, the strong incorporation of Rotterdam's largest businesses in municipal politics has

<sup>23</sup> For instance, out of the 1,364 Amsterdam civil servants in 1851, 1,073 were policemen.

decreased tremendously. At the beginning of the 1990s, research had been undertaken about the connection between the municipality and large corporations in Rotterdam. About 50 boards from companies of more than 100 employees were questioned. The involvement of these businesses in Rotterdam local politics turned out to be very limited. Businesses felt insufficiently represented in Rotterdam's municipal council, but two thirds of them did not wish to be involved in Rotterdam local politics. They considered local politics a separate world far detached from their international outlook. For many of them, Rotterdam was just the place where their company happened to be located and hardly any of the questioned employers lived in the city (Engbersen 2001).

Regarding the implementation of policy, the municipal services play an important role in the city. To implement the policy of the municipal board and the district boards, Rotterdam has about 17,000 employees.<sup>24</sup> 574 of them work in city hall as direct support to the board, council, mayor, or aldermen, and 831 work for the city districts. Most of the civil servants however work in one of the municipal services spread all over the city. There are about 25 municipal services. Several of these services deal with policymaking and policy implementation on specific professional areas. There are a lot of professions in these services. The services implement not only policy made in the municipal board or one of the district boards, but also make policy themselves. This has given the services much freedom as the board has a less clear sight on their functioning (e.g. Van der Zwan 2003: 158-160). The services can be called 'businesses' on their own as they often have their own personnel and profession, board of directors, personnel policy, supporting staff, and often their own website. Several largest services which are important for board policy are listed below, followed by the number of people working there.<sup>25</sup>

- Public Works (*Gemeentewerken*) (2180)  
Restoring and maintenance of public space and property.
- Public Cleaning (*Roteb*) (1989)  
City cleaning and garbage disposal.
- City Supervision (*Stadstoezicht*) (1245)  
Supervision of public spaces and parking.
- City Development (*Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam*) (419)  
Promoting and stimulating economic and spatial development.
- Urban Planning and Housing (*Stedenbouw en Volkshuisvesting*) (992)  
Advising, designing, and/or implementing of infrastructural projects.
- Municipal Health Service (*GGD*) (544)  
Improving and maintaining health services and preventing diseases.
- Sports and Recreation (*Sport en Recreatie*) (1005)  
Improving sport and recreation facilities and activities.
- Youth, Education, and Society (*Jeugd, Onderwijs en Samenleving*) (294)  
Engages in youth policy, education, integration, and social quality.
- Social Affairs and Employment (*Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid*) (2052)  
Provision of welfare and helping Rotterdam citizens towards employment.

The Rotterdam board of mayor and aldermen has an important role in the neighbourhood approaches. It often directs the (municipal and national) money towards the services and districts and strong aldermen have often been leaders for the neighbourhood policy. Also, the housing corporations have increased in importance. Housing corporations emerged after the Second World War and have developed into local corporations that own many of the rental homes in the (deprived) neighbourhoods of large cities. They have become increasingly

<sup>24</sup> [www.rotterdam.nl](http://www.rotterdam.nl), consulted on 19/11/2008, data over 2006.

<sup>25</sup> City of Rotterdam 2008, data over 2006.



Many interviewees confirmed that over the course of decades many managers and employees in the Rotterdam services are members of the Labour Party as well or sympathise with it. The Labour Party Commission Aubert that had analysed the defeat of the Labour Party in 2002 also acknowledged that the Rotterdam municipal services were ‘often led by party members’ (Commission Aubert 2002: 7).

## 6 Legacies of earlier Dutch and Rotterdam neighbourhood policy

The Dutch national government has always been thoroughly involved in neighbourhood policy by initiating projects or programmes aimed at improving Dutch neighbourhoods. After the Second World War, this evolved from a mainly physical restructuring discourse around rebuilding towards more attention for the social and economical position of deprived neighbourhoods and their inhabitants. In the 1990s, new policy focused on a combination of approaches, and after 2002, this included ‘safety’ more prominently next to social, physical, and economic measures.

In Rotterdam, the development is quite similar: The immediate post-war period in Rotterdam was characterised by the rebuilding of the city and harbour. In these days, Rotterdam government maintained mainly a physical and economic perspective. In the 1970s, citizens’ protests had led to more attention for problems such as deprivation and environmental hazards. Rotterdam had installed several neighbourhood policy programmes to counter these developments.

### 6.1 1950s and 1960s: post-war rebuilding and restructuring (and in Rotterdam the harbour priority)

In the 1950s and 1960s<sup>26</sup>, Dutch neighbourhood development was mainly characterised by tearing down old dwellings to make way for ‘economic activities’ such as offices, parking garages, and roads, as well as to build new houses at the periphery of the cities. In this discourse, there was not much attention for the citizens and even if there was, this was often framed in organisational terms such as being able to clear the buildings in time in order for construction to begin (Van de Wijdeven 2012).

Rotterdam experienced the first two decades after the Second World War as a time of consensus. Nearly everyone in the council agreed that besides the rebuilding of the city and houses for its inhabitants, the development of the harbour should receive priority, which it did. The plans for this development took shape in a ‘regent coalition’ or ‘political commercial coalition’ (Van de Laar 2000). These coalitions that had existed until the 1970s consisted of important public and private actors such as the Chamber of Commerce and the mayor had worked together for the construction of the harbour and the promotion of industrial policy. Officially they were advisory boards, but according to the head of the municipal harbour department at the time, the municipal council was hardly an obstruction and that the proposals were accepted there ‘by acclamation’ (Van de Laar 2000).

### 6.2 1970s: city renewal

In the 1960s, the majority of Dutch post-war housing needs had been overcome and attention in the 1970s began to shift towards the old pre-war neighbourhoods that had become more and more deprived. A large ‘city renewal’ (*stadsvernieuwing*) movement commenced which had sought to tear down many of these deprived neighbourhoods. One of the aims was to influence the demographic composition of those neighbourhoods. Richer households should

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<sup>26</sup> There is a brief period of neighbourhood revival shortly after the Second World War where the neighbourhood as living community was idealised

be preserved for the cities and (partly) be accommodated in the areas of former deprived neighbourhoods (Van de Wijdeven 2012).

The city renewal did improve the quality of the houses in many Dutch neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, protests emerged against these top down and large scale reconstruction programmes. Citizens often feel connected to 'their' neighbourhoods however deprived they might be and therefore, they reacted very emotionally when they heard about plans to tear them down. For the planners this sometimes came as a surprise. The citizens' wishes were somewhat taken into consideration only after the protests (De Boer et al. 2004: 16 and Uitermark 2003, both in Van de Wijdeven 2012). On a more abstract level, the main points of criticism directed at the city renewal were that it did not manage to solve social problems such as unemployment, solitude, and educational arrears, it was too unilaterally focused on realising social housing, which made the composition of the inhabitants static and caused 'social risers' to move elsewhere. Also, it did not manage to connect the neighbourhood to higher levels such as the city and region (De Boer et al. 2004 in Van de Wijdeven 2012).

In Rotterdam, the post-war rebuilding rhetoric was increasingly becoming less accepted with the advent of the 1970s. For instance, because of the housing shortage after the Second World War, the much needed improvement of old neighbourhoods still had not started. In 1969, the municipality presented ambitious plans in its 'Sanitation Report' (*Saniteringsnota*). Pre-war slums should be demolished and entire neighbourhoods should be dealt with. Citizens however increasingly complained about environmental problems such as stench<sup>27</sup> caused by the harbour, which harmed the situation in the neighbourhoods. All kinds of neighbourhood committees were established to draw attention to these problems. In these committees, citizens strived to have a say in the plans being made, because in many neighbourhoods citizens feared the announced reconstructions would make their neighbourhood just as lifeless and cold as the city centre. Sometimes these neighbourhood committees also directed issues regarding foreign workers who were increasingly occupying houses in the pre-war neighbourhoods as the more prosperous people moved to the suburbs.

In 1974, the left-wing of the Labour Party gained an absolute majority in the municipal council and decided not to pursue yet another council-wide board, but to govern without the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party. The board made clear that the citizens, not business, would be its focus when making new policy. Under this board, the city renewal continued to proceed up until the 1990s. But because the board had promised citizens 125% of their property's value, the municipality obtained 17,000 dwellings and 2,500 business dwellings within six months.<sup>28</sup> The board's credo 'building for the neighbourhood' indicated that affordable homes should be built. The city renewal was carried out by project groups that existed partly out of citizens and civil servants. Following the new board's perspective, entrepreneurs were not represented at all (Bouwmeester 2000: 35-37).

### 6.3 Late 1980s: social renewal

After the recession of the 1970s, the Rotterdam board developed a more positive attitude towards entrepreneurship again and the economy slowly started to improve. However, it soon turned out that people in several deprived Rotterdam areas did not profit much from this growth. Many of the neighbourhoods that were built shortly after the Second World War to replace the destroyed houses were becoming deprived as well. These neighbourhoods were often characterised by high unemployment and poverty levels as well as a large percentage of

<sup>27</sup> According to an alderman at the time, this is 'the smell of employment' (Bouwmeester 2000: 29)

<sup>28</sup> The following areas are appointed as city renewal areas: *Afrikaanderwijk*, *Feijenoord-Noordereiland*, *Katendrecht*, *Oud-Charlois*, *Vreewijk*, *Cool*, *Delfshaven*, *Kralingen*, *Oude Noorden*, *Crooswijk-Rubroek*, and *Oude Westen* (Bouwmeester 2000: 35).

non-Dutch immigrants (Van de Wijdeven 2012: 12; SCP 1998: 15). Social renewal that had started at the end of the 1980s was an attempt to counter these developments. The starting point of this policy was that economic and physical renewal cannot go without social measures and that this affected all inhabitants (SCP 1998: 15). Moreover, social renewal should also stimulate people to contribute to their living environment themselves (Van Putten 2006: 17).

Rotterdam had achieved credibility for its social renewal effort with the *Opzoomer* project. People living in the *Opzoomer* Street contributed to their living environment by cleaning the street together. The board consequently tried to deepen engagement for the the project by encouraging neighbourhood residents to take responsibility for their own living environment, for example by cleaning or organising parties together, to function in the entire city.

National government regarded this Rotterdam initiative of social renewal appealing and took it to the national level. The national social renewal policy focused on giving impulses to the implementation of a 'concentrated' and 'coherent' 'deprivation policy' at the local level. Long term unemployment and social isolation of people that for a long time had depended on welfare payments should be stopped and countered (SCP 1998: 7, 16). With covenants, the national government compelled the local governments to not only identify their problems, but also to propose suitable solutions on the following areas: 1) employment, education, and schooling, 2) housing- and living environment, 3) care and well being. About 80% of local governments close such covenants (Kensen 1999 in Van de Wijdeven 2012; Derksen and Schaap 2007: 215). According to a national evaluation, the inclusion of the ideas and measures of social renewal policy in regular local policy has quickly become a common phenomenon (SCP 1998: 174-175). The decentralisation of welfare policy (the societal support law) towards municipalities in 2007 could be regarded as a last formal step in this process.

#### 6.4 1990s: large city policy

Even though social renewal was a welcome addition to the more physically oriented perspective of earlier decades, problems with liveability, integration, and safety in especially the larger Dutch cities were still hard to deal with even in the 1990s. The unemployment figures were twice as large as compared to the national average, both the average income and educational level were significantly lower than the national average, there was a flight of businesses and employment out of the cities, cities were characterised by a unilateral stock of cheap and relatively less attractive housing, and cities were inhabited by large vulnerable groups such as drug addicts and homeless people. Many of these problems clustered in certain neighbourhoods and among ethnic minority groups. A diminished social cohesion in these neighbourhoods put a strain on the social-economic vitality of Dutch cities (Van Putten 2006: 24).

Halfway through the 1990s, national government presented a 'large city policy' (*grotestedenbeleid*) as the successor of the social renewal to counter these problems. Compared to the social renewal, large city policy focused less on social deprivation, but aimed more to economically revitalise neighbourhoods (Tops et al. 1998: 66). In 1994, the national government made appointments with 25 Dutch cities as part of the large city policy. Rotterdam was one of those cities and had translated the large city policy to focus on five areas of about 20,000 to 25,000 inhabitants.<sup>29</sup> Pendrecht fell under one of those areas. Rotterdam then had to hand in proposals for all five areas to be able to fully profit from the large city policy. Within the programme, projects were developed to experiment with the coproduction of policy and thus also with new relations between politicians, civil servants,

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<sup>29</sup> Pendrecht/Wielewaal/Oud-Charlois, Hillesluis, Hoogvliet-Noord, Delfshaven, Oude Noorden.

and society (Tops et al. 1998: 66). The money that the national government had provided for this policy was doubled by the municipalities.

The money from the national government for the large city policy at the end of the 1990s was divided alongside three lines: social, physical (including the successor of the city renewal), and economical (Van de Wijdeven 2012). The attention for neighbourhoods as the place where both social and physical renewal should focus on continued under the cabinets of Prime Minister Balkenende (2002-). Under Balkenende, safety became a more important field of attention and an explicit new field of attention within large city policy (van Putten 2006: 71). However, sectorisation that also existed in connection to the social renewal period proved hard to overcome. Especially in the most recent large city policy period (2005-2009), different departments had contributed to a neighbourhood directed approach with each their own perspective. To name just a few: a physical perspective was maintained with the 56-neighbourhoods approach (*56-wijkenaanpak*) from the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment, a more judicial perspective can be seen in the Justice-in-the-Neighbourhood (*Justitie-In-De-Buurt*) project from the public attorney, and the Our-Neighbourhood-At-Play (*Onze-Buurt-Aan-Zet*) was mainly a contribution to the liveability and safety of neighbourhoods from the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Denters 2008: 59). All projects maintained different conditions and demands regarding local governments.

## 6.5 Short overview

The National government has always been an important advocate for neighbourhood policy mainly by urging local governments to make plans within the frames set up by the national government. The local governments, however, give concrete content to these plans themselves. Over the years, the perspective at both national and Rotterdam levels shifts from a mainly spatial/physical to a more social-economic perspective<sup>30</sup>. However, in the last decade, joint up steering has become one of the largest problems which prevents the formulation of an effective national approach towards all kinds of social problems in some of the most deprived Dutch neighbourhoods. For instance, it has always been challenging to connect the ‘physical renewal’ to the ‘social renewal’ and this connection of the ‘physical’ to the ‘social’ remained difficult during the period of large city policy. By that time, the sectorisation of national government was expressed through the participation of different departments, each with their own problem definitions, goals, ways of working, organisations, and (financial) priorities that affected local governments (see Van de Wijdeven 2012).

## 7 The dependent variable: policy interventions

### 7.1 Rotterdam neighbourhood policy 1998-2002

‘The left won in Rotterdam’, was pretty much the summary of most newspapers covering the Rotterdam municipal election of 1998. The electoral success of the Liberal Party that has been hitherto doing well nationally was less than expected. The Labour Party took the lead in forming a new political coalition and board that should focus more on ‘leftist’ themes, such as more jobs, a powerful neighbourhood approach, and strong social policy regarding poverty, young people, and living together (Trouw 3/4/1998; NRC 2/4/1998).

Even though the ‘neighbourhood approach’ was only one of the twelve programmes for the period 1998-2002, the large amount of money directed to it, as well as the prominent place

<sup>30</sup> From 2002 onwards, this also includes safety.



within the social ‘pillar’ of the board<sup>31</sup>, indicated its priority. The neighbourhood approach was supposed to improve the neighbourhoods or as a flyer called it: ‘strengthen the economy and social cohesion and the improvement of neighbourhoods and living environment’ (Hendriks and Tops 2001).

The board included the national government’s large city policy in this approach. For the large city policy, the national government directed the funds according to three ‘pillars’: social, physical, and economical, and every municipality had to write development programmes (*meerjarenontwikkelingsprogramma’s*) and city covenants (*stadsconvenanten*) on how they were planning to spend the money (Cristhophe et al. 2001: 14). The neighbourhood approach was also funded by money from the urban renewal, the municipality itself, and by European money, especially the D2-funds. A municipal bureau called Bureau Urban Vision (*bureau Stedelijke Visie*) controls all funds. In total, there were about 140 million Euros available for the neighbourhood approach for the period 2000-2004. About 23 million Euros was to be spent in the area of which Pendrecht was part (Cristhophe et al. 2001: 15).

The entire neighbourhood approach was led by political coordination from the municipal board and by a programme leader (*programmaleider*) from the civil service. In every neighbourhood approach area, implementation plans were made to combine the social, economic, and physical investments, and to guide not only the municipal input, but also the efforts from societal organisations. Each of the areas was coordinated by an area manager (*gebiedsmanager*) with three coordinators below him, one for each pillar. Each area also had a political steering group (*stuurgroep*) consisting of an aldermen and the district chairman (Cristhophe et al. 2001: 15).

Researchers who have examined the neighbourhood approach were critical of the process. They noted that the neighbourhood approach was mainly a bureaucratic process, and that results at the neighbourhood level were sometimes minimal. The approach dealt with organisational obstacles but the participants regarded it as an ‘organisational monstrosity’, ‘not transparent’, and ‘bureaucratic’ (Hendriks and Tops 2001: 48).

The neighbourhood approach is characterised by an over complex governing structure ... More than one captain is steering the same ship ... Complexity and ‘ropy’ do not have to imply disqualifications ... In this aspect it however has to be noted that the ... neighbourhood approach is a ropy model without societal involvement (Hendriks and Tops 2001: 47-49).

The neighbourhood approach was also an effort to move towards integral policy for the neighbourhoods. However, regarding the municipal services in particular, the achievements were far from optimal.

Activities and efforts within the neighbourhood approach are a subordinated current inside these services; their much more encompassing year plans and regular budgets turn out hard to adjust; the so called ‘change agents’ – employed to contribute to tilt these services, to realise more consumer-directed and neighbourhood directed policy – are too much on their own in this incredible challenge (Hendriks and Tops 2001: 23).

It seemed that instead of a horizontal integral approach, the neighbourhood approach was characterised by a vertical one. Instead of combining different policy sectors into one approach<sup>32</sup>, the neighbourhood approach was vertically integral in the sense that the municipality wanted to control exactly what happened in the neighbourhoods instead of leaving room for the neighbourhoods themselves (see Cristhophe et al. 2001: 29-30).

<sup>31</sup> Next to the physical pillar which is led by another alderman

<sup>32</sup> To take note that apart from the neighbourhood approach, there were still eleven other policy programmes from the board

The municipality has also been critical of its approach. It had regarded the neighbourhood approach as 'difficult', 'large in size', and noted that 'organisational questions and bureaucracy has taken much time' (City of Rotterdam 2002a: 17). There was dissatisfaction in the municipal council. Councilmen were especially negative about the large number of plans which lacked focus and the lack of an adequate safety approach (notes of the municipal council meeting 24 January 2002).

At about the same time, the civil service presented a report called 'Implement and Speed Up' (*Uitvoeren en Versnellen*) under the supervision of the city manager. The report was meant to be an advice for a new board. It indicated that the new board should aim at a limited number of themes. It should focus and should give priority to implementation. The new board risked stepping onto the tracks of a 'speeding train', so it should focus on achieving results. Moreover, a lack of money should be the second reason to focus. Safety was mentioned as one of the issues to focus on, next to social-economical structure, youth and education, as well as urban redevelopment.

## 7.2 Rotterdam neighbourhood policy 2002-2006

Rotterdam experienced a political turnover in 2002 when a new party, Liveable Rotterdam (*Leefbaar Rotterdam*), won the municipal council election with almost 35% of the votes. Liveable Rotterdam was led by Pim Fortuyn who had already been nationally known as an outsider who was challenging the national government in the national elections of May 2002. His national electorate had been growing when he had announced that he would also lead Liveable Rotterdam for the municipal council election. Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam emphasised on subjects such as safety and immigrants. In his first speech, Fortuyn said: 'We lead the wrong lists. Rotterdam is the New York of the Netherlands before Guilliani. We have the highest crime rate and the most unsolved murders' (RD 20/1/2002). Fortuyn combined this message with a sharp distinction of himself from all those 'other politicians', especially those from the Labour Party that, in his eyes, had caused the problems in the first place: 'Liveable Rotterdam should break with the governing (regent) culture of the Labour Party. The Labour Party should be in opposition' (RD 20/1/2002).

The large number of votes for Liveable Rotterdam was generally interpreted as a sign that things were not going well and Rotterdam politics had drifted from the views of 'ordinary citizens', especially those in the more deprived neighbourhoods. However, the research of the Rotterdam research agency COS showed there was no clear connection between the number of votes for Liveable Rotterdam and the level of prosperity of a neighbourhood ( $R^2 = 0.17$ ). There was also no connection between the number of Liveable Rotterdam votes in a particular neighbourhood and the number of people from a non-Dutch background in that neighbourhood ( $R^2 = 0.25$ ) or even with former voters for extreme right parties (COS 2002). Liveable Rotterdam had gained votes everywhere. The new political coalition and board which Liveable Rotterdam was part of interpreted the election results as a need to connect more with the wishes of citizens. It considered its programme that highlighted safety policy as the main priority, as representing the 'wishes of a large majority of the population' and the board wanted to achieve a situation in which 'there are no more unsafe neighbourhood and spaces anymore, the neighbourhoods that are reasonably safe at the moment minimally will remain so' (City of Rotterdam 2002b: 5, 11; for more on the Liveable Rotterdam changes: Van Ostaaijen 2010).

Overnight, the new board almost abolished the neighbourhood approach from the previous board and installed a neighbourhood *safety* approach. According to the new approach, the city districts would be the main coordinators of the neighbourhood safety approach. The districts would have to write 'neighbourhood safety action programmes' (*wijkveiligheidsactieprogramma's*) for all of their neighbourhoods (about sixty in total).

These programmes should contain agreements with municipal services and other partners such as the police, district attorney, and non-governmental organisations, on how to deal with their neighbourhood safety problems. Within the organisation, there were several stakeholders that had regretted the loss of the neighbourhood approach; others saw opportunities in the new focus.

Yes, and it was possible to stand on another leg quickly. Within this service there are of course a lot of people who like to accomplish things. If the one thing is not allowed and there is something else equally enjoyable, then, we will do that (personal interview with civil servant).

The safety approach however did not drop from the sky in 2002. It was based on efforts from the mayor who, prior to 2002, had worked on an 'integral safety approach' as he found safety policy 'lacking of concreteness' and resembling a 'project carousel', containing many efforts and projects but no overall coordination (personal interview). He had asked an external advisor to develop a safety programme. The board and municipal council approved this plan just before the 2002 election. After the election, the new political coalition of which Liveable Rotterdam was part continued that plan as a starting point for a more intense safety approach and redirected much money towards it. Other programmes then became of minor importance. The organisation was also involved in some of the new political coalition and board's plans. The Safety Bureau, a bureau previously responsible for the 'project carousel', was then involved in the new safety approach and coordinated the writing of the safety chapter in the board programme. It met with representatives from the bureaucracy and government to write the 18 (later 19) targets (Tops and Van Ostaaijen 2006; Tops 2007). The other chapters also relied on inputs from the organisation. This ensured a somewhat broad(er) commitment of the plans.

The board made money available to implement the safety approach. Already before 2002, the municipal board decided to reserve a total of 30 million Euros. In 2002 however, the major part of the budget shifted towards safety measures. The total budget available for new priorities was 184 million Euros of which 100 million Euros would be spent on safety measures.<sup>33</sup> A more detailed look showed that 'neighbourhoods and hot spots' had received 30 million, 'public transport' 26 million, 'extra capacity city supervision' 16 million, 'care and safety' 12 million, 'clean and intact' 8 million, and 'public order and safety' 6 million (city of Rotterdam 2002b). According to the board, this money was allocated by stopping other priorities, such as the neighbourhood approach. Most of that money was controlled by the Safety Bureau. The safety manager commented:

I am all of a sudden dressed up to be the most important man within the organisation. [I am] priority number one and take away 60% of the money to implement my programme. This leads to: 1) A lot of people are upset they have not gotten anything, and 2) Some people look at me as 'you have money, and I need money'. Both categories of people ask themselves the same question: 'is he going to make it?' That is the underlying current you feel (safety manager).

The safety discourse added some sharpness to the organisation. Safety policy then became the most important priority. It affected other themes such as social, physical, and economical policy. Several civil services noted the new priority themselves. For physical services (City Development and Urban Planning and Housing), it for instance meant that not only financial

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<sup>33</sup> When looking at Rotterdam's 4.5 billion Euro budget, the millions for the board's priorities seemed rather small, but most of this money has been already reserved. Taking the 2006 budget as reference, the largest expenses were reserved for social affairs and societal service provision (1.3 billion), resources and ICT (0.73 billion), neighbourhoods and public space (0.62 billion), education and youth (0.43 billion), physical infrastructure (0.28 billion), and traffic and transportation (0.28 billion).

arguments were valid in the buying and selling of property, but safety arguments should also be taken into account as well, even if this sometimes counteracted economic logic (Tops 2007).

There were several arrangements between 2002 and 2006 to make the approach towards the deprived neighbourhoods more thorough and integral. Hot spots were certain areas that had been labelled as problematic. Nine hot spots had been appointed for improvement under the 2002-2006 board. This meant a strong safety approach combined with a social and physical approach. For example, in four hot spots on the agenda for 2003, 450 dwellings were inspected, the municipality purchased 277, 335 were improved, and 67 were demolished. Extra supervisors, camera supervision, and also many measures to improve the social cohesion completed the approach. Safety also caught on with some service directors. During the development of the board plans in 2002, the idea had emerged that several municipal services would each adopt a certain area within the city for which it would be responsible. This idea was eventually dismissed, but did lead to a continuation of contacts between some municipal service directors who had united around the board's new safety priority. Also, representatives of the police and district attorney had participated. The establishment of these contacts quickly led to a bi-weekly meeting to achieve a more integrated approach between the services.

The new neighbourhood (safety) approach was implemented with great vigour. The new discourse was aimed at action. This was also expressed in the vocabulary used by the board. Words such as policy and vision were preferred not to be used. Also regarding safety, this became apparent. There was no safety policy, but a safety approach, no Five Year Programme, but a Five Year Action Programme, no neighbourhood vision, but neighbourhood action programmes, no neighbourhood director, but a city manager, no goals, but targets, no neighbourhood teams, but intervention teams. All seemed to be more firm and directed towards action (Tops and Van Ostaaijen 2006).

### 7.3 2003-2004: Sharpening neighbourhood policy

In 2003, Rotterdam research agency COS released a report that predicted that in 2017, the overwhelming majority of people in certain Rotterdam areas would be people with a non-Dutch background (COS 2003). A district alderman from the Labour Party in Charlois (to which Pendrecht and Tarwewijk belong) used the report to publicly address the social-economical problems in his district and strongly opted for a more equal division of social deprived people in the city. This led to a discussion in the local and national media about the level of problems in certain districts and to consider stopping the immigration of such groups in certain neighbourhoods in order to alleviate poverty. The discussion also highlighted an ethnic dimension when it was argued that most people in those neighbourhoods were of non-Dutch origin.

According to an alderman from Liveable Rotterdam, the COS report and discussion came at a convenient moment. When the report was discussed in the board, the remarks from an experienced alderman that this report did not contain any new information were being put aside. The Liveable Rotterdam alderman used it to inject more 'ideology' (his words) into the more 'neutral' board programme. This led to a report called 'Rotterdam Presses On. The way to a balanced city' (*Rotterdam Zet Door. Op weg naar een stad in balans*) which was released in December 2003. In this report, it was noted that 'colour is not the problem, but the problem (often) has a colour' (City of Rotterdam 2003). The report contained proposals combining measures regarding migration, settlement, and integration. Some of the measures stirred up some controversy, especially the demand that in order to settle in certain Rotterdam neighbourhoods, a person should earn 120% of the minimum wage. The report was partly an agenda addressed to the national government and it did react sympathetically and fast in turn.

It made a national law that became operational on 1st January 2006. Outside and especially inside Rotterdam, this law was known as the 'Rotterdam Law' (*Rotterdamwet*). Among other things, the law made it possible to raise or lower taxes for businesses, to close buildings that harboured people who would cause nuisance, and to demand that newcomers in certain neighbourhoods to have 'income out of work'. It was also possible to demand (with approval from the national government) a 120% income requirement in some neighbourhoods, which Rotterdam consequently did. According to an observer, Rotterdam was treading a new path compared to not only earlier periods, but also when compared to other municipalities, as Rotterdam now 'considers its demographic situation a problem and wants to make changes in it' (Van Praag 2004: 71).

#### 7.4 Rotterdam neighbourhood policy 2006-2008

In 2006, the Labour Party won the election again and replaced Liveable Rotterdam in the municipal board. The new board maintained the attention for safety and also the 'Rotterdam Presses On' programme. All districts should still (re-)write neighbourhood safety programmes. The board however wanted to add this with more focus for social measures. This meant that neighbourhoods now should also write neighbourhood (social) programmes. This had broadened the focus (again). At the municipal level, this led to some adjustment problems, especially between the new ambitious social programme and the already functioning safety programme. For instance, questions about which programme would pay for what emerged, as many neighbourhood problems were related to both 'safety' and 'social' (for instance drug addicts and youth nuisance). The social programme also struggled with organisational setbacks in the first few starting years, making results on the neighbourhood level limited (see Van Ostaaijen 2010).

#### 7.5 Rotterdam neighbourhood policy in Pendrecht, Tarwewijk, and Afrikaanderwijk

City renewal started in Pendrecht in 1995 (KEI 2007). The malfunctioning of the shopping centres and the deprivation of the housing stock had led to the Neighbourhood Vision Pendrecht (*Wijkvisie Pendrecht*). The restructuring started in the north of Pendrecht and between 1995 and 2004, approximately 750 dwelling were renovated. The renovation of Pendrecht's south side began in 2005. This restructuring process was supposed to last until 2010 and should diminish the number of rental homes and increase home ownership in Pendrecht (Van Bergeijk et al. 2008: 47).

The district of Charlois of which Pendrecht and the Tarwewijk are part was also included in the neighbourhood approach that was implemented by the 1998-2002 board. The investments in Charlois focused on social (prosperity and liveability), economical (employment and economy), and physical measures (housing stock and living environment).

In 2002, Pendrecht was affected by the city's new safety approach. Neighbourhood safety was then for Pendrecht as well as Tarwewijk and Afrikaanderwijk the most important priority. The district received more money to act on safety and had to write a neighbourhood safety action programmes. Perhaps more noteworthy was that some districts had appointed a city marine. The idea and name of a city marine are derived from the military where the best men are placed in the front line. The city marines are civil servants with a large budget. They work on 'street level' to solve implementation and coordination problems regarding safety and are directly held accountable by the board of mayor and aldermen and the mayor. The main responsibility for a city marine is to improve the neighbourhood's grade on the safety index, a municipal indicator that calculates the safety development in each neighbourhood according to quantitative (municipal and police) and qualitative (data and surveys) data. According to the index, Pendrecht had improved from a 4.3 in 2003 to a 5.4 in 2007 (on a ten-point scale),

Tarwewijk from a 3.5 in 2004 to a 4.6 in 2007, and Afrikaanderwijk from a 4.6 in 2004 to a 5.7 in 2007 (safety indexes from 2004 and 2008).

When ‘Rotterdam Presses On’ appeared, partly following a discussion started in Charlois and Pendrecht, Pendrecht became the pilot area for its implementation and hence, ‘Pendrecht Presses On’ was introduced. To coordinate ‘Pendrecht Presses On’, the municipality and the district appointed an area manager (*gebiedsmanager*) to coordinate this programme. The area manager formulated an implementation programme that combined measures regarding social policy, building and housing, public spaces, safety, and economy. The programme was then evaluated and adjusted in 2007 (Van Beek, Bijl-Rodenburg 2008: 44, 47). Following the tone of the ‘Rotterdam Presses On’ programme, the housing corporation, *Nieuwe Unie*, devised conditions for new citizens in a certain part of Pendrecht. New tenants should have a job for at least a year, should not have a large family, and should not have caused nuisance in their previous neighbourhoods (Van Beek and Bijl-Rodenburg 2008: 45-46).

There were several actors that had been important in the implementation of the Pendrecht programme (Van Beek and Bijl-Rodenburg 2008: 43-44):

- The municipality of Rotterdam: mainly the board of mayor and aldermen that is directly responsible for the municipal services, but also for making municipal policy.
- The district of Charlois, to which Pendrecht belongs, that makes policy for its neighbourhoods and directs the municipal services to implement that policy.
- The housing corporation *Nieuwe Unie* that owns most of the houses in Pendrecht.
- The ‘Neighbourhood Development Organisation’ (*Wijkontwikkelingsmaatschappij*), a ‘business’ that is responsible for the main shopping square and its improvement in Pendrecht.
- The neighbourhood association and welfare organisations that functions (or should function) as access to the citizens.

To implement the programme, the area manager established an organisational structure. First of all, there was a steering group (*stuurgroep*) that ‘takes decisions, controls and sets the borders’. This steering group consisted of a district alderman, the head of the district department for neighbourhood affairs, directors of the involved housing corporations, the city marine, the programme manager for the South Pact initiative<sup>34</sup> and the area manager. Next to the steering group, there was a programme group (*programmagroep*) in place that functioned as a link between the steering group and the implementation level. This programme group met about once a month and consisted – apart from the area manager and a welfare worker taking place on behalf of citizens – of representatives from the organisations involved in the programme’s implementation. Each of the following led one of the sub programmes (Van Beek and Bijl-Rodenburg 2008: 43):

- The neighbourhood coordinator (*wijkcoördinator*) from the district headed the social programme (healthcare, youth, and integration/participation).
- The process manager from the housing corporation headed the building and housing programme (renovation, demolition, and construction of new houses).
- A coordinator from the district (*beheercoördinator*) headed the programme to keep public spaces clean and intact.
- A district neighbourhood safety coordinator in cooperation with the city marine headed the safety programme.
- The director of the Neighbourhood Development Organisation headed the economic programme (Central Square and shops).

<sup>34</sup> This was one of the new board’s initiatives connected to the emerging social programme.

According to the area manager, the good thing about this personal network was that everyone kept each other alerted and ensured that no one would break agreements (Van Bergeijk et al. 2008: 80). There were however some downsides too. According to the area manager, the structure was sometimes quite rigid. It was, for instance, not always easy to adequately react to projects or opportunities that came along. National initiatives such as the Social Conquest (*Sociale Herovering*) from the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the idea for powerful neighbourhoods (*krachtwijken*) from the Minister of Housing, Neighbourhoods, and Integration (Van Beek and Bijl-Rodenburg 2008: 45) are a few examples.

The area manager noted that the group sometimes maintained a 'post stamp approach' that resulted in the lack of a common future vision for the entire Pendrecht area (Van Beek and Bijl-Rodenburg 2008: 46). Sometimes different views clashed explicitly. For instance, the view of the housing corporation to build new apartments in a certain part of Pendrecht did not coincide well with the municipality's view (Van Beek and Bijl-Rodenburg 2008: 46). As the national government directed several funds directly to the housing corporations, the municipality had a harder time ignoring the position of the housing corporation, even though the view of the municipality had 'won' (Van Bergeijk et al. 2008: 70) in this particular case.

The area manager has shared encounters where views sometimes differed even more apparently. The city marine for instance, has the responsibility to make Pendrecht perform better on the safety index scale. The mayor holds him directly accountable for this goal and monitors the process in the neighbourhoods carefully. In the end, despite negotiation, the city marine still has to accept the main responsibility of ensuring Pendrecht's safety level. Other than city marines, other actors have also experienced similar dilemmas.

I see people are in for new ideas. But then it goes wrong in the implementation. It encounters those kind of standard procedures and then you see ideas bleeding to death (Van Bergeijk et al. 2008: 75).

The other problem was that the people working in Pendrecht sometimes clashed with their own organisation. For instance, within the housing corporation, there was a 'development' department. According to the area manager, the main goal for this department was to make money. In order to suit its purpose, it would re-arrange the planning that the housing corporation's representative has made at the negotiation table with his partners from other organisations, such as the district or the police (Van Bergeijk et al. 2008: 78-79).

The largest gain is not achieved by more money. That is not the problem. The problem especially in a large city such as Rotterdam is that the municipal services, but also the districts, are too much sectoralised isles. The districts ... think they are small and stupid. And the municipal services do everything they can to rub that in. They position themselves very arrogantly ... That is actually the largest problem I encounter. It is too much sectoralised (Pendrecht area manager in Van Bergeijk et al. 2008: 74).

Pendrecht's neighbourhood approach in the end was very much dependent on people. The area manager was clearly the link in the neighbourhood's (semi-)governmental network and was responsible for the total programme (Van Beek and Bijl-Rodenburg 2008: 47). Whenever there is a turnover of personnel, this could often have a strong effect on the neighbourhood programme. For instance, when one of the housing corporations experienced a change in the board of directors, this made the housing corporation much more involved in the social aspects of the neighbourhood (Van Beek and Bijl-Rodenburg 2008: 48), although it had also seemed like a national trend. From this perspective, it was not a good sign that out of the total number of people who had worked on the Pendrecht approach in 2005, only two were left in 2008 (Van Beek and Bijl-Rodenburg 2008: 46).

The neighbourhood Tarwewijk falls under the same district as Pendrecht. It was also in Tarwewijk that both the city's safety approach in 2002 as well as the report 'Rotterdam Presses On' seemed to have taken effect. The district and its alderman, Schrijer, were in favour of an approach that would be in line with what the new 'Liveable Rotterdam board' advocated and this could be labelled a 'social conquest' (*sociale herovering*) (Engbersen et al. 2005: 92). The safety approach was rolled out in the districts and the districts' neighbourhoods. Initiatives such as the city marines, intervention teams, and the hot spot approach were all implemented in the neighbourhoods. The city marine in Charlois took charge of the entire district and appointed 'neighbourhood concierges' (*buurtconcierges*) for the neighbourhoods, mainly to deal with the physical aspect of it. The concierge not only checks the quality of the sidewalk, back yards, and trash cans, but also functions as someone whom the people in the neighbourhood can go to, especially if they have problems. He would guide these people towards to the right institutions (Engbersen et al. 2005: 93).

On a larger scale, other forms of cooperation have emerged too. The efforts to integrate the national government's 'Large city policy' in the neighbourhoods already emphasised the importance of this approach and in Tarwewijk, the connection between the physical and social policy themes has been increasingly stressed upon. In Tarwewijk, there is the Neighbourhood Development Organisation (*Wijkontwikkelingsmaatschappij Tarwewijk*), which exists out of the municipal service City Development, the housing corporation *De Nieuwe Unie*, but also a project developer. Private partners (excluding the housing corporations) are not involved in these kinds of neighbourhood projects (Engbersen et al. 2005).

Afrikaanderwijk is not part of the district Charlois, but belongs to the district of Feijenoord. Nevertheless, several forms of cooperation were also visible here. At the turn of the century, three possible development perspectives (*ontwikkelingsperspectieven*) highlighting a neighbourhood vision for Afrikaanderwijk were presented. The emphasis in this vision was on spatial development. Several partners had been consulted for this vision. Geurtz had analysed the relevant actors for this neighbourhood and sorted them into four categories: housing corporations, the municipality, schools/arts, and citizens/entrepreneurs, but noted that the first two are the most important (Geurtz 2006). There are two large housing corporations active in the neighbourhood. The most important is *Vestia*. In 2006, this corporation owned over 90% of the housing stock in Afrikaanderwijk. The other corporation is *Stadswonen*, a relatively small player. The municipality is in several ways connected to what goes on in Afrikaanderwijk. The main municipal players are the services of City Development (*Ontwikkelingsbedrijf*) and Urban Planning and Housing (*Stedenbouw en Volkshuisvesting*). The district is also involved.

Compared to Pendrecht, there has been no such thing as a project group at the neighbourhood level to coordinate all efforts within this neighbourhood. On a project basis however, there has been contact between the different actors or individuals involved. In some projects, a municipal service or the district took the lead whereas at other times the housing corporation did so (Geurtz 2006: 77). According to the housing corporation *Vestia*, the relationship with the municipality is 'good', but the district noted that cooperation would sometimes be difficult. There is also a neighbourhood director (*wijkregisseur*) that maintains many contacts in the neighbourhood, mainly regarding the aims of 'clean, intact, and safe' (Geurtz 2006: 79).



**Table 11: Projects and the actors involved in Tarwewijk (Geurtz 2006: 72)**

Plan	Content	Actors involved
Dining Neighbourhood	Turn the neighbourhood into a neighbourhood which contains many restaurants	Housing corporation, City Development, district
Public Space Projects	Several projects aimed at improving and maintaining public space	Most often the housing corporation, sometimes connecting to citizens or municipal services
Opportunity Zones	Economic revitalisation of the neighbourhood	City Development and individual entrepreneurs
Renovation <i>Pretoriaalaan</i>	Buying, renovating, and combining dwellings	Housing corporation, district, City Development
Central Market	Renovation	Urban Planning and Housing, City Development, district, housing corporation

## 8 Resource availability

Most financial resources for local governments (about 83%) are provided by the national government. The amount of independent income is limited. In recent years, housing corporations and their resources – money as well as dwellings – also have contributed much to the uplifting of neighbourhoods.

See also:

‘Legacies of earlier Dutch and Rotterdam neighbourhood policy’

‘The local structure of politics and government’

## 9 Institutional structure of intergovernmental supports

The national government has been historically strongly involved in neighbourhood policy by formulating national programmes targeted at Dutch neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, there is local discrepancy. Rotterdam’s local government translates national programmes into local policy mainly through the board and instigates local programmes aimed at the neighbourhood themselves.

See also:

‘Legacies of earlier Dutch and Rotterdam neighbourhood policy’

‘The local structure of politics and government’

## 10 Mapping of potential major players

In neighbourhood policy, most actors at the neighbourhood level are mainly public organisations or bodies, such as representatives of the board of mayor and aldermen, the district board, and several municipal services, apart from housing corporations. The way these

networks operate and what they can achieve depend strongly on the individuals that are part of them and their relationships.

See also:

‘Legacies of earlier Dutch and Rotterdam neighbourhood policy’

‘The local structure of politics and government’

‘The dependent variable: policy interventions’

However, one role that has not yet been given sufficient attention to is the role of citizens. The section below discusses the role of citizens, primarily in Pendrecht.

### 10.1 Incidents and citizens’ initiatives in Pendrecht 2003-2008

It has been hard to involve many Pendrecht citizens in government initiatives. This has been apparent, for instance, with the plans for Pendrecht’s restructuring. Also, the ‘People Make the City’ initiative (somewhat connected to *Opzoomer-ing*) had little effect in Pendrecht as many people showed no real desire to communicate with each other. For some of the newer inhabitants who earned double incomes, they would merely like to live there because it was cheap and therefore, they did not want to invest too much in the neighbourhood itself (Van Bergeijk et al. 2008: 162). However, there are also in Pendrecht some citizens who possessed the energy and willingness to contribute to the neighbourhood. Unfortunately, these actions arose due to some unfortunate incidents in the neighbourhood.

In February 2003, 13-year old Seder Soares was killed by gunshot after throwing a snowball at the (later to be) killer. Whether the snowball was truly the reason for the killing or perhaps Seder had accidentally stumbled into a gang fight which then triggered the killing has never been confirmed. This episode nevertheless had engendered mass media attention for the neighbourhood, as well as silent marches and remembrance ceremonies. Media interviews with Pendrecht inhabitants had brought up other issues such as shooting incidents, sexual assaults, dealers, drugs, and other forms of criminality that reinforced the negative image of Pendrecht. One month after the killing, Pendrecht’s last doctors quit their practice. One of them wrote ‘I will become a doctor in a neighbourhood where no bullets fly around and where there is no dealing right beneath my window’. The last incident is the already reported discussion, in which Pendrecht is taken as local and national example, for the influx of people of low prosperity in several Rotterdam neighbourhoods (see ‘2003-2004: Sharpening neighbourhood policy’).

Several Pendrecht citizens were tired of the negative reputation that their neighbourhood had garnered. A district alderman had thus taken action by approaching researchers from Tilburg University, of which Eefke Cornelissen was one (see foot note 18), who then started to talk to some of the citizens. This was the start of a citizens’ initiative which would later be referred to as ‘Vital Pendrecht’ (*Vitaal Pendrecht*). In one of these talks, it was apparent that some of the inhabitants were unhappy because of the negative media attention. ‘We won’t let the press destroy our neighbourhood!’ was the common opinion. During one of the follow up meetings, an idea had emerged to put up a Christmas tree in the central Pendrecht square. The idea was to make this tree one metre higher than the Christmas tree in front of Rotterdam City Hall. This immediately gathered strong appeal and three citizens took the initiative to organise this. They succeeded in mobilising many others in the neighbourhood and did not have a problem finding sponsors to support this idea. Table 12 shows a list of organisations that the three citizens were able to mobilise at the beginning of the initiative.

**Table 12: People and/or institutions that support the ‘Vital Pendrecht’ initiative (based on unpublished work of Eefke Cornelissen)**

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• District of Charlois</li> <li>• Several primary schools</li> <li>• ‘Home on the Street’ project (TOS)</li> <li>• ‘Educative Garden’</li> <li>• The library</li> <li>• Individual artists</li> <li>• Hindu Dance Group</li> <li>• Several playgrounds</li> <li>• Charlois Welfare</li> <li>• Neighbourhood police</li> <li>• Home Care Foundation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pendrecht Shopping Association</li> <li>• Scouting</li> <li>• Park ranger</li> <li>• Neighbourhood committees</li> <li>• The church</li> <li>• Retirement Group (<i>ouderengroep</i>)</li> <li>• Theater Group</li> <li>• Garden Centre</li> <li>• The association of entrepreneurs</li> <li>• Mothers Group</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Day care for mentally disabled</li> <li>• The catholic church</li> <li>• <i>Jeu de boules</i> club</li> <li>• Music brass band</li> <li>• Turkish dance group</li> <li>• Rotterdam Neighbourhood Theater</li> <li>• Neighbourhood Maintenance</li> <li>• City Supervision</li> <li>• <i>Opzoomer Mee</i></li> <li>• Religious choir</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Turkish House</li> <li>• Neighbourhood Centre <i>Middelburgt</i></li> <li>• Youth for Christ</li> <li>• ‘Historical Charlois’</li> <li>• Theatre Sport association ‘Seize the Day’</li> <li>• Fire Department</li> <li>• Centre for visual art</li> <li>• Salvation Army</li> <li>• The mosque</li> </ul>
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It is essential to highlight the crucial help of the district alderman. For instance, the organisers forgot to apply for a license to put up a Christmas tree in the square in the midst of their excitement. The alderman promised and did manage to take care of this.

The Christmas tree is a reason to do something. Even the Turkish people want to cooperate. Well, they do not even celebrate Christmas ... But everyone just wants to show: here we are! The Christmas tree functions as a symbol for this (Cornelissen, unpublished notes).

There were a lot of activities organised for the Christmas evening. The district alderman dressed up as Santa Claus and even the mayor arrived for a short visit. In the end, although the three residents knew that their initiative did not change everything, they nevertheless felt that safety in the neighbourhood had improved. No doubt the media also did not stop their negative coverage of the neighbourhood all of a sudden, but now it was established that any unfavourable reports on the neighbourhood would trigger a reaction from the residents. It was emphasised that everyone should realise the ‘old times’ would never come back. Pendrecht is and will remain as a predominantly non-Dutch neighbourhood. The difficulty in getting different groups to come together to do things remained a problem. Vital Pendrecht was then regarded as a small, but significant initiative to change this.

After the Christmas celebration, Vital Pendrecht then became an informal organisation that would be organising neighbourhood activities in the years to come. One of these initiatives was the Pendrecht University (*Pendrecht Universiteit*) idea in which professionals (for example from the municipality or the district) were invited to take lessons from the neighbourhood residents. The underlying idea was that the residents and not the professionals are the real experts of the neighbourhood after all, and they know better what is in their as well as their neighbourhood’s best interest ([www.vitaalpendrecht.nl](http://www.vitaalpendrecht.nl)).

The active participation from residents in their neighbourhood either to engage with the local government or to do things independently has been recurring on several occasions in the entire city. During the turn of the century, several citizens had openly complained about the level of safety. The Chinese population complained about street robbery in the centre and citizens who were annoyed with the municipality’s drug policy had ‘occupied’ city hall for a short amount of time (Lootsma 2003). In 2001, 20,000 citizens expressed through a post card

action towards the municipal council that they were tired of the deprivation in their neighbourhoods (AD 28/11/2001). Some citizens who were already connected to neighbourhood organisations contacted each other to address safety problems which affected them. They found out that problems of street robberies, burglaries, and in general feelings of insecurity were widespread and they decided to write a petition to express strong feelings of discomfort about the way the city government and police had been handling safety issues. In March 2001, representatives from sixty Rotterdam neighbourhood organisations from all over the city (later turning into the 'Cooperation of Rotterdam Neighbourhood Associations', CRNA) offered this petition to the mayor. The representatives called on all political parties in the municipal council, the municipal board, the chief of police, the district attorney, and the district chairmen to cooperate with citizens to deal with the increasingly growing problem of crime (interview with former chairman of the CRNA).

The safety situation in Rotterdam is bad. Citizens feel threatened and businesses are worried. With its current strength and management, the police are not able to guarantee an acceptable level of safety. It is also not being put in a position to do so. Municipal government is passive and reacts to urgent calls in soothing announcements, showing powerlessness and meekness. The political parties, some exceptions excluded, give the impression of indifference in regard to the problem of safety (text of the petition 2001).

## 11 Political and governance relationships: Cleavages, coalitions, and alignments

The neighbourhood has been historically the place where (representatives of) mainly public institutions or bodies meet. Sometimes it is to articulate a neighbourhood vision, sometimes it is because the neighbourhood is a small area and policy interventions should be adjusted to each other there. On the neighbourhood level, most representatives of these institutions know and can contact each other. However, a quick change in personnel or less support of the institutions behind the representatives is the largest threat to the formulation of an adequate integral approach at the neighbourhood level.

See also:

V. The dependent variable: policy interventions

## 12 Understanding of the problem

In Rotterdam, the urban problems have historically been interpreted in terms of poverty, unemployment, and social deprivation. After the turn of the century and the advent of Liveable Rotterdam and Pim Fortuyn, the problems became interpreted as safety problems and problems regarding the 'liveability' in a neighbourhood, for instance, nuisance (Engbersen et al. 2005: 68).

See also:

II. Legacies of earlier Dutch and Rotterdam neighbourhood policy

V. The dependent variable: policy interventions

## 13 Explaining and interpreting neighbourhood intervention

See the comments at the beginning of this document for some first explanations and 'the dependent variable: policy interventions' for the role of Liveable Rotterdam in 2002.

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# Zurich Case Study Report

*Céline Widmer and Daniel Kübler*

## 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

### 1.1 Why study neighbourhoods? A Zurich Perspective


In Swiss urban neighbourhoods, the concentration of socio-economic problems is not as severe as in other European cities. Therefore, neighbourhood regeneration is hardly ever a topic for the national government. Nevertheless, distressed neighbourhoods are an issue at the local level in some cities, especially in Zurich. Although the city government boasts about having one of the best rankings for quality of life according to an international study (see City of Zurich 2008), significant disparities occur between Zurich's neighbourhoods and some of them are certainly socially and economically deprived as compared with other neighbourhoods within the city. In 1998, the newly elected city government, dominated by a social-liberal coalition, defined the improvement of quality of life in distressed neighbourhoods as an official legislative focal point. From 1998 until 2006, neighbourhood regeneration – understood as a broad array of policies to improve the quality of life – has been an important theme of Zurich's urban development policy.

The city of Zurich is divided into 12 districts (see Figure 1). These districts cover the historic neighbourhood structure and are divided into 34 statistical quarters. There is no coherent definition of “neighbourhood” for policy purposes. Sometimes “neighbourhood” refers to a statistical quarter and sometimes to an urban district. The term “Quartier” is very popular in the German-speaking discourse on urban development and is used both for administrative denotations like quarter or district and as a synonym for the English terms “community” and “neighbourhood” (Schnur 2008: 34-35).

Socio-spatial inequalities do exist in Zurich but social distress is certainly less severe than in other European cities. Nevertheless, one of the main focuses of the city government of Zurich during the last ten years has been to improve the quality of life in urban neighbourhoods. It seems to be appropriate to study Zurich's neighbourhood regeneration policy in order to understand why Zurich has followed a European trend in urban development policy. This case study analyses the particularities of Zurich's experience in neighbourhood development policy and provides new insight into the politics of regenerating urban neighbourhoods from a Swiss perspective. We analysed official and nonofficial documents concerning neighbourhood regeneration strategies, specific policy interventions, programme reports, project evaluation, and newspaper articles. Moreover, we conducted eight semi-structured interviews with members of neighbourhood and commerce associations, with representatives of the Office for Urban Development, the Department of Social Services and the Police Department, as well as and with a member of the city parliament and an external expert on urban development (interviews are listed in Table 8 in the Appendix, for the organisation of the Zurich city administration see chapter 6).

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<sup>1</sup> This case study report includes information as per January 2010.

**Figure 1: Zurich districts and quarters**

Source: GIS-Zentrum City of Zurich

## 1.2 Case selection

For the Zurich case study, we selected two neighbourhoods with a high level of poverty: *Langstrasse* and *Schwamendingen*. The *Langstrasse* neighbourhood is part of Zurich's district 4, known as *Aussersihl*. *Schwamendingen* is the name of district 12 and consists of three statistical quarters Saatlen, Schwamendingen Mitte, and Hirzenbach (see Figure 1, highlighted areas). The city of Zurich has a total of about 370,000 inhabitants; there are about 30,000 people living in Schwamendingen (District 12), and around 10,000 people living in the Langstrasse neighbourhood (see Table 1). The problem with neighbourhood selection is that the boundaries of the neighbourhood policy arena are not always precisely defined and interventions do not cover consistent areas.

Langstrasse and Schwamendingen are among the most deprived neighbourhoods of the city of Zurich according to assessable income (Statistik Stadt Zurich 2007: 385). Furthermore, the percentages of foreigners and people (in general) receiving welfare payments are considerably above average, as shown in Tables 2 and 3. Both neighbourhoods were a main focus within the neighbourhood regeneration strategy of the city of Zurich from 1998 to 2006. The two neighbourhoods under scrutiny differ significantly in the kind of interventions taken by the city government there. In the Langstrasse neighbourhood the focus is on public order problems (drug policy and red-light milieu) and physical renewal (e.g. Bäckeranlage), whereas in Schwamendingen interventions focus more on social capital formation (e.g. Schwamendinger Foren).



## 2 Citywide dimensions of socio-spatial inequality

**Table 1: Number of resident population**

	1993	1997	2002	2007
City of Zurich	360898	358594	364558	376815
District 4	28300	27292	27153	27056
Langstrasse	11505	10480	10447	10310
District 12	27481	27678	28470	28991
Saatlen	6472	6428	6663	6842
Schwamendingen Mitte	10175	10237	10373	10806
Hirzenbach	10834	11013	11434	11343

Source: Data city of Zurich Statistic Office

**Table 2: Percentage foreign resident population**

	1993	1997	2002	2007
City of Zurich	26.8%	28.6%	29.8%	30.6%
District 4	45.0%	45.4%	43.6%	41.7%
Langstrasse	49.3%	44.2%	41.8%	40.6%
District 12	27.1%	31.2%	35.4%	37.2%
Saatlen	22.2%	26.0%	30.1%	32.3%
Schwamendingen Mitte	31.6%	35.3%	39.1%	40.0%
Hirzenbach	25.7%	30.5%	35.0%	37.3%

Source: Data city of Zurich Statistic Office

**Table 3: Percentage of people receiving welfare payments**

	2000	2006
City of Zurich	5.3%	6.5%
District 4	9.8%	11.0%
Langstrasse	11.1%	13.9%
District 12	6.8%	11.0%
Saatlen	7.6%	12.0%
Schwamendingen-Mitte	7.5%	11.6%
Hirzenbach	5.7%	9.9%

Source: Data city of Zurich Statistic Office

**Table 4: Percentage unemployed**

	1990	2002
Agglomeration of Zurich	1.84%	4.31%
City of Zurich	2.26%	5.78%
District 4	2.98%	8.59%
District 12	2.03%	7.47%

Source: Data IMO

**Table 5: Registered crime**

	1992	2001	2002
City of Zurich	77990	73386	80746
District 4	9182	11450	11893
District 12	2216	1937	2013

Source: Data city of Zurich Statistic Office

**Table 6: Additional socio economic indicators**

Year	median income	SES-Hardship-Index		% residents with low socio-economic status	
	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000
City of Zurich	44865	51.82	54.35	11.9%	9.29%
District 4	35100	92.97	99.32	21.5%	13.94%
District 12	40000	29.36	79.21	11.36%	12.28%

Source: Data IMO

### 3 Legacies of earlier neighbourhood policy

In the mid-1980s and in the 1990s, neighbourhood development was discussed in terms of participation, not only in Zurich but in several other Swiss cities (see Wehrli-Schindler 1984, Schenkel 1989: 49-67). Explicit neighbourhood policies did not exist as a key issue on the local Zurich agenda before 1998. However, the project that was to become the most important regeneration programme had already started in 1995. This was the project “Pro Langstrass-Quartier” that was established to confront drug dealing and the problems of the red light district. Besides, the Department of Social Services has been carrying out community work in Zurich’s neighbourhoods for a long time.

### 4 Portrait of neighbourhoods selected for detailed study

#### 4.1 Schwamendingen

Schwamendingen is the name of district 12 and is located at the north-eastern boundaries of Zurich. Heye and Leuthold (2004) categorise Schwamendingen as a marginalised peripheral working class neighbourhood. Formerly a farmer village, it was incorporated into the city of Zurich in 1934, during the second large amalgamation. Today the district comprises the quarters Schwamendingen Mitte, Saatlen and Hirzenbach (see Figure 1). From the beginnings of the 1940s until the end of the 1950s, the population of Schwamendingen had increased rapidly from under 5,000 up to over 30,000 (data according to the statistics office city of Zurich). Most of the housing in Schwamendingen was built in this period for the workforce of the nearby engineering industry and their families. These developments were based on the ideals of the “garden city” in contrast to the density of the core city (Kurz 2008: 313-83). Until the 1980s, the population of Schwamendingen consisted mostly of Swiss working class families, who settled there during this period of growth. Accordingly, the population was quite homogenous and the proportion of foreigners was below average (data according to the statistics office city of Zurich). In the 1980s and the 1990s the children of these families moved out as a result of the deindustrialisation, the outdated structure of the buildings and the pollution due to the highway and the aircraft noise because of the nearby airport (Ziegler 2002: 41, Kurz 2002: 7). Young families, this time predominantly foreigners, immigrated into

this area. Therefore the proportion of foreigners in Schwamendingen increased from about 16% (citywide around 20%) in 1982 up to over 35% (citywide about 30%) in 2007 (data from the statistics office city of Zurich). The new immigrants were confronted with the long-established older Swiss population and this provoked xenophobic feelings among the latter (Ziegler 2002: 47-54).

#### 4.1.1. Understanding of the problem (Schwamendingen)

Two issues regarding Schwamendingen are widely accepted by government officials and neighbourhood representatives to be the most important. First, the afore-mentioned rise of proportion of foreigners is viewed as a potential threat to community life. According to a neighbourhood representative, some of the housing estates would no longer be mixed, and the old Swiss residents would “feel alienated in their own neighbourhood”.<sup>2</sup> Also, government officials worry about an insufficient mixture of the population in Schwamendingen. The general assumption is that the concentration of marginalised population leads to self-reinforcing problems in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The reason for this lack of social mixing is assumed to lie in the physical development of the neighbourhood. The quality of the afore-mentioned dwellings – most of them constructed in the 1940s and 1950 – would not meet the needs and habits of today’s families any more. Therefore, both government officials and neighbourhood representatives consider interventions in the housing market as important for the future development of Schwamendingen. But in terms of physical renewal, the public authorities have limited competences. The City Department of Urbanism sets down planning guidelines for Schwamendingen, but these are more of a recommendatory than of a binding character. Therefore, the city administration tries to persuade housing associations and companies to create apartments for families. However, regarding the discussion and the apprehension concerning the composition of the neighbourhood population, we assume a “Swiss-bias”: statements in documents and interviews show that in many cases, only the long-established Swiss residents are considered as the neighbourhood population. The definition of neighbourhood problems seems to be dominated by the ones articulated by the Swiss neighbourhood residents, who feel threatened by the influx of foreign persons (see also Ziegler 2002). The needs and perception of the immigrants, which account for more than one third of the inhabitants of Schwamendingen, are rarely taken into account.

A second issue that has gained importance in the last few years and reflects a non-material concern is related to the first understanding of the problem. According to a broad consensus, Schwamendingen has a negative image because of the relatively high proportion of foreigners and the resulting integration tensions, the traffic noise and pollution caused by the motorway and the air traffic, and its generally low status (see e.g. Dol, et al. 2008: 42). It is widely accepted that Schwamendingen is afflicted with this negative image and that this itself causes problems and therefore has to be improved.

## 4.2 Langstrasse

Langstrasse is the name of a street that crosses the inner-city districts 4 (Aussersihl) and 5 (Industriequartier). It is also the name of one of the three statistical quarters of district 4. The spatial definition of neighbourhoods is ambiguous. In common usage, the term Langstrasse-neighbourhood describes the area along the Langstrasse. The statistical quarter Langstrasse covers only a sector of district 4 and goes beyond the area that adjoins the Langstrasse. The boundaries for area-based neighbourhood policy interventions for the Langstrasse neighbourhood cannot be defined exactly.

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<sup>2</sup> Personal Interview with a neighbourhood representative (respondent B1).

District 4 (Aussersihl) is a former working class neighbourhood. Situated outside the medieval fortification, it experienced a rapid population growth during industrialisation from 1860 onwards. In 1893, Aussersihl became part of the city of Zurich during the first amalgamation. At this time, its population already outnumbered the population of the old town and increased further up to 50,000 in 1910 (Künzle 1990: 46). The disordered growth of industrial towns at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century generally led to a functional and social disintegration and segregation (Künzle 1990: 46-47). The Aussersihl and the Langstrasse quarter became a typical neighbourhood of the lower class: low tax revenue, small housing space and underdeveloped infrastructure (Berger, et al. 2002: 17).

From 1940 to 1980, the population of the statistical quarter Langstrasse decreased by about 50 percent. In the course of the suburbanisation process in the 1950s and 1960s a lot of working class families moved out to the agglomeration belt (Berger and Somme 2000: 31). The percentage of foreigners was always far above citywide average due to the immigration of foreign workers. It increased from around 40% in 1982 up to almost 50% in the beginning of the 1990s and then decreased slowly again to 40% in 2007 (data according to statistics office city of Zurich). As a consequence of the containment of prostitution downtown, the Langstrasse neighbourhood became the red light district of Zurich around 1980. In the 1990s, the districts 4 and 5 suffered from the dislocation of the drug users as a result of the first attempt to shut down the open drug scene in 1992, and also after the successful second closing of the open drug scene with accompanying measures. The drug scene did not disappear completely, but continued to exist as a hidden scene in districts 4 and 5. But despite this burden and certainly also because of harm reduction policies, the former enterprise zone became a famous clubbing scene and also gained attractiveness as living environment for higher income residents. Therefore, we can observe displacement processes in the Langstrasse neighbourhood (Craviolini, et al. 2008) and should highlight the reinforcing gentrification process.

#### 4.2.1. Understanding of the problem (Langstrasse)

Drug problem and prostitution are obviously the main topics in the Langstrasse neighbourhood. In comparison with other inner-city neighbourhoods, this area has a higher concentration of drug-related crime, sexual offences, and violence (Schwarzenegger, et al. 2006). Some officials fear an “oversized” sex business, which would lead to dangerous living and working conditions as well as ghettoisation. Officials and neighbourhood representatives think that prostitution should be reduced to a so-called “neighbourhood compatible” amount of sex business so that life for the neighbourhood residents would be bearable.<sup>3</sup> Government officials and neighbourhood representatives regret the exodus of families over the past decade with predictions that this will continue in the following decade.<sup>4</sup>

Although the proportion of foreigners in the Langstrasse neighbourhood (which is even higher than in Schwamendingen) is absent in the present discourse about area based problems, segregation is viewed as a serious problem. Social mixing policies (or rather social mixing discourse) do not aim at confronting the high proportion of foreigners ostensibly but to counterbalance prostitution. Again, wealthy Swiss families are idealised to be the sound population especially for such a distressed neighbourhood, and therefore it is needed to attract this population group to live in the Langstrasse quarter. It was not mentioned that very few Swiss families (and least of all wealthy families) had actually lived in the Langstrasse neighbourhood because of its history as a marginalised immigrant working class neighbourhood. Furthermore, the official discourse divides the neighbourhood population into “good” and “bad” residents. Only the “good” ones are specified as the mentioned group of

<sup>3</sup> See e.g. „Protokoll des Stadtrates von Zurich 07.12.2005“ (GR-Nr. 2005/264).

<sup>4</sup> Personal interviews, respondents A2, A3, B2.

wealthy Swiss families, whereas the “bad” ones are just implicitly identified as the sex workers and eventually also marginalised people. This understanding of the problem seems to be common in distressed neighbourhoods with a red light district (see Künkel 2008). The percentage of families effectively decreased in district 4 including the statistical quarter Langstrasse, but it was predominantly the foreign families that had moved out from 1993 to 2007 (data according to the statistics office city of Zurich, see chapter 0). The even stronger decline of foreign families and the increase of Swiss families in district 5 indicate an already advanced gentrification process.

For the Langstrasse neighbourhood, social mixing as an ideal not only comprises different population groups but also different business sectors. The idealised form of “good” business is again made by the separation from the sex trade and includes non-red light bars, creativity industry, and small shops.

Furthermore, the bad reputation of the Langstrasse quarter as a neighbourhood synonymous with drugs and prostitution is perceived as a serious problem according to officials and neighbourhood residents. For the neighbourhood development process, it would therefore be important to get a positive media coverage. For the image improvement, the creativity industry and other “good” business are again seen to play a decisive role because they are meant to contribute to the attractiveness of the environment.

## 5 The dependent variable: policy interventions

### 5.1 Citywide overview of policy / Agenda standing

For the legislative period from 1998 to 2002, the city government defined the improvement of quality of life in distressed neighbourhoods as a main official goal for the first time (see chapter 0). The Programme “Aufwertung von Stadtgebieten”, defined as a legislative focal point for this period aimed at improving the quality of life in distressed neighbourhoods rapidly (Stadt Zurich 2001: 13). In the following period from 2002 to 2006, neighbourhood regeneration was again a focal issue on the political agenda of the city government – this time labelled “Lebensqualität in allen Quartieren”. Hence from 1998 until 2006, the city government of Zurich promoted neighbourhood development processes and therefore, neighbourhood regeneration policy appeared as a citywide agenda priority. This ended with the current legislation period: in 2006, neighbourhood development ceased to be a key focus of urban development policy. Some projects still exist, but not anymore within a legislative focal point.

Neighbourhood development was first led by the Infrastructure Department and the Social Services Department and from 2002 to 2006 by the Mayor’s Office. For this entire period, the Infrastructure Department, the Social Services Department and the Office for Urban Development all attended the steering committee; from 2002 the Police Department took part too. The Department of Urbanism was also involved in neighbourhood policy.

Neighbourhood development policy is part of urban development policy primarily and is therefore first and foremost institutionally linked to the Mayor’s Office. While there is no coordinating office, the Office of Urban Development fulfils cross-sectional tasks, and it is present in most of the projects regarding neighbourhood regeneration. The Office for Urban Development is a subordinate of the Mayor’s Office and still acts as a coordinator for neighbourhood policy. It was established in 1998 after a paradigm shift related to the strategy of urban development (see 0). Thus, it appears that several administration units are involved in neighbourhood policy.

## 5.2 Strategy, tools, and content

Apart from the goals to “improve and maintain life quality in urban neighbourhoods”, there is neither a specific neighbourhood policy strategy for the two neighbourhoods under scrutiny, nor for the city as a whole. In general, and especially at the strategic level, there is a remarkable lack of documents. This indicates that no comprehensive strategy exists. Furthermore, the two neighbourhoods differ significantly in the kind of interventions taken there. Even though no specific neighbourhood policy strategy was found for the two selected neighbourhoods, or for the city as a whole, there is a frequently expressed claim for participatory processes in neighbourhood development. Participation can therefore be considered as a major tool in neighbourhood regeneration policy from 1998 to 2006. But when it comes to implementation, reliance on participatory processes differ considerably from neighbourhood to neighbourhood. Especially in the Langstrasse neighbourhood, participation does not necessarily mean an official involvement of community residents in programme design and implementation but rather a consultation process. Participation was strongly related to the legislative focal points regarding neighbourhood development, and since 2006, the demand for participatory processes has been less important.

Apart from this participatory approach, *social mixing* and *image improvement* seem to be the most important goals of urban development policy. With the social mixing approach, the government aims at de-concentrating poverty and increasing the percentage of families in distressed neighbourhoods. Related to this approach is also a focus on housing in urban development policy in both neighbourhoods. Interventions in housing should not only lead to more family friendly dwellings, but also they are supposed to change the type of business use on the properties (i.e. drive out the sex business).

Despite the legislative focal point regarding neighbourhood development policy, we would rather speak of a loose and un-integrated collection of efforts, than of a tightly knit, sustained strategy. A multiplicity of administrative units is involved in neighbourhood policy, but there is no coordination office with the power to decide on cross-sectional special policies. Coordination is mostly based on informal contacts and efforts. This indicates a general conflict of sectoral organised administrations when it comes to the implementation of space-oriented policies.

Moreover, it is not possible to provide a complete overview of the interventions related to neighbourhood policies in general. The reason for this is again that neighbourhood regeneration - understood as a broad array of policies to improve the quality of life – is related to different policy areas and is based on informal administrative coordination. It is often difficult to separate neighbourhood policies from other policy areas (e.g. transport policy) and frequently, it is about selected interventions, which are related to other broad aims.

## 5.3 Policy in selected case study neighbourhoods

### 5.3.1. Schwamendingen

Schwamendingen was a main focus within the neighbourhood regeneration strategy from 1998-2006. One of the main policy goals was the integration of immigrant communities and social capital formation. A majority of interventions were initiated by the Department of Social Services, and they rely not only on community-based organisations but also on professionally provided services. This included several interventions in selected smaller areas within the neighbourhood, e.g. some actions were taken to reduce traffic, and a playground was built to meet the demands of children and youngsters, or participative language teaching for mothers and their children of preschool age (Stadtrat Stadt Zurich 2001, Stadt Zurich 2005). The Office for Urban development organised discussion forums for neighbourhood

development (Schwamendinger Foren, see Fachstelle für Stadtentwicklung and Gesundheits- und Umweltdepartement 2000). During this participatory process, several smaller projects were developed and implemented. In the last 2 to 4 years, image improvement became a common practice. It was mainly the Office for Urban development that was in charge of the image improvement process. The neighbourhood associations of Schwamendingen also played an active part in the neighbourhood development process, especially in the image improvement campaign. The recently concluded project “Image Schwamendingen 2005-2007” was one of the most significant neighbourhood regeneration initiatives in the last few years in Schwamendingen (and probably of the whole city). Funded not only by the city of Zurich but also by the canton of Zurich and the national government – which is exceptional for Zurich neighbourhood regeneration policy – it was part of the European Union Initiative INTERREG IIIB. In five European cities (Delft, Dublin Bristol, Antwerp, Zurich), new concepts for image improvement were developed and tested to establish a toolkit for neighbourhood branding.<sup>5</sup> The neighbourhood branding process followed a participatory approach and was judged favourably by government officials and residents. It was stated that “the Schwamendingen branding process was successful and achieved its core targets: sustainable support of social networks, creation of a positive atmosphere, and positive media coverage” (Dol, et al. 2008: 137).

Since the end of the legislative focal point regarding neighbourhood regeneration in 2006, some smaller development processes still exist within various departments. For example, the Office for Urban Planning developed in association with private corporations a concept for the redevelopment of Schwamendingen in a cooperative process. This planning process seeks to promote the construction of family dwellings.

### 5.3.2. Langstrasse

Area based policies for the Langstrasse neighbourhood started before the city government defined neighbourhood regeneration as an official legislative focal point in 1998. In Langstrasse, a main effort in neighbourhood regeneration began already in mid 1990 in response to the new drug policy of the city of Zurich. Shortly after the second closing of the open drug scene in 1995, the city government launched a project called “Pro Langstrass-Quartier”. Both the Police Department and the Department of Social Services were involved in this project, which on the one hand should counteract night-time leisure, red-light and drug milieu. On the other hand, the city government intended to improve the quality of life in the neighbourhood for residents with community work. According to Berger et al. (2002), this project followed a top-down strategy despite the officially stated notion of a participatory approach and did not succeed.

Under the legislative focal point concerning neighbourhood regeneration, Langstrasse was identified as a deprived area (Emmenegger 2000: 11, Stadtrat Stadt Zurich 1998). But from 1998 to 2002, regeneration policies in the Langstrasse neighbourhood were still carried out mostly within the scope of the legislative focal point “Security” and were subordinated to the Police Department. In 2001, the city government authorised the new project “Langstrasse PLUS”, which became Zurich’s most important programme in the field of “Socially Integrative City” (Wehrli-Schindler 2002: 12). This project should guarantee a sustainable improvement of quality of life in the neighbourhood.<sup>6</sup> Another goal is to enable cross-linked action inside the city administration and residents involvement. A project manager was employed to advocate cross-section area based policies and to get in touch with the

<sup>5</sup> The results of this project have been published in a book (see Dol, et al. 2008)

<sup>6</sup> City government press communiqué March 21, 2001: „Projekt „Langstrasse PLUS“: Umfassendes Massnahmenpaket für das Langstrassenquartier“.

neighbourhood residents.<sup>7</sup> His role is similar to that of the “Quartiersmanager” in Germany who coordinates implementation of the federal-state programme “Socially Integrative City” in disadvantaged districts. The project manager of “Langstrasse PLUS” is involved in diverse revitalisation processes in the Langstrasse neighbourhood and mediates between the different administrative positions and organisations of the civil population to engender cooperative political and administrative structures. But unlike the German “Quartiersmanager”, the “Langstrasse PLUS”-manager is employed by the Police Department; in fact, the whole project is led and managed by the Police Department. In addition, the Department of Social Services particularly, but also the School and Sports, Buildings, and Finance Departments, and the Mayor’s Office are involved in this project. The project itself has only limited resources for project publicity, with most of the measures and activities funded by the project partners.<sup>8</sup> Hence “Langstrasse PLUS” rarely acts as a sole party.

The “Langstrasse PLUS” project is certainly the most important neighbourhood regeneration programme in Zurich. There is no other district where so many efforts are made to improve the quality of life and to influence the development of the quarter. However, the whole project is documented poorly, particularly with regard to the strategy and contents of the project. Participation is generally stated as an important tool (see chapter 0) and “Langstrasse PLUS” is even suggested to be a citizens’ initiative, whereas it is in fact initiated and lead by the Police Department (see Berger, et al. 2002).

Due to the incomplete documentation of the project and the fragmented actor constellation, it is not possible to give an exhaustive description of all the measures implemented in the context of “Langstrasse PLUS”. It involves a multiplicity of measures ranging from housing to security. The project is differentiated into four domains (Vieli 2003: 38). The public security domain includes diverse police interventions like razzias or drug arrest operations. The sphere of living conditions comprises efforts such as mobile social work and community work. The third addresses real estate use and wants to reduce the usage of buildings in the Langstrasse neighbourhood as brothels or the like. Therefore, the city of Zurich keeps buying brothels in order to convert them into housing in the attempt to reclaim property from the sex industry. The last domain of area development includes image improvement and marketing campaigns that seek to strengthen local business aside from sex trade.<sup>9</sup> Recently a so-called “Langstrasse Credit” was launched to give financial contributions to local small business that are considered as conducive to positive neighbourhood development (Stadtentwicklung Zurich 2007).

An important urban development process in the Langstrasse neighbourhood was the so called recuperation of a park called “Bäckeranlage” (Berger and Somm 2000). Since a long time this park was a meeting place for homeless persons and after the closing of the open drug scene, residents feared that a new drug scene would emerge again in this park. Therefore, the city of Zurich conducted diverse interventions such as police measures, mobile social work, cleaning activities, and cultural events to control the situation in and around the park in order to make it liveable for neighbourhood residents. This revitalisations process is termed as a success story in neighbourhood regeneration because today the “Bäckeranlage” is an attractive place for residents due to its playground and cosy atmosphere with a newly opened community centre as well with its own restaurant.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Personal interview, respondent A3.

<sup>8</sup> Personal interview, respondent A3.

<sup>9</sup> See [http://www.stadt-zuerich.ch/pd/de/index/das\\_departement/strategie\\_politik/projekte/langstrasse\\_plus.html](http://www.stadt-zuerich.ch/pd/de/index/das_departement/strategie_politik/projekte/langstrasse_plus.html) [01.08.2009]

<sup>10</sup> See e.g. „Die Bäckeranlage als grüne Oase im Kreis 4“, Neue Zürcher Zeitung 04.08.2007.



Neighbourhood regeneration in the Langstrasse neighbourhood is generally an important sphere of activity within the section of Community Work. Community interventions are loosely related to the “Langstrasse PLUS” project and would provide a cross-link between politics, administration, and residents.<sup>11</sup>

Regarding the Langstrasse neighbourhood, there seems to be a loose policy intervention strategy at the neighbourhood level. Most of the identified interventions are related, or integral, to the “Langstrasse PLUS” project. But due to the lack of documentation and the diverse administration units involved, it is neither possible to give an overview of all the interventions undertaken in the Langstrasse quarter nor is it possible to comment on the amount of resources that have been used or are available for neighbourhood regeneration. But we can surmise that based on general sentiments it is felt that the quality of life in this neighbourhood has significantly improved in the last decade as a consequence of this project.

## 6 Local structure of politics and government

The city of Zurich is a municipality, which is the lowest level of government in Switzerland, with its own directly elected executive and council. The next level is the canton of Zurich that also has its own government and parliament. The city of Zurich as a municipality enjoys significant decision-making powers and autonomy within Switzerland's political system. The city government consists of nine members and constitutes the executive authority of the city of Zurich. The city government operates as a collegiate authority and each member presides over a department. These are:

*Departments of Zurich city administration:*

- Mayor's Office (including Office for Urban Development)
- Department of Finance
- Police Department
- Department of Health and Environment
- Department of Infrastructure
- Buildings Department (including Department of Urbanism)
- Department of Industry
- School and Sports Department
- Social Services Department (including section Community Work)

The mayor acts as a *prima inter pares*. Therefore, Zurich's executive structure has a collective form. The citizens elect the city government directly every four years. It is currently made up of four representatives of the SP (Social Democratic Party, one of whom is the mayor), three members of the FDP (Free Democratic Party) and one member each from the CVP (Christian Democratic Party) and the Green Party (see appendix, Table 8).

The city parliament is made up of 125 members, with elections held every four years (see appendix, Table 10). The members of the legislative body are elected by district. The nine electoral districts are in line with the twelve urban districts (see chapter 0) with districts 1 and 2, 4 and 5, and 7 and 8 put together. The average population size of the electoral districts is around 42,000. The twelve city districts do not have local authority, only administrative functions.

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<sup>11</sup> Personal interview, respondent A2.

The city parliament is elected by partisan ballot. The Social Democratic Party usually has the highest number of votes with currently 44 members of the parliament followed by the Swiss People's Party (SVP), which is not represented in the city government, with 24 parliamentarians. Only minor changes have happened to this partisan power constellation in the municipal council in the last three elections since 1998.

To some degree, the nine electoral districts cover the neighbourhood structure. The districts thus have their own representatives in the city's legislative. Nevertheless, the members of the city parliament do not perceive themselves primarily as representatives of their neighbourhood,<sup>12</sup> and they do not appear as key actors in the neighbourhood policy. In Switzerland the degree of institutionalisation of inclusion of the sub-local level varies from city to city. While Bern guarantees an officially regulated participation of neighbourhood committees, the involvement of the district level in Geneva is mainly informal (Joye, et al. 1995: 255-56). The city of Bern even recognises an organisation per neighbourhood as an official partner, in which all relevant organisations of the respective district should be represented (Wehrli-Schindler 2004). However, it has to be considered that although an institutionalised neighbourhood consultation process defines opportunities to participate, the question of representativeness stays open.

In Zurich, neighbourhood associations are legally recognised. Since there is sometimes more than one historic neighbourhood per district – some of them are identical with the statistical quarters – a total of 25 neighbourhood associations exist. All together they get a contribution of 275,000 Swiss Francs a year for their administration and for cultural and community activities.<sup>13</sup> Once a year, the city government gets in contact with the chiefs of the neighbourhood associations at an informal meeting. The neighbourhood associations would have little influence on the members of the city parliament; more important was the informal contact with the members of the city government.<sup>14</sup> However, the neighbourhood associations of the city districts differ strongly in impact and acceptance. In Schwamendingen, the neighbourhood association is an important partner for the administration;<sup>15</sup> in contrast, in the district including the Langstrasse neighbourhood, there is a conflicted relationship between the neighbourhood association and the city administration.<sup>16</sup> However, the degree of institutionalisation of the inclusion of the sub-local scale in Zurich is rather low in comparison with other Swiss cities (Joye, et al. 1995).

Due to Switzerland's forms of direct democracy, residents principally have the possibility to articulate their request via initiatives. For an initiative at the city level in Zurich, 3,000 signatures are required to force a plebiscite on a local government law amendment. Therefore, residents can launch neighbourhood topics, but of course such neighbourhood requests can easily be outvoted since ballots take place only at the city level.

## 7 Resource availability

It is not possible to say anything comprehensively about resource availability in relation to neighbourhood regeneration. Indeed, the city government defined neighbourhood regeneration as a legislative focal point for the period from 1998 to 2009. But it is very difficult to separate resources for neighbourhood policies from other interventions. And because it is not possible to set up a comprehensive list with interventions under scrutiny, we

<sup>12</sup> Personal interview, respondent C1.

<sup>13</sup> Decision of the city parliament (GR-Nr. 2007/116).

<sup>14</sup> According to a personal interview with a member of a neighbourhood association (respondent B1).

<sup>15</sup> Personal interview, respondents A1, B1, D1.

<sup>16</sup> Personal interview, respondent A3.

are unable to calculate the resources for neighbourhood development projects. This is perhaps a general result of sectorally organised administration not completely compatible with area-based policies.

In both neighbourhoods under scrutiny, resources especially for regeneration policies are rare. Most of the funds for area-based policies come from the different departments involved in neighbourhood related policies. In the Langstrasse neighbourhood, the predominant programme “Langstrasse PLUS” itself has only little of its own resources for project publicity except from the personal cost for the project manager and administration.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, “Langstrasse PLUS” rarely occurs as a sole actor but usually acts in cooperation with diverse administration units that implement neighbourhood development policies. Also for Schwamendingen, there is no specific neighbourhood regeneration fund. For example, some projects were financed by the Office of Urban Development (Mayor’s Office) or by the Department of Social Services. An exception was the previously mentioned European Community Initiative INTERREG IIIB programme for image improvement in Schwamendingen. The city of Zurich and the canton of Zurich funded the project “Image Schwamendingen 2005-2007” with 30,000 and 35,000 Swiss francs respectively. The federal government funded the project with 65,000 Swiss francs.<sup>18</sup> But such federal government involvement is unusual for Zurich’s neighbourhood development policies (see chapter 0). In general, the city of Zurich provides resources for regeneration policies. Private actors do not play an active role in neighbourhood regeneration specifically. The city of Zurich provides municipal housing and subsidises a lot of cheap dwellings, and therefore is an influential player in housing.<sup>19</sup> All the same, the private housing industry is an important player in neighbourhood development.

## 8 Institutional structure of intergovernmental supports

Unlike Germany, where the federal programme for a “Socially Integrative City” has played an important role in neighbourhood development processes since the end of the 1990s, the Swiss federal neighbourhood policy is still in an early stage. Federal programmes for neighbourhood development exist since 2003. In connection with the federal agglomeration policy, the federal programme for “sustainable neighbourhood development” arose out of the collaboration between the Swiss Federal Office of Energy, the Federal Office for Spatial Development, and the Federal Housing Office. Since 2007, the federal government has funded projects for neighbourhood regeneration in distressed urban neighbourhoods with the programme “projets urbain”.<sup>20</sup> This programme covers predominantly neighbourhoods in midsize Swiss towns, where neighbourhood regeneration is not yet on the political agenda. Swiss federal neighbourhood policy is not relevant for neighbourhood regeneration in the city of Zurich. In fact, it is the other way round, with government professionals from Zurich providing information about neighbourhood regeneration for the federal programme.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, Zurich basically provides best practice information to the federal administration and to other cities and in a sense leads the way towards area-based urban regeneration policies. Neighbourhood development processes in Zurich are not funded by the national government (with the exception mentioned above).

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<sup>17</sup> Personal interview, respondent A3.

<sup>18</sup> See „Auszug aus dem Protokoll des Stadtrates von Zurich 05.07.2006“ (GR-Nr. 2006/143).

<sup>19</sup> Around 7,000 out of 200,000 dwellings are subsidized by the city of Zurich (see [http://www.stadt-zuerich.ch/fd/de/index/wohnbaupolitik/wohnbauforderung/subventionierter\\_wohnungsbau.html#](http://www.stadt-zuerich.ch/fd/de/index/wohnbaupolitik/wohnbauforderung/subventionierter_wohnungsbau.html#) [01.08.2009]).

<sup>20</sup> For more information about “projets urbain”, see <http://www.are.admin.ch/themen/agglomeration/00630/02258/> [01.08.2009].

<sup>21</sup> Personal interview, respondent A1.

## 9 Mapping of potential major players (Political and governance relationships: Cleavages, coalitions, and alignments)

There are two key actors in neighbourhood regeneration: On the one hand, there is the city government which formulates goals and on the other hand, there is the administration which is responsible for the operationalisation of goals and its implementation. Several administration units are involved in neighbourhood policy. These are mainly the Department of Urbanism, the Office of Urban Development, the Police Department, and the Department of Social Services. While there is no coordinating office, the Office of Urban Development fulfils cross-sectional tasks, and it is present in most of the projects regarding neighbourhood regeneration. In principle, the Office of Urban Development is in charge of the legislative focal points regarding neighbourhood regeneration and therefore is responsible for conceptual work and implementation.

### 9.1 Schwamendingen

Neighbourhood development in Schwamendingen is carried out mainly by the Community Work section of the Department of Social Services, the Office of Urban Development and the Urbanism Department. Since Schwamendingen was a focal area of the legislative goals to improve the quality of life in neighbourhoods from 1998 to 2006, the Office of Urban Development initiated several project in this district. The Community Work section has traditionally been involved in neighbourhood activities and various improvement processes. The Department of Urbanism is in charge of the planning process for human settlements development in Schwamendingen.

At the sub-local level, the neighbourhood association of Schwamendingen is a considerably important actor. Not all districts of Zurich have such well-organised and active neighbourhood associations. Schwamendingen's neighbourhood association covers a wide range of resident interests, but primarily those of the Swiss population, whereas the large number of foreign residents is underrepresented.<sup>22</sup> According to government professionals and neighbourhood representatives, the cooperation between the city administration and the neighbourhood association is considered to be good and important for revitalisation processes.<sup>23</sup> The neighbourhood association of Schwamendingen also affects the focus of neighbourhood regeneration policy. It even appears that the Office of Urban Development picks up issues brought up by the association.<sup>24</sup> Among other things this is one reason why the chairwoman of the neighbourhood association is against the idea of an institutionalised neighbourhood management which has been discussed by government professionals. She thinks the government professional would not make such a good neighbourhood manager, but it is rather the residents themselves who would since they are organised in associations and would thus actually know the real problems of their neighbourhood and could also address these problems, if only they could get more money from the city government.<sup>25</sup>

Neighbourhood regeneration, as it was understood in the strict sense under the legislative focal point, demanded resident involvement in regenerations projects and the Office of Urban Development had already initiated several participation processes. Therefore, the residents of Schwamendingen are also considered as relevant actors in neighbourhood development. But although the basis for participation processes in Schwamendingen exists due to the good organisation of interests, the participatory models are limited, not only from the official side, but also according to a neighbourhood representative, participatory approaches are called into

<sup>22</sup> Personal interview, respondent A1.

<sup>23</sup> Personal interview, respondent A1, B1, D1.

<sup>24</sup> Personal interview, respondent B1.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

question.<sup>26</sup> The problem identified first of all is that it is not possible to include all of the approximately 30,000 residents in the participation processes and there is also a systematic bias in the mobilisation of residents in participatory approaches. This means that the foreign population tends not to attend these participation processes. Secondly, there is generally only a small group of neighbourhood residents who want to be actively involved in such projects. Therefore, the diverse neighbourhood regenerations projects with participatory claim risk overburdening the persons who participate regularly.<sup>27</sup>

The neighbourhood association also stays in contact with building cooperatives, which provide a considerable amount of housing in Schwamendingen.<sup>28</sup> These building cooperatives themselves are concerned with neighbourhood regeneration. For example, they lobbied for interventions to reduce air and noise emissions. Since building cooperatives possess a large number of dwellings in Schwamendingen and in part considerable financial resources, they are important actors regarding neighbourhood regeneration. The city of Zurich engages building cooperatives, real estate owners, and other private actors in cooperative planning processes in order to affect neighbourhood development by settlement development (Amt für Städtebau 2005). Such a cooperative planning process was the formulation of general principles for spatial planning in Schwamendingen led by the Department of Urbanism.

## 9.2 Langstrasse

Major players involved in the neighbourhood regeneration policy in the Langstrasse neighbourhood are the Police Department and the Department of Social Services. For this district, the legislative focal point from 1998 to 2006, aiming to improve quality of life in distressed neighbourhoods was not as relevant as in Schwamendingen, even though problems in the Langstrasse neighbourhood could be considered as more severe than in Schwamendingen. What is prominently represented is primarily the “Langstrasse PLUS” project, which is led by the Police Department and is involved in virtually all interventions taken in this area. In contrast to Schwamendingen, the Office of Urban Development is not seen as a key player in neighbourhood development policy and it does not fulfil a co-ordinating task.<sup>29</sup> According to an urban development expert, the Office of Urban Development lacks the know-how for the multiple problems in the Langstrasse neighbourhood, such as drug dealing and red light district related problems.<sup>30</sup>

The municipal administration and the city government support the development process in the Langstrasse quarter. Government professionals see the penetrability of the diverse administration units as an essential condition for successful neighbourhood regeneration.<sup>31</sup> Nowadays, it is obviously much easier to work across the various departments at the operational level. This allows addressing problems quickly and usually informally, which is considered as crucial especially for the upgrading of the Langstrasse area.<sup>32</sup> Therefore the project manager of “Langstrasse PLUS” has an important function in terms of facilitating cooperation between the Police and Social Services Department. Other government officials see him as a kind of “door opener” in the Police Department with regards to the concerns of

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<sup>26</sup> Personal interview, respondent A1, A2, B1.

<sup>27</sup> Personal interview, respondent B1.

<sup>28</sup> Over 40% of accommodations in Schwamendingen are provided by the city of Zurich or building cooperatives and can therefore be accounted for social housing (Fachstelle für Stadtentwicklung und Gesundheits- und Umweltdepartement 2000).

<sup>29</sup> Personal interview, respondent A3.

<sup>30</sup> Personal interview, respondent D1.

<sup>31</sup> Personal interviews, respondent A1, A2, A3.

<sup>32</sup> Personal interview, respondent A3.

the community work and they think that thanks to him, the awareness of social concerns has risen within the Police Department.<sup>33</sup>

The project manager of “Langstrasse PLUS” is certainly a major player in the Langstrasse neighbourhood. Generally, it is striking that the discourse about the neighbourhood regeneration of the Langstrasse area is strongly influenced by him. In his function, which is quite similar to the so-called “Quartiersmanager” in Germany (see 0), he is involved in a lot of interventions and furthermore stays in contact with neighbourhood population. But in the Langstrasse neighbourhood, residents are less organised than in Schwamendingen. It must be pointed out that the Langstrasse neighbourhood is not consistent with a city district such as Schwamendingen. The area around Langstrasse is part of the districts 4 and 5, whereas policy interventions concentrate on part of district 4 since this is where most of today’s problems lie. As in Schwamendingen, a neighbourhood association exists in district 4 (“Aussersihl”), but the co-operation between government officials and the neighbourhood association turned out to be quite conflictive in the last few years. In this working class district there has traditionally been a variety of different interest groups and the relation between the city administration and government and the neighbourhood residents is traditionally tense. Furthermore, the “Aussersihl” association is not as widely supported by the residents as the neighbourhood association of Schwamendingen. The former chairman (until 2007) did not cooperate with the city administration. Due to personal reasons, he was even hostile toward government officials.<sup>34</sup> It is quite evident that unlike in Schwamendingen, where many of the impulses for revitalisation interventions came from resident organisations, the information flow in the Langstrasse neighbourhood rather runs in the opposite direction. Thus, various interest organisations were established on behalf of the city administrations neighbourhood policies (e.g. the association of real estate owners or the association for marketing actions). Generally speaking, despite the participatory approaches pursued officially, neighbourhood regeneration follows a rather top-down perspective in the Langstrasse neighbourhood.

### 9.3 Political and governance relationships (city wide level)

At the citywide level, the Office of Urban Development takes a leading role in implementing the legislative focal points regarding neighbourhood regeneration. However there is no tightened ‘policy network’. Due to the diverse city administration sections concerned with neighbourhood policies, we could not identify a coherent membership or a consistent agenda over time except the overall goal to improve the quality of life in Zurich’s neighbourhoods. We would rather speak of a wide array of actors with disparate goals and unstable – since informal – relationships. Policy intervention and actor constellation differ significantly in the two neighbourhoods under scrutiny. At the sub-local level, a coherent strategy is also missing.

Members of the city parliament are not major players in this field. Generally, neighbourhood regeneration in Zurich is not contested. We did not find any cleavages related to revitalisation policies and the effort of the city government to improve the quality of life in certain neighbourhoods is widely looked upon favourably. However, individual people from the very left recently launched criticism on gentrification processes in relation to neighbourhood development policies. There is currently a debate in Zurich as to whether gentrification is taking place in the area around Langstrasse. While former research clearly identified the “gentrified” inner-city quarters (e.g. Heye and Odermatt 2006, Heye and Leuthold 2004), the government officials of the city of Zurich currently try to contradict the criticism whereupon area-based regeneration policies foster gentrification processes (see Stadt Zürich 2008). Craviolini et al. (2009), who recently analysed the development of the Langstrasse

<sup>33</sup> Personal interview, respondent A2.

<sup>34</sup> Personal interview, respondent A3.

neighbourhood from 1993 to 2007 found a distinct change in neighbourhood population characteristics. However, they would only call these changes “insular gentrification” and they did not find evidence for large-scale gentrification pertaining to substantial upgrading of properties or social structure (Craviolini, et al. 2009).

As shown so far, the public sector is basically concerned with neighbourhood regeneration policies. The private sector is of course also involved with the revitalisation strategies (e.g. housing industry) and furthermore in the Langstrasse neighbourhood, diverse non-profit organisations do exist (e.g. medical care for drug users) as well. But these organisations are rarely mentioned in the discourse about neighbourhood regeneration.

## 10 Explaining and interpreting neighbourhood intervention

### 10.1 Problem pressure

With the legislative focal points of 1998, neighbourhood regeneration in Zurich became a priority. One possible assumption would be that problems in certain urban districts would get worse and became apparent at the end of the 1990s, which explained why the city government started revitalisation policies. Although this interpretation appears in official documents (see e.g. Fachstelle für Stadtentwicklung 2002: 6), it seems the emergence of neighbourhood regeneration policy in Zurich could not be fully attributed to the severity of the problems in the districts. First of all, the problems in the urban districts in Zurich (and in other Swiss cities) are not as severe as in other European cities. Schwamendingen (one of the two neighbourhoods under scrutiny) in particular, which was a focal area during the legislation periods from 1998 to 2006 for neighbourhood regeneration, did not actually have any problems comparable to other distressed European urban zones (e.g. criminality or bad dwellings). It was rather about the prevention of suspected future problems.<sup>35</sup> As described in chapter 0, the proportion of foreign population has already increased in the 1980s and the exposure to traffic pollution is not new either. The increase in foreign population has probably contributed to the loss of status in comparison to other city districts from 1990 to 2000 (Heye and Leuthold 2004: 58). Therefore we can conclude that at the end of the 1990s, when the Zurich city government put area-based regeneration policies on the agenda, the severity of neighbourhood issues was not so acute that the government would have been forced to do this.

The former working class district “Aussersihl” and especially the red-light district along Langstrasse have a long history of urban night life and related problems such as crime and drug dealing. As described above, as a consequence of the policies towards the open drug scene, the situation worsened in the mid 1990s. Due to this additional burden the Langstrasse neighbourhood experienced severe distress comparatively at the end of the 1990s. Area-based policies to confront this situation were already initiated in 1995. Although these measures sought to improve the quality of life in this distressed neighbourhood, they were not perceived as part of an area-based regeneration approach in terms of a social integrative neighbourhood development strategy but rather as a police-led security strategy. Even the project “Langstrasse PLUS”, which was initiated in 2001, was not a part of the legislative focal point regarding neighbourhood regeneration. It was not incorporated into this legislative focal point until the second period from 2002 to 2006, but then became the most important programme in the field of social urban development (Wehrli-Schindler 2002: 12).

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<sup>35</sup> Personal interview, respondent A1.

The problems, as well as the focus of policy strategies in the Langstrasse area differ greatly from other neighbourhoods. This also partly explains the incongruity of the design of the area-based development measures of the two neighbourhoods.

The introduction of area-based policies towards the improvement of quality of life in the Langstrasse quarter could be due to the worsening of neighbourhood problems. For neighbourhood revitalisation projects in Schwamendingen and more generally for the legislature focal point on neighbourhood regeneration, however, problem pressure does not explain the emergence of neighbourhood regeneration policy in Zurich.

## 10.2 Zurich neighbourhood policy follows a European trend in urban development policy

In the 1990s, many American and European cities developed political programmes to regenerate disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods. These programmes focused on urban areas which are characterised by various socio-economic problems and showed significant socio-structural inequalities. In the politico-administrative and scientific field there is a broad consensus that problems in disadvantaged neighbourhoods would increase due to socio-spatial segregation processes (Franke 2008: 127). Integrative approaches to neighbourhood development should break through this so called "downward spirals". This implies cross-sectoral, area-based policy interventions with resident participation in contrast to a purely structural-physical renovation strategy (Alisch 2002). This is also the direction the Zurich neighbourhood regeneration strategy follows - at least when we look at the few existing strategic goals. The Office of Urban Development did in fact study European approaches to neighbourhood development, e.g. the German federal-state Programme "Socially Integrative City". Participation became a major tool in Zurich neighbourhood development policy due to the general trend of participatory approaches in European programmes. Resident involvement procedures are a key element of the European Union, federal, state, and local district area-based regeneration policies.

The usefulness of participatory approaches is increasingly being questioned by Zurich government officials and neighbourhood representatives (see above). This indicates that the demand of resident involvement, which is a common strategy in other European programmes, may not be deemed as optimal or appropriate in Zurich's context. Participatory processes, such as those in Schwamendingen are not able to involve more than a small part of the neighbourhood population only. Unlike Germany, where participatory approaches play a different role since there is no institutionalised resident involvement at the sub-local level, the Zurich city districts have elected representatives in parliament and direct democratic instruments that allow the residents of Zurich to express their requests at the local level. A project manager of neighbourhood development has therefore raised concerns over the adequacy of participation strategies for Zurich neighbourhood development processes.<sup>36</sup> Nevertheless, criticisms have been made regarding the participatory approaches in the German federal-state programme "Socially Integrative City". On the one hand, it proved barely possible to mobilise residents systematically for participatory processes (Fritsche 2008: 149). Yet on the other hand, the so called "activation" of the neighbourhood population has also been criticised as part of a neoliberal urban development strategy (Künkel 2008: 175).

Although there is little knowledge transfer between Zurich's neighbourhood regeneration policies and the "Socially Integrative City" programme in Germany, we discovered a significant analogy in the discourse about neighbourhood regeneration policy and the underlying assumption of the origins of problems. In the current work related to the neighbourhood development processes in Germany, research findings and problem definitions are remarkably consistent with those in Zurich's context. Thus, we found again the fear of a

<sup>36</sup> Personal interview, respondent A1.



so called "downward spiral", the ideal of social mix, which attributes to domestic families a role as a tool of integration, or the disillusionment with regard to participatory processes in different studies of German urban neighbourhood development policies (Franke 2008, Fritsche 2008, Güntner 2007, Künkel 2008, Nieszery 2008). Such discursive parallels show that the Zurich neighbourhood development policy cannot be understood without the wider European context. And we can conclude that Zurich area-based strategy follows a European trend in urban development policy.

### 10.3 Segregation as a threat to urban neighbourhoods?

Urban regeneration policy is based on the assumption that segregation and concentration of marginalised groups reduces the quality of life in urban neighbourhoods. Therefore, "social mixing" interventions are very common in neighbourhood regeneration. This is not only the case in Zurich. According to Lees (2008: 2451), "[e]ncouraging socially mixed neighbourhoods and communities has become a major urban policy and planning goal in the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, Australia, Canada and the United States". Segregation and concentration of marginalised population groups are identified as a cause of the declining quality of life in urban neighbourhoods, and they are considered to be the driving force behind the so-called negative spiral (for the German context see e.g. Güntner 2007, Franke 2008, Künkel 2008). Concentration of marginalised groups and especially concentration of poverty are supposed to produce negative area effects, whereas socially mixed communities are supposed to produce social capital and decrease social exclusion (Lees 2008: 2453, Lupton and Fuller 2009). Hence, two groups of residents are identified in the Zurich neighbourhood regeneration discourse: the "good and enriching" residents (Swiss middle-class families) and the "bad and undesirable" residents (lower-class immigrants and marginalised persons). Whereas nobody explicitly calls for the displacement of immigrants, the claim to create incentives for Swiss middle-class families to move to distressed neighbourhoods is frequently expressed. Consequently, Lees (2008: 2451) defines social mixing as "moving middle-income people into low-income inner-city neighbourhoods". Interestingly, scholars do not find evidence for the mechanism upon which social mix policies are based. Moreover, as Walks and Maaranen (2008: 294) put it, "it is not clear exactly what kind of 'mix' is most desirable, or what sort of mix matters most in producing the expected positive outcomes [...]" (cited in Lees 2008: 2456). This seems to be the case in Zurich as well, where the focus of neighbourhood regeneration policy lies – at least in the official discourse – on the de-concentration of poverty. While in Schwamendingen area-based interventions are designed to prevent a potential self-reinforcing negative development, city officials think that they had to "break through a vicious circle" (Fullana 2002: 20, translation cw) in the Langstrasse neighbourhood. The fear of socio-spatial segregation has been emphasised by all respondents and resulted in the demand for a "better social mix" of the neighbourhoods. Both city-wide and in the districts under scrutiny, the emigration of middle-class families is perceived as particularly problematic. Therefore neighbourhood regeneration processes are meant to make these areas attractive for families again. Although rarely mentioned explicitly, this tends to increase the proportion of Swiss families, as the foreign population has a lower socioeconomic status than the Swiss population in general.


Therefore, a closer look at the migration trends seems appropriate. A research commissioned by the Office of Urban Development of Zurich has confirmed the departure of families for all city districts from 1991 to 1995 (Meyrat Schlee and Gafner 1998). The authors have noted that the twelve urban districts have a very different extent of migration. It is interesting that just the "disadvantaged" neighbourhoods are less affected by the relocation of families compared to the "good" residential areas. Thus, from 1991 to 1995 more families moved out of districts 6, 7, and 9 than districts 4, 5, and 12 (Meyrat Schlee and Gafner 1998: 21-22). In

addition, the loss of foreign families in all districts was significantly lower than the Swiss families.

Recent figures confirm this trend only partially. As shown in Figure 2, from 1993 to 2007 the number of Swiss families declined most in districts that are generally considered as rather family-friendly residential neighbourhoods, which includes the districts 2, 9, 11, and 12.<sup>37</sup> In Schwamendingen (district 12), the proportion of families has not decreased overall. However, the proportion of foreign resident families has increased, while that of Swiss resident families has declined. This reflects the change of the population composition in Schwamendingen as described at the beginning.

In District 4 where the district Langstrasse covers more than one third of the overall district 4 population, the population develops in an opposite manner. The proportion of Swiss families has long been very low, which is not a surprise given the history of this district. Contrary to the general presumption, the proportion of Swiss families did not diminish significantly. But district 4, in particular the Langstrasse neighbourhood has lost foreign families to a large extent. As Figure 2 shows, this process was even more dramatic in district 5.

**Figure 2: Percentage of residents living in families change per district from 1993-2007**



Other research concluded that the net outflow of families in gentrified neighbourhoods is much higher than in other city neighbourhoods between the beginnings of the 1990s and 2002 (Heye and Odermatt 2006: 62, Heye and Leuthold 2004: 72). This is certainly the case for district 4 and especially for district 5, where gentrification processes have advanced in particular. According to these studies, Swiss and foreign families were leaving these neighbourhoods in the same degree. This however does not hold true in our data. Figure 2 shows that between 1993 and 2007, the proportion of foreign resident families dramatically decreased in districts 4 and 5, whereas the proportion of Swiss families did not significantly diminish and even increased in district 5.

This brief demonstration of the displacement of specific population groups – especially in relation to the proportion of Swiss and foreign families – shows a certain discrepancy between

<sup>37</sup> According to a population survey realized by the Office of Urban Development these quarters are considered to be child-friendly (Müller, et al. 2005).

the actual and perceived problems. Neighbourhood regeneration policies are meant to make disadvantaged neighbourhoods attractive to families "again" and to stop the relocation of families (in actual fact Swiss families). This is in contradiction to the fact that it is primarily the better-off and child-friendly neighbourhoods that lose families and that for certain districts, there is already evidence that neighbourhood regeneration is generally accompanied by a decline in the proportion of families in the district's population.

Therefore we conclude that the demand for a "better social mix" of neighbourhood population, which is exclusively made in relation to distressed areas and never associated with better-off districts, is made in a rather uncritical way.

#### 10.4 Impact of Zurich's drug policy on neighbourhood regeneration strategies

The Zurich drug policy of the early 1990s played an important role in improving the quality of life in urban neighbourhoods. As a result of the open drug scene being shut down (the notorious needle park in the centre of Zurich), the neighbourly district experienced a major public order disruption (see also chapter 0). In addition, Zurich's drug policy has influenced neighbourhood regeneration policy in other ways. During the controversy about the open drug scene and the consequences of harm reduction and prohibitionist policies, the coalition concerned with the quality of life gained importance (cf. Kübler 2001). This coalition consisting of neighbourhood organisations and shopkeepers' associations argued against the implementation of harm reduction policies and affected the official discourse, with their request for "Stadtverträglichkeit" (city compatibility) becoming widely accepted (Kübler 2001: 636). This implies an urban drug policy that allows harm reduction strategies under the condition that the resident population does not feel affected negatively. In the present debate about deprived neighbourhoods – especially the red light district – the idea of "Stadtverträglichkeit" is still important. This concept implies a so-called natural neighbourhood population that is faced with a stigmatised group that is perceived as a threat. Whereas this used to be the drug users, nowadays the discussion is about a neighbourhood compatible proportion of prostitution in the same district. The imagination of a balance between the red-light milieu on the one hand and "normal" business and residents on the other is found not only in Zurich but also in other European cities, where neighbourhood regeneration policies imply the displacement of the red-light milieu (Künkel 2008).

Furthermore, an important learning process took place in connection with the drug problem: within the city administration, a form of political and ideological confrontation towards pragmatic and solution-oriented cooperation occurred (Herzig and Feller 2004: 5). The implementation of a "city compatible" drug policy, as mentioned above, required coordination between the professional sectors involved to simultaneously address the attractiveness issue and the social issue involved in drug related problems (Kübler and Wälti 2001). This led to a new code of practice, which Kübler and Wälti (2001) labelled "social public-order regime". The new so-called four-pillar-model in drug policy allowed for inter-departmental cooperation that was not possible before (see Eberle 2003). This newly achieved permeability of the Zurich city administration is also important for area-based regeneration policies in deprived neighbourhoods. Most respondents emphasised that this development has enabled a comprehensive approach, which is required for neighbourhood regeneration policy. A representative of the Office of Urban Development clarified this: "The drug policy was certainly a crucial point; we recognise that we can find common solutions and that everyone must contribute something to be successful at the end".<sup>38</sup> Therefore, the cross-sectoral coordination schemes that were set up in order to implement drug-policy are an important factor for area-based policies.

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<sup>38</sup> Personal Interview, respondent A1.

### 10.5 Neighbourhood regeneration as a strategy to improve international economic competitiveness of the city region<sup>39</sup>

The newly elected city government defined the improvement of quality of life in distressed neighbourhoods as an official legislative focal point in 1998. Zurich's neighbourhood policy is related to a paradigm shift that occurred in the 1990s. In those years, the strategy of urban development, which used to be focused on social issues, changed towards an imperative for economic growth in order to position the city in the international benchmark of city regions (Schmid 2006: 167). This is in line with what Harvey (1989) called the transformation in urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. This suggests "a reorientation of urban governance away from the local provision of welfare and services to a more outward-oriented stance designed to foster and encourage local growth and economic development" (Hall and Hubbard 1996: 153). This new form of governance aims to promote the city as an attractive location for business interests and investment. Wealth redistribution and welfare are considered as antagonistic to the overriding objectives of economic development (Peck & Tickell 2002: 394; Jessop 2002: 465). The new entrepreneurial strategy leads to a system, where cities are considered as the main actors in global competitiveness (Brenner 2004: 172-73). This engenders a mechanism of inter-urban competition, where locational politics become the dominant part of urban politics. In Zurich, the focus on economic growth and locational policy prevailed at the end of the 1990s. From 1998, the newly elected city government city has been dominated by a social-liberal coalition which promoted economic development and competitiveness policies (Eberle 2003: 67). At the same time, a new administration unit was established: the Office for Urban Development, which reflected this new entrepreneurial urban governance strategy (see Eberle 2003: 135). It was basically the Department of Social Services who had been in charge of neighbourhood policies so far, but the new Office for Urban Development became responsible for the legislative focal points relating neighbourhood regeneration (1998-2002 "Aufwertung von Stadtgebieten", 2002-2006 "Lebensqualität in allen Quartieren"). The institutional consolidation of neighbourhood development policies under the Office of Urban Development suggests that these interventions are related to the new entrepreneurial urban governance strategy. The attention to quality of life issues in distressed urban neighbourhood is therefore implicitly contained in the strategy to promote the attractiveness of the location of Zurich. This also explains the focus on image improvement in Zurich's revitalisation policy: The city cannot afford a poor image because of its most deprived neighbourhoods. This means that in the course of the rescaling processes, which leads to the afore-mentioned inter-urban competition, the sub-local scale gains importance too.

Moreover, the attention to the quality of life in distressed urban neighbourhoods could be considered as "accompanying measures" of this new urban development paradigm. The dominant coalition favoured economic growth policies over social policies. Due to liberalisations (e.g. in regional planning), neighbourhoods became more exposed to socio-economic pressure. Area-based policies facilitate the implementation of economic growth policies. Furthermore, a high quality of life in all neighbourhoods could be helpful with regards to positioning the city in the international benchmark of city regions. Neighbourhood regeneration policy – in a broad understanding of policies to improve the quality of life – therefore seems to be consistent with this new paradigm of urban development as entrepreneurial urban governance. The term "Lebensqualität" (quality of life) was originally opposed to economic growth policies and gained importance in the urban policy discourse in connection with the movement of 1968. Surprisingly, this term is consistent with economic growth and locational policies today. This explains why there is no tension between the goals

<sup>39</sup> This argument has already been elaborated in Widmer (2009).

of Zurich's neighbourhood regeneration policy and attractiveness policy. Thus, the attention to quality of life issues in distressed urban neighbourhoods can be considered as part of the strategy to improve international economic competitiveness of the city region.

We conclude that neighbourhood regeneration policy should not be seen as an expression of social policy alone. Rather, it flows from the currently dominant paradigm of urban development as entrepreneurial urban governance at various levels.

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## Appendix

**Table 1: Interviews**

Sector	Interviewee	Date	Reference
<i>City administration</i>			
Office of Urban Development	Project manager neighbourhood development , special subject participation	5.5.2008	A1
Department of Social Services	Head of section Community Work (GWA) districts 3, 4, 5	29.5.2008	A2
Police Department	Project manager “Langstrasse PLUS”	28.4.2008	A3
<i>Neighbourhood organisations</i>			
Schwamendingen	Chairwoman neighbourhood association of Schwamendingen	7.5.2008	B1
Langstrasse	Chairwoman neighbourhood association of city district 4 (“Aussersihl”)	27.5.2008	B2
	Chairman business association district 4	7.8.2008	B3
<i>City parliament</i>	Parliamentarian (SP) electoral district 4/5	15.5.2008	C1
<i>Urban development expert</i>	Political scientist, Synergo	14.5.2008	D1

**Table 2: City government of Zürich**

Party	2006	2002	1998	1994
Social democratic party (SP)	4	4	4	3
Free democratic party (FDP)	3	3	2	3
Swiss people’s party (SVP)				
Christian Democratic People's Party (CVP)	1			1
Ring of independents (LdU)			1	
Green Party (GP)	1	1	1	1
Christian social party (CSP)			1	1
Not member of a party		1		

Source: City of Zürich (Stadt Zürich 2006)

**Table 3: City parliament of Zürich**

Party	2006	2002	1998	1994
Social democratic party (SP)	44	49	49	43
Free democratic party (FDP)	19	20	26	28
Swiss people’s party (SVP)	24	31	26	19
Christian Democratic People's Party (CVP)	10	9	8	10
Ring of independents (LdU)	0	0	4	7
Green Party (GP)	14	10	7	5
Alternative list / Swiss labour party (AL/PdA)	5	3	2	2
Evangelical People's Party (EVP)	6	2	1	2
Swiss Democrats (SD)	3	0	1	4
Others	0	1	1	0

Source: City of Zürich (Stadt Zürich 2006)

# Appendix

## Regenerating urban neighbourhoods (RUN): Revised Model

